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ABSTRACT 
The aim of the th~sis is to examine British 
policies towards China and the Shantung question between 1918 
and 1922 with the object of establishing whether they were too 
indifferent to China's desiderata with t he possible result 
that Anglo-Chinese relations were unnecessarily embittere d. 
Study opens with Germany's acquisitions in the 
Shantung provinc e before 1914 and their adminis t ration. It 
proceeds to Japan's conquest of the German possessions in 
Shantung after the outbreak of the first world war and t he 
actions which sought to make her occupation permanent, such 
as the Japanese twenty-one demands of 1915 and the Anglo-
Japanese exchange of notes of 1917. The consequence of China's 
entry into the war, including the British pledges made to Japan 
before the Sino-Japanese treaty of September, 1918, are dealt 
with in Chapter 11. 
Indications that Britain would support Japan's 
claims to Shantung at the Paris peace conference are seen to 
be fairly decisive in Chapter Ill. The centrepiece of this 
study is Chapter IV which describes the negotiations at the 
peace council in detail and stresses the role of the British 
I delegates, particularl~ Balfour,·in securing recognition for 
--Japan's claims in the treaty o~ Versailles. ~Last minute 
a t t empts of the Chinese to reverse the decision, China 's 
refusal to sign the treaty, and t he importanc e Df the Chinese 
gov ernment's action in severing negotiations with Bri tain 
ov er Ti be t are reviewed in Chapt ers V and Vl. 
Throughout 1920, Britain's far ea ster n po lici es 
were dominated by the question of the Anglo-Ja panese alliance 
and nava l considerations, but Britain's suspicions over 
Ja pan's acti .::ms in China had an obvious bearing up:m her re -
l ations with Japan. This is made clear by the Cur zon-G hinda 
exchan ge s described in Chapter VI1, which also discu sses t he 
a t temp ts which vler e made by Britain to reach a better f ar-
east ern understanding with America. 
Chapter VIII describes British policy to China in 
detail a s revealed by the · .cabinet meetings of Hay and June, 
1921, in preparation for the Washington conference. The 
study ends (Chapt~r lX) with a brief account of the Shantung 
ne gotiations associated with the Washington conference in 
which Britain had ,an important, if secondary, role. 
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CHAPTER I 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SHANTUNG QUESTION. 1898-1917. 
It is well known that during the 19th century 
China'S international standing was relegated from one of lofty 
isolated independence to that of a semi-colonial country. In 
this process Britain acquired such extensive trading and poli-
tical privileges, including territorial concessions, extra-
territorial rights, and the control of Chinese custom duties, 
1 that Britain became the predominating foreign power in China. 
1. 
During the last decade of the oentury further inroads were made 
upon China's sovereignty, for following China's humiliating 
defeat by Japan in 1895 the flood-gates were open to demands for 
additional concessions. As part of a process commonly referred 
to as 'cutting the Chinese melon', a phrase which suggests the 
softness of the country, Russia, Germany, and Britain, in 1898, 
acquired leases and economic rights at Port Arthur, Kiaochow, . 
2 
and Wei-hai Wei, respectively. At one stage it seemed that 
China was about to disintegrate as even second and third class 
powers acquired privileges almost with ease. 
Russia's far eastern activities in the winter of 
1897-8 aroused in Britain a sense of danger that she was about 
to lose part of the China market, and Russia's acquisition of . 
Port Arthur was regarded with distinct alarm. 3 The international 
2. 
situation at this stage was particularly unsettled by the fact 
that a re-alignment of the powers, especially those which were 
to become allies, was imminent, and in the fluid situation which 
, 
existed the countries were generally extra-sensitive lest others 
should secure disproportionate advances. It is impor t ant to 
stress that in the far-eastern sphere of world politics China 
suffered considerably from the manoeuvres of the powers, and 
, 
indeed China was generally treated as if she were of no i mportance 
at all as the powers endeavoured to improve their respective 
posi tions. 
An indication of this lack of concern for China can be 
seen when owing to heavy pressure from Russia, the German govern-
ment turned to Britain for support. Count Hatzfeldt, the German 
ambassador in London, hinted to Lord Salisbury, prime minister 
and foreign secretaryj~ that if no Anglo-German agreement were 
possible upon the Kiaochow question, Germany might have to meet 
the objections of the other states by payment of a high price, 
'possibly an anti-British alliance,.1+ From his conve:lt~l .. ~.ren 
I 
with Salisbury, Hatzfeldt concluded that Britain was prepared 
,for an agreement upon Samoa and New Guinea, and that Kiaochow 
did not clash with British interests. The ambassador also con-
cluded that if Klaochow proved unsatisfactory there were other 
r places to which there would be no British objection, for Brit.ain 
Was not -averse to Germany taking up a position on the China 
coast. Her presence there would be an additional balance to 
4a Russia.' But British statesmen were anxiOUs for a peaceful 
settlement of the issue lest trade with Chi na be interrupted . 
It was, therefore, with British acquiescence that Germany suc-
ceeded in picking a quarrel with China which gave her the pre-
text to seize Kiaochow. 
In view of the various interpretations which Japan 
made of the German rights in Shantung after she had expelled 
the Germans from the province in 1914, it is r elevant to emphas-
ise what Germany acquired from China by means of the 8ino-
5 German treaty of March, 1898. The second and third articles of 
the treaty laid down that the Bay of Kiaochow was to be l eas ed 
to Germany for 99 years, and 'the Imperial Chinese Government 
Will abstain from exercising rights of sovereignty in the ceded 
territory during the term of the lease •••• ' The exact boundaries 
, 
of the ceded areas were defined, and it was stipulated that 
'~hLnese ships of war and merchant vessels shall enjoy the same 
privileges in the Bay of Kiaochow as the ships of other nations 
on friendly terms with Germany ••• ' Hence, China no longer had 
the undisputed right to the use of one of thlei-:.' own ports!f The 
first article of the treaty created a type of buffer zone ot ?O , 
kilometres between the leased bay and the rest of the province, 
and within this zone German troops could move freeiy, but the -
Chinese emperor reserved all rights of sover~ignty regarding the 
area. 
4. 
Section II of the Sino-Germanytreaty defined railway 
and mining rights in Shantung, and under its terms the Chinese 
government recognised Germany's right to build two lines, one 
from Kiaochow to TSinan, and the other from Kiaochow to 
Laiwuhsien. It was recognised that in order to carry out the 
work 'a Chino-German Company shall be formed', and that detailed 
Sino-German negotiations would have' to take place. But it was 
understood that 'the object of this agreement ts solely the 
development of commerce, and in constructing this railroad 
there is no intention to unlawfully seize any land in the Pro-
vince of Shantung'. This and subsequent German declarations 
concerning the railways were important, for in the. post-war 
negotiations concerning Shantung ownership of the railways in 
the province was to prove a vital factor. 
The treaty accorded German subjects mining rights 
along the entire length of the railway and to a width of 30 1i 
(approximately 15 kilometres) on each side of the track. In 
conclusion the treaty stipulated -that in the event of any foreign 
work being undertaken in Shantung on behalf of the Chinese 
government, the said work and the right of supplying capital and 
materials had first to be offered to Germany. 
Sino-German regulations for the Kiaochow-Tslnantu 
railway were agreed upon in March, 1900, and by their terms 
6 
Germany was accorded a decisive voice in the business or the line. 
Germany also acquired some extension of political influence for 
article 14 stated that all foreigners entering the interior of 
Shantung 'must be provided with passports sealed by the proper 
Chinese and German authorities'. Nevertheless, of great im-
portance to the limitation of Germany's rights, and or parti-
cular relevance to l ater controversies, was article 16 which 
stated: 
'Troops, eventually necessary for the protection of 
the r ailway will be stat ioned by the Governor of 
the Province of Shantung. Therefore outside the 100 
li zone no forei gn troops shall be employed for this 
purpose. The Governor of the Province of Shantung 
binds himself to take effective measures during the 
period of surveying as well as when the railway is 
under ' construction or opened fo r traffic to prevent 7 
any damage ~ein~ done to it by the mob or by rebelsJ 
As the Governor of Shantung was Chinese it was obvious that 
China was responsible for any movements of troops to protect 
the line. 
. 
Although the German government had obtained important 
gains in Shantune; , they were anxious to avoid claiming exclusive 
rights to the province. Kiaochow became an open-port in Septem-
ber, 1898, and some four years later Germany denied that she 
had any intentions of abandoning adherence to the principle of 
the 'open-door'. Germany declared: 
'The facts are tha t a German corporation has 
obtained mining concessions for certain strictly 
defined mineral lands situated in the province 
of Shantung; but this does in no way mean a mo-
nopoly for the whole province.' 8 
6. 
While Germany's declarations of disinterest in Shantung w~re 
, , 
undoubtedly exaggerated, her attitude and actions were in 
marked contrast to those later adopted by Japan. 
i " 
Proof of Britain's support for Germany's actions in 
. . ~ '. 
seizing Kiaochqw, and her willingness to bargain with other 
powers at China's expense, can be found in a note which Sir 
, 
Frank Lascelles" the British ambassador in Berlin, handed to " 
~' . ~ . . . . 
the German government just betore Britain acquired Wei-ha! Wei. 
, , 
It stated: 
'England formally declares to Germany that in 
establishing herself at Wei-hai Wei, she has no . 
intention ot injuring or contesting the rights and- . 
interests ot Germany in the Province of Shantung, 
or of creating difficulties for her in that provlnce. 
It is especially understood that England will not 
construct any rail-road communication from Wei-hai 
Wei and the district leased therewith into the 
interior ot the Province of Shantung. ,9 
No doubt Britain would have pre~erred all other foreign coun-, 
tries to have kept out or China, but Britain's ready reeo~~~on 
ot Germany's acquisitions at the end of the 19th century ~~t . 
quality Britain's later ac~sat10ns against Germany of d01~g 
< 
great wrong to China by obtaining rights in Shantung. 
" 
Britain's tear ot Russia was obvious in the ter~ 
.', 
whereby she acquired Wei-ha! Wei, tor the relevant Angl<i-Chinese 
convention sta'ted that the island ot L1IlkUnl, 'and a belti~ot 
i'~ 
land 10 English miles wide along the entire coast o'r the': B&y. --'. " 
..., 
were to be conceded to Bri tain of tor so long a period a. Port 
10 Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia.' In view 
of the fact that a retreat of British warships from Port 
Arthur in January, 1898, had been seen as an abject surrender 
to the Russians, some counter-measures were clearly under-
11 
standable, but one must question the wisdom of Britain 
acquiring Wei-hai Wei for it has been argued that: 
'The place was of little value. Its harbour was not 
deep enough for large ships, it was expensive to fortify, 
and it was cut off from the-Pinterland by a range ot 
hills and they Lthe Britiah! had to give the Germans 
assurances that they would ns~er do anything with the 
place that was worth dOing,.l 
One may note that as late as 1927 only 100 English people were 
in per manent r esidence in the port, and in the same year 
wh er eas the total tonnage of ships using Port Edward (Wei-ha' 
Wei) was approximately 2 million, that for Hong Kong was some 
~ mi llion, and for Shanghai nearly 30 million.13 Despite its 
I 
compara t ive unimportance, however , the question of Wei-haiWei 
monotonously appears in Anglo-Chinese relations, especially 
during the Shantung negotiations at the peace conference at 
Paris and the Washington conferenc e in 1921. 
Ref er8nce has already been made to the 'open-door' 
policy regarding China, which also features regularly 1n far 
east ern affairs, and much credit for the expression has been 
attributed to John Hay, the American Secretary of state.l~ 
But when he was questioned by a certain Mr. Parker, Dord Curzon, 
who was foreign secretary from 1919-1924, had some comments 
on the origins of the expression which are of interest to 
British policy. He stated: 
'It is qrl te true that I used the phrase "The open door 
in China ll in Parliamentary Debates in 1898 •••• I must 
however disclaim the honour of authorship. The origin 
of the phrase is trac~ab1e to a speech made by Sir 
Michael Hicks-Beqch LChance1lor of the ExchequeI! at 
Swansea on January 17th, 1898. In the course of his 
remar~s he re!erred to a statement of the policy of 
His Lsic, He~ Majesty's Government in China, made by 
Mr. Balfour ••• and observed thatz- "We did not regard 
China as a place for conquest or acquisition by any 
European or other Power. We looked upon it as the 
most hopeful place of the future for the commerce of 
the world at large, and the Government were absolutely 
determined at whatever cost, even ••• if necessatY at the 
cost of War, that door should not be shut.1! ,1, 
8, 
One must doubt, however, whether Britain wo~ld have risked such 
a war unless her interests in China were seriously threatened, 
and in the 20th century Britain's attitude towards the 'open-
door'principle proved that she was vitally concerned with main-
taining her special positiJn, especially in relation to Shanghai 
ann Hong Kong. 
The Boxer Rebellion and some subsequent developments. 
The influence of the foreign powers not unnaturally 
had a profound reaction upon the Chinese nation, and her his-
tory of the 19th century is full of wars against foreigners. 
The superiority of western arms helped to create within China 
movements for the reform of the system of government and the 
16 
introduction of more modern met ho ds of agriculture and industry. 
Towards the end of the century the demands for reform had be-
come widespread and such leaders as Sun Yat-sen and K'ang Yu-wei 
had emerged to give effective voice to Chinese nationalism. 17 
China's size, the character of the Manchu emperors, 
and the ne ed for provincial governors left the country vulner-
able to all kinds of factionalism, and often the main develop-
ment s of the reform and nationalist movements were lost in a 
series of complicated political manoeuvres which frequently 
split the country. This encouraged western governments to re-
gard China contemptuously and be misled a s to the real strength 
of the country. Superior attitudes wer e often adop ted by 
government representa tives and wes t ern settlers in China who 
too often looked upon the Chinese people as coolies and of 
little importance . There were , however, some not able exceptiJns 
among the western di ploma ts, and undoubtedly the most outstand-
in g were Sir J ohn Jordan and Paul Reinsch who, for varying 
peri ods bef ore the first world war, and during t he conflict, 
wer e th e respective British and P.merican ministers in Peking. 
Both continued in office until just after hostilities had 
ceased. 18 
A most violent clash between the anti-foreign forces 
of China and the representatives of the foreign powers occurred 
in 1900 when the famous Boxer rebellion witnessed very bloody 
scenes, especially in the legation area of peklng19• Despite 
ID. 
the differences which existed among the powers a marked degree 
of unity was achieved in quickly suppressing the uprising, the 
20 
details of which have been described elsewhere. Although the 
Chinese scored some early victories in the uprising, especially 
in June, 1900, the arrival of reinforcements of foreign troops 
in August saw the quick defeat of the Boxers. 
The defeat of the Boxer rebellion reduced China's 
international standing still further, increased popular dis-
like of the Manchu dynasty, and led to the formation of the 
Chinese Republic, after the revolution of 1911-1912. China was 
forced to agree to a heavy indemnity amounting to some £67 
million to be paid at four per cent compound interest, which 
meant that over the forty year repayment period more than twice 
21 the original sum was to be exacted. In 1908, however, the 
United states decide ~ that her cla ims were excessive and decided 
to devote half of her shar e of the indemnity to educating Chinese 
22 
stud en t s in America and setting up a universi t y near Peking. 
Britain's share of the indemnity wa s some £7i million, and she 
fell in line with the United States in spending part of the 
instalments upon education for the Chinese. America's actions 
gained her some popularity in China, but as Chinese nationalism 
grew so this form of international control over a part of 
China's expenditure proved irksome to the nationalists. It may 
be noted that as late as 1929, Arthur Henderson, foreign 
11. 
secretary in the second Labour government, was most annoyed 
when he learnt that indemnity money was planned for building 
Chinese railways instead of being spent on education. 23 
During the post-rebellion negotiations Russia tended to 
be lenient over her financial claims and in her demands for the 
punishment of rebels. Russia also sought to induce the rest of 
the powers to withdraw from Tientsin while she remained, and 
24 these actions increased international distrust. The unity of 
the powers which was established during the Boxer uprising proved 
very brief and the uncertain international situation helped to 
facilitate the Ang1o-Japanese negotiations of 1901 which resul-
ted in an alliance between the two countries early the following 
year.25 
The Ang1o-Japanese alliance las ted in an amended form 
until the Washington conference of 1921, and it had world wide 
ramifications, for the possible combination of t he British and 
Japanese fleets was of obvious importance to Russia, Germany, 
France, and the United states. The alliance also had a bearing 
upon Anglo-Chinese relations, for if Britain were indifferent 
to China, but an ally of Japan, it was clear that in any 5ino-
Japanese clash the British government were hardly likely to 
26 
give serious consideration to China's desiderata. 
12. 
Within a few years the Anglo-Japanese alliance wa s 
tested by the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5, for by the terms of 
the alliance no country could come to Russia's assistance with-
out becoming involved in a war with Britain. To the surprise of 
the world Japan proved the victor and this result had a marked 
27 influence upon the actions of the powers. The importanc e of 
th e war was also considerable for China, for apart from the 
Russian-Japanese fighting having taken place on Chi ne se soil 
and waters, article V of the resulting peace treaty stated: 
'The Imperial Russian Government transfer and assign to 
the Imperial Government of Japan, with the consent of the 
Government of China, the lease of Port Arthur, Talien and 
adjacent territory and territorial waters and all rights, 
privileges and con2~ssions connected with or forming part 
of such lease •••• ' 
Japan had thus secured a hold on the Chinese mainland with the 
direction pointed towards Manchuria. 
While the Ru s so-Japanese war was in progress negotia-
tions began not only to renew the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which 
was not due to expire until 1907, but to sharpen its terms and 
extend its scope to cover India in the interests of Britain, 
and to limit its relevance over Korea in the interes~of Japan. 
The negotiations revealed that Anglo-Japanese relations were 
, 
exceedingly close and that Britain welcomed Russia's pending 
defeat. 29 After the Russo-Japanese war, however, Britain became 
suspicious of Japan and, owing to growing fears of Japan's 
13. 
increa sed economic and naval capabilities, dislike of the 
al liance developed. 30 But in weighing the var1:.)us alternatives 
Sir Eriward Grey, forei gn secretary, recogni sed the rights of the 
J apanese on the Chinese mainland, and 'Gr ey was supported by 
most officials in the Foreign Office in his policy of allowing 
31 J apan a fre e hand in the Far East within reason'. 
Japan for her part was prepared to s ee Britain ext end 
her interests in China, provided, of course, that th ey di d no t 
conflict with her own, and she encouraged t he Br i t ish t o remain 
in Wei-haiWei. Baron Ko rrrura, the Japanese mini s ter for foreign 
affairs, argued that on no account should Britian leave the 
port, for 'it would be quite impo ssible to leav e the Germans 
holding Kiaochow and you Lthe Britishl not t her e to keep t hem 
32 in check.' China, however, had different aims and Wang Ta -
hsi i h, the Chinese minister in London, a sked Grey to return 
Wei-hat Wei as China l,vanted to develop it as a ba se for her 
future navy.33 
By the t erms of t he Anglo-Chinese agreement of 1898 , 
Wei-hatWei was to r emain in British hands for as l ong as Rus sia 
occupied Port Arthur,34 and Wang argued that as Port Arthur was 
in the hands of a power which was an ally of Britain, Wei-hmWe1 
should be returned to China, but Grey demurred. The Japanese 
gov ernment remained hostile to a retrocession and argued t hat: 
14. 
' so lo n ~ a s Ger niun y h e ld Ki aocho w, so l on e 
s g,ould. ; , ~ r e .\ t Britain r enu.in at \/ei-ha i ';;ei ••• 
':~he J8.panc c; e fli n i f:; tc r Lor Foreign t ff a irs 
f urthe r s ~ .J. t c d th'.i. t th e inl' r; r ma tion which had 
reuched the J np a n 0.se '~-o verY.llIl cmt from reld n e; and 
o ther uour CCi3 'IUS t o tlh~ ef fec t tha t China was 
try i n ,; t o r e nl1 :li J te a ll h e r engo p; e r.r. ~ nt$; that 
if ,lei-ha i ',je i vlCl. S re t urned the Chinese would. 
in hiD op i n i on , rc e;:~rd it as D, r;re&t diploma tic 
trii.l.rnph f or the::J.se lve s ; and. thCl t it would lead 
to furtht~ r d,muu.nus \'.;h i ch Houl :'::' result il\ very 
Gc ~i ous tr8ublc '. 35 
.U th0 u :!.,h Gcrnuny held Li a ocho'd i t C C-lE b E:; s een, hO \lQver. that 
she wus se~~ killfJ; t o Llo cli fy h e r po ei -cion . Al mo s t i~ediately 
after the l{ USGO-Japnn ese \'Ju :r' , Germany a r,r eed to wi tbdraw all 
her tro ops f rom the neut r a l zone, und s he s peci f ically stated 
t hat the r a ilways 1:lithin the Shi.J.n t ui.1g' province ' s ha ll comple-
tely be Wlder t he s upervi s ion <.!.nd protection of the Chinese 
10ccA l a u t ho Ti t ic :3 and poli ce 0 .'"' f i c c::'s ' . 36 Indeed, Germany's 
policy in .Shantunr.; h :ld been de scribed as b eing G,uite 1iberal.;7 
One mus t G.oubt tha t J apan' s op inions on 1,·/ei-hai We1 
had any decisive influence upon t he British government for t~ 
was a lready ma r ked Briti sh hostility to any propo sa ls for retro 
cess ion, and even Sir John Jorduc , the 13ri tish mini s ter who later 
adopted different views, argued tha t a surrender would assist 
'the Chauvinist movement' in China. Early in November. 1906, 
Grey re i.i ched the conclusion th.:lt rctrocession \'lould be wrong 
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politically for it would encourage Chinese nationalism and, 
indicating that her views had been con sidered, t hat it would 
let Japan down. But Grey was against spending money on, or 
38 investing in, Wei-ha', Wei. 
If Britain were hesitant to make advances in China, 
Japan was not and she 'initiated plans for obtaining a foothold 
in Shantung Province several years before the outbreak of the 
Great War ••• ,39 Japan did this by developing the port of 
Lungkow, and the Japanese-backed Dairen Steamship company 
operated a triangular shipping service to three ports nearby. 
It can be seen that in the first ten years of the 
century Japan had transformed her position in the far east and 
had emerged as a very strong power. She had not only inherited 
Russia's rights in sections of China, but by her aggressive 
policies had established a repu t ation which was causing Britain 
to become increasingly uneasy, but it was China who had to bear 
the brunt of Japan's actions. 
The Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. and the 
Cninese Revolution of 1911. 
Although the Anglo-Japanese alliance was not due to 
expire until 1915 it was renewed again in 1911, but the spirit 
of the renewal and the political circumstances were in marked 
contrast to those of 1905 when the alliance was first revised. 
16 • 
. Owing to international agreements Russia was no longer regar-
ded as the menace she had once been, especially to Britain and 
Japan, whereas Japan's annexation of Korea was indicative of ~ 
~
f  country. High in Britain's considerations, 
however, was the need to improve Anglo-American rela tionsand 
establish the fact that a revised alliance with Japan could not 
be invoked against America. The details of the situation have 
been fully described by Dr. Lowe who points out that there were 
some British diplomats who were against renewal on the grounds 
that the uncertainty which would have been created 'would be a 
check to any unnecessarily forward policy on the part of Japan', 
who would have been apprehensive of Britain's intenti:)ns. 40 
These views were opposed by Grey for not considering 
world wide circumstances. It was argued that Britain had to 
economise on her naval building, for the Victorian days of 
supremacy were over, and in 1911 it was Germany, not Japan, who 
was in need of control. 'The Times' welcomed the renewal, but 
British commercial interests in China opposed it, while 
'Chinese opinion disliked the new agreement fearing, not with-
out some justification, that Japanese encroachment in Manchuria 
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would develop further'. 
If the powers in the far east had been re-grouping in 
the first decade of the century, changes in China were marked, 
and although the Chinese revolution ot 1911 began with an 
accidental explosion the political situation had been ripening 
17. 
for som1t1me. It can be seen that three main features were 
working for changes within China, and they were the radical 
revolutionists, the constitutional monarchists, and the ytian 
Shih-k'ai faction. The first group were the implacable enemies 
of the Manchu dynasty who sought its overthrow, the second 
wanted moderate reforms while retaining the Manchu line, and 
the third group were dominated by yltan Shih-k'ai who was a 
It-2 . 
professional politician and an expert at compromise. 
It is not necessary to trace the progress of the 
revolution, but it may be noted that as it developed the di-
Visions between the groups disappeared, or became blurred, and 
by the end ot 1911 most of the Chinese people were in revolt 
against the Manchus. The toreign policy of the revolutionaries 
was based on the fear that should the powers intervene the 
revolution would suffer defeat, and as a result of such JDi8-
givings a prOVisional central government meetini in Shan~ 
declaredl 
'We have, in shor~taken every pOssible s~ep to 
protect vested interests, safeguard international obli-
gations, secure continuance of commerce, and shield . 
eduCatlon and religious inst1 tutions; and what is eYen 
more important, striven continually to maintain law and 
order, sustain peace and promote a4conltructive policy 
upon sound and enduring grounds.' .:s 
The powers of the Shanghai prOVisional government were fleeting, 
but there can be little doubt that their sweeping statement re-
flected the revolutionaries' aims not to offend the foreign 
44 powers. 
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Initially Britain adopted an attitude of political and 
financial neutrality, but the 1mpact of the revolution upon 
Japan was immediate for she agreed to advance the Manchu govern-
ment munitions 'providing the Chinese government adopted a mtre 
cordial attitude towards the Japanese position in Manchuria'. 
Japan was anxious to intervene in 1911, ostensibly to protect 
the Peking-Mukden railway, but as this could have caused a 
clash with Russia, Grey warned the Japanese not to extend their 
influence"lt-5 
As the revolution progressed influential British 
nationals gave advice to the Chinese factions concerning policy. 
For example, Dr. Morrison pointed out to the republican leaders 
in Shanghai 'that it was hopelel. to expect that a leader .uch 
as Sun Yat-sen, who knew nothing about China, could obtain for 
the Republic early reco&n1tion from toreian povers,.lt-6 lr1t1lh 
policy began to change from neutrality to supporting Chinele 
leaders who were considered dependable, of which the .olt out-
standing vas y1tan Shih-ktai, a war-lord, po11t1.1an, and diplo-
mat who had served the Manchu regime with distinotion. Y11an 
had clashed with the Japanele over Korea, for wbicb they never 
forgave him, and he had been in dispute with the Chinel. relent 
during the attemptl to reform the Manonu re&1me, but he vas a 
practical politician who could manoeuvre adroitly and vas re-
&arded as the man me at likely to achieve stability 1n China. It-7 
19. 
Consequently 'whatever the ultimate form of Chinese government, 
monarchical or republican, Britain felt that it could on~1 work 
efficaciously if Yt(an controlled it. British policy may be 
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summarised as neutrality with a pro-Y1ian bias'. Britain'l 
desires for the political stability which it was thought Yl!an 
could introduce were undoubtedly related to hopes for an in-
crease in trade and investment which follow automatically from 
an orderly regime. 
Stability, however, proved elusive and it has been 
:lr gued that: 
'It had been a basic contradiction in the Chinese 
Revolution of 1911 that, whereas the~l of the young 
nationalist and republican revolutio r s had been to 
build up China as a strong modern sta e in place of 
the loosely organised archaic autocracy of the old 
imperial system the short-term effect of the upheaval ~ 
was to strengthen the forces of provincial partieularism.' 
The unity of the Chinese factions necessary for the overthrow of 
the Manchu dynasty quickly proved too weak, and the revolution of 
1911 was followed by further disorders in 1913. Yl1an Shih-k'ai 
banished parliament and his elash with the m11i·tant nationalists 
caused Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the newly formed Kuomintanc 
party, to flee for his lire. Sun wa. to prove a major 
figure in modern China, while the Kuomintang became the main 
basis for the formation of a rival ~tlonalist government at 
Canton. 
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Negotiations for the recognition of the republic 
involved --. China in attempts to strengthen her position on 
such an issue as Tibet)and relations among the powers were 
influenced by the new situation. Britain's gupport for Y11an 
Shih-k'ai has been stressed, but Japan was very hostile to him, 
and as a result Britain was concerned lest Japanese actions 
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should endanger her economic interests in China. Between 1911 
and 1914 international relations in the far east tended to be 
expressed in the actions concerning loans and the financial 
consortium, and this tendency brought the United states into 
greater prominence. 
International financial consortia to control loans to 
China had existed earlier in the century, but that of Jun., 
1912, was clearly different and more significant. Its scop. 
has been thus described: 
'The Consortium, however, was now called on to handle 
a question of finance that had nothing to do with industry 
but was purely political in character. The object ot the 
proposed loan was the stabilisation of the Government of 
China and the Governments of the lending Powers according-
ly undertook to lay down the conditions on which the money 
was to be lent and the purpose. to which it was to be 
applied: sources of revenue were to be placed under foreign 
control; foreign Administrations were to exercise the 
functions of the Chinese Government, Chinese armies were 
to be disbanded under foreign supervis10n and so on. 
Russia and Japan had no money to lend and accord1ngly had 
no place in a Consortium whose function was the economic 
development of China; but when it became. question ot 
establishing a measure of political control Over China 
these Powers could not b. left out. Russian.and Japan ••• 
groups were accordingly admitted into the C~nsortlum ••••• 
This iJYni,~di;, t<>ly filled the'~h i.nose ld th the 
de'.:pest ~)i ... GP.Lcion of the policy cmd aims of 
the (r)lL,O':,i clD. It IlO\; :Jcc:mca clea~ to them 
thut the ~oJJ:3oT'tiu;n WU3 t:Ie in::tr:.uncnt by which 
the Powers h0peJ to ost~blish a political do-
min~A.tion OVI'Ol' Chin:J.., oC0no;'li8 development being 
ei th,'p a ~';rctunl:s or ::;. side i '..;;:;ue.· 51 
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~Ihih1 such dC;3cr'intion mi;ht b,.~ c:xt:rc;u; there can be no doubt 
affcd.cs ,::...nd h'hen a loan ·w8..'3 made outsic:e :he auspices of the 
COIl:Jo:rtilun J ',linor dij~lo:,li..l. tic 1."'0''': cnsucc.. 52 
United Jt d;e.s in 1912, H'.lS :'.'011 :J.Wi.l:'G :)f the scope of the con-
sortium, and one of his fir: ... t :.;.ctio:c.s upon assunin.; office was 
to insist on ;'meriCCi.Il '--dthclra·/)3..l from its uembership on the 
3'rounds th:it its terill3 seemed 'to touch very nearly the adminis-
trative independence of China itself,.53 ~..,en before he was 
president, ',iilson had expressed his vie\·:s on China and was ge-
nerally sympu-thetic to the pOGsibilities of China obtaining 
some restoration of lost 8ovGrei(;Il riGhts. Althoui,jh he did not 
understand all the compL~i(i ties of the J:.'ar-eastcrn situation 
it hus b8un c~rf3ued tha t.Jilson, 
'was core-ect in his julg.-rnenti that the un-
fortunate position of th,:Jt country [China] 
in world nff...lir;J ''TaG (luo in no small dec;ree 
to the policien of the I.,lestern Po,!{ers and 
Japan. In his own Chinese policy he usu~lly 
found himself alone among the world leaders.' 54 
From the turn of the century the China policy ot' the United 
States had been genorally liberal, and ~lthouGh valid critio1s~ 
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could be made of the manner in which she had championed the 
'open-door', her actions had won considerable friendship from 
wide sections of the Chinese people, especially Chinese students 
who had been to the United States to complete their education. 
Hence, when Wilson began to give his attention to China's pOint 
of view this was a development which was to prove of consider-
able importance to Britain's far eastern policies. 
It may be judged that Wilson's concern for China added 
to the dilemma into which the British government were slipping 
t\A.~ 
in the far east. By 1913 British fears of ~  
Japan ~ere increasingly out-weighing her apprehensions regard-
ing Russia. In add! tion, Anglo-Japanese economic rivalry in 
China, particularly in the Yangtse valley, had increased and it 
has already been noted that the two powers wer,e backing differ-
ent Chinese factions. Britain's aim was to compromise with 
moderate Chinese elements, but Wilson's aims were for the res-
toration of China's sovereignty. It will be shown that Britain 
in the first quarter of the century was not prepared to make 
any serious, or indeed trivial, retrocessions to China. In fact 
Britain was beCOming involved in an impossible Situation where 
she wanted to preserve her political rights in China, and 
possibly extend her economic interests, but at the same time 
she wanted to be on good terms w1 th Japan and the Un! ted States. 
However, unfortunately for Britain, the policies of these two 
countries regarding China were tending to operate in oPPosite 
directions, and bad relations between them had already developed. 
over various Pacific problems and the question of Asian imm1-
55 gration. It was, therefore, to prove increasingly difficult 
for Britain to please China, America, and Japan at the same 
time, and even if Britain were not unduly concerned over China, 
she was anxious to remain on good terms with the other two 
countries. 
While it is possible to isolate the far east for study 
purposes, the governments of the powers were confronted with a 
world-wide situation and as the events described above were 
occurring all but the most outstanding were overshadowed by the 
growing crisis in Europe and the rise of German military power. 
Rather paradoxically after her seizure of Kiaochow in 1898, 
Germany played a comparatively minor role ln the far east, and 
apart from such an exceptional occasion afthe Boxer rebellion, 
Germany's actions tended to be inconspieuous. Indeed, in the 
far east Britain was more concerned with the actions of her 
future allies rather than her future enemy. 
The gutbreik of the War and Japan's occupation of th, 
Shantgns province. 
Britain declared war OD Germany on 4 August 1914, and 
Japan fOllowed suit on 23 August. Between these dates there was 
considerable Anglo-Japanese diplomatiC activity during which 
24. 
Britain tried to persuade Japan to restrict her activities to 
the sea and avoid any military action in China, which was the 
only major centre in the far east where German and Japanese 
troops could engage. It is clear that Japan's declaration of 
war was viewed in Britain \\TiL1} only qualified support, but as 
there are a number of detailed accounts which describe the 
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events it is not necessary to -repeat the story. However, 
it is important to refer to the documents which were relevant 
to Britain's policy to China, especially to those which had a 
bearing upon post-war considerations. 
On the outbreak of hostilities Beilby Alston ot the 
far-eastern department of the Foreign Office ,who later played 
a major role in helping to determine policy in his capacities 
as charge d'affaires in Tokyo and minister to Peking, reviewed 
the situation. 57 He recogniled that German shipping had to 
be destroyed, but he was concerned at the influence which the 
warfare would have upon China. Alston warned that Japan would 
be seeking to improve her position and that some action should 
be taken to minimise the loss to British trade in China. He 
felt that German shipping in Chinese waters could be 'neutral-
ised' with comparative ease by the British, and this would 
still leave ample British naval forces free to operate tor 
Police purposes in China in order to counter-act Japan should 
she become too active on the pretext of safeguarding foreign 
interests on the mainland. He arguedz 'In other words our 
position vis-~-vis the Chinese Govt. should not be weakened 
more than is absolutely necessary and the Japanese allowed a 
completely free hand through force of present circumstances.' 
Sir Eyre Crowe, assistant under .• secretary of state, entirely 
agreed with the political aspects of Alston's memorandum, but 
later in the war, however, the changed shipping position called 
for Japanese naval cooperation. 
Jordan, the British minister in Peking, thought that 
Japan's entry into the war would endanger the stability of the 
~egime in China and would have a bad effect upon Britain's 
influence in that country and throughout Asia genera11y.58 
Jordan was against possible unilateral action by Japan regarding 
59 TSingtao, and he favoured the neutralisation of the Pacific. 
Crowe, however, opposed Jordan's views on neutralisation and 
argued that they were restricted to the Chinese horizon. 'What 
is wanted i. to strike hard with all our m1«ht in all the tour 
corners of the world.' But Grey was uncertain over neutralisa-
tion and he realised that the United states was anxious 'lelt 
Japan should acquire too preponderating an influence in China 
whilst European Powers are fi&hting.,60 As Grey had supported 
limited Japanese expansion in China, one must question how 
sincere he was when he stated •• 'as any action taken by Japan 
will be in protection of general interests of Anglo-Japane •• 
Agreement, it will be a special object of Great Britain and 
3apan to see, as provided by the terms of their agreement, 
that the integrity of China is maintained, and we hope her 
neutralityalso ••• ,6l 
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Alston realised that Japan was determined upon entering 
the war and he felt that any further British objections would 
only serve to antagonise her. It was vital, Alston agreed, that 
Germany should be crulhed everywhere with the greatest possible 
rapidity, and he continued by describing a recent interview he 
had had with Katsunosuke Inouye, the Japanese ambassador in 
London. Of partIcular relevance to China were Alston t s comments 
tha t Inouye, 
'disclaims any desire on the part of Japan for 
territorial aggrandisement and proposes to meet 
Sir J. Jordan's apprehensions by our ,iving joint 
advice to the Chinese Govt. to rely on our maintaining 
peace and ord.er on condition that China does not look 
for assistance elsewhere. I would go further and with 
a view to inspiring confidence in China and living 
proof of our honesty ot purpose, arrange with Japan 
betorehand that in the event of Kiaochow oainl taken, (and we must insist that this shall only be taken by 
our co~:~ined force. and not by Japanese force. alone) 
Kiaochow shall at once be given back to China together 
w1 th Wei-hai Wei' • 
'It an underatandinl on the aDove la arrived at with 
Japan I see no reason for any apprehengions on our 
part as to accepting her assistance.' 2 
Meanwhile Jordan had reached the conclusion that Anglo-Japane.e 
co-operation was to be preferred to leparate action by lapan, 
but he felt that it vas absolute11 necessary tor a public 
declaration to be made that Kiaochow would eventually be 
restored to China. 63 A1ston welcomed Jordan's dispatch and 
noted: 
'Sir J. Jordan holds the same views now as we do -
viz. (1) that joint co-operation with Japan will 
allay disturbances in China, (2) that China should 
be assured beforehand that if Kiaochow is taken 
it will be restored to her, (3) that American ob-jection will be remoTed if action is confined to 
China and China seas ••• ' 
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Hence, if the 'we' which Alston used meant the Foreign Office 
this was a clear statement that the British government believed 
that Kiaochow should be restored to China. 
The Germans, of course, had not been idle, and Jordan 
reported that the German charge d'affaires had been seeking to 
negotiate the direct surrender ot Kiaochow to China. The main 
points of the German proposals were that all military installa-
tions were to be handed to China and the German troops interned, 
but the question of compensation to be paid to Germany was to be 
61+ 
arranged later. When Jordan pointed out that the last pro-
posal Vitiated the arrangements, he was told by the Chinese 
emissary that it would almost certainly be dropped. 
Sir Conyngham Green_, the Br1tish ambassador in Tokyo, 
reported that the Japanese government had learned of the Sino-
Germ.-." :legotiations and as a result Baron Kato, minister for 
foreign affairs, had instructed the Japanese charge d'affair •• 
in Peking to warn the Chinese government against entering 
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further negotiations. Kato asked if the British government 
would do the same. 65 Grey agreed that Greene Should make .uch 
a warning if Greene saw no objection, and Grey informed the arob-· 
assaaor 
that the British government were considering a jOint Anglo-
Japanese communication which was to be made to China in regard 
to crossing Chinese territory to reach Kiaochow. 
It is, perhaps, interesting to note in view ot the 
attention which the issue of Wei-hmWei commanded, that Japan 
made an offer to send reinforcements for the defence ot the 
port if they were thought necessary. Illustrating the military 
insignificance of Wei-haiWel in the crisis of 1914 were Alston'l 
comments thatl 
t ••• the force at Wei-haiWei consists of a marine 
guard 0 r about 50 men who have standing order. to 
disappear in Case ot trouble. There are alia about 
100 natives employed on police duty. For the present 
there is no need tor any apprehension in regard to 
these forces but we can 5hank the Japanese Govt. for 
their fripnd1y message. t6 
In the post-war settlement, however, Britain continued to place 
importance upon \I/ei-hai. Wei as a base, but continued to refrain 
from deVeloping it. 
Events were moving with conliderable rap1dity, and 
Jordan informed Grey that the Chinese government had realised 
that Kiaochow should be taken by an internat10nal force. In 
reply Jordan had informed Yiian Shih-ktai, the Chinese preSident, 
that 'Chinese interests were being seriously considered, and that 
they need have no apprehension as to the results of any joint 
action which might be decided upon against Kiaochow.' 67 
Alston welcomed China's acceptance of the situation and he 
felt that it was essential that the Chinese government should 
be dissuaded from any attempts to open direct negotiations with 
the Germans lest they should reveal the allied plans. Alston 
continued by making some comments of particular relevance to 
Anglo-Chinese relations, for he stated that an opportunity had 
been provided whereby China would be advised to rely upon Anglo-
Japanese influence to the exclusion of others. 
'It is well known that the Japanese have for some time 
held the view that the future of China lies in the hands 
of Great Br1tain and Japan - and she has now proclaimed 
this view officially and made a bid for our acceptance or 
it in no uncertain terms. This view is based on two 
facts viz. (1) that while Japan is China's most powerful 
neighbour and has larger 1nterests at stake there than 
any European Power, (2) she £a!Ulot and 'While the YUan 
r~gime exists n~er will - LOwing to Japan's poor rela-
tions with Yl1an/ - gain the ear and the confidence ot 
the Chinese Govt. except through us who have it in an 
exceptio~~ degree.' Britain should mediate tor 
'The time has now obviously arrived for a complete 
understanding with Japan tor a future joint policy in 
China ••• ' 
Hopes for such a policy were, however, quickly destroyed by 
Japan's assertive actions, and Alston's disappointment may have 
helped him to develop the general hostile attitude to Japan, 
and friendship for China which ~ he held in the post-war 
years. 
)). 
In mid-August Jordan was concerned over the prospects 
of violating China's neutrality but he felt this was unavoidable 
if Kiaochow were to be recaptured. Jordan felt that an Anglo-
Japanese note should be delivered which should give the assur-
ance that: 
' ••• any Chinese territory at present occupied by our enemies 
which may fall into our hands will be restored to China when 
host1lities are concluded, and that neither Power ent~rtains 
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any territorial aggrandisement at the expense of China.' 
Grey agreed, and hoped that if Japan could not associate herself 
with such a note as little modification as possible should be 
made in order to obtain Japanese agreement. Grey was also un-
easy about the possible Violation of China's territory and he 
argued that such a step I would be exactly similar to that of 
the Germans in Belgium which has been the chief cause of our 
th G ,69 war wi ermw.l.'y ••• 
The preparations for the re-capture of Kiaochow had 
gone ahead while Japan was still neutral, but on 15 August, 
Greene reported the demands which Japan were to present to 
Germany as an ultimatum. She demanded that Germany was to give 
up Kiaochow to Japan without any conditions on compensation, 
'China eventually to have the place restored to her'. All 
German ships in Japanese or Chinese waters were to be removed 
or dis-armed, and .... the measures demanded had to be complied 
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with by the 23rd AUgUst. 70 Alston was alarmed at the demands 
and he informed Grey that it would create an unfavourable im-
pression 'if on account of ~ ~lston'B emphasia7 conflict 
with Germany, Japan is to demand the unconditional surrender of 
Kiaochow to herself alone.' But AIston felt that it the demand 
were made jOintly by Britain and Japan 'it will be all right'. 
Crowe agreed that further consideration was necessary. Grey 
was anxious to discuss the matter with the Japanese ambassador, 
and a reply was sent to Greene instructing him that Britain 
should be associated with Japan in any measures necessary for 
the capture of Kiaochow, but Britain wanted to make it clear 
that she had no claims to make on K1aochow in the post-war 
settlement. 
Suspicions of Japan began to mount when Jordan reported 
that increased accommodation for some 15,000 men was being pre-
pared at Hankow. Alston stated that this was the type of action 
he had long feared and he felt a trank discussion should be held 
with the Japanese to try to reach an agreement upon a policy for' 
China. 7l Sir WaIter Langley, assistant under •• cretar1 of state, 
argued that the action of the Japanese was likely to alienate 
the Chinese, and they ought to have consulted the British 
government before taking such a step. 
Hews of the Japanese ultimatum caused the Chinese 
government to renew their efforts to secure the direct retro-
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cession of Kiaochow to China, but Jordan 'informed the Chinese 
that his Government could not now recognise such a transfer. In 
view of the threatening attitude adopted by Japan and apparently 
acquiesced in by Great Britain, the Chinese Government dares 
take no official action.' China strove hard to persuade the 
United states to take up her cause, but the American government 
ueclin~d to get themselves involved. 72 
It is not necessary to dwell upon the brief but fairly 
bitter military campaign for the capture of Tsingtao which las-
ted from September until November 1914.73 One may note that the 
Japanese bore the brunt of the casualties, namely, 1,~55 killed 
an~ 4,200 wounded to Britain's 14 killed and 61 wounded. This 
disproportionate sacrifice may be explained by a dispatch fr~m 
John T. Pratt, consul-general at Tsinan and later adviser to 
the far eastern department of the ~orelgn Office.7~ Pratt 
argued that the Japanese had insisted that the Tsingtao cam-
paign should be mainly a Japanese affair and only 1t bat~alions 
of British troops had been used. Barnadiston, the British 
commanding general, had been treated ~y the Japanese general 
Kamio in a very off-handed manner, and Pratt complained that 
'when Tsingtao was actually captured great pains were taken to 
demonstrate to all that it was a Japanese, and in no sen •• a 
Sritish, or even an alliedvlctory'. 
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There can be no doubt that Britain's policy towards 
China in the early stages of the war was more liberal than that 
of Japan, for although no joint Anglo-Japanese declaration that 
Shantung would be retored to China materialised, this was due 
only to the non-cooperation of Japan. 75 Japanese troops became 
extended along the railway lines well beyond the buffer zone in 
Shantung in a manner which seem~~ in excess of the demands of 
the military situation, and within six weeks of the German sur-
render at Kiaochow, 'Baron Kato •••• stated that whether Kiaochow 
would be restored to China and whether Japan would succeed to 
the rights of Germany in Shantung were questions for the 
future, but that no agreement necessitating the Japanese retro-
cession of the area existed with any power_,76 Japan was to 
follow her initiative in China by a series of political demands 
which had a most profound effect upon the international diplo-
matic situation. 
The 21 Demands Qf 1915 
On 18th January, 1915, Eki Hioki, the Japanese minister 
in Peking, presented the notorious 21 demands, in secret, to 
Y\Jan Shih-k1ai, the Chinese president. The demands were divi-
ded into five groups and they constituted serious limitations 
upon ~ ... ~aa' s sovereignty, especially the fifth group. 77 ot the 
first group, the first article stated, 
'The Chinese Government engage to give full assent 
to all matters that the Japanese Government may here-
after agree with the German Government respecting the 
disposition of all the rights, interests and concessions, 
which, in virtue of treaties or otherwise, Germany 
possesses vis-a-vis China in relation to the Province of 
Shantung' • 
The remaining four articles in the group all referred to Shan-
tung and their terms were for Japan to haTe the right to build 
railway. and secure widespread entry into the province. 
British reactions to the 21 demands were sharp and 
Grey, who had favoured limited Japanese advances in China, 
expressed his disaPPointment with Japan. 78 The story of China's 
counter-proposals of February and the Sino-Japanese crisis of 
May, 191;, when Japan threatened war in order to force China's 
acceptance of the requirements has been told elsewhere,79 but it 
is important to stress the inability of Britain to restrain 
Japan who brushed aside all attempts to curtail her actions 
w1 th compara tiv':, ~ase. 80 
At the Paris peace conference Robert Lansing, the 
American secretary of state, was a decided opponent of Japan's 
claims to ~hantung. But in 1915 when he was under-secretary 
he was quite sympathetic to Japan, and questioned the wisdom of 
protesting at the infringements of American treaty rights which 
would occur with the implementation of the 21 demands. Lansing 
felt t~at Japan had to expand and while emigration to America 
was prohibited it was unreasonable to exclude the Japanese from 
certain areas of China. He suggested that if the American 
government 'retrains trom urging its undoubted treaty rights 
relative to Southern Manchuria and Shan Tung, it would do so 
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as a friend of Japan who is solicitous for her welfare.' Lans-
ing was in favour of a bargain whereby in exchange tor a sym-
pathetic attitude to Japan's actions in China, Japan would 
recognise the 'open-door' and end unfair monopolistic positions. 
He stated: 
tIf a bargain along these lines could be struck it would 
relieve us of the vexatious California land controversy, 
and prevent in large measure future disputes which seem 
almost inevitable if the "demands" of Japan are permitted 
at the present time to pass unchallenged.'~l 
One must obserVe, however, that the bargain which Lansing pro-
posed was to be at Chinats expense once again. 
Aftu ,,~ ?kl~~ __ ..~ Japan wac to secure Chinese ;lcceptance 
of the 21 demands there were other developments of such conse-
quence to Anglo-Chinese relations that the following len&thy 
quotation is jl~-j.ified: 
'There were hopes Lin 19127 that supplies of arml would 
be lent to Russia via China. But both Russia and Japan 
were worried lest China should want to join' the war and 
thus upset the 1912 agreements of these powers concerning 
East Inner Mongolia and South Manchuria r.espectively'. 
tIn London_the Japanese Government w~r. opposing the 
proposal Lfor China to enter the wat! on various grounds, 
such as the possibility of revolutionary trouble at 
Shaaghai and Canton and the fear that China WOuld ask for 
her reward after the war in the torm of rendition of con-
epssions and other foreign privileges. It was in vain 
that His Majesty's Government urged the danger ot enemy 
intrigues against India and the desirability of expelling 
all enemy subjects from China. The Japanese then simulated 
36. 
great indignation, and made false accusations against 
His Maj~sty's Minister of having initiated negotiations 
behind their back; they stated that Japanese public 
opinion would strongly oppose abandonment by China of 
her neutrality. The Japanese Government formally re-
fused to join Great Britain, Russia and France in 
asking China to enter the war ••••• This attitude was 
obviously hypocritical in view of Japan's assertion 
that her action in presenting the twenty-one demands 
had been taken with the idea of binding China to the 
side of the Allies; but at that time the Allies were 
not in a position to resist pressure from Japan, and 
the proposal to bring China p~enly into the war had 
therefore to be abandoned.' (, 
Such a report make" l"lrmsense of the oft-repeated phrase used by 
Arthur J. Balfour, when Britain's foreign secretary, that 
China had not spent a shilling nor lost a man in any Chinese 
attempt to wrest Shantung from the Germans. 
Whether China could have waged war effectively in 1915 
was very doubtful for the country was in conSiderable chaos. 
Yiian Shih-k'ai felt he could unite the country and defeat the 
rival factions if he had himself declared emperor, and in the 
mid-summer of 1915 it was clear that such a step was imminent. 
But in October, the British, Japanese, and Russian representa-
tives in Peking suggested that this step should be postponed. 
America, however, refused to join in the representations and 
declared that whether China had an emperor or not was for the 
Chinese to decide. 83 
Although YUan continued in his attempts to become 
monarch, the frustrations caused by the oPPosition of the 
8lt powers undoubtedly contributed to his sudden death in 1916 • 
37. 
After the temporary un1 ty of the Chinese factions following 
Yiian's death, discord became prominent not only between the 
Kuomintang section in the south and the Peking government in 
the north, but among the rival groups surrounding these 
centres. This discord became almost a permanent feature of 
Chinese politics which was undoubtedly made worse by the 
presence of foreign powers and their support of respective 
Chinese factions, especially by Japan, in order to further 
their own interests. 85 
30me Important Deyelopments in 1917. 
On a world basis the Russian revolutions of 1917 were 
undoubtedly the most important events of the year, but their 
impact upon China was deferred until the 1920's, but one 
irwnedia te result of the November revolution wa s that the 
Bolshevik government published the secret Russian-Japanese 
alliance of 1916 which restricted Chinese sovereignty in Man-
86 
churia and was 'directed against America'. In 1917, however, 
Japan began negotiations with the United States, and early in 
November the exchange of the famous Lansing-Ishii notes took 
p1ace. 87 The preCise meaning of these notes has been the sub-
ject of much controversy which need not be considered here, but 
there can be no doubt that, whatever Lansing intended, the 
Japanese derived encouragement from what they believed was 
American recognition of Japan's special rights in China. 
38. 
In mid-February the British war cabinet decided to 
support Japan's claims to Shantung 'with the proviso that the 
Japanese Government should give a corresponding assurance of 
support, in the eventual peace settlement, to our claims to 
the German islands south of the Equator, and in our general 
88 policy elsewhere.' But the cabinet were concerned at the 
effect such an agreement would have upon America and the 
dominion~, and at the insistence of A.J. Balfour, who had re-
placed Grey as foreign secretary, the Shantung question was 
discussed again two days later. At the second cabinet meeting 
it was decided that 'It would be inexpenient and unfair to our 
Allies to invite Japan to give so wide an assurance' to British 
clall~ls, and as a result the words 'in our general policy e1ge-
89 where' were omitted from the text given to Japan. 
The Anglo-Japanese exchange of notes in February has 
been derided ~s a straightforward bargain between the two 
countries, and Balfour maintained in later years that recog-
nl tion of Japan's claims to Shantunb ',:J.S part of a priee that 
Japan 'had exacted from us when we asked for naval assistance 
90 in the Hediterranean'. This interpretation is, however, too 
harsh upon Japan, for it is clear that Britain's objective was 
to obtain political as well as naval support. Also Japan, under 
~j~ 
the leadership of the new ~~cabinet had dropped her ob-
jections to China entering the war and had agreed to the re-
39. 
quested naval assistance before Britain recip~ocaten by giving 
assurances to support the Japanese claims to Shantung.91 It was 
a feature of the exchange that Jordan, the British minister in 
feldng, was not consulted nor even informed of the bargain until 
1ater9~ But whatever the exact purpose of Britain's aims in 
1917, the attitude of her delegates to the Paris peace conterenpe 
1919 '''as that they were honouT'_~)ourl'l to meet the obligatL::ms 
incurred. and support Japan's claims to Shantung. 
At a meeting of the imperial war council in the spring 
of 1917, Balfour associated himself with Grey's policy of 
allowing Japanese expansion in China. With what appears to be 
almost incredible simplicity in the light of events or 1915, 
~':i~ 
even if the new poliCies of the ~l~government are allowed 
for, Balfour remarked: 
'I have myself no doubt that Japan, with an eye to her 
own interests! is quite genuinely helping the Allies, and 
helping "tit; A lies to the best of her ability" 
and he concluded, 
'I do not myself look forward with the least apprehen-
sion to anything th~t Japan is likely to do during the 
course of the war'.~3 
Balfour was to maintain a sympathetic attitude to Japan and one 
of hostility towards China: throughout the peace conference, 
but at the Washington conference, 1921-2, his attitude towards 
Chin<... ,J,'came more friendly. 
In February 1917, the United states and China both 
severed diplomatic relations with Germany and entered the war 
l'el:in~:, was jubilu ..nt Hhen b.e hei::rcl () L .. ;ll.ina':c~ actj,ons. He 
'J.1his \'I'":'1.S ~)hina I sf :i.rut indercndent participation 
in ",'mrlCL pi 1i tics. 'Jhe had stopped out of her 
'~~"~-]onr- "'oo''''nc'~C" "nr' ':"'Jl'~'en 1-,'~r nl'-'cc am' ong the C"U '.- -. . i.)~"""" ... "-~ .... ) _..J. '..... l- .. ,...... .. .. .:.. 1:-' \...00. -
modern n:ltions'. Heinsch had met Dr. l'lorrison who 
told him '11'his is the crcD.test thing ever accomplished 
in China. It n1f:a:rnj L\ ne': 01':..1,. It vlill make the 
''-''''l' no ,-, (' n" tl' n1lrJ 1 J ',r "r.> 1 f f''''~ n r'l" au'"" 94 v L L. '-... ~_~ " _ '_l '. _ c.. ____ t.l ,~ ) ':. _'- - ..... _ \ ! L ,a."., \_.' .... 1-..-") • 
Uncloubtedly I:orriscH' 'J".H' C0rrcot :.:n:: u.:::> :~ result of China' s 
entry into the \1a1' une h~~d I thus o!:lerc:;.J :.is ;m actor ip. the 
urena of ~ iel tpoli tik'. 95 
China'}3 sev':;rance of diploIDc;.ltic relO-tions and declara-
tion of war upon (~eY'mc:..ny, however, made very little impression 
Cl. $ et. 5e~ 
upgn Ba::'four as nay be seen _ ~ u~<J.e to the ioreign 
secretary's visit to /.merica in the early summer of 1917. A 
Mto 
dispute <.:iro ~)e la ter ~ ,,(nether 13o.1four had informed the 
United ..;t~,tcs t;Ov8Y'illnCnt of the British promise to support:} 
Japan' 8 clai:ns to)hantun::, o.n:l Balfour t S anSVler to this query 
reveals his a120st c~nteTIptuous attitude to Ohina. He stated: 
tIt is just po~sible, thou~.<:h most 
improbable, th'l.t in speaking about the 
territori~l ch~ngco W~ had promised to 
support I did not ,'>peak about the trans-
fer of Germon ri[!hts in Shantun'",,: to the 
Allied POi.vcr. i.8. Japan, which had con-
quered them. ~he proposed transfer was 
not 01 tel'ri tO~J... It took nothinl.~ from 
China which China possess8d; China was not 
an Ally •••• • 96 
But what is perhaps of gr.ater importance thru~ the question of 
com:-:llL.'1ica tion~ is the indica tion of Ba1four' s willingness to 
support the transfer of rights and his indifference to China's 
position as a power. However, by declaring war China had en-
hanced her international standing by ensuring her place at the 
peace conference which was to prove an excellent medium to argue 
for the return of Shantung anJ the restoration of Chinese 
sovereignty. There was also t~~ legal argument that by virtue 
of the declaration ot war all Sino-German treaties were void 
and that, as China was quick to claim. there were no German 
rights in China which could be transferred to Japan. When the 
peace conference began China was to prove very skilled in the 
presentation 01 these ar5uments. 
One may conclude that the development of the Shantung 
question reflected Britain's decline as an imperial power for 
in seeking a bargain with Japan, as distinct from maintaining 
her independence of all other countries, Britain had become 
involved in promises which limited her freedom of action and 
were to prove costly not only to Anglo-Chinese relations but 
also detrimental to a better Anglo~merican understanding in 
the post-war world. 
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CHAPTER 11 
THE DEBATE OVER BRIIAIN'S P0ST-WAR POLICIES 
TO CijINA. 1918. 
lt8. 
At the beginning of 1918 the achievement of victory 
was uppermost in the mind of the British gov('rnment, but as the 
year progressed, and allied military success became certain, 
attpntion bp-gan to focus upon post-war problems including those 
of the far east. In the interim betwpen the armistice and the 
peace conferp.nce British policy in China was considered in 
letters between Sir John Jordan, the British minister in Peking, 
and Ronald Macleay of the far eastern department of the Foreign 
Office, and the conflioting views clearly expressed the problems 
involved. Consideration of policy was, however, complicated by 
Britain's secret pledges of February 1911, about which Jordan 
waS not informed, to support Japan's claims to Shantung.1 
F~rly in the year proposals for Japanese military 
forces to occupy the Siberian railway exercised the attention of 
the British and American goyernments. Balfour, the foreign 
..... tar1, recognised that some aggrandisement by Japan was 
almost certain and the area most likely to be involved was the 
2 Maritime Provinces ot Russian eastern Siberia. These prOVinces 
.. re of considerable interest to China for their population in-
eluded large numbers ot Chinese immigrants, but in his r~iew of 
the developing situation Balfour ignored China completely. 
While it was natural that Balfour should give his attention to 
the possible influence of Japan's actions upon Russia and the 
outcome of the war, his total disregard of China may be judged 
as part of the contemptuous attitude which the foreign secretary 
took towards that country. 
No doubt Balfour's attitude had been influenced by 
China's internal chaos and poor conduct in fighting the war. 
China remained hopelessly dividp,d and the policy of Tuan Ch'i-
jui, the premier, was described as 'a declaration of war abroad 
without fighting, and a fight at home without declaration ot 
3 
war.' Such a situation had obvious international repercussions. 
Tuan borrowed huge sums of money (some Sl20 mill1~n) from Japan 
and created the so-called European War Participation Army and 
the New Parliament, ostensibly to participate effectively in the 
European war and establish order within China. But Tuan used the 
Japanese loans mainly in selfish schemes to defeat his rivals and 
as a result became dependent upon Japanese money for surviva1.~ 
Perhaps ot greater importanoe than the manoeuvres of the warring 
cliques were the gitter Chinese protests against Tuan's actions, 
especially by the students from Peking university, which were a 
greater manifeltation of widespread nationalism than the exist-
ence of a separate government in the south VDUld have suggested. 5 
As early al June, 1917, Balfour in reviewing policy be-
moaned the tact that any Anglo-American naval agreement would be 
regarded by Japan as ending the Anglo-Japanese all1ance.6 
50. 
Bal four f-raiscd th~ alliance and arSUt~c1 th'_~ tit h[~d conc1uced 
n(;:...rl~T t"enty ycurs,.;nc1 thpT'efol'e it ~3hould n·')t be abandoned 
fer Dalf'")ur clair;()d thc).t: 
'This \vou1d have the triple effect of Ell1ay1ne; 
Jap"ncsc fl)~rst of l)n;;L<;ill~ Ja~.:anecc w.pport, 
dCj of 3.dvertir;ini~ the :rc,--~t·'y :-;:"; t-:. protection 
iJ..L;Llinst Ger::'.1any. I 
It m:,v be no tea th<.,;. t China W3,S once 0.(~'--:l.~1. not L~cntioned in 
Bulfour's 1.1eiloranliur;:, ancl ::~l thou_~h the ~Uc;.3t:'on of alliances of 
the navJ.l powerG in the po;.;t-war p('riod was not ncces~arily 
rclcvi.Ant to "":hinc...., she ohviously stood to be indirectly affectedi 
by such m;;cttt)rn. ior eXili.ll)lc~, if. Br:i-tain concluded an Anglo-
An;erican-Japunesc a11i(;(nce, whic~l reiaained hc~' hope until the 
1.)ushinc;ton conference in 1921, then any Jhinese claims against 
JapHn were h ... lrdly IH~81y to receive active uupport from Britain. 
In the summer of 1,)18, B~lfour :n:.;:.de proposals for the 
po:.:> t-\,/2Ar fc..i to of the Gcr1'.:..:..n colonies t anci he was enpha tic that 
it w0uld be madness t r ) restore any coloD;)" to I an unregenerate 
Ge:r'1ll<.Ul.Y,.7 Balfour c,r::;ued that apart fro~ considerations of 
abstr<ct .ju;tice the security 0f th~ British L!n.pir.e offered the 
strongeGt PI'd.C t.i.~o..l r(~d.~on why Germany should not be permitted 
to reGain any of her colonies in Africh,~hin;)" or the Pacific. 
In relation to the f~r east Balfour stated: 
'J'H);'..n j_;~, in(ieed, the heir of G0T'rnany in 
Chil1:.i, ;;. .. nc... ,(:) Pl.·Oz:.L;8d. tc: sUPJ)or·t hlSr cId-ins 
to ~he Pacific Islands north of the Equator, 
when t:1.:: ;..;u:Jj cc t i:.: brou ~ !--1 t uS :' t the }'8&.ce 
Conf8re:rce •••• Go far lrre <'1.1'e committed.' 
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The fact th' t t'h i: rnemorundtL~ ",as ,,!ri tten in June was important 
f01' it :'.''3..8 elecr the.t T~alfour :rfWGLr(~.8d Britain as being !)b1iged 
to support J:3 Y \<-tn' G cloir.:s to c;.crrnL.n colonies in China, of 
which rrAin~';t[\o and various rights in the Shantung province ",)'ere 
of the e;reHte,:;t si '"nif'iccUlce, Defore the conclusion of the 8ino-
J<~~-,ane::)e tre"ty of Gf':'pterrtbf1r, 1918, which, it was alleged, was a 
vollln tHry t'f'coa;:ni tion by China of Japan' s claims to Sh3ntllng. 
This treJty W'iS "!':'~ferred to on several important occasions by 
Be 1 four nUTi. f1 £\ the P08N' conference in support of Japan' s claims • 
. \ furthor inr9.:tc',tion of Balfour's attitude to China is 
offernd in 3. lettc::,,:, which he ',ofrote to C.3..ptain Leopold Amery 
M.P. Hho sugc;cstcd. a peace settlement based on • a \{orld dis-
tribution of terT'itory according to spheres based on the Molm08 
DoctJ'ine'. Bnlfour dii=lagreed with Amery's main proposals, but 
conceded: 
·YO'J. ''lould [jive Japan as her sphere China e;enerally. 
On the ';lhole, as far as this country h; concerned, 
I am disposed to agree; but would the Unit~d Btates, 
or plE'haps Hhilt is mor~ imnortimt the Chinese them-
selves?' 8 . 
The meanin€s of some of the expressions used by the two men are 
uncertain for it vms hardly likely that Britain would have 
readily surrendered her interests in China, especially in such 
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strong areas as the Yangtse valley. But it was clear that 
Amery's proposal$ would have accorden Japan a more powerful 
position in China than hitherto, and Balfour had no objection 
to this d~elopment. Hence, before the peace conference began, 
Balfour, the foreign secretary, was envisaging both the 
creation of allianoes and a China settlement which were 
obviously contrary to the aspirations of Chinese nationalism. 
The attitude of Sir·John Jordan was, however, in 
marked contrast to that of Balfour, which is made clear in his 
co~respondence with Sir WaIter Langley, assistant under secre-
9 
tary of state. Jordan referred to the efforts of the United 
States government to ourb foreign loans to China, and he argued 
that it was time that some power should intervene, 'to stop the 
criminal folly of the Japane.e t • Jordan maintained that *he 
Japanese had had a splendid opportunity of showing a statesman-
like policy to the Chinese during the war but had thrown it 
away in a huckstering spi.ri t unworthy of a great nation. He 
felt that the record of the Japanese 1n China would recoil upon 
themselves in a very marked fashion. Referenee was then made to 
anti-Japanese protests made by the Chinese in Shanghai, and Jor-
dan concluded that the Chinese were no longer prepared to submit 
to the domineering methods ot the Japanese. 'That sort of tning 
may do in Mancnu.1.a, but 1s attended with dangers when practised 
at a Treaty Port'. 
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In the latter half of his letter Jordan referred to the 
manner in which large quantities .,r opium were being lmp')'t'ted by 
the Japanese into China via Tsingtao and nalny, and hp. thJught 
much or the drug came from In~ia, 'Our han~s are still, I fear, 
far fr'JrJ cl~an in this matter'. J)rdan then (lues ti~ned what a 
harmful ~ff~ct ~pv~lati)ns of nritain's traffic ln opium vould 
have had upon hpr reputation in the far east. The 1uestion of 
ribet was also raised by JJ't'dan, and he saw little hope of 
1J 
Teichmants mission settling the controversy. 
A further letter from J~rdan to Langley In August des-
cribe~ the situation so forcefully and raised such important 
pOints that a long quotation ls justifiedl 
'The situation in China is gOing from bad to worse. 
All power is concentrated in tne hands of a number 
of unscrupulous military men, an~ Japan is taking 
advantage of their cn,ld1ty and ot the European war 
to obtain a financial hold over the country which 
will ensure her a permanent position when peace come •• 
All this is common knowledge in China and admits no 
difrerenc~ of opin1Jn. The only questiln is Whether 
a remedy can be found nJW or !h~uld be ~ererred until 
the war ~nds ••• With all our world wide preoccupations 
at present, I do not !@p how we dan expect to do more 
than mark time in China. At.any rate, we cannot afford 
to antagonize Japan and w1 thout antagonizing her, we 
cannot ~t the principles for which we are fighting in 
Europe extended to the Far East. But there are many 
forces at work which will inevitably lead to that result 
in the end. America viII be strong enough at the end 
of the War to call a halt to Japanese methods in China 
and ve sball be obliged, ~ all the declarations that 
the political exigencies citthe moment demand, to 
support her. Japan's own internal cond1 tions bear an 
ominous resemblance to those of Russia before the war 
and sooner or later our alliance with her will exp~rlence 
the fate of that with Russia.' 11 
~. 
Jordan had clearly foreseen the predicament for British post-
war poliey in having to choose between the United states and 
Japan, but Jordan was to be proved wrong in his contention that 
12 Britain would be forced to support America. 
Differences with America were al~eady beginning to 
develop over economic matters and it may be argued that while 
the United states advocated the 'open-door' and equal opportuni-
ties for all foreign traders in China, Britain supported the re-
tention of spheres of influence. Jordan had welcomed American 
proposals to ourb foreign lending to China13 , but Macleay 
adopted an opposing view. Macleay took exception to the 
American proposal that all options including those on industrial 
and railway loans should either be relinquished to China or 
pooled among the powers, a Japanese diplomat had told him that 
'its aoceptance would practically imply the renunciation of the 
policy of spheres of interest,.l~ However, while Macleay wanted 
to retain spheres of influence he recognised that Britain had 
not sufficient capital to develop the areas which had been desig-
nated for her and he pondered upon whether the internationalisa-
tion of such ooncessions among Britain, America, France, and 
Japan might not prOVe the best solution. But Macleay could not 
envisage the Japanese agreeing to suoh a remedy and he oould 
not see how the United States could expect the Japanese 'to 
forgo the privileges of the speCial position in China which the 
U.S.Govt. have just recognised Japan to pOEsess by the terms ot 
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the Linsing-Ishii agreement'. Macleay feared that Britain's 
special sphere of interest in the Yangtse valley was being 
granually whittled down by Japanese encroachments, 'but so long 
as Japan is to be allowed to have large areas such as Manchuria, 
Shantung and Fukien exclusively reserved to her •.•• it seems to 
me that we must cling on to our Yangtse Valley sphere fiction 
for all it is worth'. 
Undoubtedly 'here was logic in Macleay's reasoning, even 
if his conclusions might be judged wrJng, and the idea pre-
vailed that British privileges in China and the question of their 
retrocession should be reviewed against the similar rlghts of 
foreign powers. This reasoning had a~ear influence upon 
Britain's attitude over Wei-hwWei. 
W'1-h~ Wei and it. ,fflet on British Thinking. 
Although Britain had acquired Wei-hw Wei in 1898 it 
had never been developed as a port, and its naval and military 
value in 191~ had proved almost laUghabl •• 15 As the end of the 
war approaohed Britain had to determine her attitude to the 
territory fer the retention of W.i-h~_W'l, or its retrocession, 
would influence Anllo-Chinese relations, while its development 
as a base would involve very heavy expenditure. R. F. Johnstone, 
(later Sir R.~14) the otfieer administering Wei-halWei re-
viewed the situation from political and naval considerations and 
came to the conclusion that the territory should be retroceded.16 
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Apart from naval consldera tions, Johnstone argued tha t the Chin-
ese government would be grateful for such strong proof of Britain's· 
goodwill, 'and would welcome the indication that our future 
p~licy in China, both in theory and in practice, was to be 
identical with that consistently advocated by the United states -
equal commercial opportunities for all, and no encroachments 
upon China's poUtical rights or territorial integrity'. 
Hacleay, however, queried whether the Chinese would 
want the British to quit Wei-ha', Wei while the Japanese 'ltlere in 
possession of Shantung, and he envisaged a Japanese retention of 
the province in the post-war period and their development of the 
area to make Japanese influence 'as strang as in Southern Man-
churia.' He argued that a deal sh~uld be concluded not with the 
Chinese, but the Japanese, and that the naval base sh~uld be 
used a s a means of securing concessi::)ns from Japan which were 
favourable to British commercial interests in Wei-hai Wei. 
Macleay seemed oblivious of any Chinese desi~erata. China, as 
part of her policy of seeking the restoration of her sovereignty 
was an::.<iJus to see tl-}e Japanese leaV'.~·Shantung immedia tel" and 
t'1f~refore the Chinese did not seriously consider the desirabili ty 
of Britain retaining Wei-hai Wei as a counter-weight against 
Japan's hold over Shantung. l ? 
The Admiralty opposeo the surrender of Wei-hai Wei, 
. 18 including the island and the mainland territory. But Jurdan 
argued most forcibly in the months immediately b~fore the peace 
conference for a drastic revision of Britain's policies in 
China. However, hopes for the retrocession of Wei-hai Wei 
must have been dealt a severe blow when Jordan, after some 
equivocation, finally opposed such a step as being inadequate 
unless it were part of a wider scheme of concessiJns and re-
19 forms, which the British government refused to accept. 
Wei-hai Wei continued to attract attention at the 
Paris peace conference and at Washington two years later. 
Obviously Britain had to safeguard her interests and guard 
against opening the flood-gates for furth~r Chinese demands, 
but one must question whether the limited extent of Britain's 
interests in Wei-hai Wei justified the illiberal British 
attitude to the concession. 
The Sino-Japanes, Agreement, Septemb~r 24th, 1918, 
In the spring of 1918, alarm was expressed at the 
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manner in which the Japanese government and forces were extending 
their influence in Shantung. They had decreed a 'civil adminis-
tratiJn' code over what had b€en treshly designated the Shan-
tung railway Zone. Reinsch, the United states minister in 
Peking, made the important pOint that under the previous 
arrangements with the German government no railway zone existed. 
He contended that. 
'The fact that the administrative regulations deal with such 
matters as taxation, construction of roads, forestry and mines 
make it apP2ear that p.~manent administrative arrangements were 
aimed at.' 0 
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Reinsch reported that, not unnaturally, there was widespread 
Chinese c,:>ncern at these developments, and it was clear that 
Reinsch himself was alarmed. The contrast between his attitude 
to Japanese retention of the province, and Macleay's approach to 
the problem was striking. 
In September the Chinese and Japanese governments con-
cluded an agreement in which, unlike the Slno-Japanese treaty of 
1915, China was widely regarded as being a voluntary party for, 
unlike the earlier treaty, no threats appear to have been used 
to secure China's signature. But one Can easily challenge the 
idea that the Chinese government's acceptance of the September 
terms implied that China was a party to a bona-fide treaty. 
It must be emphasised that the country was hopelessly divided 
and the premier, Tuan Ch'l-jui, was heavily dependent upon the 
Japanese for financial assistance to sustain him in power, so 
that Japan was able to obtain the Chinese government's aoceptance 
of the September treaty not by force, but by the bribery ot the 
political clique who were in power at Pek1ng. 2l 
Irrespective ot the oharacter of the September treaty 
it can be seen that its terms meant a oontinuation of Japanese 
power over Shantung. Its opening statement was somewhat 
deceptive for this said that it, at the end of the war, the 
leased territory ot I1aoohow Bay were left completely tree for' 
the disposal of lapaft. 'the Japanese Government will restore the 
said leased territory to China under the following conditions', 
and the conditi)ns which followed gave Japan nQt only control 
of the Shantung Railway, but the right to station troops in 
strategic positions and a voice in the running of the Chinese 
22 
railway police forces. Of the seven points which comprised 
Japan's conditions only the last was in China's favour, for this 
stated, 'The Civil Administration established by Japan and 
existing now is to be abolished', but it may be noteo that no 
time limit for the abolition was given. 
A fundamental feature of the September treaty, and the 
basis for oonsiderable controversy at Paris, was that even if 
allowance were made for the return of the leased territory it 
extended Japanese control over Shantung in excess of that en-
23 joyed by Germany resulting from the Sino-German treaty of 1898. 
Undoubtedly the Tsingtao-Tsinan railway was a major factor in 
controlling Shantung, and in the Washington negotiations regar-
ding the provinee in 1921-2 it was constantly referred to as 
being the crux of the situation. But by the terms of the 
step ember agreement the railway .as to remain under Japanese 
control and this led to the later charges that Japan had promised 
to restore the shadow but retain the substance of the German 
interests in the Shantung province. 
Ba1four was one of the western statesmen who were very 
impressed by the September treaty. In numerous memoranda 
written during the peace conference, and afterwards, he ditfer-
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entiated between the 1915 and 1918 8ino-Japanese treaties and 
referred to the pecuniary benefits which China had obtained from 
'her dealings with Japan in 1918. He argued that having received 
such benefits, China should hon~ur her obligations. At no time 
did Balfour seriously question the character of the treaty. 
It was, no doubt, a serious refleotion upon China's 
state of government that by the end of November, i.e. just two 
months after the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese treaty, 
Wellington Koo, the Chinese minister in Washington who was later 
one of his country's leading representatives at the Paris peace 
conference, presented China's peace desiderata in terms which 
were obviously incompatible with the September treaty. Koo 
asked for the restoration of China's territorial integrity, in-
cluding the termination of foreign settlements, concessions, and 
leased territories. In addition, Koo demanded the abolition of 
extraterritoriality and the recognition of China's economic 
independence which necessitated the ending of the control of 
China tariffs by foreigners, and the cessation of spheres of 
2~ influence. 
rf Britain were hoping for close post-war co-operation 
with the United States then progress towards this aim was ren-
dered more difficult when .. '.Reinsch, the American minister in 
Peking, who was well kno~ for his sympathetic attitude to China, 
made recommendations which were contrary to the principles under-
lying the Sino-Japanese treaty, the very treaty which Balfour 
supported. Reinsch argued thatl 
'The separatist, economic and political action of the 
Powers in China must be replaced by the i-'lea :)f a trus-
teeship Jll behalf of an uni ted China exercised in the 
general interest, that is, the forei~l enterprise and 
expert assistance existing in Ctlina must be Jrganlsed, 
not to support the growth of differf:·nt foreign nati)nal 
localized interests, but to support and develop the uni-
fied process of Chinese nati..:>nal 11fe.,25 
It may be noted that there was a striking similarity between 
Reinsch's views and those expressed by Jor~qn during December. 
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Reinsch continued his rpport by stating t~at if China's 
grievancps were not settled the peace of the worl~ would be in 
danger, for he saw that the rivalries of the powers in China 
would lead to armed conflict and a poisoning of the international 
atmosphere. In clear contradiction to Balfour's opinions 
Heinsch argued: 
' •• should Japan be given a freer hand and should anything 
be done which could be interpreted as a recognition of a 
speCial position of Japan, either in the form of a 50-
called Monroe Doctrine or in any oVler way, forces will be 
set in action which malee a "ftuge armed conflict absolutely 
ineVitable within one generation. There is no Single 
problem in Europe which e~uals in its importance to the 
future peace of the world, the need of a just settlement 
of Chinese affairs'. 
Unfortuna tely for mankind, l1einsch' s prophecies were to prove 
all too true. 
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Some British att~tudes to China at t~e time of the Armistice. 
As the armistice in Europe was about to be sign~d some 
parliamentary questions raised serious criticisms of China's 
failure to intern German civilians, confiscate their property, 
and pursue the war with vigour. Hacleay prepared a reply to )ne 
such questLm, which was delivered by Lord '1obert Gecil, 
assistant secretary of state, that made it clear that the British 
goverThnent sympathised with the criticisms. ~h0 supplementary 
questions and answers revealed ei ther a hostile a tti tude t:) 
China, or one of complete lack of understanding. One member 
asked whether appropriate action would follow China's poor 
war-time performance, 'espeCially baving regard to the great 
help we gave them in holding up the Joxer inoemnity and in 
27 
other ways', to which Cecil replied that the British govern-
ment would not forget the events of the case. In a different 
sphere it may be noted that Dr. W. Will)ughby, an American 
ci tizen who was an adViser to the Chinese government, made a 
spirited defence of China's war efforts, but he had to conclude 
that they did not leave China in a strong position to demand the 
restoration of her sovereignty over Tsingtao at the peace con-
28 ference. 
While parliamentary questions were being asked in 
London which could have proved harmful to China's prospects at 
the peace conference, there were attempts by British interests 
in China to prevent a reversion of ex-German concessiJns to 
that country. E.W.Carter, chairman of th~ British Municipal 
Councils urged that ex-German concessi )ns sh:mld go to Bri tain, 
and almJst simultaneously H.F.H.andley-nerry, acting consul-
general, Tientsin, wrote to Jordan protesting against the 
possibility of the restoration of ex-German rights and complain-
ing bitterly of the behaviour Jf the Japanese and Chinpse for 
29 trading with Germany via Tientsin. He argued: 
'If for no .other reason than to make it a permanent 
object-less~on to the Chinese and Japanese, the 
occupa tion and admini s tra ti·::m of tha t area would seem 
to be advisable. The permanent administration of the 
concession by the Chinese is a solution which every 
foreign resident and landowner hopes earnestly may not 
be adopted. The foreigners bought land there and 
developed i t beca~se the concession \·ms controlled by 
a western people in accornance with western ideas, and 
any wi thdrawal from ti1a t po si ti:-Jn would place the 
Britons there at a great disadvantage.' 
Jordan's reply was that the issue would receive attention at 
Paris, and shortly after the peace conference had started 
Macleay gave his views on the matter. 'le thought that the 
internationalisation of the concpssion at Tientsin would afford 
the best solution for although there were a large number of 
ti-;p, 
British residents iniex-German area, Macleay did not think that 
t.. 
the other powers, 'especially Japan', would agree that there was 
sufficient ground for the administration of the former German 
concession being placed solely in the hands of the British. 
gac1eay then went on to consider whether German nati0nals should 
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have t~e vote in the municipal electiDns in the concession and 
concluded that they should not. At no time did Macleay consider 
the reactions of the Chinese. 
Despite Jordan's brief reply to Handley-Derry, he was 
very concerned ind E'ed wi th both Bri ti sh interests and China's 
well-being. On the eve of the armistice Jordan claimed that 
such factors as leased territories, railway and mining conces-
~;ions, and spheres of influence had provided a di sintegra ting 
and dangerous element in China and far eas tern affairs in the 
past. If a conflict were to be avoided in the future, Jordan 
continued, it was essential that all these questions should be 
examined and a nefinite policy be made binding on all the power~ 
.Jf importance to Anglo-American relations was Jordan's 
warning that the United states government seemed intent upon 
raising the issues at the peace conference and that several un-
official agents of the American president and secretary of state 
were in China collecting information in connection with the peace 
settlement. Jordan had obtained the unofficial information from 
these agents that: 
' ••• so far as China is concerned, league of peace is 
to be an Anglo-Saxon combination, which shall control 
militarism in the Far tast, and secure that resources of 
China are developed, not for the aggrandisement of any 
particular natiJn, but for the common benefit of all. 
The idea rouGhly is, iha~ the Powers Sh:)ill,4 ili~:cJDse 
1-,'1(' l r cl)nr:('s:,i~)j'lc--;: l'll L a] J the} r c'lr t'1s :)n the t:lb1e, 
'l'-,-r~" to 'r1'1 n") 'l",,':"'11-1r-r CC'''t'ct ,)Y"1~'rl::"'c:rn(''-lt'(' o,y:,-l c()m'? 
.... ' (:: ! '.- 1 .. Lt Lv.. ..::J 0;:;:; \..,.. ".A .... • _'" , " " •• ~ " '_, :J. -. • -
t,', :;n 11l1:~('r~~tan1j nC',Jn t}'.r \-r:J,)J2 SUb~Fct'. 
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The British minister stressed that he did not know how far t[leSe 
Wlofficial statements corresponded with the views of the United 
states government, but if they were reasonably accurate it 
seemed to Jordan that as far as China was concerned a clear 
choice had to be made between Japan and America, 'whose aims 
and policy in this country are diametrically opposite.' 
A further indication of American desires for closer co-
operation with Britain in the far east came from Sir Conyngham-
Greene, 3ritish ambassador iniokyo, who reported thaf~~Iorris, 
the American ambassador had several times in recent conversa-
tions recommended an f,nglo-Saxon cQmbina tion for the trea trnen t of 
far eastern problems. 31 In addition, Morris had dwelt upon the 
importance of not permitting a severance of the re-united rela-
tions between America and Bri tain. t-1ac1eay noted t!1e determina-
tion of the American government to play a new and active role in 
the far east, and he made the ra thar ambiguous comrnent that the 
United states government 'confidently pxpect that '-T.t-LGov. will 
cooperate with them in the policy outlined in Sir J. Jordan's 
telegram' (i.e. that of 30' above). 
The subject of Anglo-American relations in the post-war 
periQd is very wide and complex, but a common British criticism 
of the Americans was that it was difficult to get them to agree 
to any permanent commitment. NeVertheless, in relation to the 
far east Hacleay was being distinctly cool in the matter of an 
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Anglo-American understanding for if he expressed a va~~c state-
ment in reaction to Greene's dispatch, Hacleay's mem:)r3.noum of 
early December was contrary to the unofficial views of the 
Americans and the definite ideas of Jordan, and the importance 
of ;'jacleay' s recommendations was considerable for he was 
32 3ritain's far eastern expert at Paris. 
Hac1eay began his December memorandum, which was des-
cribed by Lord Hardinge, permanent under secretary for foreign 
affairs, as very good, by questioning the wisdom of the American 
prop.:)sa1s for the 'open-door' and the denunciation :)f the special 
interests in China. 33 He queried whether the pooling of railway 
and industrial schemes in China would make such ventures m:)re 
profi table and 1·1ac1eay was convinced tha t diminished profi ta-
bility would result. Bef:)re Britain subscribed to the policy of 
O;Jen competi tion, argued r:!acleay, the Sri tish government should 
have some guarante0 from the Uni ted ;~ ta tes that the Americans 
would call upon Japan to adopt similar policies in her spheres 
of influence in Hanchuria, 'ii'likien, and S1.antung. Also that 
American financial cooperation would really be forthcoming in 
the event of British acceptance of American government proposals, 
'and, once agreed upon, will not be withdrawn'. 
The memorandum continued by stating that ~rltain had 
tacitly recognised Japan's claims to a sphere .)f influence in 
:·:anchuria anQ, Fukien, at least as far as railways were concprned, 
on the understanding that Japan recJgnised Sritain's similar 
claims to a sphere of influencp in the Yangtse valley. But, 
lv;acleay ar gued: 
'There would certainly be a great outcry from ~ritish 
commercial interests at home and in China if we were to 
ren':mnce our claim to a sphere of influence in t:le Yangtse 
Valley at thp l'Aquest of the United states, thereby open-
ing tha t re'gion to unrestricted Japanese comreti tion, ana 
if we pledged ourselves at thp same time to respect the 
Japanese spheres in Manchuria and elsewhAre. Consequently 
it seems desirable that we should at the Peace Conference 
leave the task of forCing the JLirJanese noor in this manner 
to the United states Delegates beforr: '.-IP corruni t ourselves 
to the acceptance of the new Amorican policy in China, so 
tha t, in the event of the Uni tee'! S ta tes Governmen t failing 
to bring Japan into line, we shall not incur the risk of 
antagonising Japan to no purpose by supporting a policy 
directly opposed to her interests, while at the same time 
we renounce the privileged p.)si tion in the Yangtsevalley 
in regard to railway enterpri se whic~1 we have hi therto ' 
successfully maintained'. 
It may be noted that Macleay did n;)t even mention the question 
of the lack of capital required to c!='velop Britain's interests 
which had worried him in the late summer. 34 
One mus t conclud e tha t ;·~acl eay' s memorandum was hardly 
of the highest principle for, if it were agreed that there was 
a developing divergencp. between American and Japanese policies 
in China, Macleay's arguments were that Britain should sit on the 
fence and wait to see that the Americans were winning before 
supporting her. It may be noted that, like numerous memoranda 
wri tten by Balfour, ~lacleay gave nJ consideration to China, and 
no doubt the country's confused political affairs obscured the 
developments which were occurring. 
Some developments within China and their possible influence 
upon ~estern reasoning. 
'During 1918 there was a marked contradiction in 
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China's intr>rna1 situation for while the government of Tuan 
C'l'i-jui was making more concessions to Japan on the one hand 
fairly widAspread opposi ti·:)n was neve10ping towards Japan on the 
other. 35 Reference has already been made to the manner in which 
Japan was gaining control over the Peking government by means of 
lJuns 36 and this control found expression in a number of one-
sided :Jino-Japanpse mill tary conventions concluded between Harch 
and ray, 1918, aimed ostensibly against the Soviet Union, but 
which were regarded as constituting a further domination of China 
by Japan. In September the Sino-Japanese treaty was signed which 
furthered Japan's post-war claims against China, and by the autumn 
the very pro-Japanese .mfu club had obtained domination over the 
Pelting parliament. Thus, it can be seen that during the year· 
Japan'~ hJld over the Chinese government tightened considerably. 
In 'February, 1918, however, the newly founded Soviet 
Uni·)n publi shed the secret war-time treaties concluded between 
Imperial Russia and Japan which aimed at the wre sting of Man-
churia and t,.longolia from China, and preventing China from obtain-
ing help from any other power. 37 The disclosure of these trea-
ties exacerba ted the a1 ready c,)nsiderable anti-Japanese sentl-
mGnts in China, esppcially when news of the 1918 Sino-Japanese 
milit~ry conventions gradually leaked out, and reactions to the 
ne,'Js oi i:;he convt;n-tions \i~el'e particul;;;.rly sha:;:-p among students. 
,jOII1e three thouOd.nd Chinese ztudcnts in l;apan resolved to re-
turn hOille by J..a:y 1910 in order tu voice th0ir protests, and 
efforts by the Ju.p~e.se Wld ;';hinese Cl.utho:"ities to prevent 
such action caused passion£ to risc to hiGher levels. In Peking. 
SOlue t'tlO thou:.:;unu stuucnts of the uni ,,-crsi ty and local colleges 
were no less :wilitant in their response. :Jurin5 the summer of 
19lu "" link up of ;;tudents' orgoni.3ations on <.l national basis 
.. :0.8 uchieveu c.LLlU as a rc~ul t n'U.!1l(;rou;:.; m<...g<.J.zines WlU various 
forms 01" uuti-Japanese proput;clJlda were iS3ued. But. 
'The si€;lli:;:.'ica.nce of the ;~t\lJ.ent demon.stra-
tions und petitions of l1ay 1918 did not lie 
in uny immedicttc effect on the government. 
Of prime importance is thc fact that they 
marked the bebiruLinG of the ~ooperation on a 
si~ific;:l1lt sc[,le of the new intellectuals 
with othe:c forces in the ~:;ocL)ty, aud in a 
sense were rehearsals for the May Fourth 
Incident' • 30 
':rile Young Ghinu li.SGociation :Zor:uJ.ed in June., althouGh comprising 
lil<:il1Y ;..tuclelltiJ, aimed <.it .J. ',vide intel10ctuul, literary, and 
ni.l.tiond.li.-:.>t revi'.'al. But undoubtedly '.1113n the merchant and 
inuLi;.;tria1 clu.330G b,:t;un to ally thL.:l.l-,;',;lves with the aims of 
til<.: ..:>tuJ.8nt' UOViJ:'::i,]l1t it; liUS cl.:;;.;,r th..i t .J. ne\,' si tu,:i. tion was 
J.vvelopinGe 
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The actions of the merchant ana. industrial classes of 
China \'Jere to a large extent proruptea. b,:{ "cll.8ir fears of Japan's 
growin;-:; economic dor~inCition \'1hica had incrl~ascd cOD.;Jiderably 
durinc; the \'Jur owinG to the ab£,ence of mo;..,t ',Hestern powers from 
the f:J.r east. Hence, a movement .3.saillst 1'oreigners (with 
iiffe~~~lll" powers recoiving the brunt 01' Chinese wrath at 
different times) \'1US established between 'che forces of revolu-
tion and. conservation whieh remained a feature of \Jhina's 
politics at least until the late 1920's. 
These developments to\Jards Greater n;.:.tiona1ism were 
to some extent obscured by the leuder of the ~uollintang, Sun 
yatsen, quittinfj LlhaD.[;hai for Canton in I'lay. ';;)UIl ex.plained his 
reasons for leavi!l{~; thuG: 'l'or a year I encountered immense 
difficul ties without aDJ"body to help ne. ily stuying on would 
only evoke the regrets of my frienQs and the joy of my enemies.' 
Hu Bheng, a Chinese communist historian, Gives his description 
of the situation as followsa 
"J.'he warlords and bureaucrats in Ccm.ton while 
cl,dminr; that they were dcfcndinr: the consti-
tution were in reality only interested in the 
strucr;le af:;uinst th8 northern ,-~overnment because 
they wanted to grasp IJOAlG be:Hefi ts from it. 
They "rere not interested in the revolution itself. 
In their endeavours to win favour from foreign 
imperialism they revealed that they and the 
northern gove~ent were birQs of a feather.' 39 
71. 
While such language is strong it clearly reflects the fact that 
the forces of the south were by no means united around a mili-
tant nationalist programme. With intermittent warfare occurring 
not only between the north and south governments, but within the 
vari·::>us north and south factions, it was hardly surprising that 
Macleay, whose main service in China was limited at the time to 
two years as counsellor of embassy at Peking between 1914 and 
1916, should have such little respect for China's claims for the 
restora tion of her sovereignty. But if t<ac1eay and others de-
termining British policy had little practical kn::>w1edge of 
China, Jordan, of course, wal ex~ly familiar with that 
country's developments, and it seems reasonable to claim that 
such knowledge made Jordan far more sympathetic to China than 
were his colleagues at the Foreicn Office • 
. 
IPe ~ontrast betyeen the vieys or Jordan and Macl'I!. 
In a despatch to Macleay in December Jordan repeated 
some of his earlier arguments upon the disintegrating effect 
which spheres of influence were having upon China, and in res-
pect to the spherel of influence Jordan was particularly critical 
of the war-time activities ot Japan in increasing her share.40 
Jordan claimed that: 
'People of China on the oth'er hand look to Great 
Britain and America for some sign that forthcoming con-
ference will clole this phase of militarism and natiJnal 
disintegration 1n conformity with expressed ideals of Allies. 
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Americ~'s position in Pacific will compel her to combat 
danger of an impotent or militarist China •••• We cannot go 
back to prewar conditions. We must either follow Japan 
in her policy of dismemberment or lead with America in 
the formation of a new policy'. 
The British minister denied that he was anti--Japanese, but he 
felt that the Japanese government should cease their efforts at 
~ self-expansion in China and join with the other powers in 
schemes for the internati~nal development of China's resources. 
Such developments he felt were vital for the future interests of 
Bri tain' s trade. 
Jordan then outlined twelve clauses which he considered 
Britain should aim for at the peace conference. The first 
stated quite bluntly that 'Special privileges to be surrendered 
and equal opportunity recognised for all' and this idea of equal 
opportunity influenced Jordan's reasoning regarding railways and 
harbours. In relation to the railways the main theme of Jordan's 
proposals was that the Chinese government should control all the 
lines and a unified system be introduced, an international syndi-
cate should raise loans for future developments, and no country 
should maintain exclusive railway rights to further a particular 
sphere of influence. 
The fourth clause of Jordan's proposals noted that 
while Chinese emigration to Manchuria continued steadily, 
Chinese opposition to the Japanese in Shantung was growing in 
intenSity. Jordan issued the serious warning that 'any attempt 
to recognise or prolong special rights in these areas would be 
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a great blow to our prestige. A continuation of present 
position would inevitably lead to war'. He continued by des-
cribing leased territories as a legacy of imperialist ambitions 
and the cause of the Boxer outbreak. Jordan argued 'Wei-hai 
Wei should be returned to China. We should then press for com-
plete restoration of Kiao-Chow and Kuantung peninsula, former 
of which is vital to our commercial interests in China'. 
In addition, Jordan maintained that German and Austrian 
concessions at treaty ports should be internationalised, and 
British concessions should be internationalised under guarantee. 
'rhere should ba no restoration of any enemy rights by virtue of 
any protocol or treaty. On the question of opium, Jordan thought 
that the powers should cooperate more effectively to stamp out 
illicit trading. 
Extraterritoriality was of particular interest to 
Britain, and on this issue Jordan thought that the powers 
should begin to make some concessions to China, and China on 
her part should begin to allow easier foreign access to the 
interior. The tenth, and perhaps last important clause worth 
mentioning, was a statement that the powers should concur that 
all agreements relating to China which were concluded during 
the war should be laid on the table, and all future undisclosed 
agreements should be regarded as void. But Jordan's views were 
strongly opposed by Hacleay. 
Macleay stated that private consultations with Jordan 
had confirmed that the British minister's desires were for a 
complete and radical change of Britain's policies towards 
China, and Macleay repeated Jordan's belief that conflict in 
the far east could not be averted unless an end were put to the 
process of disintegration which spheres of influence and leased 
terri tories were causing. It was, however, Macleay' s opinion 
that in advocating a policy of close cooperation with the 
United states, Jordan had overlooked the fact that: 
• ••• Japan atte~ all, is more directly concerned in 
Far Eastern affairs than Great Britain, America or any 
other Power and that she possesses not only special 
interests in certain parts of China of a political as 
well as a commercial character, but a speCial position 
in"-'respect to the Chinese Govt. which she obtained as 
the result of two successful wars and has consolidated 
by treaties. Japan's acceptance of the policy which Sir 
John Jordan now advocates would imply the renouncement of 
the speCial position which she considers that she is 
entitled to hold in China and I cannot believe that any-
thing but force would induce her to abandon that position 
or to surrender the Kuantung (Liaotang) Peninsula and her 
speCial rights in Manchuria, Shantung and elsewhere'. 
These views of Macleay were expressed on a number of occasions 
during the Paris conference, and the reasoning undoubtedly had a 
marked influence on British policy. 
The possible influence of Jordan's policy was then 
considered in relation to China, and Macleay argued that pro-
tests would result, for China would deeply resent a strengthening 
of international control over her resources. This resentment, it 
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was thought, would be particularly pronounced in the south and 
international control would be also resented by the Young China 
movement. Macleay thought that the United states government, 
'which hitherto has been influenced by sentimental rather than 
practical considerations in its relations with the Chinese 
RepubliC' would support the view that international. control was 
incompatible with China's sovereign rights. It was owing to 
tnese considerations, Maoleay argued, that it would be difficult 
for Britain to treat the Chinese ~uestion on the same lines as 
that of the 'baokWapd nations' issue which, it had been sugges-
ted, should be placed under the supervision of the League of 
41 Na ti·)ns. 
Macleay thought that Jordan's ideas should on11 be 
borne in mind and concludeda 
'It would appear to be unwise for us to take the 
initiative in advocating a policy, such as Sfr J. Jordan 
recommends until we know exactly what the U.S.Govt. have 
in mind and how far they are prepared to go. ltle must also 
wait to see in what spirit the Japanese Delegates will 
approach the question. Japan, I think, is conscious of 
having abused her special posltion in China •••• and she 
probably realises not only that she has over-reached her~ 
self, but that she will not be able to pursue a policy 
of dlsmemberment and disintegration in the face of the 
growing hostility of a united China which would be assured 
of the economic as well as the moral support of the United 
states and Great Britain. Thus it may well be that we 
shall find that the Japanese Delegates at the Peace Con-
ference wqile determined to resist any attempt to torce 
Japan to relinquish her special position in China and the 
advantages which she has secured in Manchuria and Shantung, 
will not be averse to cooperat1ng in a selt-den11ngpolicy 
d~reoted towards th, internationalisation ot all tatur' 
LMacleay's emphasialindustrial financial & economic enter-
prise 1a China which although it will, as Sir J. Jordan 
says, "be a blow to Japan's imperial ambitions", will not 
impa1r her prestige as the Power principally interested in 
the Far Eas t ' • 
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In other words, }~ac1ea1 was contending that Brita.in was commit-
ted to support Japan's claims for the retention of her main war-
time gains in China, but that there should be no more Japanese 
unilateral advances in that country. 
One may argue that Macleay's conclusions presupposed 
acceptance of Japan's advances by the United States and China, 
and Japan's willingness not to press any further claims. But 
such a presupposition seemed reasonable to Haxl1u1ler, head of 
the far eastern department who expressed his 'entire agreement 
with Mr. Hac1eay's criticism af Sir J. Jordan's very radical 
propo sa1s ' • 
In a well-known memorandum written at the end of 
necember, Jordan marShalled all his arguments to plead once 
again for a revision of British policy, but although the docu-
ment was lengthy it contained little that was new to reinforce 
the plea for the surrender ot marginal interests to China, and 
added little to the contention that the powers should co-
operate to their common advantage in the development of China's 
lt2 
resources. Jordan made a powerful case for a reappraisal of 
China's politIcal and economic progress and argued: 
'It there were solId toundation tor the beliet that 
China is a decadent and decaying nation, we might be 
tempted to postpone consideration of ner future to a 
period ot greater leisure and greater detachment. But 
no serious observer ot Chinese affairs can be unconscious 
of the great forces that are stirring within the country. 
It Is awakening trom a long period of stagnation, realis-
ing its late~t powers and determined to find its place in 
the world. I'+j 
?? 
But Jordan's arguments, however forceful, were rejected by the 
British government and they had little impact upon British de-
liberations at Paris. Such a rejection must be considered un-
fortunate for the chances of closer relations with America as 
well as China. 
Almost at the same time as Jordan was arguing his point 
R.S. 
of view,/Morris, the American ambassador in Tokyo was concerned 
wit~ what he considered was Britain's indifference to Japanese 
F.L. 
actions, especially in Siberia./ Polk, the American acting 
secretary of state, reported these misgivings to Lansing, the 
American secretary who was in Europe, and stated that Morris 
was worried that Japan's act10ns would strengthen her control 
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over China. Details of the activities were given, and Polk 
was of the opin1on that Japan was bent upon securing an exclu-
sive hold on extensivE' regions in China. He added that Reinsch, 
the American minister 1n Peking, was more emphatiC than Morris 
1n his statements eonoerning the probable results of the actions 
of Japan, and of obv1ous 1nterest to Br1tish far eastern policy 
was Polk's .uggestion thatl 
In t~ the all,Proaohing vi si t of the Pr&sident and 
yourself ~s1ng/ to London, the opportunity will come 
al perhaps nerer aga1n, to reach some broad and,compre-
hensive understanding with the British Government on the 
whole question of relations of the United states and 
Great Britain in the Far ~ast, particularly as to whether 
the interests and 1deals of the two aation. and those or 
France and 'even Italy are not identical, and if so, 
whether this is not the moment'to agree upon a reasonable 
policy and to have our respective representatives clearly 
so instructed'. 
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It has been noted that hopes for closer Anglo-American relations 
often faundered upon American reluctance to undertake nefinite 
commitments, and too much emphasis sh~uld n:>t be placed upon 
Polk's suggestions, for his powers were obviously limited. 
Nevertheless, it will be shown that any hopes of progress along 
the lines which he advocated Were destroyed by British policies 
at the peace conference. 
Some ~~nclusions regarding 1918. 
It can be seen that in the mvnths before the peace, 
conference began 1iG:a:t Bri tish p·::>licy in China was subjected to 
quite searching examination by the British far eastern experts, 
and that the policy which was adopted was considered, in the 
given circumstances and with the known data, to have been the 
~ 
most suitable. Such a statement may be judged ..... Uim: in view 
of a Foreign Office memorandum which, in an attempt to explain 
the stormy years of Anglo-Chinese relations in the mid-1920's, 
descr1bed the result of China's claims being rejected at the 
peace conference in these words: 
lA golden opportunity was thus lost of doing with a 
good grace and in a serener atmosphere what has since 
been wrung from us by the force of circumstances, with. 
considerable loss of prestige. From that moment onwards 
our policy, instead of being one of spontaneous relin-
quishment of our privileged position, became an enforced 
retreat, necessitating endless rearguard actions) and in 
which our main effort is directed towards preventing it 
from being turned into a rout'.~5 
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To claim that a golden opportunity was lost suggests that 
indolence or a lack of knowledge and consideration of the facts 
caused a mistake to have been made. But the Jordan-Macleay ex-
changes made it clear that the main issues involved in British 
policy to China were reviewed very carefully, and if a golden 
opportunity did exist it was not apparent to the British govern-
ment at the time. 
In describing Anglo-Japanese relations between 1911 and 
1915, Dr. Lowe concluded that a general aim of British policy 
in the far east was for the preservation of stability in the· 
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region as far as was feasible and undoubtedly this description 
~ correct for the whole of the war years. Dr. Lowe also 
stated that British policy to Japan in the last two years of the 
war had been determined by Balfour as soon as he became the 
foreign secretary in 1917, and that Balfour had decreed: 
'The British objective must be to protect her interests in China, 
Tibet and the areas bordering India and Tibet, and to prevent 
the Japanese securing a footing "where their exclusion is con-
4·7 
sidered essential to British political interests".' 
But if Britain's policy were mainly to preserve her interests 
while trying to restrain Japan making further advances, one 
must question whether this were adequate for it has been shown 
that China was expecting not merely that no further inroads 
should be made upon her, but that a start should be made in the 
restoration of her sovereignty. 
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Jordan had obviously recognised China's demands and 
agreed with many of her claims. On the other hand, Macleay, 
while not wanting to see further encroachments upon China,felt 
that those which had been achieved should be preserved. Of the 
more recent encroachments upon China, the Shantung issue was to 
prove highly contentious at Paris, and in accepting the general 
arguments of Macleay the British government had to defend a 
policy ~ieh was to incur bitter hostility from both China and 
America. 
; 
" 
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CHAPTER III 
tHE OPENING ROUNDS OJ!' THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE. 
JANUARY -MARCH. 1919. 
The Paris peace conference began on 12th January 
with 'an informal meeting of the Heads of the four Great Powers 
and their Foreign Hinisters I which was 'in reali ty a continua-
l tion of the Supreme War Council ••• ' One day later Japan was 
admitted to this body which, because two representatives from 
each country were allowed, became known as the council of ten. 
This council had a powerful influence not only upon matters to 
be placed before the full conference but also upon the hard 
bargaining among the different countries. 
An imme4iate problem faCing the council was that of 
deciding the number of plenipotentiaries to which each power waS 
entitled, and the character of the negotiations which ensued 
seems to have fallen short of the high ideals generally associ-
ated with President Wilson's name. 2 Wilson referred to Brazil 
and argued that it should be well represented lest it become 
prone to pro-German sentiments, and he therefore favoured Brazil 
being granted three delegates. But Lloyd George, the British 
prime minister, thought that the size of each country's dele-
gation should bear some relation to war effort, and although 
Brazil had sent two or three torpedo boats she had made no 
other sacrifices. Lloyd George's motives, however, were hardly 
altruistic for he was concerned at securing a good representa~ 
tion for the British Empire. In the midst of these early delib-
erations, Alfred Sze, a member of the Chinese delgation and the 
Chinese minister in London, wrote to Balfour, who was a leading 
figure in the British delegation, asking for the sympathetic 
support of Britain concerning the number of plenipotentiaries 
to be accredited to China. 3 Although the British war cabinet 
had already taken a deciSion to support a general proposal that 
China, like Brazil, should have three delegates,4 the Br1tish 
foreign secretary dealt curtly with Sze's letter merely endors-
ing it with an instruction that a formal acknowledgment be sent, 
and as a result Sze was assured thatthe matter would 'receive 
due consideration'. 
When the issue of representation was settled, China, 
whose war effort V.I feeble, but scareely less than that of 
Brazil, was allowed two plenipotentiaries, Brazil three, and the 
five great powers, Amer1ca, Brita1n, France, Italy, and Japan, 
five each5• Thus, almost trom the start of the peace conter-
ence, Japan, by virtue of her membership of the council of ten 
and her superior representat1on, was in a much stronger necoti-
ating position than China. 
The charaoter of China'. delep.tion was alsointlu-
enced by the tact that it represented the r1val government. &t 
north and south China and retlected the divisions within that 
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country. While the peace conference was in progress the 
powers encouraged the Chinese to reconcile their differences, 
although Japan for selfish reasons continued to support certain 
northern Chinese factions. A conference which aimed at ending 
Chinese political strife was held at Shanghai between Februa~y 
and Hay but it ended in total failure. 7 Hence, while the 
Chinese delegates at Paris were facing formidable oppoai tion 
they had to be on their guard against sudden changes at home 
to a more marked degree than most other delegations. 
Internal disorders did not, however, prevent China 
from making some far-reaching demands, and she asked for a 
complete revision of her relations with all foreign powers, 
8 both ex-allied and ex-enemy. China wanted all leased terri-
tories and foreign land concessions returned to her or inter-
nationalised, all railways built with foreign capital to be 
consolidated although foreign experts could continue to assist 
with their operation, foreign mining, agricultural, and indus-
trial rights were to be drastically restricted, foreign postal 
and telegraph offices were to be withdrawn, extraterritoriality 
was to be abolished within ten years, foreign troops were to be 
withdrawn, all further payments of the Boxerlndemnity were, to 
be devoted to educational purposes, and subject to certain con-
ditions China was to be granted tariff autonomy. In the face of 
such demands Britain had to draw her earlier deliberations to an 
end and make a definite decision whether she would agree to an 
overall revision of China's treaties, as advocated by Jordan, 
or insist upon dealing only with the questions which had arisen 
directly from the war. 
Hacleay thought that C.hina' s demands were mainly ir-
relevant to the peace conference ,but that the Chinese govern-
ment would n.:>t have .put forward 'such a far reaching programme' 
if t:Ley had not felt assured of the support of the United States. 
He was convinced that there would be strong opposition from 
Japan ruld france to the proposal to internationalise foreign 
residential concessions, but he noted that in the international 
settlement at Shanghai large numbers of Chinese residents had 
not even got a vote regarding the settlement's administration. 
In the circumstances Macleay thought that it would be wise to 
resist China's demand and restrict the internationalisation of 
foreign residential concessions to the ex-enemy holding at 
Tientsin. Macleay suggested acceptance of the withdrawal ot 
British post and telegraph offices provided that the other 
interested powers did likewise. On the question of extra-
territoriality Macleay did not think that China could implement 
the necessary judicial reforms and this view of China's inability 
a Foreign Office legal adviser. 
was s!1.ared by Halkin,1 It was Macleay's opinion that no con-
cessions should be granted concerning tariff autonomy unless 
China abolished likin, a form of inland customs payments, but 
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Macleay agreed that the Boxer indemnity could be waived provided 
t~lat C~ina used the money for educational purposes. Hardinge was 
also of the opinion that China's demands were not concerned with 
the war and should not be raised at the peace conference. 
Jordan, however, continued to argue for the retro-
cessi:m of at least some British rights and possessions in China 
in order that greater stability might be achieved in that 
country. He contended that Britain should release its exclu-
sive hold over the Kowloon territory for unless the powers who 
had acquired, or inherited, leased territories in 1898 made some 
sacrifices no solution of China's problem was possible. Jordan 
stated: 
' ••• all these leases had their origin in imperialist 
aggressions of Germany and Russia; that they had all been 
negotiated in rapid succession within a period of 3 months 
and that they should ei ther all be abrogated or none at all ••• 
we should now revert to our former attitude and endeavour to 
come to some arrangement for neutralization or international-
ization of all leased territories under conditions which will 
ensure immuni ty from attack and render such terms as "open 
door", "China's integrity", reali ties and not meaningless 
expressions they too often are at present. '9 
The British minister agreed that the security of Hong Kong was 
essential and if British occupation of Kowloon were vital to its 
safety he thought his proposal for its retrocession should be 
dropped. Such a reservation indicated that although Jordan was 
liberal in his approach to China he believed that certain 
British rights should be maintained, at least until political 
con(!i tionn in Chino. improved nnd obv:i.atpd their necessity. As a 
£t~-p to':o.:-'~s better intprnational relc....tions .Jordan argued. 
'if Uni tod ~..;tate8 end "!G arc willing to attune 
our nJinus 1:iO f~p1Ti t of new principles which are to 
F;overn the v!orId. and tr, enforce annlication of those 
principl!3s in China it should not be impossible to 
devise Fl. scheme which lrlf)uld B"Uarantee economic free-
dom and military security of lenoed territories'. 
'It is no exagr.:ora.tion to say that all competent 
observers are agreed that present conflict of in-
te!'€!sts in China constitutes Cl Grave menace to peace 
of Orient.' 
Unfortum~tcly for mankind Jordan' s forebodings proveti a remark-
able prophecy, but at the time the rrlGn on the spot saw things 
differently. 
~urzont ,V'ho remained in London as the acting-foreign 
secretary, reacted. e:::ctrG~ely sharply and. 8tated that he was not 
sure ho\{ fJ.r tho British ~';overrunent had encouraged Jordan's 
'altruistic speculations', ~Jfhich (;uJ'zon considered were mis-
placed. Curzon was convinced that old treaties could not be 
dug up and that only war issues were relevant. \Jithout consider-
inG Jordan's rO:3ervtttions on the issue, Curzon thought that it 
was entil"ely out of the question to cOllsiuer hand.ing back Kowloon" 
0ecil thOUGht Uifi'erontly frolJl Jurzon, und wb.1l. 
S l.rc,coJint,.; the point that he \";i;.t.U aot an uxpcrt on 0hinese affairs 
he maintained 'I;hat from a Leab"Ue of nutions point 01 view he 
ae;reed with Jordan. He argued that the scramble for conoessions 
in 0~ina had caused at least one civil and one foreign war. 
and t1w.t further conflicts were likely. Jrherefore; 
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'To consider merely the undesirability of probing this or 
that concession is a very superficial way of approaching the 
problem. Ordered Chinese prosperity is of great value to us 
and fre0dom from danger of war is still greater. To secure 
these advantages we might well consider some present sacrifices.' 
Cecil's views were of particular importance regarding China's 
intprnal affairs for undoubtedly western statesmen were expec-
ting too much in their hopes for a stable and law abiding 
country with so much of China under foreign control. 
Support for Curzon's views was expressed by Macleay 
wh'o felt that a revision of China's international relations 
and treaty rights should be referred to the League of Nations, 
'when constituted'. This was a theme to which Macleay adhered 
throughout the peace conference, but the character of his re-
marks suggested that he was using the proposec League as a 
convenient method of deferring the issue. In fact Britain did 
not agree to a major revision of China's treaties until after 
the turbulent scenes of the mid-twenties when the so-called 
'December Memorandum' of 1926 introduced a more liberal atti-
10 tude to China. 
liia1s 6Qnsidera~ ~t the Shantung question at Paris iD before the eWcl1 of hn. 
There were various groups of Chinese living in Paris, 
especially students, who loudly demanded a major revisian of 
China's treaties and the return of the Shantung province, and 
one such group issued a memorandum which emphasised Wilsonian 
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idealS and was very close to China's peace desiderata. But 
Macleay brushed the memorandum aside stating that there was no 
need to attach any importance to the views of the committee 
which had issued it. ll Macleay then described an interview 
with Sze during which he gave the Chinese minister a warning 
tha t Bri tain would not support the main claims of the Chinese 
delegation. Apparently undet~rred Sze had stated that the 
Chinese government intended to ask the peace conference for the 
return of Kiaochow and former German rights in Shantung. 
Macleay replied by· asking how the Chinese were to meet the 
difficulties of the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1915 by which terms 
China had recognised Japan's claims upon the province, and Sze 
was temporarily at a loss for an answer, but he eventually 
adopted the argument that war-time agreements had been modified 
by subsequent events. Sze, however, admitted that he could not 
hope that the powers would agree to the ending of extraterri-
toriality, but he :ifi~lf. that some probati:)nary period could be 
agreed upon wherein China could undertake some judicial reforms. 
It would seem that Macleay was purposely using the 
treaty of May, 1915, to discourage the Chinese, for less than 
one month after his interview with Sze he seriously questioned 
the validity of the 1915 agreement, although he maintained that 
the Sino-Japanese treaty of September, 1918 was legally bind1ng~2 
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. WunBZ King, secretary to the Chinese delegation, blamed Macleay 
for creating a situation in which the British delegation had 
from the beginning of the peace conference.! ••• indlcated, 
privately of course, their readiness to side w1 th Japan, though 
discreetly on some other grounds than this specific commitment 
- -'13 "-. Li.e., the secret Anglo-Japanese treatie!! Balfour, on tl. 
1ll-
other hand, Claimed that Macleay, 'hates the Japanese', and 
various statements which Maeleay made proved that he had grave 
doubts about Japan's intentions. But there can be no question 
that from an early date Macleay had decided to support Japan's 
claims against China, and it would seem that he was particularly 
influenced by the secret Anglo-Japanese agreements of 1917, and 
the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1918. 
The question of Shantung was discussed by the oouncil 
of ten on the 27th and 28th January, and the deliberations have' 
been described in detail by Dr. Fifield.15 Macleay's account of 
the meetings 1s oontained in a letter to Maxl$uller who remained 
1n London as head of the far eastern department, and he stated 
that Baron Makino, a former Japanese minister for foreiln 
arfairs and a member ot his country's delegation, had clalm.d 
from the German government: 
'The leased territory of K1aoehow together with the 
railways and other rights possessed by Germany 1n respect 
of the Province or Shantung'. 
'All the islands in German6Possession 1n the Pacific Ocean north ot the Equator ••• ' 1 
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Makino explained the circumstances of Japan's entry into the 
war and stated that his country's post-war claims aimed to 
prevent a revival of German military activities in the far east 
which would render earlier Japanese sacrifices useless. Some-
what pointedly Macleay coamented that Makino 'said nothing 
about Japan's intention to restore Kiaochow to China' in his 
opening statement. 
Macleay continued by saying that Wellington Koo, a 
representative from the Peking government, made a speech which 
earned widespread admiration, and 'claimed the direct restora-
tion to China of the leased territory of Kiaochow, the railway 
in Shantung, and all rights which Germany possessed in that 
Province'. Koo's Inain arguments were that the territories 1n 
I question were an integral part of China which had been wrung 
from her by force, the.territories were vital to China's defen-
ces, and that the Tlingtao-Tlinanfu railway was partieularly 
important as it led directly to Peking. Also, Koo claimed that 
China's declaration of war abrogated the treaty of 1898, whereby 
the areas in question were leased to Germany, and the terms of 
the treaty precluded any ri&hts of transfer to another power. 
Macleay stated that Makino had replied by referring to 1apan's 
ultimatum to Germany, wh1ch contained the eventual restoration 
of the area to C~ina as one of ita objectives, and the Japanese 
delegate ~ that: 
r 
lA friendly exchange of views had taken place on the 
subject between the Chinese and Japanese Governments and 
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Japan had agreed to restore Kiaochow as soon as she had I 
free disposal of the place. Agreements had also been 
reached with regard to the railways. As notes had been 
exchanged he thvught that a statement of these engage-
ments might be worth the consideration of members of the 
Council'. 
The Chinese delegation then countered by offering to produce 
copies of the war-time Sino-Japanese agreements regarding Shan-
tung, which caused marked reactions from Japan that continued 
after the council had oeased its January deliberati~ns of the 
Shantung question. 
Undoubtedly the arguments before the council resulted 
in China winning sympathy for her claims for it was felt that 
' ••• from the legal point of view the Japanese could make a 
powerful argnment, but that from the point of view of political 
and mural principles the Chinese had presented a ~trong case~,17 
The presentation of the opposing claims of China and Japan before 
the council forced the powers to declare their attitudes over 
Shantung, and almost immediately differences between the United 
states and Britain emerged. 
Dr. Fifleld's conolusions on the January meetings 
concerning Shantung are that Japan placed much importance upon 'I 
her treaties with China of 1915 and 1918, and the complementary 
Sino-Japanese exchange of notes of May, 1915. 18 Japan allo 
ubviously placed much emphasis upon her 1917 agreement with 
Britain, and in the early stages of the peace conference Japan 
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was alarmed lest the advances which she had made in China during 
the war should be taken from her by an agreement among the powers 
who were again able to give greater attention to far eastern 
affairs. Naturally Japan was anxious to obtain the agreement of 
both China and Britain to her plans, but adding to Japan's 
worries were the fears that: 
' •• Great Britain, and especially France, though friendly 
to the Chinese desiderata of Japan, would not be in a 
position to take a strong stand because of the attitude of 
the United States. The Japanese delegates concluded that 
it did not seem probable that Great Britain and France would 
in thA end support them if this policy resulted in impairing 
American friendship.'l9 
But Japan's fears, at least as far as Britain was concerned, were 
to prove groundless. 
EVidence of the way that the British delegation were 
thinking is provided in a minute written by Macleay after Makino 
had made a press statement describing Japan's aims. Maelea1 said 
that the press statement: 
'certa1nly &10 .... over some awkward an~ discredit-
able episodes in Japan's past policy towards China espeeially 
in reference to the presentation of the notorious 21 demands 
in 1915 which are naively stated to have been made "in a 
desire to bring about a rapprochement with China and to 
settle outstanding differences", but it admits that "it 
would be foolish to say that in the conduct of our LJapan'al 
political and commercial relations (with China) ••• ser1ous 
m1 stak.es have not been made". t 
Macleay's conclusions were that: 
96. 
'Whatever Japan's original intentions may have been 
1n reiard to Kiaochow, her statesmen appear to have 
rf;alised that they cannot come before the Peace Conference 
professing Japan's faithful adherence to the principles of 
C~ina's independence and territorial integrity and at the 
same time claim to retain possession of the important 
fortress and harbour of Tsingtao and of the railway to 
fsinan!u and to consolidate their position throughout the 
Province of Shantung by mili tary occupa ti·Jn and civil 
administration. Japan accOrdingly declares her readiness 
to restore the leased territory or Kiaochow to China on 
the under~8and1ng that it is first surrendered to them by 
Germany. ' 
It was further argued by Macleay that Japan's 'amour-propre' 
demanded the surrender of the previously German-held Shantung 
territory to her, and that when Japanese possession had been 
confirmed she would hand it to China in accordance w1 th the 81no-
Japanese agreements on the subject. 
Macleay envisaged Japan becoming the heir to German 
concessions, railways, and mines in Shantung which, he argued, 
'does not on the face of it appear to be an unreasonable inten-
tion'. He pre~ed that Japan would be prepared to compensate 
private German interests involved in the Shantung enterprises. 
Macleay recognised China's mistrust of Japan, especially her 
doubts regarding the 'eventual' restoration of Shantung, and that 
obviously China feared stalling tactics. Even if' China were 
accepted into some form of economic partnership, Macleay realised 
that she was worried at the possibility of a Japanese penetration 
into the whole of the Shantung prOVince, and the creation of a 
I 
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situation 'little different from that prevailing in South 
Manchuria'. But Macleay made no comments upon these recognised I 
fears of the Chinese, not even to giv.~an indication as to 
whether he considered them ill-founded. 
Macleay ooncludedl 
'China hopes to persuade the Conference to declare 
the 1915 treaties and agreements with Japan invalid on 
the grounds that they were extorted by force, but I do 
not see how she can expect the Conference to admit the 
validity of this argument in the ease of the agreements 
concluded in 1918 which although they may have been made 
for the advantages of a corrupt clique at Peking who jumped at an opportunity of making money out of a Japanese 
loan for railway construction in Shantung were neverthe-
less ostensibly bona-fide agreements between the Chinese 
and Japanese governments'. 
The substance of Macleay's comments were to prove in keeping 
with the policies which Britain adopted. 
Reinsch, the American minister in Peking, was of the 
same opin1on as Macleay concerning the character of the treaty 
Of september, 1918, but unlike Macleay he condemned the efforts 
which the Japanese were making to use the treaty to secure a 
pre-judgment of the Shantung question, and he argued strongly 
against Japan's attempts to dominate China. 21 The attitudes of 
the two men were in marked contra-distinction, and Reinsch's 
comments tend to encourage the ~uestioning of Macleay's reason-
ing that Britain should have stood by a treaty which he recog-
nised as having been concluded by 'a corrupt clique'. Hor was 
Macleay unaware of some questionable practices which Japan was 
using against China owing to China lodging her claims before the 
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council of ten and her willingness to publish the war-time 
Slno-Japanese treaties. One week before Macleay had written I 
the lengthy minute referred to above he had had an interview 
with sze, the Chinese minister, Sze had informed Macleay that 
he had just received information that Torikichi Obata, the 
Japanese minister in Pekin&, had tried to put pressure upon the 
Chinese government, including threats to send troops to Shan-
tung, in an effort to induce China to withdraw her complaints 
against Japan at the peace conference and curtail China's 
willingness to publish the secret treaties. 22 Macleay conclu-
ded ' ••• from my experience of Japanese methods and my acquaint-
ance with Mr. Obata I have no reason to think that Mr. Sze's 
account is exaggerated'. Macleay was of the opinion that when 
the question of Kiaochow came before the council of ten again 
the 'highly improper' action of the Japanese minister, Obata, ~panese 
should not pass unnoticed. Despite orficialldenials Macleay 
had no doubts that Obata had resorted to the use of pressure 
and threats. 
Early in March, Viscount Chinda, the leader of the 
Japanese delegation in PariS, issued a press statement denying 
23 
reports that Japan was trying to coerce the Chinese delegation. 
Underneath the Foreign Office's report of this statement is the 
pencilled comment, probably by Curzan, 'Methinks he doth protest 
""D'.lCh', ",ihilc t'1:~_clec-W e:)m-;.>l&ined hi tterly that the Japanese 
':;!')':"n:L~ trJ' t" ::!:::11::e };C'ople believe that the reports which have 
Th')se statements indicate thut 
r':aelca:y, ~8cT'it(' his support of Japanese claims, could be 
quite critical of thC3.t country. 
In Chlnft itself, British diplom:J.ts and officials 
"-;('1'.: v·.'r"J much conc'"'rned ,·.rith Jaro.n's activities. Jordan 
rCT''Jrtca +-;h:lt out of a total of 168 Japanese enterprises in 
T:::in:1nfu only 8 0/0 'fere commercial undertakings and 50 0/0 
~.,e!,e ~i ther 'brothels or drug shops selling morphia. To find 
a T'~:T:'['l11el to such del:tbernte exploitation of a weaker people, 
Jo::,:l'"'J1 ;1.!'~e(l, • one would have to go bacl{ to the treatment 
of the 'ztecs and l'cX'Uvians by the SpaniJ.rds'. 24 Just 
before ,To-.:-dan· S ,dispatch J. T. Pratt, the T3ri tish consul 
at r2sinan, ',.,.-rote a more detailed report on the Japanese 
activit:;,~s in :21w.ntunr; "Thich vms confirmca by Jordan. 25 
Pratt \'1ent into gre.'..i.t detail concerning Japan's 
(l-i.';c:r;r!"dn:t~: busines.;, r'lp.thods, her unfair treatment of 
f"'lrcj '::n 6hippinC;, the illc;;;al mel tin" d01;m of Chinese 
coin;Jge, the increase of Japan's influence, and the wide-
Sr:J:'~d encouragement of drugs and vice. Of particular 
i."~1.t(·r'e:"t t ~ the dolib.T;;...tions In Paris was the observation: 
r 
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'Shortly after the outbreak of war the Japanese Government 
gave assurances that her object in expelling the Germans 
fro:n TSingtao was in order to restore the place to China. :r 
It is safe to say, however, that in no quarter were these 
assurancp.s taken very seriously and there has never been any 
int"ntion to hold Japan to too literal a fulfilment of them. 
It would be mere folly to allow a modern up to date seaport 
town like Tsingtao to fall into decay under the unfettered 
control of the Chinese, and it was generally felt that the 
spirit of the promise would be adequately kept if the muni-
cipal Government of Tsingtao were left in foreign hands, on 
the Illudel of, though perhaps on more liberal lines than at, 
;yhanghai 1 whilst Chinese aspirations and national sentiment 
were sat~sfied by the formal recognition of Chinese suzer-
ainty' • 
These critiCisms of both Japan and China were obvious support 1 
for the policy of internatiunalising foreign rights in China, 
but unfortunately, perhaps, for the outcome of the critical 
Shantung negotiati:)ns which took place in April, 1919, neither 
Jor0.un's nor Pratt's dispatch arrived at the Foreign Office 
until Hay when they were not submitted to the ministers. 
Some ~scellaneous aspects of British policy towards China. 
As requested by the Foreign Office, Jordan gave his 
views upon China's peace desiderata, but his reply seemed to 
lack his usual force of argument, possibly because he had al-
ready expressed his opinions upon the need to internationalise 
26 foreign rights in China. Upon this pOint it must be ques-
tioned whether the professed Chinese desire for the consolida-
tion of foreign rights, even if granted, would not have caused 
a deep internal split with the Canton government for Macleay, 
in arguing against earlier proposals of Jordan for sueh inter-
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nationalisation, had stated that 'the more advanced political 
thought of Southern China would strenuously resist such foreign r 
tutelage,.27 But on the question of foreign troops, and con-
trary to Macleay's expectations, Jordan was opposed to China's 
claim for the withdrawal of foreign forces, and he dismissed 
the claim as being for bargaining purposes only: 
•• 'it would be a grave imprudence to withdraw foreign 
troops stationed in North China under 19<)0 protocol until 
a stable Government has been established in Peking, 
country reduced to a semblance of order, armies of mili-
tary governors disbanded and their place taken by an 
efficient national gendarmerie'. 
Such an expression of opinion was in keeping with Jordan's aims 
that in securing an improvement in Anglo-Chinese relations 
Britain's economic interests should be maintained and, where 
possible, expanded. This aim was clearly visible in the leading 
role w~ich Jor~an played in helping to obtain the expulsion of 
ex-enemy nationals from China. 
Perhaps the clearest indication of Bri tain' s motives 
regarc3ing the expulsion of ex-enemy nati::mals from China is to 
be found in the correspondence between the London Chamber of 
Comr.ierce and Balfour regarding a resolution which its far 
eastern section had passed. The resolution urged the British 
government to extend the acts of parliament concerning trading 
with the enemy for another five years regarding the Germans in 
Chlna. 28 A separate letter stated that the British chamber 
of cornrlerce in Shanghai thought that all Germans in China, and 
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if possible in Japan as well, should be repatriated without 
delay, and in support of the Shanghai body, the London chamber ·r 
of commerce called upon the British government to put pressure 
upon China and Japan to secure the desired expulsions. Its 
letter concluded: 
' ••• the business methods by which Germans in China 
previous to the War were able to encroach to a very 
appreciable extent on British Trade have always been 
considered unsound and objectionable, and, in effect, 
unfair competition. The attitude of the. Germans in 
China during the War is notorious and for these 
reasons alone ••• justify the foreg~ing request'. 
The ~oreign Office reply stated that negotiations to expel ex-
enemy nationals had already been taking place in Peking and that 
the Chinese Government had agreed to the British proposals. 
It seems that although Jordan faced considerable 
difficulties he was determined to press the issue of the repat-
riation of Germans to a successful conclusion. 29 To obtain the 
necessary shipping Jordan was in constant communication with 
the A(~miralty and there were difficulties in Gbtaining full 
Chinese cooperation, for thousands of enemy subjects had to be 
rounded up and temporary accommodation found for them. The 
United states believed Britain's motives were not unselfish, 
and\einsch in particular objected to Britain's actions. A 
brush with the Vatican occurred over the expulsion of German 
missionaries, and there were numerous questions of humanitarian-
ism to be considered. There was also the point that Japan was 
1 
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not expelling Germans from her territory; so why should China? 
'l'hr:)ughout these difficulties Jordan remained firm until several :r 
th)usand Germans were expelled f~om China in the early summer or 
191). Although there were other issues which influ~nced China's 
s~vFr~ignty, such as the banning of arms imports, foreign 
c~ntrol :>ver Chinese customs with resulting political impli-
ca tLms, and the maintenance of wirpless m:Jnopolies, the wisdom 
of the 3ritish government in seeking the expulsion of Ger~ans 
frDm China must be questioned, for it can be seen that, apart 
from any adverse influence upon Anglo..(!hinese rela tions, the 
3ritish government had left themselves open to charges of 
interested interference in China at the very time when the 
3ritish delegation were to help judge Japan's claims regarding 
Shantung. 
One must also question whether the Sritish government 
were consistent regarding policy, for on a number of occasions 
the Chinese delegation had been informed t~t only issues 
arising from the war could be dealt with, and that the peace 
conference was not an appropriate occasion for a general re-
vision of China's foreign treaties. Early in February, how-
ever, the British delegation wanted to raise the quest10n of 
the opium convention of 1912 at Paris, wh1ch had a special 
30 importance for China. But the United States was not in 
ravour or it being raised and correspondence went on throughout 
T'i,by·":..:r-:r Lll'lc1 ~~a~r:l; :In Hhetber tlle opiU11J issue should be dis-
c-' .. w::;ed. ::l. t ths c.onference. ·,v'b.ilo the otjcct of banning illegal 
.)-:)i UIn \',','1.8 ·:}J'~?i se'i·lorth.v th: .. : r.lOti ves of the British 
~_ • t..i 
.~~)VG '~Il1entc::'c not CO;UT)lc:tcly <.ll truj.:..; ti c for Ceci 1 Harmaworth, 
• Both the 70reiGD Office und the !Iome Office are 
ar ..:-:ious thJ..t s11ch a recolutioD [on the opium con-
v~ntion] should be tabled at the Peace Conference 
and it 1s pretty ccrtr.dn to be tabled by one Power 
0r an0ther. I suggest that the resolution should 
be tabled by us, if only for the reason that we 
ouc;ht to have the cren.i t of ta1::ine; a step which 
vlOuld be 'ij:..~rm.ly '.Jelcomcd t,y inJ.' 1 ut::mcial borlies of 
opinion in all countries. If we do not do it, the 
Americans probably will, ill!.. ,ot all the credi t(. ;1 
HHrn~~w0rth onphasi Ged t.h:J.t it \iQuld be a 'bull-point' to table 
such a resolution and, a1 thoul:;h he; rocuc;ni;')e(i tl:.:.:..t the peace 
CJnl"..:;l't:nce might be too busy to (:'08.1 ~;ith such secondary 
questions, he felt that in p:riodG of 'r:'H . lr:':inc time' the dele-
gations would be only too pleasod to do sOhlothing practical. 
p.R. Kerr's (private secretc..ry to tht:i P]:'i:1C ainiGtcr) reply to 
Harmsworth i'laS Gaatious and he stdtol~ho...Lt preliL1in:J.ries with 
Germany would have to be settled ~'ir,Jl;. ~jut he h~d asked M.F.A. 
danlcey, secretary "to the British J.e1 ° 6-.... t1C):i."l , I to 300 that if 
possible the British liolag.::...tion ::novo f::"i.':~l; in '~hc ID.:J.tter'. 
A eommenda.-blc feature of 13ri tish policy ',i,J,S the reason-
ing thd.t as Germany h .. d refused to ::.:;itjllthe opium convention 
of 1912, the peace con.' erence offaL'cd. d.11 oppcrtuni ty to force 
Germany • s hand. An answer to a parliillnentary question had 
made the British. government's prop0;;,lals common knoHledge 
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and early in April the United states dropped her objections to 
the mattpr being raised at Paris. But when the Americans 
chaaged their minds a statement by l1acleay revealed a selfish 
approach once more: 
'It is interesting to note that after having thrown cold 
water on our proposal .•• Mr.Lansing should come forward with 
the very proposal which we had made months before to the 
U. ~:.Government. However! as we have got in first wi th 'Jur 
:':em.)randum we shall not hope lose the Kudos of having 
been the originators of toe idea of bringing up the matter 
a t the Peace Conference' • 3~ 
rrhus it was largely as a result of the British aelegati::m's 
initiative that article 295, which made the opium conventl)n of 
1912 binding, was incorporated into the peace treaty. 
Britain's attitude to China on comparatively small 
matters must be judged as unhelpful. For example, in mid-
f.:arch the Chinese delegation submitted a claim to the peace 
conference for reparations for war damages against Germany. 
>fac1eay made a detailed examination of the Chinese claims which 
he stated would have to be decided by the reparations commission, 
but he expressed the opinion that some of them were absurd and 
others inadmissible. 33 While there were sound reasons for 
~·1ac1eay's criticisms of China's demands it is somewhat signifi-
cant that there was a complete ~ack of effort on Macleay's part 
to suggest any equitable solution. 
A further example of Britain's unhelpfulness arose 
when Lou Tseng-tsiang, the chief Chinese plenipotentiary, wrote 
106. 
to C1emenceau, president of the council, asking that China 
shJu1d be accorded representation upon a commi ssL:m to study [' 
the problems of aeronautics which the peace conference was 
about to establish. The letter pointed Qut that Belgium, 
Brazil, Cuba, Greece, and several other small powers were al-
ready represented, and it was argued that as the aeroplane was 
a thing ·of the future, and in view of the size of China, repre-
34 
sen ta ti:Jn should be granted to the Chinese government. A copy 
of Lou's letter was sent to the British delegation in Paris and 
pr:Jmpted Ha.1or-General Sir F.N. Sykes, a military adViser, to 
urge Salfour that British representatives on the commission 
shJu1d act for China. But Ba1four was most reluctant and argued: 
'I do not see how we can possiblY act for her LCh~a7 
formally though something might ~a1four's emphasi~e 
arranged privately. I much doubt however the wisdom of 
any such attempt; the Japanese and probably the Americans 
would resent it'. 
Salfour's rejection of Sykes' suggestion was undoubtedly correct, 
but it may be noted that Balfour did not urge the acceptance of 
China's request for representation despite the strength of her 
case. 
Foreign Railways 1n China. 
Questions relating to the ownership and control of 
railways were to prove of maximum importance to the Shantung 
problem, and in the early months of 1919 there Were considerable 
negotiations concerning the @oreignfrights o~ railways through-
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out China. The various lines crossed territories which were 
disputed by the affected powers and rendered the railway ques-
tion a very complicated one which is only briefly noted here in 
order to observe some of the political manoeuvres which were 
involved. For example, at the end of January the Foreign 
Office informed Jordan that Japan had decided to waive all 
claims to succeed German rights on the Tientsin-Pukow railway 
in order to 'give support to China in assisting her own rights 
against Germany ••• and to give China a free hand in respect to 
the railway ••• ' The Japanese memorandum concluded by saying 
that it was hoped that the British goverrunent would note 
Japan's fair-mindedness on the issue. 35 But when Jordan 
replied he stated that in his opinion the Japanese government 
had never had any right to state how the northern section of 
the Tientsin-P~kow railway should be disposed. Hence, when the 
Foreign Office replied to Japan they thanked them for their 
'fair-mindedness', but made the point put forward by Jordan. 
In mid-February the British consul in Chefoo for-
warded a letter from the local British chamber of commerce 
urging that as the proposed Chefoo-Welhs1en railway was vital 
to British interests plans for its construction should be 
sanctioned at Paris,36 but this was in contradiction to Jordan's 
warm endorsement of the railway section of China's peace 
108. 
desiderata which asked for the internationalisation of 
foreign railways in China. 37 Macleay was of the opinion that 
there were no reasons why Britain should not go ahead with 
construction without any reference to the peace conference, and 
it may be noted that he made no suggestion to consult Jordan 
on the issue. 
While the British were discussing their projected 
lines the Chinese government issued a memorandum which linked 
a Chinese claim for the restoration of the Tsingtao-Tsinan 
railway with their claim for the direct return of Kiaochow. 
The memorandum outlined the origins and extent of German rights 
in Shantung, claimed that Japanese military occupation had ex-
ceeded these rights, and gave China's reasons for asking for 
the direct return of the area and rights. With the memorandum 
were a number of documents and appendices. 38 A main point of 
appendix 6, a Chinese note of protest to Japan of 30 September, 
1914, was that Japan's military possession of the K1aochow-
Tsinan railway had occurred after German troops in Shantung 
had been defeated and the railway was a private affair, having 
been built with German and Chinese capital. Japan's answer 
had complained of the Chinese government being 'suspicious of 
Japan's every movement', but British officials were not im-
pressed with Japan's 'very poor argumentation'. 
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If Japan were using war-time developments concerninE 
the railways to extend her economic and political influence over 
China, especially in Shantung, then such devel~pments were 
obviously relevant to the peace conference, but the issue .... 'as 
clouded by the Sino-Japanese agreements and someSritish 
officials were against the Shantung railway question being 
considered at Pari s. For example, C.]. Tufton, cOWlsellor of 
embassy attached to the British delegation, argued that China 
had bartered away the ex-German railway concessions to Japan in 
return for a loan, and he did not see the peg on which the con-
ference could hang its intervention in the matter. He tl1~Ught 
that to place the railways in any country under some form of 
internat1~nal control was precisely what the ec~nomic section 
of the British delegation were trying to avoid, and thus this 
was another British voice arguing against Jordan's proposals. 
Tufton concluded that the transit and transport cOlli1cil of the 
League of Nations, 'if and when set up', could examine the 
entire question. 39 
In view of later developments both at Paris and 
Washington one must question whether the majority of British 
officials had realised the real significance of the Shantung 
railway issue and its relevance to the political situation. 
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Further considerati~f the Shantung issue. 
Following China's presentation of her claims for the 
restoration of Shantung at the council of ten at the ene of 
January, her delegates continued to press her case by means of 
memoranda and interviews with foreign statesmen, and it can be 
seen that most of the issues raised by the Chinese delegation 
at Paris were of relevance to the Shantung question. 
The use of Japanese loans to influence Chinese poli-
ticians was krDWA to the British· c1elega tion, and in February 
the Foreign Office reeeived information that Japan was threat-
ening to stop giving China further financial aid because of 
the latter's demands for the restoration of Shantung. But 
1-1aeleay did not believe that the Japanese had made such a 
threat, or if they had it was not to be taken seriously, and 
his reasons for this conclusion reveal a marked awareness of 
Japan's interference in China's affairs. Hacleay argued that 
the Japanese government were not disposed to stop the Japanese 
banks from making loans to the Chinese northern military party, 
'who use the money to raise troops to overawe the South and 
prevent a peaceful settlement of the struggle between the two 
40 parties'. Such a realisation, one might have thought, would 
have helped to reduce the continuous British criticisms of 
China's internal Situation, but often the question of the in-
fluence of foreign powers was completely absent from British 
assessments of China's internal affairs. 
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While this int~rference in China's sovereignty was 
occurring, Jornan, in a private letter to Lord Bryce, a former 
3ritis~ ambassadGr in Washington, expressen considerable pessi-
mism ')Ver Anglo-American~hinese relat1::ms. l1is comments on 
the 0evel~ping situation were quite scathing: 
' •• It is no wonder that, as you say, the very exis-
tence of China has been forgotten. F.Jr oy,t'r four ye.,ars 
there has been a rigid Press censorship Lin Britain! and 
not a word reflecting upon Japanese action in this 
country has been allowed to appear in the British press. 
l'her~ may have been some excuse for this during the ~,~ar, 
but th~re is none now and yet this deliberate suppres~ion 
of the truth still continues. The "Times" devotes half a 
column to describing the pedigree of some obscure Japanese 
prince and gives two or three lines of small type to re-
cording an important movement in China. There is no one 
at home who has any real knowledge .Jf recent developments 
in this country and I am not sanguine enough to expect much 
from the Peace Conference. We and the Americans work to-
gether v~ry closely and Anglo-American Associations have 
been established in Peking, Shanghai and other important 
centres. Their activities are dOing much good and useful 
work, but these\.local efforts make little impression out-
side of China' • .,.1 
Obviously, Care must be taken in assessing the views of men-on-
the spot who claim that their part of the world has been for-
gotten, but Jordan's complaints about British sentiments being 
pro-Japanese could scarcely be dismissed as mere bias. It would 
seem that Jordan was accurate in describing the degrep of loeal 
Anglo-American co-operation, and there was clearly a great deal 
in common betwNm the ideas of Jordan and Reinsch, but whereas 
the 1merican delegation in Paris were fairly sympathetic to the 
Affiprican minister's views, even if Reinsch did consider the 
support offered to be inadequate, the British delegation had 
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\.Iang 
rcvL::ion of thr; 'ere., tip S .J.nJJ exclE~n~"(~ 0'.' notjcs which \..fang claimec 
it '::L.!.S rc~o ~:li~)r;d, \'</011L1 ~tff(;ct not ",nly J:lpcm's ri~'!-lts in 
'~;hantunr~~, but <.I.' ;~o Japan' s s:v~ci ,1 '[10 ,:i t10n and int~re9ts in 
o.·-ld -=:alny, the t~T~:JS f') ~ t11(~ south ~:t:nch~".:~:·i 1. D.nd .\n'!;1L'1[j rail-
''''''J,y concGG.:3ions, and th:::- 'I'lnyehf',:tnr~ !!!ini~r; 3.r;rc ::?T'lent. AoIording 
to :-Tucleay, \hmc; ~.yished tl') n9CeT't~I:i1J "rhet'her tr.c Eri tisb. pleni-
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• •• cvcrn if ti.r:' U(')TI f!Or':'r:' ce '.oJc-:-:e unable to 
discuss the matter or to express any opinion 
eT' the Vii 1.IHty of PLC tr~J·:ti0S, ~.t ni~'!1t be 
prepared to muke 8011le formal stutement to the 
cff3Ct th~t, i~ its vie~, the claim of Shi~a to 
the revision of these treaties was one which 
should:;o ::,r:;f'~>l'rei 1;,"1 C-~.e I.e:;~~;: or ~T::ttion3·. 
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and Wang had argued that unless these questi )ns c:>uld be dis-
cussed, which were vital to China's interests and tl1E" future 
peace of the far east, and if China were to be left in the 
position resulting from the 1915 agreements, all hFr war efforts 
would have been in vain. 
In reply to Wang, Nacleay had stated that the Paris 
conference was a meeting of the allied powers vlhic':l aimed at 
reaching a peace settlement, and that it could n:Jt be expected 
to decide upon matters which had not arisen out of the war and 
were of n) c:mcern to Germany and ) ther 0.x-enerny C Qun trie s. 
Jbviously the conference 'could n:>t constitute itself into a 
sort of tribunal to adjust old grievances between Allies'. 
Therefore, Hacleay continued I (in his prlva te opinion) that it 
would be ina~visable for China to raise the ~uestion of the 
twenty-one demands and t~e other treaties of 1915, exc~pt those 
which concerned previous German rights in Shantung and the 
leased territJry of Kiaochow. Macleay pressed his case by 
adding the point that if the Chinese delegati:>n were to try to 
use the conference to formulate a serious indictment against 
Japan rpgarding her past policies towards China in )r~~r t:> 
obtain an expression of international sympathy it would b~ em-
barras~ing to all the members present. Japan as well as China, 
it had to be remembered, had been an ally :>f 3ritain ~uring the 
war, and Macleay thought that in the circumstance~ it would be 
lIlt. 
inadvi sable for C b.ina to antagonise Japan in such a fashion. 
iI (' ".uesti.)ned whet"ler it would not be wiser to wai t for the 
CT'e~l tion of t'1e League of Nations to which disputes concerning 
the rrvision of treaties could be referred. 
In reviewing the interview Hacleay was of t'1e opinion 
tha t .Jang had received some kind of promise from the Americans 
for a rev Ision of the 1915 trea ties which made Wang the m'ore 
anxiJus to know the possible reacti.Jns of Sri tain. i·lacleay 
argued t:1at the Bri tish delegation should formally inform ';Jang 
that t~ey considered it would be: 
' •• undesirable for China to raise at the Peace Confer-
ence the question of the 1915 treaties, with the exception 
of the Kiaochow and Shantung Agreements, as well as any 
other matters affecting her international relations O~ 
the past poliCies of the foreign Powers, which have no 
connection with the war and no bearing on tl-J.e peace terms'. 
~iacleay conclu0ed by referring to the fact that the demand for 
::119 revision ·of China's treaties was not in keeping wi th the 
aims of the Peking government which, being unn€r the domination 
of Japan, might repudiate the actions of their own delegates if 
such matters were raised at Paris. 
No doubt China could be criticised for making such 
widespread demands for the revision of her treaties, but at 
internati)nal conferences it is common practice for a country 
t,1 demand more than it expects to receive. ~'Tha t is perhaps 
~ignificant in Hacleay's memorandum is that despite the evidence 
Jf Japan's interference there was a total absence of any 
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gesture of friends'IJ.ip or encouragement to C ~ina, IDwever va[,ue, 
.~ even though the si tua tion wau1c1 :lave seemed to 
jusr,ify such a ffi.JVe. 
at the l"oreign Office which provided the interested Britis~ 
officials with an opportlillity to re-appraise t~eir attitudES. 
'L'he mem::>randum r evi ewed the main evpn ts in C'1ina sinc c the mid-
19th century and its tone was 0E'cioP(ny anti-Japanese. It des-
cribed the twenty-one demanns of 1915 as an unparal1ele1 attack 
upon the integrity of China and the policy of the ')pen door'. 
It stated: 
'The demands caused a sensation in China. But for 
the war they could not have been presented without danger 
of complications elsewhere. As it was, Japan was given 
hints by the Allies to restrain 'lJ.er dernnnds wi thin t 11e 
bounds of her obligations to them, but she gave little 
~eed to these hints •• L • _ 
•.•• The effect Lof the twenty-one demand~ was to 
make Japan predominant in China at the expense of the 
~~estern Powers, and to place the Chinese Government under 
Japanese influence in a manner wh4Ch is certain to pro-
voke dissension sooner or later'. j 
With the Chinese delegation at Paris pressing for the reVision 
of the 1915 treaties, one might have thought that interested 
Bri tish officials would have made some relevant com.~en ts upon 
the memorandum, either to dispute facts presented or aefend 
attitudes adopted. But Macleay only made the brief co~~ent, 
'ThFre is nothing new in this'. 
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1'here were many striking similarities between the 
confidential memorandum of the l?oreign Office and a :nemJ:rOindu~n 
sent to Lloyd George by the Chinese Students Union in Pr-:king 
early in March. 44 This memorandum asked thE: prime minister to 
support China's case against Japan and China's struggles to 
obt.ain 'a just peace'. The students' uni:>n clai:u€a that 
Japan appeared intent upon the permanentoccupation:)f Kia)cl:::Y",r 
and the ending of the open-door policy. It claimed that: 
';Jhen that ambition of hers LJapan'il is fully 
realised, it will, we may safely predict, bring about 
another world upheaval like that which ~as just come t) 
an end, a catastrophe to all mankind'. 
'2he memorandum continued in this ra ther extreme language to 
claim that in the general interests of peace the war-time 51no-
Japanese treaties, 'like the Treaties of Buchares~ and 3rest 
Litovsk', should be pronounced null and void. 
Macleay's reactions were to repeat his ~pinion that 
the peace conference could not discuss China's complaints 
agains t Japan which aid not ari se from the war and t!1erefore a 
general revision of treaties was impossible. But he continued 
by stating: 
'There is much truth in the descripti~n of Japan's 
policy and considerable justification for the fears ex-
pressed in this letter as to the ineVitable result of a 
continuance of that policy, but China's remedy w:mld 
appear to be in an appeal to the League of Na ti )ns, w~1en 
constituted, and not to the Peace C~nference'. 
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~~o ~ncouragement WdS given to the Chin~se students for ,:dxnuller 
argued tiat the prime minister'~ secretary shoul~ reply tJ t~e 
::leDDrandum merely acknowle<iging its recei;Jt an r< E:'t3.tlnc t'lU.t it 
112.d been forwarded to the Bri ti slt nE'lega ti)n in P3.ri s. ,d. few 
days later Kerr coml~en terl that tl-}l s "'ad been ~Jne. 
During the first ten weeks of the peace conference 
the Sritish delegation ltad taken a number )f ~t('j;s w"lic'.., 
fav:1ured Japan's position in China, and althoug~ tllE' iSSUE: )f 
Shantung had still to be deci r1 ed it seemed almost ccrt3.in that 
Britain would support Japan's claims in the spt~lement Jf ~~e 
question. However, Britain was by no means una, . .,are .Jf some of 
the dangerous aspects of Japan's policies in C~ina and the 
potential risks to her own interest~ in that CJW1try. It is, 
therr;fore, somewhat surprising that the British gover~~ent did 
not adopt a firmer attitude towards Japan, p.Jssibly by letting 
it be known t~at it would give at least sympat~etic considera-
tion to China's case if it were brought before the League )f 
Nations. But efforts on behalf of China to obtain expressilDs 
of sympathy were either refused or ignored, and it must b9 seen 
as part of British policy that no such statement was issued. 
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CHAP'rER IV 
THE APRIL NEGJTIA'fIJNS 
During April, 1919, a aecisi0n was ~eachen by the 
delegates of the United states, Britain, and Prance w~ich 
tieterminen t'rJ.e Paris settlement of t1:1e 3}lantung c')ntrovsrsy and 
1 r~sultea in articles 156-7 being written into the peace tr0uty. 
These negotiations have been describen in 0f'!,tail by T')r. ','ifi01d 
who argues that throughout the exchanges ~ritain regarde~ h~r-
self as being cO~Ditted to support J~Dan's claims re~ar~i3g the 
province, and there can be little doubi: that his concl'1.2i)i1.~ are 
2 C0rrect. But of obvious interest to British policy are t~e 
motives and character of such support. 
In considering the negotiations it is important to 
recall that the controversy concc,rning Shantnng was :mly one 
of the many problems which facea the delegatps -;f t':lc major 
,,,astern powers whose principal task was to det~rmine a pl?3Ce 
settlement wi th Germany. One may c::>nclude tha tit was ty[;ic:ll 
of such conc~rn that when Phi1ip Kerr, L10yd George's priv3.te 
secretary, prepared a memorandum, which ranged wice in its 
considerations of how a firm but just peace could be achi~ved 
with Germany, it said very little about t1:1e influencE' of t'le 
far east upon international relations. Kerr's contention that 
the first condition for the success of the a1l-impartant peace-
preserving League of Nations was an understanding that there 
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should be no competitive building up of rival fleets or armies 
among the British Empire, the United states, France, and Italy 
completely ignored Japan, and prompted Drummond, a member of 
the British delegation, to suggest that it would be wise to 
include her. 3 
In addi tion to the multiplici ty of the problems wllich 
confronted the Bri tish principals one must c)nsider the grasp 
which they had upon far eastern affairs. The Britis~ prime 
minister's understanding of the area was generally recognised 
as being limited, and Dr. Morrison, whJ was present in Paris 
as an adviser to the Chinese government, concluded that Lloyd 
George 'seems woefully ill-equipped for settling these important 
I 4-questions. It may be argued that 9alfJur's knowledge Jf the 
Shantung issue was not as deep as Dr. Fifield maintains, fJr a 
current criticism, that of Sir Charles Addis, a leading banker 
with an extensive knowledge of far eastern affairs, was 'Quite 
5 frankly he LBalfourl' admi ts that he knows nothing abJut China. I 
But if Addis's comments were correct it can be seen that 
Balfour did not act in keeping with his knowledge. Undoubt~dly 
t1acleay, who had served in the far east, had a detailen command 
of the issues involved, but his attitude to China has already 
been observed as being unsympathetic to China and during April 
his attitude hardened. 
An indication of Macleay's hardening attitude appeared 
when he gave his opinion upon the course of action which he felt 
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should be adopted following the request of Lou Tseng-tsiang, 
the C~ief delegate, for an interview with 3a1four, the British 
foreign secretary. Nacleay speculated upon the reasons for t:1e 
requested interview and concluded tllat Lou lseng-tsiang·." (Lain 
purpose was to seek Balfour' s advice \:m thf' Shantung issue. As 
a result i'~acleay thought that • ••• in ViEW of our commitments to 
Japan I suggest that Hr. Balfour should excuse himself :ro::: 
r eceiving ~,ir. Lou T seng-tsiang •.• • Consequently a letter 
wri tten in the formal third pers0n asked t:lat 3alfour be excu:isd 
from the requested interview, ' ••• as he has bef'n advist-'d by lis 
Doctor to leave Paris for a few days', but th.at jalf·::mr woulrl 
be pleased to receive any co~nents which China ~ight likr to 
make in writing, 'in Qrder to avoid delay,.6 
Undeterred by Balfour'8 diplomatic illness, Sze sub-
mitted a memorandum whiCh asked for the sympathetic support of 
Bri tain when the Shantung issue next came before t'.1e courlcil of 
four. 7 The memorandum paid tribute to Britain's friendly 
interest which had contributed 'in no small measure to C:1ina's 
rapid progress in recent years', and it went on to emphasise 
the importance of the Shantung issue to China as wpll as the 
foreign powers. But any hopes which China had for 3rltish 
support were discouraged, for after a delay of mJre than a fort-
night during a critical phase of the Shantung negotiations a 
most formal reply was sent. The reply merely acknowledged 
receipt of the memorandum and stated that the British foreign 
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secretary ' ••• has duly noted the views of the Chinese Govern-
ruent ••• ' 8 This reply was sent only after careful considera-
tion by Hacleay whose comments might be judged J so important 
~s to an assessment of British policy that they justify a fairly 
full quotation: 
I'rhis LChines!1l Memorandum shews clearly that even 
if Japan carries out her un;,1ertaking eventually to re-
store the leased territory of Kiaochow to China, her re-
tenti~n of the German railway and mining rights in the 
Province of Shantung and her possession of an exclusive 
Ja:'anese conces 91)n including the port and business part 
of the town of 'rsingtao will, from China's point of view, 
cJrnpV'tely nUllify the value of the rest::>ra tion. Japan 
in fact will retain the substance and give back to China 
~~r~ly the shadow'. 
'I think that it is more than probable that Lord 
Gr~y did not fully realise what far-reaching effects the 
promise which he gave to Japan in February 1917 to support 
~er claims in regard to the disposal ::>f German rights in 
Shantung at the l)eace Conference would have and I believe 
that Sir John Jordan was not conSUlted. It will be remem-
bered that the assurance was the price extracted by the 
Japanese for the naval assistance in tl:le Hediterranean of 
which we then stood in urgent need. We could not without 
committing a breach of faith tOVI-,rds our old Ally ignore 
this assurance or admit the validity ••• of the Chinese 
memo. It is therefore somewhat difficult to suggest what 
answer should be sent to the Chinese Delega tion •••• ' 
Hacleay continued by suggesting that the reply be limited to a 
statement that China's comments would be borne in mind when the 
issues were next d1scpss~~, and concluded: 
'If, as I antiCipate from conversati::>ns which I have 
had with Members of the American Delegation, President 
Wilson strongly supports the Chinese claims, it may be 
possible to suggest a compromise. Until the attitude of 
the American Plenipotentiaries is definitely known the 
Japanese are not likely to accept any suggestion that 
they shOUld revise the condit1ons on which they are at 
present prepared to restore Kiaoehow to China but if 
President Wilson refuses to agree to any settiement of the 
Kiaochow and Shantung questions, which he considers in-
compatible with the 14 POints, they might welcome our 
intervention' • 
A brief comment by Ra~dlnge, permanent under-secretary for for-
f'ign affairs, supported the proposal that a formal aclrJlowleog-
.p~ 
ment ~ )&t»r dispatched to the Chinese delegation. 
Macleay's comments were harClly a credi table reflpcti::m 
of the British government's treatment of Jordan in 1917. ~ ft 
would seem that the main theme of Macleay's reasoning was t"1at) 
even if Japan werei\seeking to exact a higher price for '1f!r 
exertions than ~ad been originally expected, it was a point of 
JJt 
British honour that the price should~be fully paid, albeit at 
China's expense. One might judge that following the poor treat-
ment of the British minister an even worse t~eatment of the 
country to which he was accredited was contemplated. ;'acleay' s 
concluding paragraph was Q~doubtealy lacking in principl., for 
Britain was not a disinterested party to the point at issue and 
therefore lacked the essential quality to entitlr hrr to arbi-
trate between the claims of the two countries. Indeed, the 
tone of l'Iacleay's suggestion to arbitrate indicates that he 
was more interested in achieving a diplomatic success than 
securing an equitable solution of China's claims. 
China's continued pressure. 
While the Chinese government and delegation were 
seeking diplomatic support for their claims regarning Shantung 
they maintained a steady flow of press statements and published 
memoranda. Rarly in April they issued a semi-official state-
ment, which was thought to have been drafted by Morrison, that 
contained cogent arguments against the Japanese case. 9 The 
Chinese statement began by recognising that Japan had lost 
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sori,e 2,000 lives in expelling the Germans from Shantung, but 
:~hE; a ::tenti,)n of the Chinese people had been drawn to the fact 
that in the expulsion of Germans from the Alsace Lorraine area 
the ~merican army had sustained l~sses thirty times greater 
than those of the Japanese at Tsingtao. But unlike the Japan-
ese in relation to China, the United states goverrunent had not 
clai;:1ed ''Jne foot of railways or one yard of the rich mining 
lands :.>f the recoveredF'rench provinces. Nor was such liberal-
i ty confined to America for it was also well known that England, 
1I\.,rho has made the fields of Flanders one vast cemetery for her 
youthtl, and incurred a tremendous national debt, had made no 
I dem.:.lnds upon 3elgium. The report also defended China's war-
timr efforts. 
Jordan praised the Chinese statement and argued that 
it could do nothing but good as it contained statements of 
facts that were historically correct and which needed emphasis-
ing at a time when the Japanese were seeking to confuse issues. 
These comments referred particularly to the sections of the 
Chin0.se statement which dealt with China's actions during the 
war and were pertinent to the peace conference, especially in 
view of Balfour's repeated criticisms of China's poor perform-
ancp during the conflict. Jordan argued that the Foreign Office 
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tn,J~ilj t:y" of the allied 
()~~ ') ,'d ti on. 
J . .,;; .TaTlan's 
• ••• to :,.,-rr".J.t; Cr:.5..n<~ o:;ta.i"';.jn~': th r:~ ~restir;e B.nd 
influoance in the (;ouncilG 0:2 the ~~11ies which she 
wl)ulc h'iv~ ()t;hel"v'!"l f~e 3ai.ned hy ,?'ctive int f"!J"v8nt ion, 
and Hhich would bu.ve Ci V0n her a definite voice in 
the (lisposal of JCiaochcn,·. 
Jord:.m conclu0fhl hy ct'ltin:: that 1L.'1.til the United Sta.tes had 
C?nterea the:: conflict, ·vlh:i..ch had. a dtrect bearine; upon 0hina's 
dinlomatic Hctiorl3, th~~ :."\ttitude of l~ri.tish residents in China 
to~·mrcls the Jap;.meee was largely ono of self-effacement in 
arier not· to pJ'ejudiee the ·.rider 3.~pects of the war. But 
Balfour's actions later in April do not indicate any recog-
nition of Jordan's Case ar;ainst Japan, or indeed, that he had 
noted the points made. 
Chin:.;., ho\"ever, Wd,S continuins her diplomv.tic offensive 
and her next step WClS taken \'fhen Louisf.nG-tsiang addressed 
a letter to Clemenceau, pres1_dent of the peace conference t 
asking th~t the pe,~.ce treuties re[!ul:ttin.;-:; Austria and Germany' 8 
relc:tions with China should be on the basis of equality and 
reciprOCity. The letter emphasised the importance which China 
att~.ched to the principles of equity, and it expressed the hope 
that China's claims against Germany would not be overlooked. 
I, 
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But 1.acle<1Y was n:Jt sympathetic to what was essentially a 
recp0st for thf" direct return :Jf the former German rights in 
'3 11.:1n tung, and he ar gued tha t Japan was cf"rtain to :Jb jf"ct to 
l'J :~uc': .'l step_ In what seems a rather cowardly fashion i::acleay 
c::mcluded: 'In any case the onus of explaining t) the C'linese 
":01egati:Jn the reasons why their proposals have n.Jt been adapted 
,. , , 
seems tJ rest with the Secretariat General'. Thus ,just over Cl 
week bE'f,)re the CQuncil of three reached its o('ci si:)nm. t)18 
Shantung questi:Jn, i!~acleay appeared to be of t~e (It)ini:m t~lat 
the d8Ci sion ha.d alre,,~dy been made in Japan' s f~vJur. 
It is interesting to note the strikine c~ntrast be-
tween the attitude of the British govern~Gnt towards certain 
south American countries and China which is offered by the fact 
tha t 'I..Jhen Lou Tseng-tsiang was addressing his let ter to 
Cle:nFnce~u, Balfour was proposing to raise the status of the 
'3ritish ministers in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile to ambassador 
lrvel, and argued that although none of these countries vIaS 
very i~nportant they were of potential importance .11 This may 
have been very sound reasoning, but it appears strange t!1at 
Srazil, for example, whose lamentable war efforts have already 
been noted, should have received such favourable consicerati:Jn, 
whilst China's potential dpvelopment, despite the vicissitu1es 
of almost perpetual civil war, seems to have received scant 
notice from the British foreign secretary. 
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If Balfour did not accord China reasonable c)nsidera-
tion this was hardly due to any lack of Chinese pressure, for 
when t~p council of three were actively considering t~e Shantung 
controversy a conference was held in Paris of forpign based 
Cl1ines0 nationals which passed a resolution that called for the 
direct retroc~ssion of Shantung to China. The resolution asked 
the powers to declare that China should cease to be bound by the 
SinJ-.Japanese treaties and relevant notes 'of 1915 and 1918 on 
the grounds that the Chinese government concluded these agree-
ments only to expedite China's joining the war on t~le side of 
the allies. But if such an argument can be brus~ed aside as 
ridiculous, the concluding claim of the resolution that the 
promises of the powers to respect Japan's demands in Shantung 
were 'entirely in conflict with the Formula of Righteousness for 
which Great Britain, France, and Italy have proclaimed urbi et 
orbi t~at their manhood has fought and 0ied', might be seen as 
deserving a reasoned answer. l2 
Towards the end of April t~e Italian prime minister 
and c;1ief delegate, V. Orlando, temporarily left Paris in higl1 
dudgeon over the Fiume question. This event undoubtedly had an 
influence upon the remaining delegates, and it may be judged 
that Orlando's departure did not impress the other delegates 
with Wilson's firmness 1n dealing with opponents, but rather it 
resulted in a weakening of Wilson's position for he did not want 
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to see the Japanese leave Paris as well. Obviously such a step 
would have dealt Wilson's hopes for a League of NJtions a severe 
if not crippling blow, and the evidp,nce indicates that the 
American president was subsequently more willing to compromise 
over the Shantung problem. 13 
In trying to assess the actions of the British dele-
gates during the April negotiations a marked comparison can be 
made wi th American sources concerning the am'Junt of evidence 
available whereby eorresponding American policies might be 
judged. Whereas there is an abundance of American d~cuments, a 
government-produced history of thE=' peace conference which d8als 
with Shantung in detail, and biographies of American principals 
which describe developments at length, there appears to be little 
ma tf'rial on this question in comparable British sources. 'fhe 
published biographies of Bri tish prinCipals ign'Jre shantung com-
pletely or give it only scant a ttenti·on. It would seem tha t the 
British principals concerned regarded the issue as largely 
settled and this might explain the differenep, in the delibp.ra-
tions upon the Shantung quest.ions with American material. 
In a number of occasiJns Hacleay, at least, had spoken 
as if the Shantung issue had definitely been deeidec1 in Japan's 
1+ favour, and during an important interview between 3alfour and 
Wilson before the counci11~nsidered Shantung again, BalfJur made 
it clear that Britain would support Japan's claims. l5 
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It was reported that Wilson 'although reasonabl€, was inclined to 
favour Chinese claims as against Japanese', whereupon 3alfour 
had pointed out that the S~antung issue was regarded by Japanese 
public opinion as being a point of honour over which it woulc be 
dif"icult for the Japanese government to yield. If they did not 
yield, it had been pointed out to Wilson, Britain regarded her-
self as being bound by her pledges to Japan. 
After a meeting of foreign ministers on the same day 
as the Balfour-Wilson interview, the Japanese delegatr. took 
3alfour to Dne side and told him that he was ann JUS t:'1a t the 
questiJn of Tsingtao should not be discussed until the foll.Jwing 
15a 
week. Such a request indicates that there ,,,as a marked 
difference in the degree of consultation betwEcnSritain and 
Japan In the one hand, and Britain and China on V19Jther, fot' 
w~ereas the Chinese were denied an interview with 3alfour to 
discuss Shantung, the Japanese were able, quite easily, to press 
for the date on which they desired the council of four to discuss 
the question. 
Negotiations before th~ tEbUl)cil. 
The council~~an its further consideration of S~an­
tungon April 22nd when the Chinese delegation were represented. 
An immediate problem facing the council was the rtuesti'1ned 
validity of the relevant war-time treaties, and if Lloyd George 
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had a poor understanding ~f these agreements this did n~t pre-
vent him from making proposals which ~vunsz King has critically 
described: 
'Lloyd George ·was well known for his skill and 
audacity in participating in the discussion of a subject 
without knowing exactly what it was all about. Thus, 
having admitted that he had neVer heard of the Japanese 
twenty-·~ne <"iemands let alone the ultimatum, he did n~t 
11€sitate to put to Koo this question: Which China w,)uld 
prefer - -ro allow Japan to succeen t.~ the German ri gh ts 
in Shantung as stu ted in the treaty between C ~lina and 
Germany, or to recognise Japan' S posi tion in Sflantung 
as stipulated in the treaties between China and Japan. 
This sounaed like an ultimatum ana Dut the Chinese in an 
extremely embarrassing situation,.lo 
Only one day earlier Lloyd George had questioned ·wi1son why 
Kiaochow should be treated differently from other ex-German 
colonies regarding mandates, and it appears that Macleay had 
exerted pressure to induce the prime minister to respect Britain's 
war-time treaties. 17 Whether it was Hacleay's influence or not, 
at t, 11e important council meeting of .April 22nd Lloyd George had 
made it clear that Britain regarded her treaties as binding and. 
t:1at 5>19 could not turn to Japan and say, 'All right, thanlt y:m 
very much, when we wanted your help, you gave it, but we now 
think that the treaty was a bad one and should not be carried 
18 
out' • 
The Chinese replied to the question of the sanctity of 
treaties in a memorandum addressed to Wilson asking for S11antung 
to be surrendered first to the major five powers, and that after 
one year it be retroceded to China.19 The memorandum emphasised 
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that the Chinese delegation recognised the force of accepted 
obligati.Jns, but they questioned whether there was not a higher 
'.Jbliga ti:>n resting upon the council, which Ivas to remove the 
serious obstacles to a durable peace in the far east. In rela-
tLm t,) Shantung, the Chinese claimed tha t the cJuncil could 
make a settlement compatible with justice which woul:} ensure 
peace in the far east for at least half-a-century. But, the 
memorandum continued, if the council declined to mb.~e a just 
settlement because of certain obligations either imp,)sed on 
China by threat or force, or contracted by France and Britain 
in entirely changed Circumstances, it would probably be sJwing 
thp: sepos of oiscQrd for the future. The memorandum concluded 
by s ta tine that China was at the parting of the way s. C"lina had 
CQme to the west for justice, and if she were disappointeCl the 
Cl1in~se people would blame the west, and not Japan, for failing 
to giv~ her a helping hand 'merely because some of its leading 
powers had privately pledged to support Japan'. 
Undoubtedly China's appeal was strong, even if its 
concluding remarks were one-sided, and at an important stage 
the Chinese memorandUm posed the question whether the Shantung 
issue should be settled according to treaty obligations, the 
character of which was dubious, or in accordance with the prin-
ciples, however vague, of a just peace. It may be noted that 
2J this question weighed heavily on Wilson's mind. 
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As a result of L10yd George raising the questi8n ~f 
which alternative would China pref~r, the transfer of German 
rig~ts to ~, or the implementation of the war-time Sin1-
Japanese treaties, a panel of three experts, Haeleay, I'lilliams, 
and Gout, from Britain, United states, and France respectively, 
met to consider which alternat1.e would be most beneficial to 
China. The report was ready within twenty-four hours, an.d its 
0pening remarks were that 'either course presents serious ~is-
21 
arv3.ntaGes for China t • 
After considering the two alternatives the experts 
favoure0 the transfer of ex-German rights to Japan rather than 
the implemen ta tion of the Sino-Japanese ~.;ar-time treaties, because 
the latter step would have given the Japanese greater economic 
power in S'1.antung. An important article in the Sino-Japanese 
treaty was for the establishment of an exclusive concession at 
L'singtao, and in arguing against acceptance of t:v:~ war-time 
treaties the experts stated: 
,rrhis concession presumably vlould be permanent a..'1C 
if as is understood to be the case it is int~nded tnat 
thIs exclusive Japanese area shall include the greater 
part of the business portion of the town of TSingtao, the 
docks, quay and railway terminus, its effect, in our 
opinion, will be to diminish to a great extent the value 
of the i~nediate restoration to China or the leased 
terri tory t • 
It has already been noted that Hacleay had come to similar con-
clusions prlvately.22 Yet the recognition of the potential in-
fluence ·:)f Japan's claims did not dissuade the British delega tion 
from playing a leading role in the April negotiations of the 
Council w}H~reby international recognition was accorded to 
Japan's position in Shantung. 
E.T.Williams, the American expert, was dissatisfied 
with both the alternatives which had been presented to China, and 
je submitte~ a separate report to Wilson. 23 In his report 
,iilliaills advocated the adoption of a solution similar to that 
r(';'1uesten by China, namely, surrender :>f the province to the 
powers for one year and then retrocessiJn to t~e motherland. 
On the day following the issue of the rep:>rt of the 
experts, the Shantung question was discussed again at the council. 
At this meeting a proposal was made that if Japan were to have her 
own way over the disposal of rights in the province she would be 
agreeable to the ending :>f all unequal treaties with China but, 
'Lloyd George i~~eniately backed away from any 
relinquishment of the "unequal treaties". He stated that 
Great Britain "could not allow other nations to cooperate 
in the Yangtse Kiang, although we should like to, since 
w~ had not sufficient capital ourselves for deVelopment. 
The reason we could not d0240 was because we should have 
to let the Japanese in." , 
These com;nents are a furt~er indicati:>n that although Britain 
paid lip-service to the 'open-aoor' in China, in practice her 
policy was for the maintenance of spheres of interest. 
The question of the maintenance of such spheres, it 
has been noted, had been decided upon in late 1918, when Hacleay 
and :>ther leading British officials opposed the surrender of 
privileges in China unless there were economic advantages to 
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compensate for any retrocessions made. Before the peace con-
ference had started l1ac1eay had argued tl-lat during the making of 
t1-19 peace trea ty any forcing of the door regarding Japan t s posi-
tion in China should be left to the Americans, for if the Ameri-
cans failed to curb the Japanese Britain would have thereby 
25 
avoided antagonising the Japanese unnecessarily. An additional 
consideration for British policy was the ownership of Hong-Kong 
and the Kow1oon territory, for Curzon had recognised that while 
~ritain held these possessions it was unrealistic to expect Japan 
26 to surrender Shantung. As the situation developed at Paris it 
may be judged that not only were the British delegates leaving 
thE forcing of the door to the Americans, but were proving reluc-
tant to follow through once an opening seemed likely. Hence, 
Lloyd George's 'backing away' might be explained as a manifesta-
tion of the influence of Britain's pos sessions in China upon her 
policy. 
Japan maintained her pressure for securing a prompt 
settlement of the Shantung question and on April 25th her chief 
delegate, liarquis Saionji, wrote to Clemenceau stating that the 
council had heard the Chinese delegates on the Shantung question, 
and therefore Japan was asking for another meeting of the council 
in order that a final decision on the province could be reached. 27 
At the same time, Saionji's letter continued, the Japanese dele-
gates requested that owing to the special gravity of the issue for 
Japan they should be kept informed, as far as possible, in all 
phases of progress. 
A copy of the Japanese letter was sent to Hankey, 
secretary of the British delegation, and much to his annoyance 
137. 
it arrived while he was taking his morning bath. One can under-
stand f-Iankey's pique a t being thus disturbed but ,)ne can assume 
~'1a t he had time to allow his annoyance to subside before writing 
t) Balfour concerning the essence of the Japanese letter. But 
after making a mistake with the date of his own letter Hankey's 
statement to Balfour read: 
'Baron Hakino has already mentioned the subject to me, 
and I believe to you. He attaches extraordinary importance to 
it for some reason that I am unable to understand. As I 
understand the Prime Minister wishes you to take the lead so 
far as we are concerned in the discussions on the2~apanese 
claims perhaps you would bear the point in mind'. 
From the varied contents of the Japanese letter it can be seen 
that Hankey's note does not make it clear to what subject Makino 
was allegedly attaching such importance, Japan's desire for a 
decisi::m, Japan's request to be kept informed of progress, or the 
entire issue of Shantung itself. Yet whatever the subject may 
have been it is strange that Hankey could have found it so extra-
ordinary for Japan to be so concerned, for they were all relevant 
to Japan's consistent agitation regarding her claims for the pro-
vince. While too much should not be concluded from a letter 
written in such circumstances, Hankey's co~~ents cast doubt on 
the extent to which he understood the far eastern situation. It 
would appear that the importance of the task which had been given 
to Balf~ur concerning discussiJns with Japan had not been 
realised by Hankey, but possibly the importance of these dis-
cussi::ms only emerged as they entered the decisive phase. 
The Decisive Phase. 
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When Salfour began discussiJns with the Japanese 
delegates in late April he did so on very high authority fr~m the 
peace cJnference, for a letter from Lloyd George stated: 
'At the meeting, the President ~f the United 3tates, 
the President du Conseil of France, and myself agreed to 
ask you to discuss with the representatives of Japan ~n ~ur 
behalf the questions of Kiaochow and the German rights in 
Shantung which are in dispute between C'1ina and Japan. 'r"1ey 
will be glad if you can arrange to meet the Japanese Dele-
gates as soon as possible.'~9 
3alfour lost no time in meeting the Japanese delegates and t:me 
day after his letter from Lloyd George he issued a report on ~is 
conversations which stated that the Japanese strenuJusly "lpnied 
that they intended to modify in their own favour th~ conditions 
which the Germans had enjoyed in Shantung, or that their own 
30 treaties with China would have the same result. Indeed, 
Balfour reported that the Japanese were claiming that their en-
visaged military rights would be less than those enj~yed by t~e 
Germans, and that it was the intention of the Japanese to restore 
Chinese sovereignty wi thin the leased territory of Shantung. The 
report continued by stating that the provisions whereby Japan was 
139. 
to maintain a garrison at Tsinan to guard the railway were 
'purely provisional', and references were made to the transitional 
post-war period. It was stated that it was Japan's intention to 
rnai(e the occupation of the garrison as short as possible, but 
Balfour made the observation that no date had been given for the 
termination of the transitional periJd. Nor, it may be noted, 
did Balfour make any statement t~at he had tried to secure such 
a date. 
Balfour's special repor~.continued by saying that the 
rights which the Japanese proposed to retain were economic and 
consisted of a concession at Tsingtao which 'does not exclude ••• 
the right also to organise an internati.)nal concession, if that 
is desired'. However, the report gave'no outline as to the size 
or scope of Japan's proposed concession, the size of the proposed 
internati,)nal concession, nor the amount of TSingtao whic\l it was 
envisaged would be left to the Chinese. The report state~ that 
the Japanese were asking also for the transfer of previous German 
rights regarding the Shantung railways and the mines associated 
with them, but the Japanese stressed that the land on which the 
railways lay 'is in full Chinese sovereignty and subject to 
Chinese law'. In addition to the existing railways, the report 
continued, the Japanese wanted the transfer of the concession 
from Germany for the building of two new lines. 
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The concludin~ of Balfour indicate his acceptance 
of the Japan(~se clain~s~, 
"J.1he Japanese l)lenipotentiaries, for reasons of 
nution<.~l \.l.i'~llj.ty 'hfhich are f:'.osy to undercta:r.d, are 
WlwillinG to modify the letter Ol the Treaties which 
they h~,ve !'1;;,de \1 i th Chin:-., but th(!y c..re ready (if I 
understand them ri~htly) to give e~~licit and binding 
Cl.SI;3Ul'CUlCe::'l: -
Ca) That any concession '{!hich 0hina gives them at 
r.lsingtuo will not exclude other forGign enterprise 
from the Port t • 
Cb) rHut the economic control of the raihray, which 
the possession of the majority of the shares gives 
them \;ill n0t be used in a.':ly way to discrimin&te 
between the trade facilities of dj.fferent nations'. 
Despi te the[,e re as S"l.U'ance s , however, it may be judGed tho.t Japan 
'lrlanted not only to retain but to extend the economic rights which 
~acleay had earlier recoGnised would largely nullify the bene-
fits of any politicul retrocession to China, while the proposal 
for the creation of a Japanese concession atl~inetao had been 
specifically condemned by the report of the three western 
experts \iho saw such a step as p;iving Japan a powerful grip 
upon the centre of the port. But if Balfour were aware of 
Hacleayts understanding and the findings of the other two 
experts his report gave no indication of this fact, nor that he 
used any of their points in his consultations with thu Japanese 
delegates. 
Dr. Fifield has described how Lloyd George and Bal!our ar-
gued with President Wilson for the acoeptance of Balfour's spe-
cial report, but that \.Jilson would not agree that the Japanese 
proposals were better, as far as China was concernad. than atnna 
fer of former German rights to Japan. Balfour maintained that 
'I 
,1 
China would gain advantages as a result, and 'noted that his 
expert, ~·.acleay, had cross-examined the Japanese for an hour and 
'ITaS fLlally sa ti sfied wi th their proposal'. 31 But it may be 
jUd[8d that ~wleay's acceptance of the Japanese case did not mean 
~~at he agreed that Japan's claims were not in excess of former 
G:::;rman rights, but rather that Hacleay had become convinced of 
t:1e poli tical justice of the Japanese pr,Jposals. This may be 
seen m,Jre clearly in the official account of the exchanges: 
':lr. Balfour said that there was no doubt whatsoever that 
Japan was returning these terri tories to China on incompara~l~ 
~ better terms thrul Germany had held them'. 
'President Wilson said his experts did not agree'. 
':rr. 13alfour said that the United states experts had not 
heard the Japanese case. The same had applied to his 
expert, Mr. llacleay, who had signed the expert Report 
furnished at the request of the Supreme Council. After 
hearing the Japanese representatives and cross-exa\lltning 
them for an hour he had been entirely satisfied'. j2 
i~aeleay had been clear in his condemnation of the creation of a 
Japanese settlement at TSingtao and aware of the influence of 
the Shantung railways. 'rherefore, his acceptance of the Japanese 
case is surprising and, without any reasons given for his change 
of attitude, difficult to understand. 
There is, of course, the possibility that the British 
foreign secretary was indulging in diplomatic manoeuvres and 
seeking to involve the American experts, the majority of whom 
were known to be hostile to Japan's claims, in protracted 
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negotiations so that the British delegates could be provided 
with an opportunity to step in and mediate, as Macleay had at 
::me time thought possible. Yet so clear were Balfour's argu-
raents in favour of Japan, and so precise were his statements 
concerning 3ritain's position that this line of reas.)ning seems 
doubtful. One can only regret that no record seems to have 
survived explaining Macleay's change of opinion, or whether 
Jalfour was using the name of his expert merely to further his 
.Jwn case. 
The disagreement between the American and British 
(1elegates necessitated further consultations with the Japanese, 
and Balfour was given the task of writing to Makino to ask the 
Japanese delegates to attend a further meeting of the counci11~' 
After referring to the fact that the council had considered 
9alfour's special report, but giving no indication of the 
differences which had arisen, Balfour blandly concluded: 
'The only points on which your colleagues expressed 
anxiety were the temporary arrangements with regard to 
guarding the line and garrisoning Tsinan. These, as they 
pointed out, were not merely interferences with Chinese 
sovereignty, but interferences in excess of anything 
which the Germans could claim under their Shantung 
arrangements. They hope'~ you would consent to discuss 
this relatively unimportant aspect of the Shantung problem 
tomorrow at 11 o·clock. They quite recognise, and greatly 
regret, the inconvenience to which you may have been put ••• 
but they hoped that, inasmuch as the main doubts and 
difficulties connected with the surrender of the German 
lease appear to be already satisfactorily disposed of you 
will forgive the inevitable postponement of conversatIons 
upon the purely temporary arrangement which §till in their 
view seem to raise questions of difficulty.'33 
Dr. Fifield has made the point that in the subsequent negotia-
tions the 'relatively unimportant' aspect of the Shantung 
~uesti)n mentioned by Balfour proved a very seri:)us obstacle. 3lt 
lut of importance to British policy was the very tone of the 
l~tt2r,for at a crucial stage when Wilson was still undecided, 
and the majority of the American delegates were opposed to Japan's 
tlemands, Balfour's letter, with its implication that a settle-
~ent of the Shantung question could be obtained which would 
meet Japan's main desiderata if only several minor matters could 
be cleared away, must have been a great encouragement to the 
Japanese delegation. It may be noteo that in these delibera-
tions there is a marked absence of British consideration of 
China's desires, nor do the Chinese delegates appear to have 
been consulted. 
When the council met on April 29th some hard bargaining 
took place and a draft containing three proposals, of which 
Balfour was the main author, was put forward as a basis for dis-
cussL)n. The Japanese then asked for an opportuni ty for their 
full delegation to consider the proposals and the Japanese dele-
gates convened for this purpose during the evening. Afterwards 
Balfour met Makino and Ch1nda, and as a result Balfour wrote 
immediately to Wilson giving the details of the amendments which 
the Japanese wished to make to his earlier draft. The letter 
Idtlt.. 
be gan by s ta tlng that as the propo sed fo;,xmtiLa differedA from the 
one discussed that morning it might prove satisfactory. 
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Balfour then explained that the two modifications which the 
Japanese wished to make were underlined, and he argued that the 
second modification was the more important and was 'entirely in 
favour of Chinese sovereignty'. He enclos~d a copy of the 
formula which with the Japanese amendments stated: 
'l. The declared policy of Japan is to hand back to China 
in full sovereignty the Shant1L.'1g peninsula and to retain 
only the economic privileges possessed by Germany as well 
as that of establishing a Japanese settlement at Tsingtao'. 
'11. The intention of the clauses relating to the police 
on the railways is merely to give the owner of the railway 
security for traffic and will be usec for no other purpose.' 
'.lll. Such Japanese instructors as may be required to assist 
in policing the railway may be selected by the Compauy, 
but shall~aggointed by the C2ines~ Goyernment'. 3, 
Dr. Fifleld has referred to this letter and seems to accept 
3alfour's claim that the Japanese proposals differed 'but little' 
. 36 from those debated that mornlng, but such a claim might, on 
further consideration, be judged as false, and that the amend-
ments were distinctly in favour of Japan, not China. 
Jf obvious importance was Japan's amendment stipulating 
tha t there sl-:lould be a Japanese settlement at 'rsingtao, and in 
face of this proposal it is difficult to appreciate Balfour's 
claim that the second Japanese amendment was more important 
than their first. It was well known that the Japanese were able 
very often to influence the Peking government to do their bidding, 
and therefore the fact that China would have the right to apPOint 
Japanese police instructors was scarcely a serious advantage. 
If the railways in Shantung were to be extended, as seemed 
probable, it followed that Japanese influence in the province 
would consequently be increased. It would appear that Balf~ur 
was going to extraordinary lengths both in his actions and in 
the presentation of argument to put the Japanese case in the 
most effective manner, and in doing so he seems to have been 
oblivious of any possible reactions from the Chinese. 
Dr. Fifield has stated that he was unable to trace 
Wilson's reply to Balfour's letter in either American or British 
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sources. The present author was fortunate enough to find 
Wilson's original letter of reply to Salfour, ann it can be seen 
that the President's letter was basically a surrender to the 
Anglo-Japanese arguments concerning shantung. 38 Perhaps of 
relevance to \-/ilson' s methods of working on matter s of such im-
portance is that he had typed the letter personally ("1e 
apologised for the quality of the typing), and it may be nJted 
that the use of the first person was stressed rather than the 
reply being in the name of the United States government, for in 
returning the Japanese proposals, Wilson enclosed •.• 
, ••• a form which I hope you will be kinn en.::mgh to 
urge upon the Japanese. I hoped that I had made it clear 
to them that I could not accept a settlement based on the 
agreements with China, which all go back for their founda-
tion to an ultimatum connected with the wrongful Twenty-one 
Demands. The whole settlement must, in my view, be based 
u~on the German ri&hts and our present understandings. 
/Wilson's emphasil/. What I have written is exactly equiva-
Ient in substance to their form'. 
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Despite these reservations, however, the formula which Wilson 
enclosed revealed how far he had moved in order to reach a 
settlement for his proposals were inde0d almost identical with 
Japan's demands: 
'The declared policy of Japan is to hand back the 
Shantung peninsula in full sovereignty to China, return-
ing only the economic privileges granted to Germany and 
the right to establish a settlement under the usual con-
ditions at TSingtao'. 
'The owners of the railway will use the special 
police only to insure security for traffic. They will 
be used for no other purpose'. 
'The police force will be composed of Chinese and 
such Japanese instructor~ as the directors of the rail-
way may select w1ll be appointed by the Chinese Govern-
ment' • 
Later on ouring the 30th April, delegates from the United states, 
sritain, France, and Japan accepted the formula quoted above with 
only minimal changes to its wording and none to its substance. 39 
At this meeting of the powers an argum~nt developed 
between Wilson and Chinda concerning what would happen if China 
refused to co-operate in the implementation of the formula for 
Wilson wanted Japan to agree that she would apply voluntar1ly 
to the proposed League of Nations for mediation in any future 
dispute over Shantung. But Chinda replied that even if such a 
dispute were referred to the League, Japan must retain her 
rights to base her case upon her special agreements with China. 
These comments brought a sharp reaction from Wilson, but despite 
considerable pressure from the American president, Chinda 
re:l1ained adamant concerning Japan' s ri ghts to fall back upon 
the war-time treaties. 4J It is significant that although Lloyd 
Georf,e and Hankey were present at the meeting neither gave their 
')pinLJns :)n the matter. Indeed, 'Hankey's contribution as 
secretary "vas confined to asking wha t should be sent to the 
drafting co~nittee. This prompted Chinda to produce drafts of 
articles 156 and 157 which, with small alterations in the word-
ing, Here written into the final treaty. 
Some consideration~o~ the Settlement. 
The decision to allow Japan to acquire post-war 
rights in Shantung, whether temporarily or not, caused marked 
and long lasting reactions in America and China. It is well 
known that the Shantung question was widely blamed, but this 
was probably exaggerated, for the failure of the United States 
to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. In China the deCision was 
undoubtedly a considerable boost to the launching of the Hay 
the FDurth movement which heralded an upsurge of nationalism. 
Wilson's reply to Balfour at the end of April had made the 
point that the American president was against a peace treaty 
based upon war-time agreements, which presumably included the 
1918 SinD-Japanese treaty as well as that of 1915. But British 
policy was determined by different criteria, namely, respect for 
war-time Anglo-Japane~agreements to support Japan's claims at 
the peace conference, and the belief that China had voluntarily 
t -,,,,,·.t - '.-' t' -J-'~ .,., r' 1,-1:: .1, "':>- '1, l Ll t L": ,,_.1 J. .' -'- .. ' • • UIH~(n:cbt()C.ly the)s€) y:01icics of 
it SC8l.:U.'; rC:-lsol1ub18 to conclucie th,.:~ tc.e Bri'tish ~clegD.tes 
would hiJ.ve :.5i V8Tl GUDport ~o ',iilccn '.rhich';culd he:.vc resulted 
It is interci:.tin;:; to note tb.;.t ~';hen the sftrm broke in 
GhL-::J. ovor the' !)ri1 f.wtt1el'lent, uoth i'"liJ.clca.y and ~~LLY''l:f)n, in de-
fendin6 Bri tui::l 's ~1ctions, ~lites(l e:"::;h3.sis upon the .3ino-
J clpane 83 aE;rc~e;lGnt ::i T',; thcr ti.Klll upon Bri t&in 's :::mpport of her 
o',m war-time ob:~_i;,·<:~tions to Japan. i'\.acleo . .y arG"Ued that the 
1<)18 Jino-Japaneze tre~t:! was definitely of a voluntary chmll:-
ter 'Vlhereby China had received over ,f.2 million for railway 
t t ' 41 cons rue lone Curzon, 'ehe actin:: foreign sucretary, was 
equally firT'l on -:;his poillt:::LIlG. 1::hcn Jord;;m reported how badly 
th" Chinef::;8 ntudents had recci v'.d ne 1:JS of the ~3ettlement. 
Curzon maiut:J.incd thut; 
, • •• the I.)o'llers V18re prevented frClIll handinG 
clhantune:; back to China by the reason that it 
-wus not theil!S to Give and this oV/inG to the 
previous action of China herself.- 42 
Yet one must question whether British policy would bave been 
different had there been no Sino-Japanese treaty of 1918 for 
throughout the April negotiations the British delegates, eontr~ 
to their post-settlement justifications, had stressed Britain's 
own ~bligations to Japan. It has already been noted that a 
li'~reign 'Jffice memorandum wri tten by Balfour before the Sino-
Japanese treaty i-laS concluded in September, 1918, had stated 
quite clearly that Britain regarded herself as being committed 
to support Japan's claims regarding Shantung at the future peace 
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conference, and it appears that Britain's acti~ns were consis-
tent with that eo~~itment. 
In his aecount of the April negotiations, Balfour 
referred to Britain's obligatiJns to Japan, and after stating 
that his sympathies had lain with that country, he stated: 
'The real difficulty arose when an examination by the 
experts into the terms on which Japan was to restore 
Kiaochow to China, under the Treaties of 1915 and 1918 
appeared to show that the rights whieh Japan proposed ~o 
retain after this restoration involved a greater inter-
ference with Chin~se sovereignty than Germany had acquired 
under her lease'.~ 
But, Balfour continued, as a result of discussiJns which he had 
had with the Japanese delegates he was assured that it was 
Japan's intention 'to surrender every privilege in the peninsula 
which involved an interference with Chinese sovereignty'. It may 
be noted, however~ that if Balfour had any reservations OVer 
these assurances, or any doubts as to the possible political 
influence of the economic concessions which had been granted to 
Japan, he did not mention them. The foreign secretary then des-
cribed the American hostility to the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1915 
which had been manifest during the negotiations, and Balfour 
agreed that it was a treaty which he could not defend. But he 
believed that it was essential to avoid harping on the past in-
stead of building for the future, and with this aim he defended 
the three points of the settlement reached by the powers. Such 
a reference to the past must be judged ironic, especially in 
view of Britain's support of her war-ti~e treaties with Japan, 
and the ignoring of Wilson's emphatic plea made little more 
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than a week earlier to take the situation from the present. 
However, Balfour continued by stating that the Japanese d~lega­
tion had given the most explicit assuranees as to the 'open-
door' and the equal commercial treaties of all nations, and 
Balfour then ma0e some sharp criticisms of the manner in which 
the Chinese delegates had behaved during the negotiations which 
amounted to allegations of unprincipled conduct. Balfour re-
peated that the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1918 was a voluntary 
agreement and concluded his statement: 
' ••• nor did they Lthe Chinese delegateil ever 
adequately realise that, by the efforts of Japan 
and her Allies, China, without the expenditure of 
a single shilling or the loss of a single life, had 
restored to her rights which she could never have 
recovered for herself'. 
In view of Britain's inability to restrain Japan from declaring 
war on Germany in 191~, the character of the campaign for the 
capture ot TSingtao from the Germans, and Britain's helplessness 
against Japan's opposition to China's joining the war on the 
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side ~f the allies before 1917, Balfour's statement must be 
46 considered extraordinary. Even if allowances are made for 
the very heavy pressure under which Balfour was working, this 
statement, which he repeated on several occasions, indicates 
that 3alf~ur had read little on the far eastern situation 
cJvering the 1914-17 period, at least as far as China's war-time 
situation was c~ncerned. 
In his review of the Shantung negotiations ~alfour had 
recognised that the implementati~n of the Sino-Japanese treaty 
Jf 1918, ~s well as that of 1915, would have witnessed an in-
crease Jf Japanese control over China's sovereignty, and the 
foreign secretary's comments later in his dispatch give the im-
pression that the settlement reached by the powers restrained 
such an increase. In a0aitlan, Salfour's accaunt glasses over 
the subject of the q,uite bitter Anglo-American-Japanese bargain-
ing which occurred during the last days of April, and, as n~ted, 
the significance of Japan's ecanomic rights was ignored. The 
impartance of such rights was not lost sight of by Wunsz ldng 
who, after referring to Japan's sustained economie priVileges, 
cJncluded that, 
'On the face of it, the settlement was based on the 
original Sino-German treaty and not on the subsequent 
Sino-Japanese arrangements, but to all intents and pur-
poses it was a clever combination of the two sets of 
instruments with Wilson acceding, doubtless against his 
will, to this comic tragedy.' 4( 
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While the speculation concerning Wilson's desires can be ignored, 
it may be thought that King's description of the Shant1.Ulg agree-
ment reached by the council, which was e>ften referred to sub-
sequently as the Balfour ~ettlement, was mainly true • 
. _eM 
Justification for King's description of the~ettlement 
can be found in the terms regarding the S'1antung railways. It 
l1as besn noted that from 19JJ onwards Germany agrC'e4 tha t s~e 
would not send her troops beyond the 1)0 li zone which surrolxn-
c1ed KiaJc~ow.48 But by the terms of the April settlement Japan 
waS to have righ ts for the policing of t'1e line s, while t~1E; ex-
istence of the Japanese garrison at TSinan, although allegedly 
temporary, was regarded by the Chinese as a further intrusion 
into the province. Closely c')nnected with Japan's righls to 
cJntrol railway troops was the point t1.at w'1ereas the fJrl'!1er 
l'singta)-Tsinan railway had been mainly a private affair as far 
as Gerdany was concerned, there was n') doubt that under the new 
settlement the Japanese government would play a more active role 
in the r1.Ulning of the line than the German government had done. 
The report of the three experts in considering the Sino-Japanese 
treaty of 1918 had stressed the advantages which would accrue to 
49 Japan by its articles concerning the railways, and it seems 
reasonable to state that the April settlement allowed Japan to 
acquire the bulk of these adVantages. 
An assessment of the settlement regarding the 
Kiaochow area is more difficult, for although China stood to 
gain by the terms of the April agreement regarding the return 
of leased territories around the bay and elsewhere it has been 
noted that such a gain had tJ be considered against the possible 
nullifying effects which the establi shment of a Japanese c::>n-
cf!ssion at Tsingtao would have upon the situation. 1'he pr:=>-
posed Japanese concession was to be permanent, whereas the 
Germany lease of territory in Kiaochow was due to have ended 
in 1997, but of far greater importance were the methods which 
it was thought Japan would use to tighten her grip upon the port 
of Tsingtao. Under former German rule TSingtao had been an 
open-port, and although the local supervisor of the Haritime 
customs Union had been a German, the port was part Jf the inter-
national customs service. But in 1919 there were serious fears 
that Japan would use her position to discriminate against other 
nations and one may judge that the heated Curzon-Chinda exchanges 
later in the year justified the gravest suspiciJns of Japan. 5J 
Thus, while the April settlement offered advantages 
to China on the one hand, there were also some serious dis-
advantages entailed. Perhaps what tilted the balance against 
the settlement as far as China was concerned were not the legal 
terms inVOlved, but the difference in the spirit bAtween Germany 
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and Japan. Before 1914 Germany had not been very pressing in 
demands upon China and had been anxious to disclaim a monopoly 
of power in Shantung. But Japan's actions in Manchuria and on 
other parts of the mainland, and the nature of her war-time 
treaties were such as to give China Cause for alarm when Japan 
acquired such extensive rights in the Shantung province. 
Balfour's actions have been defended by Hankey who 
described the Shantung settlement in very favourable terms, 
stating that 'To Balfour and Wilson belongs the credit for 
achieving a settlement by informal good offices •.• ,51 Unfortu-
nately Hankey's account was written some forty years after the 
peace conference, and it may be judged to lack the accuracy and 
powers of analysis usually associated wi th l-Iankey' s name, despi te 
rIankey's statement that in wri ting the account he had referred to 
his diaries. 52 Hankey described what a good impression Koo had 
made at the meeting of the council on April 21st, and continued 
by implying that China should be treated more sympathetically: 
'After this LKoO'S speecal Japan's claims for 
Shantung looked rather different. ~specially effective 
was Koo's description of the so-called "twenty-one" 
points~ which had been formulated by Japan as recently 
as 191/j, when the 1·1astern Powers had been too busy with 
the final stages of the war with Germany to pay much 
attention to the Far East ••• At last a question was put to 
Koo whether China would be better off under the maintenance 
of the Treaty forced on her by Japan (the twenty-one 
pOints) than under Japan's present claims, which were 
sUpported by France and Great Britain.'~3 
But it has been noted that the alternative put to China was, 
in fact, a choice between the terms of the war-time treaties or 
the transfer of former German rights to Japan, and not to any 
subsequent Japanese demands. 54 Also, as is well known, the 
twenty-one demands were made in 1915, not 1918, and in view of 
far eastern developments between 1915 and the signing of t~e 
Sino-Japanese treaty of 1918, which was assessed very differrntly 
from the earlier agreement by the British experts, Hankey's 
error in mixing the two agreement toget!'ler must be considered 
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as being more than a pedantic point. It must be noted that al-
thoug11 the three experts were called upon to consider the impact 
of both the war-time Sino-Japanese treaties their report concen-
tra tes upon the 1918 agreement, while the ramifications of the 
twenty-one demands are largely ignored. 
Hhen Hankey described the report of the three experts 
he referred to Macleay as 'Maclean'. This, of course, may have 
been a typographical error, and even if the mistake were 
Hankey's it could be dismissed as being of no importance, except 
that as Maeleay had written so extensively on the far east one 
would have thought that Hankey would have been familiar with 
his name. Hankey's description of the report gave no assess-
ment of the implications involved, for he merely stated: 
'The report was the starting point of fresh dis-
cussions, some of them "behind the scenes" and others at 
the Council of Three, but it was not until Wednesday (April 30th), after a final discussion by the Council of 
Four, that I had the pleasure 56of forwarding agreed articles 
to the Drafting C ommi t tee. ' 
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While one does not wish to be oVer-precise in describing such 
events the fourth party present on April 3Jth was Japan, who 
normally did not attend council meetings unless specially invi-
ted, and one would have thought that Sankey would have made this 
point clear. 57 
If, as Hankey stated, Koo had placed Japan's twenty-
one demands and claims for Shantung in a different light this 
was not obvious in the memorandum which Hankey wrote shortly 
after the April settlement which summarised its terms for the 
benefit of the Chinese delegation. 58 Nor did Hankey express 
an opinion whether the settlement offered China advantages 
greater than those of the war-time treaties or the transfer of 
former German rights,for the memorandum was confined to a des-
cription of the terms which had been reached, and to Japan's 
warning that she WOuld resort to her rights under the war-time 
trea ties if China failed to co-operate in implementing the J .. pril 
settlement. 
Dr. Fifield corresponded with Hankey in the early 
1950'~ when he (Fifield) was writing on the Shantung question, 
and he pays a handsome tribute to Hankey's well known qualities~9 
One can, therefore, regret that Hankey did not write more fully 
and at an earlier date upon the Shantung issue, for the evidence 
of his account of the negotiations in late April, 1919, tends to 
confirm an impression that Hankey's grasp on far-eastern affairs 
l5? 
was considerably less than t~at of his deep knowledge of affairs 
elsewhere, but such an impression could easily be wrong. 
Several accounts of the Shantung negotiations have 
emphasised the role played by Lloyd George, and Wunsz King is 
particularly sharp in his criticisms of the British prime minis-
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tar. King did not blame the American president for the 
shortcomings which the April settlement had as far as China was 
concerned, and thought that Wilson had done all that was possible 
to secure a more equitable solution, But, 
'Lloyd George was ••• in the key positiJn ••• for if 
he could have taken a less academic view of the secret 
promises the British Government had given to Japan, 
and if he could have agreed with Koo to review the en-
~ire issue on a broader basis, he could have used his 
l.nfluence to counsel moderation on Hakino's part ••• 
The Japanese representative would have listened t·J the joint urging of both Great Sritain and the United 
States. Clemenceau would also fall in line with the 
others. The story of Shantung would then be a different 
one'. 
In view of Wilson's hesitation over the April settlement it is 
easy to argue that King's conclusions are baSically correct. 
It may be noted that if King did not criticise Wilson, 
Dr. Horrison did. Horrison maintained that Wilson had caused 
the Chinese government to believe that America WJuld support 
them, but owing to Wilson's personal pre-occupation with the 
proposed League of Nations he let the Chinese down in a very 
discreditable fashion. 6l 
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Undoubtedly Britain had exercised a major influence 
upon determining the Shantung settlement, but one must question 
w':letl1er it is correct to praise, or blame, Lloyd George for its 
terms. Jf course, the constitutional position of the British 
prime minister rendered him responsible for the policies and 
actions of his country's delegation at the peace conference. 
But even if L10yd George were thus constitutionally responsible, 
and after allowing for the aetive part which he did play in the 
April negotiations, it can be seen that the real authors of 
British policy concerning the Shantung settlement were 3alfour 
and l,:acleay. 
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CHAPTER V 
CHINA AND THE TREATY OF VERSAILL~S 
When the council of three reached a decision on-the 
terms of the Shantung settlement at its meeting on April 30th 
no Chinese delegate was present, but it has been noted that Japan 
was represented and that it was the Japanese delegate Chinda who 
produced the drafts for articles 156 and 157 which were accepted 
in substance for inclusion into the peace treaty.l Obviously, 
the Chinese delegation were anxious for information on such a 
vital issue to them, but it was necessary for Lou Tseng-tsiang, 
the chief Chinese delegate, to write to Balfour, the British 
foreign secretary, stating that reports were circulating that 
a decision had been reached, and he requested ~, if this were 
the case, to be informed of the terms of the proposed Shantung 
2 
settlement. At this stage of the peace conference the council 
of three were confronted with a wide variety of problems but, 
even if allowances are made for the h.a~1 pressures of business, 
it seems an act of disrespect that no official communication 
was made to the Chinese delegation immediately atter the 
settlement had been concluded. 
Following receipt of Lou Tseng-tsiang's letter, 
however, Balfour lost little time in meeting the Chinese dele-
gation, and he informed them, verbally, what the council of three 
and the Japanese delegates had decided. The Chinese reactions 
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to Balfour's information were of marked dissatisfaction, and Sze 
asked for written details of the proposed articles and for a copy 
of the council proceedings which had determined them. 3 However, 
it was nut until June that the Chinese government received a 
reply to their request for information regarding the council 
proceedings, although Makino made an immediate press statement 
which declared that J~pan's policy was to hand Shantung back 
to China with full sovereignty, retaining only the former 
German economic privileges in the province, but claiming Japan's 
rights to establish a settlement lunder the usual conditions', 
. 4 
at Tsingtao. 
The Chinese delegation continued to argue their case 
for Shantung, and Lou Tseng-tsiang informed Clemenceau, the 
president of the peace conference, that they were disappointed 
at Balfour's verbal report, for the Chinese delegation could not 
appreCiate on what grounds rights formerly possessed by Germany 
could be legally transferred to Japan. It was contended that 
the agreements of 1915 and 1918 were concluded with Japan only 
under the menace of war, and the Chinese claimed the direct 
return of former German rights rather than ~,agree to their being 
handed to Japan who, it was understood, 'voluntarily engages' to 
restore them to China. 5 These arguments were not new, and 
Macleay merely referred to the financial benefits which China 
had derived from the 1918 agreement, while Hardinge made the 
unhelpful observation that 'It looks as thJugh the Chinese 
intend to be troublesome', which was scarcely indicative of an 
at~empt to understand the Chinese point of view. 
Further Chinese protests over the Shantung settlement 
were made at a meeting of the preliminary peace conference early 
in ;.fay. China was admitted to the conference only after pressure 
from America, for China's status was considered to be less than 
that of an 'effective belligerent' in contradistinction to 3razil, 
whose delegates were readily accepted and whose country's war 
effort of sending two or three torpedo boats had been noted by 
Lloyd George. 6 At the conference Lou Tseng-tsiang, who had 
just received his copy of the treaty of Versailles which was but 
one day before the German delegation received theirs, complained 
that the proposed Shantung settlement had been formulated with-
out sufficient consideration being given to the principles of 
justice and the problems of China's natlJnal security. But it 
would appear that no delegate from any other country expressed 
sympathy for China's claims, and obviously China was sustaining 
a series of diplomatic defeats. 
Owing to the rebuffs which China was receiving it 
would undoubtedly have been advisable, especially in view of 
the upsurge of Chinese nationalism which the news of the Shan-
tung settlement was provoking, for the British government to 
have adopted placat~tactics, at least on small issues, and 
166. 
allowed China some 'saving of face' so important to the 
oriental mind. Therefore, when China requested a revision of 
her foreign treaties, the wide range of the topics covered by 
the relevant agreements offered an opportunity for minor adjust-
ments to be made in China's favour. 7 But Macleay's reactions 
to the Chinese memorandum which had requested the revision were 
hostile, and he stated that he had repeatedly impressed upon 
the Chinese delegation that their government's desinerata re-
garding the abolition of extraterritorial rights and all forms 
of special privileges in China were not matters for the peace 
conference as they had not arisen from the war. Hacleay th:)ugrtt 
that the Chinese delegation were hoping to elicit an expression 
of support from the powers but he argued: 
' ••• that we are not called upon to express any such 
opinion or to give any promise of support and that all 
we need to do is to acknowledge the receipt of the 
Hemorandum with thanks. 
Some day, no doubt, these questions will have to be 
seriously considered, but China must find a more 
suitable opportunity for raising them; the establishment 
of the League of Nations may afford such an opportunity.' 
As a result of Macleay's recommendations only a brief formal 
note was sent to Lou Tseng-tsiang thanking him for the Chinese 
memorandum. 
This cold treatment of China was in marked contrast to 
Clemenceau's handling of a similar memorandum which was sent to 
him in his capacity as president of the conference. 8 
Clemenceau's acknowledgment of the Chinese claims was,\'!B.I'Jn~J 
phrased, and he continued by saying that although the powers 
fully recognised the importance of the questions which China had 
raised it was considered that they did not fall within the pro-
vince of the peace conference. But, Clemenceau concluded, the 
claims should be brought before the League of Na tions 'as soon 
as that body is able to function'. 
l·lacleay's reactions were immediate and he suggested 
that Clemenceau's reply should be telegraphed 'in extenso' to 
Peking for: 
'If the Chinese Govt. publish this letter •••• it 
should go far to allay the dissatisfacti:>n which the 
settlement of the Shantung and Klaochow questions has 
caused in China, as by showing clearly that the 
question of the abrogation of the Sino-Japanese 
Treaties and Notes of May 25th 1915 was not within the 
scope and competence of the Peace Conference while 
suggesting that the matter should be brought before the 
League of Nations, it removes all possible grounds for 
the assertion which the Chinese have made that they 
have not received justice at the hands of the Conference'. 
Such a reaction from Macleay seems to be strange and illogical in 
the light of his earlier views. It can be seen that there was 
little difference, if any, between what Macleay had argued in 
priVate from what Clemenceau had said to the Chinese; namely, 
although China's claims for treaty revision were important it was 
for the League of Nations, and not the peace conference, to settle 
such matters. But while Clemenceau was willing to communicate 
his views to China, Macleay evidently was not prepared to do so, 
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and the reasons for his retieence are difficult to understand. 
I fJ"'''l~4v-. Clemenceau's reply, although friendly, was vague, f@.~i!t4-e', 
and gave nothing away, and if Hacleay considereti that Clemenceau's 
message was so important it is hard to see why he c~uld not have 
said something equally non-committal, but in friendly terms, ab:>ut 
the attitude of the British government. 
One can searcely believe that C lemenceau' s reply was 
so brilliantly conceived as to be beyond the scope of the Foreign 
office, unless the writing of polite replies to China was so un-
usual that such an answer was indeed too much for British author-
ship. Despite Macleayts claims, it must be questioned whether 
Clemenceau's reply had repudiated China's assertions that she 
had not received justice, for although reference to the League 
was possibly a step forward as far as China was concerned this 
was hardly a guarantee that China's grievances would be dealt 
with sympathetically when the League began to function. 
Maeleay's failure to make a reply similar to 
C lemenceau' s may be judged as lllustra tive of the unnecessarily 
abrupt manner which was prevalent in Britain's dealing with 
China, which was an obvious obstacle to Anglo-Chinese relations. 
Sr§akdown of the Shanghai leace ebpference. 
From the end of February, 1919, a conference between 
the northern and southern Chinese factions had been meeting at 
Shanghai with the ob j ect of resolving their di fferences, but 
there existed harsh feelings among the delegates over the degree 
of the Peking government's cooperation with Japan, which was 
criticised for being too close. After a temporary breakdown of 
the talks in April, the southern delegation made a number ·:>f 
proposals which included the cancellation of the Peking govern-
;nent's mili tary agreement with Japan, the liquidation of the 
war participation loan which Japan had granted, and the joint 
use by both the north and south of all war loans for reconstruc-
tion purposes. 9 
Already a nationalist movement of cultural as well 
as political life was in being, but when news of the Shantung 
settlement reached China it was given new force, and the high 
wave of mili tancy created the famous 'Nay the Fourth Movement' .1J 
Henceforth, rioting, attacks upon foreign legations, political 
strikes, and the boycotting of foreign goods, became far more 
formidable weapons in the hands of the Chinese, and their effec-
tive use had a definite influence upon international develop-
ments in China throughout the 1920's. 
When the news of the April settlement broke in China 
marked hostility was expressed to the northern delegation to 
the Shanghai conference, who were regarded as having facilitated 
Japan's diplomatic success at Paris, and some three thousand 
students paraded in Peking tas a mass protest against the 
1'70. 
"~lan tung deci siGn and the presence in Peking of three pro-
) 11 Japanese traitors... In addition to the news of the Shantung 
sett1e!:lent the hitherto secret Anglo-Japanese agreement of 1917, 
\vhich had pledged Bri tish support for Japan's claims, was dis-
cI,) sed. This informa tion wa s almo st certainly 'leaked' by the 
12 Japanese delegates at Paris, and whether this act was inten-
ti.Jnal:Jr not a feature :>f Japanese tactics developed that when 
Chinese wrath was aroused against her, Japan would seek to 
divert attention fr:>m herself by raising contentious issues 
which cast blame upon Britain and western countries in general. 
Jordan was concerned at the amount of criticism of 
3ritain which the disclosure of the secret Aliglo-Japanese treaty 
h~d arJused, and it was his opinion that unless former German 
rights in Shantung were restored, China's confidence in western 
justice would be destroyed and a League of Nations resting upon 
a foundation that included the proposed Shantung settlement 
would be as meaningless as all the past declarations concerning 
China's integrity.13 Jordan also reported that Reinsch, the 
A~erican minister in Peking, foresaw the possibility of a 
p:>pu1ar :>utbreak in China, and the British minister stated that 
he would not be surprised if this forecast came true. But 
;:acleay did not seem perturbed by Jordan's comments, ann ar gued 
that a Chinese boycott of Japanese goods would only delay the 
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restoration of Kiaochow, and he hoped the Chinese would not be 
so 'foolish' as to refuse to sign the peace treaty. Hacleay 
stater1 V1at he had informed Sze that if China did not sign the 
treaty she would not become a member of the League, and Mac1eay 
n)ted that neither Koo, nor Wang, were taking anvantage of the 
opportunities offered by pre1imina.ry League discussi)ns to make 
provocative speeches against Japan. 
The political turmoil in China showed no signs of 
abating and Jordan reported that Chinese patriots had looked to 
Great Britain to see that China received fair play concerning 
the retrocession of former German rights in Shantung. Therefore, 
the news that China was expected to honour her treaties of 1915 
and 1918 with Japan had come as a shock. Jordan continuen: 
'Up to this time it had been the hope of all Chinese 
that the Great Powers would in the long run extricate the 
Chinese Government from the hopeless pass into which they 
had fallenj through their own folly in signing away their rights to apan as late as September last. All the more 
bitter, then, the disappointment when it was reali~ijd 
that they were to be held to their plighted word'.l 
Jne may argue, of course, that the British government were being 
perfectly reasonable in holding the Chinese to their words, and 
the Chinese government were being unreasonable if they expected 
the western powers to assist China to dishonour her commitments 
to Japan. Obviously much depends upon an accurate assessment 
of the character of the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1918, and whether 
it was really a voluntary agreement, or concluded between the 
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Japanese government and only a corrupt Chinese 'clique', before 
the.C~inese expectations can be judged fairly. 
China's indignation at the Shantung settlement contin-
ued to mount and an example of outraged feelings is offered in 
a protest mane by the Chekiang provincial assembly to the Paris 
delegates of Sritain, America, France, and Italy.l5 It was 
stated that the assembly was surprised to learn that 'rsingta) 
~ad been disposed of in the manner which the Japanese desired, 
especially in view of the allied Victory over autocracy, and 
the high motives of the allies regarding humanity and justiee. 
The protest concluded by saying that street demonstrati()ns were 
taking place throughout China with the object of securing a 
reversal of the Shantung proposals in order that ' ••• the seed 
of endless disaster may not be sown in the Peace Conferenee ••• ' 
A few day s after this pr'otest Jordan reported upon an 
interview With the Chinese minister for fore1gn affairs when the 
internal situat10n of the country was discussed. 16 The Chinese 
minister had stated that there was no prospect of the Shanghai 
conference reaching an agreement except on the basis of a mili-
tary government being formed in China. The minister eontinued 
by arguing that the terms of the Shan~ settlement had con-
Vinced China that might was still r1ght, and this had eemented 
an alliance between the military forces of China and the mili-
tary party in Japan. He claimed that a great wrong had be>en 
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done to China and that the country felt deeply aggrieved. 
President Wilson had held out hopes for alleviating China's 
position through the League of Nations, but the minister felt 
that the League was a sham. The minister felt that his country 
was in a difficult position for if China signed the peace treaty 
there would be an outcry throughout the country, but if she did 
not sign, which was her intention, she would remain technically 
at war with Germany and thereby be left isolated. 
Further British reactions to China's threatened re-
fusal to accept the Shantung settlement were of almost incredu-
li ty, and MaxMuller in the Forei gn Office, like Hacleay in 
Paris, could hardly believe that the Chinese would be so silly 
as to refuse to sign the peace treaty 'though they have certainly 
been harshly treated'. In reply to some of the points which 
the Chinese had raised, Curzon argued that a refusal to sign the 
treaty would not only be foolish but would alienate the sympa-
thies of the allies. Curzon claimed that the best way of miti-
gating the evils of the presence of Japanese in Shantung consis-
ted not in a military Chinese government, which would only mis-
manage affairs and give the Japanese an excuse for remaining in 
the provinoe, but in the formation of a government 'which will 
leave foreigners no excuse for interrerence'. While too deep an 
interpretation must not be placed upon Curzon's remarke it 1s 
interesting to note that he should refer to Japanese presence 
in Shantung as an evil and suggest ways whereby such presence 
could be removed as soon as possible. No comment, however, 
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was offered regarding the contribution Which Britain had made to 
enable Japan to remain in the province and it may be argued 
that Curzon's advice was scarcely helpful, for it was the in-
fluence of the foreign powers, especially Japan, which was 
largely responsible for disorders among the Chinese political 
factions and aroused serious internal controversy concerning 
what policies were essential for the re-establishment of China's 
sovereignty. 
Although the Shanghai conference continued spasmodi-
cally until the autumn of 1920, in May, 1919, it experienced a 
major breakdown from which it never really recovered. l ? Jordan 
reported upon some of the assessments of the situation by the 
different factions and his remarks make it clear that foreign 
interference was largely blamed for China's unrest: 
'While admitting that China herself is not entirely 
free from blame for the unfortunate positi~n in which 
she is placed, the local press strongly criticise the 
action of the Allies in disregarding the legitimate 
aspirations of the Chinese people for control of their 
own territory. They accuse the Allies of having failed 
to live up to their professions of justice ••• and they 
cast on them responsibility for the consequences to 
tranquility of the Far East and future peace of the 
world. It is even stated that China in her aesperation 
may be goaded to another outburst of violence like that 
of 1900. A boycott against Japanese goods has already 
begun in Shanghai and fear is felt in some circles of 
more violent manllestations of anti-foreign feeling.18 
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gut the response of the British government to the situation 
created by China's internal friction was undoubtedly inept. 
After considering Jordan's report MaxAuller, the 
head of the far eastern department, stated that he deplored the 
break up of the Shanghai conference and suggested that the 
3ritish minister should be instructed to inform China of the 
disaopointment of the ~ritish government about the breakdown, 
and urge the C~inese to do all within their power to prevent 
a permanent cessation of negotiations. ~axMuller continued by 
stating that he was going to ask the American and French govern-
ments to take similar action, but 'Under present conditions it 
might appear ironical to ask the Japanese Govt. to join in such 
representation'. It may be noted that M~Mull€r made no attempt 
to analyse China's internal situation, nor to deal with the 
claims 
rest. 
that foreign interference was the cause of China's un-
~u~~ 
Also, no consideration wasA~ that Britain should offer 
some concessions to China, such as giving way on minor pOints 
concerned with extraterritoriality or even retroceding Wei-hai 
Wei; and in the Circumstances the proposed request to China to 
resolve her differences must be Viewed critically. 
Despite i·MaxMuller's reserVations, Japan was inclu0ed 
when Britain, France, Italy, and the United states presented an 
aide-memoire to China which viewed the adjournment of the Shang-
~ai peace conference 'with deep concern,.19 The powers stated 
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that they did not think that the differences separating the 
different parties were very great and their memoire concluded: 
' ••• the Representatives of the Powers desire to 
assure the Chinese People and Authorities of the con-
tinued good-will and friendly interest of their Govern-
ments and na tL)ns who will welcome with the grea test 
satisfaction the restoration of union and concord 
throughout China, with her Government in the full exer-
cise of its powers organised to promote the general 
welfare of the people'. 
;:ome indication of the inappropriate character of the memoire 
can be drawn from a report in the 'Canton Times' that the 
statement of the powers had created a furore and exacerbated 
anti-foreign sentiments. 
Almost at the same time as f·MaxMuller wa s ini tia ting 
t~ rather one-sided approach to China, a dispatch was received 
from Jordan who reported that the Canton government was in 
financial difficulties and was asking for any surplus from the 
20 dari time Customs Union. There was, however, no such surplus, 
for all incoming revenues were being spent upon construction 
works and repaying the instalments on foreign loans. But, 
Jordan argue~f the Canton government were to attempt to seize 
any revenues, ...- forceful measures should be used against them 
if necessary. Jordan's dispatch was written well before the 
breakdown of the Shanghai conference, and it is possible that if 
it had been of a later date Jordan's attitude may have been 
different, but no attempt appears to have been made to use the 
customs revenues in a more equitable manner in order to induce 
the Chinese political factions to eo-operate instead of indulging 
in warfare. 21 
177. 
'rhe April Settlement confirmed. 
In mid-lvlay Balfour wrote to Lou Tseng-tsiang refusing 
to make any supplementary statement to the Japanese press release 
issued earlier in the m:>nth concerning the Shantung settlement 
which, Balfour claimed, covered all the pOints of interest 
essential to China. 22 Balfour noted that China wanted the 
restoration of her sovereignty over leased territories in the 
pr:>vince and he maintained that: 
' ••• the broad policy embodied in the final arrange-
ment, namely that Germany should surrender all her rights 
to Japan, and that Japan should restore to China her full 
sovereignty over the leased territories was always part 
of Japan's declared policy. I venture to hope that it is 
a policy which will commend itself to enlightened public 
opinion, both in China and Japan'. 
No reference was made to the contentious political issue of the 
Shantung railways,. nor to the influence of an exclusive Japanese 
concession at TSingtao, and Balfour denied that any pressure had 
been put upon Japan to induce her to agree to the settlement, 
although 'There was in this, as in all similar eases, a certain 
amount of debate and discussion ••• ' In view of the bitter 
wrangling that had occurred before the agreement had been 
reached, Balfour's comments must be considered as misleading for 
they conveyed the idea that the agreement had been reached fair-
ly easily, which was not true. 
At the end of May the Chinese delegation again re-
quested information on the April settlement and the relevant 
council proceedings, and it is obvious that their request w:>u1d 
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have been refused but for the insistence of Wilson who refused 
to accept objections raised in the council that information con-
cerning the proceedings could not be conveyed to a third party.23 
As a result of Wilson's pressure, Hankey prepared a memorandum 
for the confidentual use of the Chinese delegation. 
The Hankey memorandum contained an accurate summary of 
the Shantung settlement but it said little about the council pro-
ceedings even though it revealed that differences had taken place 
21+ between America and Japan. It is not necessary to describe 
the memorandum in detail for it dwelt upon the formula reached 
at the council meeting on April 30th and the draft of articles 
25 156 and 157. The memorandum, however, did stress that the 
Tsingtao-Tsinan railway was to become a mixed Sino-Japanese 
enterprise, and the owners Jf the railway would use the special 
police only for the security of traffic. The memorandum also 
stated that Japan was to surrender all military control over the 
Shantung peninsula and there would be no military interference 
in civil administration. The maintenance of a garrison at Tsinan 
was a provisional measure 'Although no date was named for this 
transitory arrangement ••• ' It was then stated that the forti-
fications built by Germany would not be included in the area of 
the residential concession granted to Japan. A feature of the 
April negotiations had been Japan's insistence upon her right to 
fall back upon the agreements of 1915 and 1918 if China refused 
to co-operate in making the settlement work, and the Hankey 
memorandum concluded by emphasising this development to the 
Chinese, adding that despite American disapproval Japan would 
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'reserve her right in the last analysiS to base herself on the 
Agreements'. 
«hina was, thus, left in no doubt of the position of 
the main powers regarding Shantung, and the presentation of the 
Bankey memorandum made it clear to the Chinese government that 
there was little chan6e of securing any amendment of substance 
to the Shantung settlement. Henceforth the Chinese could place 
no hopes llpon the United states to seeure the direct retro-
cession of the province, and it was clear that the terms which 
had caused such sharp Chinese reactions when they had become 
known early in May were irreversible, at least as far as the 
peace conference was concerned, unless there were a major 
diplomatic upset. 
The arrival of the Hanke, memorandum on the same day 
as the powers presented their aide-memoire giving their advice 
concerning how a permanent breakdown of the Shanghai peace con-
ference dealing with China's internal affairs could be avoided 
was unfortunate timing by the British delegation. 
Some Reactions to the Shantung i~ttlement. 
While the victorious powers had been deliberating upon 
the settlement of the Shantung question, Germany agreed to the 
180. 
surrender of Kiaochow, though they demanded indemnification for 
26 t~eir public property in general. This demand for indemni-
fication was curtly refused, and the allied reply stated that 
tt1ey recalled the fact that Kiaochow, which had been 'unjustly 
torn from China', had been used by Germany as a military base in 
pursuance of a policy which had been a perpetual menace to the 
peace of the far east. As far as Britain was concerned this 
criticism of Germany's obtaining Kiaochow was somewhat hypo-
critical for it has been noted that the British government gave 
their agreement to Germany's acquisition and took similar action, 
but with much less fruitful results, in seizing Wei-hai Wei. 27 
Jne might have thought that if Kiaochow were 'unjustly torn from 
China' in 1898, then the correct step was its retrocession to 
that country when such an opportunity as a peace conference 
occurred, especially when the military aspects of Japan's policies 
were such as to command attention and which raised fears for the 
preservation of peace in the far east. 
Consideration of the military aspects of Japan's 
policies was prompted by a memorandum written by the British 
military attache in peking. 28 This stated that the Japanese 
claimed that their policy in China was defensive, for the Japan-
ese feared European intervention in China by the western use and 
further construction of foreign owned railways. Macleay's re-
actions were partkularly bitter and in view of his role in the 
April negotiations his comments are given at length: 
'There is, I think, practically no limit to the 
aims and ambitions of the military party in Japan. 
That party might possibly allege the fear of Europe 
obtaining domination over China and eventuallY over 
Japan as a justification of their policy of aggression 
in China, but since the defeat of Russia in 1905 and 
more especially since the collapse of that Power in 
the great war the excuse can no longer hold water.' 
'Speaking generally I believe that the Japanese 
General Staff supported by the Chauvinist parties aim 
at securing Japan's hegemony of the Far East and the 
conversion of China into a Japanese Protectorate. 
Now that the fear of Russian aggression has been re-
moved Japanese policy in the matter of railway construc-
tion in China is principally directed towards obtaining 
control over all railways in Manchuria and Mongolia which 
would enable the Japanese whenever necessary to move 
troops against Peking ••• t 
It must be judged surprising that Macleay could have written 
such a strong indictment of Japan so shortly after the Shantung 
negotiations and before the April settlement had been signed as 
part of the peace treaty. Undoubtedly his comments indicate that 
a revisi.::m of the settlement was justified, but what possiblr 
deterred Macleay from taking any action was the manner in which 
he differentiated between the military party and civilian govern-
ment of Japan. Such a distinction was, of course, necessary, 
but there was the possibility, as eventually occurred, that the 
military party in Japan would gain power, and with this very 
real danger existing it would seem that it would have been wiser 
for Britain to have adopted a more conciliatory policy towards 
China. 
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A plea for such a policy was mane when Jordan wrote to 
Curzon giving details of the deliberations of the various Anglo-
American associations in China and their misgivings r~garding the 
Shantung c1ausea. 29 Jordan stated that the Ang10-American 
association of Peking was particularly distinguished for its lea-
ding members in many spheres of activity, and there was complete 
unanimity of opinion that the decision of the powers regarding 
Shantung was not only unjust to China, but was fraught with 
grave peril to the future peace of the far east. He continued 
by stating that the association had passed a resolution, a copy 
of which he forwarded, that maintained the Shantung clauses were 
not only subversive to the principles of national self-determina-
tion, but a denial of the policy of the open door and equality 
of opportunity. The resolution concluded by arguing very 
strongly that because of Japan's proximity to China she might 
prove a greater danger to the peace of the far east than had 
Germany. But there is no obvious evidence that the British 
government's policies were influenced by such a resolution. 
While there were British residents in China who sought 
to prevent an increase of Japanese influence, there were those 
who did not want to see an increase 1n Chinese power over the 
ex-German concessions. For example, the British municipal 
coUncil of Tientsin argued strongly that the ex-German area 
should be internationalised, anq it presented a memorandum which 
gave details of how such an international scheme could work, 
which, if implemented, would have given considerable power to 
the British council. 3J J.W.a.Davidson, a member of the far 
eastern department, argued that, as the Chinese felt so aggrieved 
over the Shantung decision, there was not the slightest chance 
that they would consider what amounted to a British administra-
tion of the ex-German concession. He thought that it would be 
better if the initiative to secure British control did not come 
from the municipal council but from the residents of the ex-
German area. There would be a greater chance of success, 
Davidson argued, if such initiative were left until after the 
Chinese administration had been in force for a short period and 
its shortcomings had become apparent. while too much must not 
be made of a pomparative minor incident, such an outlook was in 
keeping with Britain's aims of maintaining, and possibly exten-
ding her privileges in China. 
Dr. Fifield has described the deep influence which 
the Shantung settlement had upon the American delegation and that 
it caused the resignation of Reinsch, the United states minister 
in peking. 3l There was no comparable reaction among the 
British delegation, even if one allows for Macleay's outburst 
against the Japanese military party, nor does it seem that Jordan, 
who was reasonably sympathetic to China, ever considered resigning 
in protest against his government's policy. Indeed, the observa-
tion may be made that the Shantung settlement seems to have had 
very little influence upon the British delegation in Paris and 
the appropriate officials in the Foreign Office. 
184. 
At the beginning of April, 1919, Beilby Alston was 
appointed the British charge d'affaires at Tokyo and he adopted 
a markedly sympathetic attitude towards China almost from the 
moment he arrived in Japan. Dr. t1orrison had formed a very un-
favourable opinion of Alston and described him as an 'incompetent 
32 
noodle'. No doubt Morrison had his reasons for making such 
derogatory remarks, but Alston, who succeeded Jordan 'as British 
minister in Peking the following year, was consistent in his 
opposition to the Shantung settlement until the Washington con-
ference revised the situation. 
It may have been thought that with such aims Alston 
would have had no clash with Jordan, but in early June, at a 
time when it was still possible, even if difficult, to alter the 
Shantung settlement, the two British representatives in the far 
east had a difference over tactics. An indication of Alston's 
feelings is offered in a dispatch in which he stated that since 
his appointment in ;Zapanl he had not hesi ta ted to argue in the 
strongest terms that there could be no peace in the far east 
until Japan retroceded Shantung, and he compared the Japanese 
occupation of the province with the German occupation of Alsace-
Lorraine. 33 Possibly it was the intensity of gueh feelings 
which caused Alston to ask the Japanese vice-foreign minister 
whether he would like 'a frank conversation with me on the sub-
ject of China and our respective policies there' with a view to 
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reducing suspicion of each other. 34 The Japanese vice-minister 
had welcomed the suggestion ann Alston e:lquired of Curzon wi1ether 
the time was not ripe to pursue the conversations further. 
Alston's suggestion for Anglo-Japanese discussions of 
the si tua tion in China caused sharp reactions from MaxAtuller and 
Curzon, in London, and Jordan in Peking, when some British far 
eastern policies were considered in a series of exchanges which 
~d not include Balfour and Macleay who were still in Paris. 
Jordan was hostile to Anglo-Japanese talks on the grounds that 
they would cause the Chinese to mistrust the Bri tish. He des-
cribed the British position as being partieularly delicate for 
owing to China's deplorable internal chaos it was important that 
Britain should help China by trying to improve China's interna-
tional standing. But, Jordan argued, Britain ought to act in 
harmony with Japan who was her ally although such a step would 
incur unpopularity and the risk of a boycott of British goods 
by the Chinese. Jordan argued that by tradition Britain sym-
pathised with people who were struggling to improve their con-
ditions, but to do so in the case of China would expose Britain 
to Japanese charges of being disloyal to an ally. He concluded: 
I I hold tha t Chinese problem is now a world one, 
solution of which can only be found in free and open 
discussion between Powers concerned, and not by nego-
tiations with another single Power, which can only add 
to our difficulties here,.3' 
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~laxM\uller shared. Jordan t s hostili ty to Anglo-Japanese talks 
and wondered if Britain should not take the lead in initiating 
international discussions which MaxMuller felt should be in 
Peking. But Curzon ignored this suggested venue. 
Curzon stated that he did not understand what Jordan 
wanted the British government to do. It was all very well, 
Curzon continued, to suggest a free and open discussion mf a 
world problem, but where was it to take place? Jordan had rUled 
:)ut Tokyo as improper, and it could nJt take place in London a.s 
the principals were all elsewhere. Paris, Curzon, concluded, was 
the most SUitable, but the powers were either 'too busy or too 
indifferent' to consider China. Curzon then stated that the 
only great power with Similar interests to Britain in China was 
America, and he asked whether any steps had been taken to as-
certain what America was thinking or doing about the situation. 
This was an important question which might be seen as an indi-
cation of the subsequent attempts to improve Anglo-American 
co-operation in the far east that took place between the summer 
of 1919 and the Washington conference. 
A1ston continued to argue in favour of Ang1o-Japanese 
discussions, not in order to be involved in a conspiracy, but: 
'If it be admitted Japan's attitude towards China 
is important factor in maintenance of tranqu11ity of the 
Far East friendly cooperation with Japan in a common policy 
is surely best means of attaining that object. In other 
words our endeavour should be to convert Japan from a 
policy of Which we do not approve to our own. 
Nothing could be more desirable than willing 
association of6the United states in pursuance of this object.'3 
But in a very long statement ~axMuller emphasised that Anglo-
Japanese discussions in Tokyo could only do harm, and he agreed 
with Jordan that the only question that mattered was that of 
Shantung and that until a really satisfactory solution were 
reached 'no amount of general assurances respecting China's 
sovereign rights will be of any value'. 
Curzon argued that although the Shantung decision had, 
in general terms, gone in favour of the Japanese, they had 
accepted qualifications of the rights given to them and had made 
undertakings concerning the future. Hence, Curzon maintained 
that 'Before we settle ~ to discuss with either Japan or China 
let us be clear what to discuss'. LCurzon's emphasiA/. As a 
result of these deliberations instructions were sent to Alston 
stating that while Britain did not want to appear anti-Japanese 
in outlook, no conversations regarding China were to be held in 
Tokyo, but that future discussions should be held in London 
between the foreign secretary and the Japanese ambassador. 
From the exchanges prompted by Alston's suggestion for 
Anglo-Japanese talks it was clear that although Britain was an 
active party in helping to secure the Shantung settlement, 
reservations remained concerning Japan's policy to China. As the 
peace conference drew to a close, Curzon began to replace Balrour 
in determining British policy even though there was not an 
offiCial change of office until October. 
188. 
China refuses to sign the ~~eaty of versailles. 
During May, it has been noted, the British government 
had received clear intimations that owing to the proposed Shan-
tung clauses China would refuse to sign the peace treaty, but at 
the end of May Jordan reported that the Chinese mi~ter for 
foreign affairs had told him that the Chinese delegation had 
been instructed to sign.37 Shortly after this interview Jordan 
began preliminary negotiations with the Chinese government con-
cerning rights in Tibet, but progress was threatened by the 
actiJns of Japan, for Jordan stated that: 
'Japanese papers are publishing the most sensational 
accounts of our demands with view of diverting attention 
from Shantung question. If negotiations about latter 
question are allowed to take precedence of ours in regard 
to Tibet it is moralli certain that we shall fail to 
reach a settlement'.3tl 
In the summer and autumn of 1919, Tibet was to prove a conten-
tious issue in Anglo-Chinese relations, and China placed much 
blame upon the Shantung agreement for her refusal to negotiate a 
Tibetan settlement with Britain. 39 
It may have been the intention of the Chinese govern-
ment to sign the peace treaty, but during the crucial month of 
June the Chinese delegation in Paris became subjected to heavy 
pressures both from home and vociferous Chinese groups 1n the 
French capital, which made the delegation undecided. Jo~n re-
ported that the Chinese delegation had received some 7,000 
telegrams, many of them very hostile, and it was Jordan's opinion 
that such oPPosition caused the delegates to decide that it was 
safer to comply with the expressed wishes of their countrymen 
than heed a weak and vacillating government. 40 
The known indecision of the Chinese delegation in 
tlaris prompted the Japanese minister in Peking to seek informa-
tion about the attitude of the Chinese government. At the same 
time the minister promised that if China were to agree to sign 
the treaty without reservations concerning the Shantung clauses 
the following statement would be auth:Jrised; 
lJapan in accordance with the repeated declarations 
of the Japanese Government and with the agreements between 
Japan and China is resolved to restore to China the lease-
hold of K1aochow when that leasehold shall have been con-
ceded to Japan by Germany under the Peace Treaty. 
Accordingly, if the Chinese Government has no objection, 
negotiations between Japan and China as to the details of 
the Kiaochow Leased Territory will be opened as soon as 
the Peace 'rrea ty, now presented by the Allied and As 50c1-
~~:~a~~~:r~nt~e~~~~~~f ~:~~e:~ds~~~~ :~~ g~;~~;~~~l 
It was obvious that the treaties of 1915 and 1918 were involved 
in Japan's reference to her agreements with China, and it was a 
further indication that, despite American disapproval, Japan was 
~ 
not prepared to abandon completely her claims ~ these treaties. 
The Japanese minister, however, elicited a promise from the 
Chinese Vice-minister for foreign affairs that if the Chinese 
delegates in Paris were to refuse to sign the treaty, the Chinese 
minister in London would do so. But it was not long before the 
Chinese government were also influenced by the pressure of 
public opinion and began to waver in their instructions to 
42 
t~eir delegation. 
190. 
Only a few days before the arranged date (28~h June) 
for the signing of the peace treaty, Clemenceau reported at a 
meeting of the council of four that t~e Chinese delegation had 
written to hLn stating that they would not sign unless reserva-
tiJns 1;;c;re allowed which specifically stated that China did not 
43 
accept the articles referring to Shantung. Wilson made a 
half-hearted attempt to support the Chinese claims but, according 
to Dr. Fifield, the president was hesitant about reservations 
lest the United states senate should use the precedent to secure 
American qualifications to the treaty.44 L10yd George argued 
that the Italian government had reservations upon certain issues, 
but they were prepared to sign the treaty without any written 
qualifications, although possibly the British prime minister's 
praise of Italy was prompted by the dispute he was having with 
M.Tittoni, the Italian minister of foreign affairs, concerning 
the latter's public criticisms of Britain's actions regarding 
45 African colonies. The British prime minister also felt that 
if reservations were allowed this would be a bad example to 
Rumania and Germany. Hence, it would seem that, as with other 
issues, proper consideration of China's claims was precluded by 
the global interests of the major powers. 
191. 
Undoubtedly Britain had loyally carried out her treaty 
obligations to Japan. Indeed, it could be argued that the 
3ritish goverrunent had been too conscientious in this direction, 
but, while Britain was supporting Japan regarding Shantung, the 
Japanese intensified their efforts to divert hostile Chinese 
feelings from themselves to westerners in an extremely question-
able fashion. Alston reported that ten members of a Japanese 
secret society were to have gone to Shanghai dressed as Chinese 
where they were to have assassinated foreigners in an attempt to 
show that Chinese sentiments were anti-foreign rather than anti-
46 Japanese, but the plot was discovered. Jordan reported that 
Japanese efforts to use the Tibetan negotiations to distract 
attention from the Shantung issue had partially succeeded, and 
the Japanese had issued pamphlets accusing Britain of wanting to 
annexe large areas of western China. SUch developments were 
scarcely encouraging for hopes of sound Anglo-Japanese relations 
in the post-war period and indicated that future British actions 
in China were susceptible to Japan's arousing the hostility of 
the Chinese population. 
Lansing, the American secretary of state, has described 
his interview with Makino on the morning or the day when the 
peace treaty was Signed, and he referred to the fact that the 
Japanese would not issue a statement expressing their liberal 
47 intentions for the early retrocesslon of Shantung. No mention 
was made of the proposed Japanese declaration concerning an early 
retrocession which had earlier been offered to the Chinese 
48 
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government, and one must question why Makino was so reticent. 
Possibly he was encouraged to believe that China would sign the 
peace treaty unconditionally, which Lansing said was Hakino's 
opinion, by the support which Japan had received from the powers, 
especially Britain. Indeed, on the whole question of Shantung 
the 3a.J anese delegates 'were satisfied that l<"rance and Great 
Britain would stand by their engagements',49 and with such 
support Japan could afford to be somewhat indifferent to China's 
wishes. 
China, however, did refuse to sign the treaty of 
~c~ ~c~ 
Versailles, and ~se. letter to Clemenceau giving ~ reasons 
reflects the bitterness of Chinese feelings. It read: 
'The Supreme Council of the Conference, having made 
it a rule not to admit any reservations of any kind what-
ever either in the text of the Treaty or elsewhere, and 
having refused to accept before the signature of the 
Treaty any compromise cc)mpatible with their idea of right 
and justice - eVen a declaration to the effect that the 
signature of the Chinese Plenipotentiaries should not be 
considered as preventing China from demanding at a suit-
able time a new examination of the Shantung question - the 
Plenipotentiaries of the Chinese Republic have the h::>nour 
to inform you that they do not consider themselves quali-
fied to sign the Treaty of Versailles today'.50 
This refusal, it may be judged, was weakened by the inclusion 
of the last word, 'today', for it indicated that a change of 
mind was possible and reflected some of the uncertainties felt 
by the Chinese delegation and government. 
193. 
The signing of the Vreaty of Versailles by the other 
p~wers did not, of course, bring the Shantung controversy to an 
end, but China had lost an important rou!1d in her struggle to 
secure the retrocession of the rights granted to foreigners in 
the province. However, as a result of the peace conference 
China had gained world wide publicity for her case, and won at 
least some sympathy for her claims. In such a situation one 
might have thought that Britain, having honoured her obligations 
to Japan, would have become more friendly disposed towards 
China, but little progress, if any, was made in this direction, 
despite some early promises that such developments would occur. 
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CHAPTER VI 
A SUH1~lER OF MISSED OPPORTUNITIES, 
JULY-SEPTEMBER, 1919. 
197. 
During the three months which followed the signing of 
the treaty of Versailles it was natural that affairs in the far 
east, as elsewhere, should be unsettled. In China the main aim 
of Britain's policy was the safeguarding of her economic inter-
ests, and in the immediate post-war period consideration had to 
be given to the proposals for a new international financial con-
sortium. Shantung continued to be an important issue, while 
other questions such as the Anglo-Chinese negotiations regarding 
Tibet, the changed international position of Russia, Japan's 
activities in Siberia and the South Pacific, the possibilities 
of a recurrence of German militarism, and the continuing rise 
of Chinese nationalism, also commanded attention and helped to 
determine the pattern of far eastern politics. 
China had declared that her reason for not signing the 
treaty of Versailles was the refusal of the powers to allow her 
to make reservations regarding the treaty's articles concerning 
Shantung. Subsequently Jordan, the British minister in Peking, 
feared that an estrangement of China from the rest of the al11es 
would lead to a Sino-German rapprochement. For reasons which 
were not unselfish to British interests, Jordan had worked during 
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the Paris peace negotiations for the elimination of German in-
fluence in the far east and this may have made him sensitive to 
tl1e possibility of a German revival which, he thought, might be 
achieved by a Sino-German agreement whereby Germany would regain 
her properties in China in exchange for a voluntary surrender 
of her extraterritorial rights. l Jordan believed that German 
::>fficers would begin to train the multitudinous Chinese troops, 
and he argued that China should not be treated as a truant, for 
the allies could not afford to see the establishment of a mili-
tary hegemony in the far east which was hostile to allied 
interests. Jordan recognised the growth of Chinese nationalt*m, 
and claimed that it was the weight of hostile Chinese public 
opinion to the Shantung settlement, and not merely the diplomatic 
manoeuvring of her statesmen, which had proved decisive and 
caused the Chinese delegation to refuse to sign the peace treaty. 
Hacleay, the British expert on far eastern affairs, 
thought that Jordan's fears were exaggerated, and argued that as 
a result of British pressure the Japanese had agreed to modify 
the conditions by which they said they were prepared to restore 
Kiaochow to China. There appeared to be reason, Macleay 
claimed, to hope that the Chinese and Japanese governments would 
reach an understanding which would enable China to sign the peace 
treaty. But Macleay feared that such hopes were endangered by 
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the resolution which had been adopted by the Foreign Relations 
Committee of the United states Senate, proposed by Senator 
Lodge, which aimed at amending the peace treaty to make China, 
and not Japan, the recipient of former German rights in Shan-
tung. 2 Such a resolution, Macleay concluded, 'will encourage 
the Chinese to maintain their present attitude'. 
British policy towards Japan and China was examined in 
a Foreign Office memorandum which described Japan's actions in 
China as 'largely opportunist', but claimed that Britain could 
draw comfort from the fact that a more moderate party was in 
power in Japan. 3 The Japanese government had given certain 
assurances to China which were thought satisfactory 'as they 
provide for the surrender to China of the sovereign rights over 
every part or Shantung including Kiaochow, the Japanese retain-
ing only certain economic rights in that area'. But this state-
ment must be judged ambiguous for it does not make clear whether 
the retention of economic rights applied only to the concession 
area in Kiaochow, or throughout Shantung, or to both, and the 
political influence which the rights carried is minimised with 
no reference being made to the Japanese-dominated railway police 
force. The memorandum did, however, question the value of 
Japanese promises, especially concerning Japan's end-or-war 
actions in Manchuria. In view of the importance attached to 
Japan's promises during the peace negotiations, the raising of 
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such a question less than one month after the conclusion of the 
treaty was undoubtedly a reflection upon British judgment at 
Paris. 
The memorandum then traced the steps which had led to 
the peace settlement and in doing so the Chinese delegation were 
blamed for starting anti-Japanese propaganda which 'threatened 
to convert a simple question Lthe Shantung issu~ into a serious 
problem of Far Eastern politics'. After further adverse cOrrL:.:ents 
regarding the Chinese representatives, the memorandum concluded 
by stating that it was too early to judge whether China's 
'foolish refusal' to sign the peace treaty would be seized upon 
by the Japanese to defer opening negotiations for the surrender 
of Kiaochow. The Shantung issue was, of course, a very complex 
affair and to refer to it as a Simple question was incredible, 
and it must be noted that no attempt was made in the memorandum 
either to understand or refer to the Chinese point of view. 
Despite this memorandum, more sympathetic views to-
wards China were beginning to be expressed by a number of British 
statesmen and officials of whom, Curzon, the actinglforeign 
secretary, was undoubtedly the most important. But in the numer-
ous contacts which were made with Chinese representatives no 
indications of greater friendship for China were expressed, nor 
even hints dropped of Britain's growing suspcions of Japan. 
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An example of the inept handling of an interview with 
a Chinese representative which did not do justice to British 
policy is offered when Sir John Tilley, an assistant secretary, 
met Alfred Sze, the Chinese minister, at the Foreign Office.4 
The interview began by Sze informing Tilley of a number of pro-
posals which Lansing, the American secretary of state, had put 
to the Japanese peace delegation. It was proposed that the 
Japanese should put their verbal assurances regarding Tsingtao 
into writing, agree to the concession in the port being inter-
national, not just Japanese, and that the concession should be 
retroceded to China within two years. Tilley stated that he 
would inform Curzon of these proposals, but he doubted whether 
Curzon would accept them for it was unlikely that Japan would 
agree to an international settlement, which was a far wider 
proposal than merely fixing a time limit for retrocess1on. 
Although he did not inform Sze, Tilley recorded after the inter-
view that he was of the opinion that two years was an unnecess-
arily long period for occupation,and the Japanese ambassador 
should be asked only if his government would address a note to 
the allies embodying the Japanese assurances regarding Shantung 
and stating when they would be carried out. Obviously, Tilley 
had reservations about Japan, but he did not give any indication 
of them to Sze. Instead, he may have given the Chinese minister 
the impression that Curzon was frightened of offending Japan and 
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therefore would not support Lansing's proposals. As events 
proved Curzon did approve of many of Lansing's main suggestions 
and he ~cted upon them with vigour, but there is no immediate 
evidence that the Chinese government wer~ ever informed. It may 
be noteo that early in August there was some concern in the 
Foreign Office that nothing in writing had been received concern-
ing Lansing's proposals. 5 
\tJhen it became known that Curzon was about to have an 
intervir:w with the Japanese ambassador to discuss affairs in 
:;hina, Max Muller, head of the far eastern department, suggested 
that Curzon might be able to refer to the 'wholly selfish' policy 
which Japan had pursued in China while her allies were pre-
occupied in ~urope, la policy aiming at securing her political 
and commercial supremacy to the exclusion of other powers and 
6 
at the cost of Chinal.~axMuller continued by sharply 
criticising the military party of Japan which he claimed ha4 
devoted all its energies to the exploitation of China and very 
little to helping the allied cause. He pinned his hopes, how-
ever, on the fact that the Japanese government had recognised 
that the means which they had hitherto adopted to gain their 
aims in China would bring them into the direct opposition of 
Great Britain and the United states. 
Meanwhile Philip Kerr, who was still in Paris, was 
considering what should be said publicly about 'the Shan~g 
affair,.7 Kerr referred to Japan's promises to China as con-
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tained in the Hankey memorandum of 5 June which had been handed 
to the Chinese government and which stated that the terms of 
the Shantung settlement reached by the peace council on 30 
April would be implemented. It was Kerr's opinion that publi-
cation of this document 'would undoubtedly allay excitement in 
China and satisfy misgivings in Great Britain and America'. 
Kerr claimed that Britain had the right to publish the document 
if Japan refused to do so, but he reported that it was the 
Jpinion of Balfour, the British foreign secretary who was also 
still in Paris, that the British government should not put 
Chinda, the Japanese ambassador to London and a leading Japanese 
delegate, 'in the position of vetoing any action we think it is 
n~cessary to take'. Balfour, Kerr stated, was in favour of try-
ing to gain Japan's co-operation rather than invite a clash. 
However, one can easily question whether publication of the April 
settlement ~ould have achieved the placatory effect which both 
3alfour and Kerr anticipated, and it must be considered surpris-
ing for any British government action being subject to a veto 
~'rom Japan. 
If Balfour and Kerr were advocating a policy of an 
appeasing character, Curzon's interview with Chinda was blunt.8 
The interview began by Curzon stressing the importance of the 
Shantung issue for future far eastern relations, and he continued 
by referring to Japan's policy on the Chinese mainland. He 
claimed that the object of Japan, especially during the war, 
had been to establish a mastery over China, and she had pursued 
her aims in a manner which had aroused widespread Chinese hos-
tility and a boycott of Japanese goods. America had been 
antagonised, and this step had dangers for the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance and could result, possibly, in Japan's isolation, 
~lthough China was temporarily helpless, Curzon foresaw a 
difficult situation should China take her grievances to the 
proposed League of Nations. 
Curzon then described the events at the turn of the 
century when many powers had been keen to join in the dismember-
ment of China in an imperialist fashion, and argued that in the 
different post-war situation it was essential for the powers to 
co-operate in helping China rather than perpetuate dangerous 
inter-power rivalries. These comments led Curzon to review the 
steps leading to the peace settlement, and he described several 
Britis~ war-time treaties, including the Anglo-Italian treaty of 
1915, as 'stupid and short sighted'. He claimed that the post-
war situation had revealed the folly of treaties which could 
scarcely be implemented and he claimed ••• 
• ••• it was unwise of Japan to insist upon the 
technical rights secured to her by her agreements with 
China in respect of Shantung •••• lf Japan was actuated 
by the friendly sentiments which she professed; if she 
meant to adhere to her earlier pledges to give up 
Tsingtau and Shantung; if she was prepared to withdraw 
the whole of her troops, civil administrators, and police; 
if, in fact, she was prepared to make a "bona-fide" res-
titution of whatever she had acquired from Germany to 
China, why should she not come out into the open and say 
so? Why allow the atmosphere to be further poisoned by 
long concealment and delay?' 
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These remarks provoked Chinda to defend his country in a fervent 
fashion, and possibly caused the ambassador to be rather indis-
creet. 
A t first Chinda maintained that it was the intention to 
evacuate Tsingtao for Japan had never failed to honour a pledge. 
But Chinda then argued that China had willingly signed a treaty 
consenting to Japan's claims in Shantung, so why should Japan 
who had thrown herself into the war not reap some of the profits 
to which her sacrifices entitled her? What Japan was 'proposing 
to take or keep' was not a Chinese but a German pos~ession. 
Bri tain was proposing to retain former German possessi·,)ns, why 
should Japan not do the same? ~hy should China be allowed to 
tear up a treaty which she had voluntarily concluded with Japan 
less than one year previously? Chinda claimed that Japan was 
prepared to evacuate Shantung in her own time, 'But the economic 
rights which she had inherited from Germany she proposed to re-
tain'. The ambassador concluded this part of his case by stress-
ing the importance of the Shantung issue to Japan's sense of 
national honour. 
Curzon countered these remarks by stating that the 
situation demanded not only concern for national honour but 
large-minded statesmanship. If Japan were to continue with her 
policies in China she might succeed in the short-run but at the 
long-term cost of antagOnising the Chinese and creating a most 
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bitter situation. To these remarks Chinda replied, surprisingly, 
by asking Curzon's advice as to what japan should do. After 
paying suitable compliments to such a request, Curzon stated that 
if it were the intention of Japan to evacuate Shantung she 
should say so openly and announce the date. He asked why the 
japanese commissioner of customs at Tsingtao should nJt be with-
drawn and the llari time ,Dustoms UniDn be empowered to appoint a 
successor, which would make Japan's intentions appear less 8e1-
fish. 
In view of the economic privileges which were accorded 
to Japan by the April settlement Curzon's comments on this issue 
were significant for he suggested that economic privileges ••• 
' ••• seemed to be another way of perpetuating the 
era of spheres of influence, which the Ambassador 
concurred with me in deprecating. Everyone pro-
tested against Germany when she insisted on seizing 
this preferential position Lin Shantun&7'.lihy was 
it any better in the case of Japan?' 
Curzon argued that preferential positions were not in harmony 
with the spirit of the times and this applied particularly to 
railway rights. But instead of Japan supporting m~ves to inter-
nationalise the railways she was claiming exclusive rights for 
her present lines and she envisaged an extension of them on the 
grounds that they lay within Japanese spheres of influence. In 
conclusion Curzon stated that he did not think it would be 
humiliating for Japan to make a series of concessi)ns to China 
public knowledge. 
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It is clear that Curzon's remarks were a serious re-
flection on the wisdom of British policy during the peace ne-
gotiations when so much support had been accorded to Japan,while 
Chinda's comments pointed to a Japan determined to hold on to her 
war-time advances, so it seemed that some Anglo-Japanese friction 
was inevitable. Diplomatic use of the interview was envisaged, 
for Ma)C!'luller gave instructions for copies of the reports of 
the exchanges to be sent to Peking, the peace delegatiJn in 
Paris, and to Washington 'for the confidential use of the 
American government,.9 
Alston, the British charge in Tokyo, Jordan, and Hax 
Huller who were all sympathetic to China were delighted with 
C ' t dId them. lO 0 t ti urzon s argumen s an we come ne mus ques on, 
'1owever, whether Curzon was not being sanctimonious for it was 
easy to condemn the imperialist division of China, but Britain 
had not announced any intention of surrendering the gains which 
she had made at the beginning of the century, and she was holding 
tig11tly to her interests in the Yangtse Valley, Shanghai, Hong 
Kong, and Tientsin. Britain had not retroceded even places of 
marginal value such as Wei-hai Wei, nor agreed to a revision of 
China's international treaties whereby at least minimal changes 
could have been made in China's favour. Even if all the criti-
cisms of Japan's policies were valid, Curzon would have been in 
a stronger position to admonish Japan if Britain's standing in 
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China had been on a more equitable basis. This point was not 
lost upon the Japanese, for from Tokyo Alston reported that they 
really believed that none of their deeds was as guilty as the 
earlier British acts of aggression in China,11 In presenting 
some deliberately biased arguments in favour of Japan, Alston 
queried whether the Japanese occupation of Shantung was worse 
than that of Germany, and he referred to the difficulties in 
which Britain would have been placed had Japan joined the side 
of the central powers during the war. It was Alston's sincGre 
opinion that both Britain and Japan should honour their obli-
gations to respect China's integrity. Alston, however, soon 
ceased to play the role of a Japanese advocat,for almost 
immediately he submitted a further dispatch in which he stated 
that Japan was placing more importance upon her armed strength 
in order to secure a solution of her problems than relying upon 
12 the future deCisions of the proposed League of Nations. It 
was all very well, Alston concluded, for Japan to talk about 
resuming her natural role, but he questioned whether this im-
plied further steps against China, 
British policy towards China was in some difficulty 
for Britain was trying to restrain a forward-~l1g Japan, 
tt : ... ~ 
while at the same time she was s.ikihg to retain benefits from 
actions similar tO~iCh she was admonishing Japan for taking, 
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The pJsition was made worse by the fact that Britain still had 
two major spokesmen, Balfour and Curzon, who had different 
attitudes to the far eastern situation which are not explained 
by the tactical variations of emphasis which mediators must make 
in order to draw opposing parties closer together. While Curzon 
was speaking very sharply indeed to the Japanese ambassador in 
London, in Paris Balfour had an interview with Wellington Ko) in 
which the British foreign secretary was sympathetic towards Japan 
in a manner which clearly went beyond seeking to induce the 
Chinese delegate to appreciate the Japanese point of view. Koo 
argued that his delegation had not signed the peace treaty owing 
to China being debarred from making any reservations concerning 
the Shantung clauses.13 Balfour replied that he understood the 
reasons for Chinese agitation over Shantung, but the Chinese 
government had not informed their people that 'the Treaty clauses 
as published were not all that had been agreed to in regard to 
Shantung, but that there was a supplementary understanding between 
the Allied and Associated Powers and the Japanese ••• ' which was 
clearly a reference to the April settlement. It was Balfour's 
claim that this agreement modified the situation, and he queried 
why China had not published its terms. He then asked what China 
objected to in the peace treaty. 
Koo replied that the agreement was objectionable for 
not recognising China as a principal and not gOing far enough to 
protect China's rights. A time limit had not been fixed beyond 
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which Japan could not maintain troops in Shantung, and Koo com-
plained that by the treaty Japan was to have an exclusive settle-
ment at Kiaochow instead of there being an international settle-
ment. But Balfour was scornful of these objections and he stated 
that ther~ could be little doubt that Japan would evacuate Shan-
tung at an early date. He confessed that he was not sure of the 
significance of the difference between an interna tional resi-
dential concession and a series of national concessions, but he 
could not believe that the difference could be so great as to 
justify China's refusal to sign the treaty. 
The interview proceeded by Koo contending that Japan 
was extending her influence in Shantung by means of extensive 
railway building and that she aimed at a permanent domination of 
the province. But once again Balfour made light of China's 
fears, claim1ng that 'British policy had always aimed at the 
maintenance of the independence of China'. If, Balfour argued, 
China really did fear Japan, it was clear that her refusal to 
sign the peace treaty would not counter Japan's actions and he 
continued by stating that China had in fact recovered much of 
her sovereignty in Shantung. At the conclusion of the interview 
Koo asked Balrour whether he had seen a proposal of Lansing for 
Japan to make a public declaration that Japan would give effect 
to the undertakings which she had given to the peace council. 
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Bal!our replied that he had discussed the matter with Lansing 
and he, Balfour, was anxious that Japan should make suoh a 
public statement, thus showing he had some regard for China's 
wishes. 
It was obvious from Balfourts remarks that he believed 
t~at the April settlement was a serious modification in China's 
favour of the Shantung clauses in the peace treaty. Also, it 
was clear that if Balfour had read the report of the three ex-
perts in late APril14 he had forgotten much of its findings for 
the report made the distinct point that the proposed Japanese 
concession at TSingtao would occupy the most advantageous position 
in the centre of the port. 
Simultaneously with Curzon's interview with Chinda, 
Alston in Tokyo queried whether the time was not ripe to argue 
with Japan that the concession at Tsingtao should be of an 
int~rn~tional character. But after referring to Curzon's inter-
view, MaxMuller argued that Britain had done enough for the 
present and he would deprecate the raising of the question. He 
anded, 'We might leave that to the others to do,.15 But of 'the 
others' the United states was undoubtedly the most important, 
and the American delegation were anxious that the British 
government should press Japan to declare publicly her intentions 
regarding Shantung. As a result C.H.Tufton, counsellor of 
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embassy at Paris, argued that it would be relevant to show 
'Ienry '14 hi te, a membrc'!r :Jf the American delegation, the substance 
of thf' account of the Curzon-Chinda interview. But Balfour 
opposed this step. ~e claimed that White had already seen an 
account :Jf his own interview with the Chinese plenipotentiary, 
'Wellington Koo (if that is his name), and Balfour ad~ed 'This 
gives a fair amount Laccount17 of our policy. I am a little 
afraid of communicating this admirable but rather violent dis-
- 16 patch to Japan's most formidable critic~'. 
Balfour Was becoming an extremely tired man and no doubt 
allowances must be made for his labours at Paris. Nevertheless, 
his arguments reveal another unusual situation. ~f course, it 
was possible that ~alfour was being merely off-handed in profes-
sing to be uncertain of Koo's name, but if he were being serious 
Balfour's memory was slipping badly for Koo, which is a simple 
name to the English tongue,_ had played a leading role throughout 
the peace conference and should have been well known to Balfour. 
)ne must also question Balfour's judgment in believing that an 
account of his own interview with Koo was an exposition of Brit-
ish policy, for Curzon had adopted a markedly different attitude 
in his interview with Chinda. It is interesting to note that 
while Balfour was against the Americans being informed uf the 
Curzon-Chinda interview instructions had already been issued for 
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a confinential report to be placed at the American government's 
,4isposal.l7 It WOuld seem that some confusion was resulting 
from th~ different attitudes of Curzon and Balfour and the 
nifficulties of one being in London and the other in Paris. 
When Chinda met Curzon for the second time the 
Japanese ambassador stated almost immediately that as a result 
)f Curz,)n's remarks at the first interview Chinda had concluded 
th.at Curzon was not in agreement w1 th the policy of the Bri t1sh 
government, and he asked if such a conclusion were correct. l8 
Curzon replied that he had no desire to dissociate himself from 
his O~l government's policy, but public Jpinion in England, 
Auerica, and China was critical of Japan's actions, and that he 
felt a personal sympathy for such sentiments. He had offered 
his advice in an attempt to help Japan to extricate herself from 
3. difficult position. Chinda then challenged Curzon to state 
wheth(!)r he believed that Japans~ould withdraw her military 
forces from Shantung, to which he replied that he had no doubts 
as to J,'lpan's intentL)ns but it would be better for Japan to make 
a public statement and to give dates. The ambassador then asked 
if Curzon's criticisms applied to Japan's commercial and eCJnomic 
concessi,)ns in China, to which Curzon replied that, broadly 
speaking, he felt it was undesirable for Japan to have such 
preferences for thAy carried with them la command of the 
country's LChina'il policy and resources quite as effective in 
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its way as that which resulted from the presence of troops'~ 
Curzon continued by making an appeal for the principles of 
internationalisation of economic rights to be implemented and 
for Japan not to be worried about considerations of 'losing 
face' • 
Curzon reported that in his two interviews with Chinda 
he had spoken very sharply to the ambassador about Japanese 
brutalities and atrocities in Korea. A further point was that 
Japan, by means of a wireless agreement, was extending her in-
fluence towards Tibet, and the British government looked un-
favourably upon such a development as a possible threat to her 
own interests in that country and in India. Curzon was obviously 
concerned at Japan's activities, and the negotiations regarding 
tile proposed international consortium which were taking place at 
the sa;ne time increased doubts regarding Japan IS motives in 
China. 
The Financial Consortium. 
A financial consortium had existed in China before the 
war in order to control foreign lending to China and ensure that 
loans would be so placed that interest and capital repayments 
would be reasonably seoured. 19 The pre-war consortium had been 
weakened by the withdrawal of the United states in 1913 when 
President Wilson objected to the political interference which it 
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but 
Lnplied in China's affairs, / Obviously any consortium would have 
v>litical implicati:ms for the very purpose of such organisatL)ns 
necessitate a measure of political control. The proposals for 
the post-war consortium were complicated and they can be studied 
for their economic importance, but the political implications 
are reasonably clear and they centre upon Japan's self-interested 
attempts to secure areas of exclusion from the proposed agreements. 
Plans for a new consortium had been drawn up in July, 
1918, an/"1 a meeting of delegates from Sri tain, france, Japan, and 
the Unit~d states had been held in May, 19l9. 20 However, in 
mid-June, rl.Odag1rt, a Japanese financial representative, wrote 
to F.r.Lamont, the principal American financial representative, 
asking that in the reg1::>ns of Hanchuria and Mongolia where Japan 
~ad special interests these areas should be excluded from the 
21 proposCc'r1. arrangements. This request was made as a result of 
ti1€ direct intervention of the Japanese government, and the 
Japanese financial representatives informed Lamont that they were 
not in favour of such a sugges tion. 22 C onsequen tly consul ta tions 
among the financial representatives of Britain, France, and 
America ensued and it was agreed that such exclusions were con-
trary to the principles of the consortium. Na:xiluller believed 
that the request was a 'try-on' by Japan, and if the other. 
countries were firm she would give way. Curzon stated explicitly, 
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'I WOQld not yield for one moment,23 and such opposition was 
made official in an exchange of letters between the Foreign 
.Jffice and the American embassy. France was informed of 
Britain's hostility towards the exclusions and of her opinion 
24 that Japan was releasing a 'ballon d'essai'. 
Curzon's criticisms of Japan'~ consortium plans were 
mounting at the same time as his interviews with Ch1nda~ver 
Shantung. But at a crucial moment Britain weakened her case 
le~'" 
against Japan by proposing to ~ £5JO,000 to the Chinese 
government in the form of special bonns and an arrangement with 
the F.nglish firm of Vickers to supply China with aeroplan •• 25 • 
These proposals also concerned the arms embargo on China, and 
arguments continued into the winter causing Britain to be 
criticised in excess of the supply of planes and the sums of 
money involved. 
Jordan had been a consistent supporter of the princi-
ples underlying a consortium and the internationalising of the 
Chines~ railways. Hith plans for a consortium developing Jordan 
became anxious lest the weak Peking government should conclude an 
agreement whereby Japan would gain control of a number of key 
Chinese railway lines before a plan for international management 
26 
was reached. As the summer progressed his comments about 
Japanese policy became sharper, and concern was expressed in 
western circles that Japan would use the pretext ~f intervpntion 
against Russia to gain c:Jntrol of the Chinese i;~anchurian Railway. 
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Alston in Tokyo shared the misgivings about Japan's 
ambi ti:::>ns, but he came to different conclusions from Curzon and 
Jordan. He reported that there was strong opposition in Japan 
against weakening her control in Manchuria, and Alston was con-
vinced that in order to defend her interests in the area Japan 
VIas prepared to face isolation. 27 Therefore, Alston argued, 
a compromise was necessary, and he suggested that Japan should 
be given the undisputed economic hegemony in iv1anchuria and Hon-
golia, but that Japan should be asked for the surrender of every 
right and privilege which she had in Shantung. This proposal 
brDue;ht a sharp reaction from Jordan wh:) deplored the suggestion. 
He argued that if the consortium were to succeed it would 
reauire the aotive co-operation of the Chinese, but the deal 
envi saged by Alston would antagonise them and render c,:>-opera tion 
imp:>ssible. Jordan claimed that a struggle was taking place in 
China between the military and civil parties, and it was vital 
not to encourage the military which would result from such an 
agreement with Japan. The Chinese people would win in the long 
run, Jordan maintained, and therefore short-sighted policies 
should be avoided. Already some iuccess was being achieved con-
cerning the internationalising of the railways, and it was 
Jordan's opinion that if Japan did not want to co-operate she 
should remain isolated. 28 Curzon agreed with Jordan and ex-
pressed his opposition to Alston's suggestion. 
218. 
Despite China's acute economic plight the consortium 
negotiations of the swumer achieved nothing, although consider-
able friction arose wLlen any of the powers were suspected of 
entering unilateral arrangements for a loan. 29 
Further influence of the Shantung problem. 
The question of Shantung continued to dominate the 
C~inrse situation and quite heated exchanges occurred between 
t:le Japanese ann American governments concerning the finalising 
of t e18 p~ace treaty arrangements. 30 Jordan ha<4 been extremely 
critical of the peace treaty and when he learned of Curzon's 
-renarks to Chinda regarding Japan's economic rights he noted: 
'~'!e are asked by Paris Conference to believe a 
railway running for two hundred and forty five miles 
from principal port in China to capital of one of most 
important provlncel,owned, financed, policed and con-
tr·)lled by Japanese Government, is a mere economic 
privilege ,·,htch does not involve interference with 
China's sQvereign rights or impair principles of "open 
rioor" or equality of treatment'.31 
In Jordan's opinion Japan was anxious to secure an empire and 
was prepared to use the railways to do so. :.MllxI'-iuller agreed 
wi th t'1e importance which Jordan was placing upon the influence 
of the Shantung railway, while Davidson, a member of the far 
eastern department, somewhat opt1m1stically believed that con-
sideration of economic rights would lead to an agreement between 
China and Japan, and result eventually in China signing the peace 
treaty. 
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At the beginning of August, Alston reported that Japan 
had issued the awaited public statement concerning her policies 
in Shantung, but that the statement contained little that was 
32 
new. The province was to be retroceded to China, although no 
date was specified, and it was stateo that the c')ncession at 
t'singtao would be of an international character, not merely 
Japanese, but the 'Area of foreign settlement is not to be 
limite~ to present area of Tsingtao'. Japan was to have prefer-
ence within the province concerning capital, materials and work, 
and the proposed arrangements convinced Alston that Japan would 
be given a dOminating influence in Tsingtao as the Jap~~ese were 
expected to insist upon their own comrnissioner for customs • 
. I.lston's dispatch prompted .. i:1a~uller and Davidson to reflect 
upon thE value of Japan's railway and mining rights in Shantung. 
As if in answer to the importance they attached to such rights 
Curzon briefly noted 'See my third and latest talk with Japanese 
ambassador' • 
It is of purpose to recall that during the peace negoti-
ations, Balfour had been mainly instrumental in securing the re-
jection of the report of the three experts which had specifically 
warned of the political importance attached to Japan's proposed 
economic rights in Shantung. 33 The resulting April settlement 
had incorporated Japan's main deSiderata, and Balfo\1r1.nd Karr 
argued subsequently that implementation of the settlement would 
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be to China's benefit. In the immediate post-war period, 
n~wever, Curzon joined Jordan and Alston in complaining at the 
strength of Japan's economic rights and that the privileges were 
impeding an equitable solution of many of China t s problems. 
Hence, when Curzon had a further interview with Chinda he voiced 
such complaints far more strongly, although wi th less heat, tha.l1. 
in previous interviews. 
The interview began by Curzon noting the friendly tone 
of the Japanese public statement of early August, but Curzon 
continued by vOicing some of the opinions expressed by Alston, 
namely t 11at the proposal for an international settlem.ent at 
l'singtao was welcome but no time limit had been fixed for the 
Japanese military occupation. 34 He then asked Chinda Whether 
the Japanese would agree to the tiaritime austomsUfiion appointing 
a commissl~ner for the post or would they claim such a right. 
Britain was vitally interested in the maritime customs, and 
future arrangements on this point concerned her trade vIi th 
China, and it ma~ be noted that the arrangements which had exis-
ted when Germany held control of TSingtao were based on: 
, •••• two agr~ements signed by Sir Robert Hart and 
the German envoy LWherebii the Chinese customs administra-
tion, instead of being pushed outside into Chinese terri-
tory, was invited inside the Schutzgebiet and established 
at 'rsingtau. Under these arrangements the port, docks 
and manufacturing district were made a bonded area •••• in 
return for this Tsingtau was given the privileges of a 
Chinese treaty port, and one fifth of the net reVenue from 
imports by sea was paid to the German administration. The 
free depot, aided by the railway, prospered, but it "'las a 
prosperity based on an English free-trade policy, and uot 
on the policy adopted elsewhere in German terrltory'.3, 
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JbviJusly Britain was concerned lest her interests in TSingtao 
should suffer, but to Curzon's question concerning the important 
issue Jf the appointment of a commissioner, Chinda could only 
reply that he had forgotten an earlier request to submit the 
matter to his government and that he would rectify his omission. 
Discussion continued by dealing with the economic 
rights which Japan proposed to retain in Shantung, but Chinda 
was uncr:rtain of his country's preCise claims. Curzon then 
repeated his objections to Japan's railway policies which, r1("s-
pite various paper guarantees to the contrary, were, he claimed, 
'establishing a stranglehold upon the Province which wJuld place 
it eventually and for all time lli'1der her control'. A t the con-
clusi)n ·Jf the interView Curzon again raised the questi.::m of 
Japan's policies in Korea, and stated that he was at a loss to 
understand why reports of the atrocities had n:)t appeared in the 
Britls'l press. Curzon warned Chinda that such reports would 
lose Japan many friends should they be published. 
Japan's economic claims in Shantung continued to give 
cause for concern and Hiles Lampson, a first secretary at the 
Peking legation, reported that the Japanese were endeavouring 
to in '~erpret the ri ghts as determined by the Sino-German treaty 
of 1898, the essentials of which had been transferred to Japan 
by the peace settlement, in an excessive fashion. 3D Lampson 
enclosed a resolution which had been passed by the British 
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chamber of co~~erce at Tientsin that expressed fears at Japan's 
threatened dominatiJn of Tsingtao. In terms similar to the 
findings of the three experts in April the resolutiJn stated 
that the devE;lopment of the port of ;rsingtao and the Shantuag 
railways would be considerable, and it continued by claiming t~at 
such a development could out-match the facilities of Tientsln and 
Shanghai which were areas of vital imp~rtance to 3ritis~ interpsts. 
Lampson's conclusions were that Japan's activities strained still 
furt~er the attempts which were being made to belittle her 
('conJmic as opposed to her political rights, and prO:l1pted :\.'-{. 
C live, a member of the far eastern department, to note t~1a t Japan 
had abandoned all pretence about the 'open-aoJr'. 
Within China the public statement Jf Japan of early 
August created a generally unfav:mrable impres sion, and Jordan 
reported that many Chinese felt that the Paris peace settlement 
waS no better than the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1915 as far as 
Shantung was cCIXl:!rned. There was marked confusi·')n in Peking 
and vacillation between trusting the allies to make an acceptable 
agreement for the Chinese and, at the other extreme, contempla-
ting direct Sino-Japanese negotlations. 37 Hacleay's reactions 
to Jordan's report were unfriendly towarcls the Chinese and he 
sta ted: 
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'I gather ••.•• that the U.S. Hinister at Peking must 
have advocated in regard to Kiaochow and Shantung questions 
t'~0. same policy as tha t which the Far Eastern experts on 
tl10 American Peace Delegation urged upon President Wilson, 
viz: that the Agreements and Treaties of 1915 and 1918 
should be declared invalid and that the Peace Treaty should 
restore the lease~ territory of Kiaochow and the German 
rights in Shantung to China disregarding any claims which 
Jnpan might base either on the treaties ann agreements or 
on her conquest and occupation of TSingtao, unaided by 
China, long before China entere~ tJ1e war on the side of the 
Entente' • 
'rhis' sta tement resembles Balfour I s oft used phrase re garding 
China u:)t having spent a shilling nor lost a man in the clearing 
of the Germans from Shantung, which overlooks comrletely the 
.:1ili tary helplessness not only of China but also 
allies in 1914 and 1915. 
the western 
With doubts growing concerning Japan's motives, as 
:llade clear by the Curzon~hinda interviews, it would have been 
wiser for 3ritain to have begun to adopt a more friendly approach 
towards China, but instead a very cold attitude was maintained. 
An example of this coldness can be seen when Lou Tseng-tsiang 
called at the Foreign Office and saw Sir Rona.ld Graham, who was 
substituting for Lord Hardinge, permanent under-secretary of 
state, in order to discuss China's refusa.l to sign the peace 
Greaty and voice a number of grievances against Japanese action~~ 
LOUiS presence in the Foreign Office occurred in the period when 
Cur zon wa s having hi s heated interviews wi th C hinda, and two 
such exchanges had already taken place. One would think that for 
22l.f.. 
obvi::>us reasons Curzon would have been pleased to receive Lou, 
but when the chief Shinese delegate expressed a wish to see 
Curzon, Graham 'dia not hold out much hope to him', but gave n) 
\ 
reason for Curzon not being available. In fact, Curzon ',.ras 
'",illing to see him, and in his famous blUe pencil he scribbled 
·)n Graham's account of the intervi ew 'I cou1.] see him tomorrow 
Caturoay at 1 p.m. at F.O.', but there is n') evinence that t~e 
lIlceting took place. Thus, the opportuni ty for even the nDst 
inforil~l discussion was lost, before Lou left ~urope and returned 
to Peking. 
An indication of China's standing in the list of 
p~1orities of Balfour and Curzon is revealed in an exchange of 
letters between the ~wo principals. 3alfour stated that he 
wishec to leave Paris for a six week holiday anc listed a n1l.'Uber 
of outstanding issues which were delaying his departure, but he 
made no reference to China. 39 When Curzon replied he made a 
detailed political review of the situation which, however, con-
centrated upon the middle-east and ignored far eastern develop-
ments. 4J Jbviously too much should not be inferred from such 
an exchange, but one might have thought that Curzon would at 
least have mentioned Shantung which in the summer ·')f 1919 was 
mainly responsible for bringing the Anglo-Chinese negotiations 
concerning Tibet to an abrupt ending. 
Anglo~hinese ne~otistions concerning Tibet. 
Britain's interests in Tibet were mainly strategic 
and aimed at preventing other countries, especially Russia and 
Japan, from gaining a Tibetan entry point into the sub-continent 
Jf India. Tibet was a country over which China claimed suzer-
ainty, and in 1914 an Anglo~hinese-Tibetan dispute had occurred 
regarding boundaries. Th1sdispute continued intermittently 
until 1918 when Eric Teiehman, a British consular officer, was 
able to arrange a cease-fire, after which an uneasy truce en-
41 
sued. 
Early in July, 1919, Jordan reported that much to his 
pleasure China had submitted proposals for bringing the Tibetan 
dispute to an end, and he argued that no time shJuld be lost be-
42 fore negotiations were started. After studying the Chinese 
proposals Curzon agreed that such negotiations should begin, and 
he informed Jordan that as the Tibetan government had asked 
Britain to mediate with China in the dispute, it was not necess-
ary to refer to Lhasa before a decision on boundaries could be 
reached. 43 He stated that the boundaries proposed by China 
were generally acceptable, and argued that China's suzerainty 
regarding Tibet should be recognised. Curzon did object, however, 
to a Chinese proposal for their commissioners to be stationed at 
trade marts as he thought that they would interfere unjustly 
with British commerce. 
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In mid-August Jordan reported that detailed Anglo-
C~inese negotiations regarding Tibet had begun and the attitude 
of the Chinese was reasonable. Among other items discussed, he 
stated, was a possible division of Tibet into separate zones over 
which different powers would exercise influence. 44 The impli-
cations of Jordan's report were studied in detail at the Foreign 
Uffice, and Curzon 11 n"', 11""-' indicate. some of his lm-
~k~" 
patience on the issue~ 'I thought the Chinese were supposed to 
be yearning for settlement'. But if the Chinese government did 
want a settlement, the Japanese press (and no doubt government) 
clid n~t, and a propaganda campaign was waged with the object of 
depicting Japan's acquisition of Shantung as being a mild affair, 
for all Chinese who were willing to negotiate with Britain over 
Tibet were described as arch-traitors about to betray their 
country's basic interests. An example of such propaganda 
arrived at the Foreign <tfice and ;,HaacMuller noted the venom of 
the pamphlet received, and stated that its tone corresponded 
closely with the anti-British propaganda in the Japanese press 
about which Alston, the British charge, had informed them. 45 
To this Curzon briefly noted 'It is the hand of Eaau in both 
cases' • 
Owing to the fundamenta.l weakness of the Chinese 
government there was an attempt to assess the potential dangers 
of the Japanese propaganda campaign. R.H.Clive, a member of the 
far eastern department, believed that the campaign could be 
ignored, and his opinion was backed by Macleay, who argued 
'I do nJt believe that clumsy propaganda of this description 
will affect the negotiations which Sir John Jordan has just 
46 
commenced with the Chinese Govt.' But Macleay was some 
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forty-eight hours behind events for the Chinese government had 
already informed Jordan that they wished to postpone the Tibetan 
negotiations. 
Jordan, of course, asked for an explanation of China's 
actions and was informed that the Chinese cabinet feared popular 
agitatian over Tibet similar to that concerning the Shantung 
issue. In an interview with Ch'en Lu, the vice-minister for 
foreign affairs, Jordan protested strongly at China's actian and 
painted out that it was the Chinese government which had formally 
asked for the Tibetan negotiations to begin.47 Whether Jordan 
actually lost his temper is not certain, but it is clear that he 
gave every appearance of so doing for he not only informed 
Ch'en how badly the British government would react to the news, 
but adcied that he hoped he would soon be recalled from Peking 
which would relieve him of the task of dealing with such a 
government. Jordan insisted upon asking Ch'en that he should be 
allowed to see the Chinese president and any other officials 
responsible for the severance of the negotiations. Ch'en Lu, 
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however, prevaricated and confessed that an:>ther power': was 
anxiJus to divert agitation from the TSingtao issue to Tibet. 
At this point Jordan asked if the Chinese government were so 
weak that it had to conform to the slightest hint from another 
power, to which Ch'en replied that his government was not strong 
enough to stand up to popular agitation in addition to that re-
lating to Shantung. Jordan then claimed that 'Great Britain had 
been China's friend in the past far more than the Chinese realised. 
It waS an insult to the British government to break off these 
negotiations at the hint of another Power ••• ' The other power 
was, of course, Japan, and Jordan concluded his report by 
arguing that Japan not only sought dominati~n in China, but 
aspired to a deciding voice in central Asia. 
There can be no question that China's action in asking 
for the Tibetan negotiations and then breaking them off as she 
t.t. did wasAsubject for justified criticism by Britain. But it may 
be argued that Japan's role in the Tibetan negotiations was more 
reprehensible, for if, as lordan claimed, Britain had been a good 
friend to China, she had undoubtedly been a much better friend to 
Japan, especially regarding the Shantung issue. Not surprisingly 
there was some doubt as to the extent of Japan's interference, 
but early in September Macleay was of the opinion thatz 
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'The Chinese Govt. will no doubt renew the 
negotiations, but unless we can induce the Japanese Govt. 
to give peremptory instruction to their Hinister in Peking 
to cease putting obstacles in our way I fear that there is 
little hope of a satisfactory issue,.48 
A few days later Jordan reported that Wang Tahsieh, a member of 
the Diplomatic Council, had confirmed the British minister's 
conclusions that Japanese interference was the cause of the 
interruption of the Tibetan negotiations. 49 Indeed, the break-
down of the negotiations was in keeping with the Japanese press 
campaigns against 'British diplomatic cUIUling' which had 
allegedly won so many diplomatic victories as a result of the 
peace conference. It seems that in return for her support con-
i" H,(. 
cerning Shantung, Bri tain received calculated abuse ~ Japants~ p~ss 
which succeeded in its aim of causing harm to the Tibetan 
negotia ti:ms. 
China's action caused a flurry of diplomatic activity. 
Jordan saw both the Chinese premier and president, but although 
promises were made to examine the possibilities of resuming 
negotiations nothing materialised. Curzon's anger out-
matched that of Jordan's, and when he saw the Japanese ambassador 
in the Foreign Office he bluntly re~ to the anti-British 
propaganda campaign which Japan had been waging. Curzon then 
asked Chinda directly if it were true that Japan had interfered 
in the Anglo-Chinese negotiations, to which the ambassador 
replied that he could not believe such a step were possible but 
he would seek confirmation from his government that Japan was 
not implicated. Curzon staten that he hoped that this was so, 
but if the accusations were justified it would be a sorry reflec-
tion upon Anglo-Japanese relations. 5J 
Following this interview Curzon saw Sze, the Chinese 
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minister in London, when the exchanges were decidedly one-sided. 
After making a strong protest at the breakdown of the negotia-
tions, Curzon told Sze that he had been espousing China's cause 
in relation to Shantung, but he had little expected while 
fighting such a battle to receive 'a slap in the face of this 
uncalled for description', and that he would find it difficult 
to support China's causes in the future. Curzon had undoubtedly 
championed China's cause in his series of interviews with Chinda, 
and from his own viewpoint Curzon's anger was jur:tified. But 
there is no eVidence to suggest that Curzon's support was known 
to the Chinese; on the contrary, it has been noted that Chinese 
diplomatic representatives had probably been given the impres-
sion that British policy was more pro-Japanese than it was. 
Thus, although China's aotion in severing the Tibetan negotia-
tions may have appeared as personal insults to Jordan and 
Curzon, it was taken by an ill-informed China. As China felt 
let down by the western allies over Shantung, why should she 
feel that Britain would stand by her should Japan start to 
exert pressure regarding Tibet? 
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Less than a fortnight after his interview with the 
Japanese ambassador, Curzon complained that he had heard nothing 
from J8.pan and instructed Alston in Tokyo to make enquiries con-
cerning Japan' s role in the breakdown of the 'ribetan negotiations. 
Heanwhile }~acleay agreed wi th the strong tone which Jordan had 
52 
adopted with the Chinese premier. In Peking Jordan saw T. 
Obata, the Japanese min1ister to China, who flatly denied Japan's 
implication in the negotiations' breakdown, and refused to 
agree, despite the evidence, that Japan was respJnsible for an 
anti-British propaganda campaign. Jordan had afterwards called 
upon the Chinese actingfF!nister for foreign affairs, Ch'en Lu, 
and was told by Ch'en that the Japanese had exerted pressure 
upon the Chinese government, and Colonel Banzai, a Japanese 
adviser on Chinese affairs, was implicated. 53 
When Jordan taxed Obata in Peking with the information 
he had received from Ch'en tu, the Japanese minister denied all 
knowledge of the allegations and stated that he would make en-
quiries. Hacleay was of the opinion that the Japanese govern-
ment were involved in exerting pressure upon China.5~ Jbatats 
enquiries, however, were limited to a call upon the C:1inese 
minister for foreign affairs who, on the same day, smtfor 
Jordan and told him that Obata had reproached him in very strong 
terms for the Chinese aocusations brought against Banzai, and 
Obata had stated that even if the accusations were true it 
would have been an unfriendly act to divulge such information to 
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another power. Ch'en was reported to be in a dilemma, and that 
~ in~circumstances, Jordan stated, Ch'en felt he had no alterna-
tive but to 'cancel' the charges against Japan. 55 Documentary 
eVidence had come into British hands and Macleay learned of the 
Chinese withdrawal of charges with regret as ••• ' ••• it will pre-
clude us from making use of Sanzai's letter as evidence of 
official Japanese interference with Tibetan negotiations'. 
Attempts were made later to induce the Japanese 
government to inform China that they had no desire to see a 
cessation of the Anglo-Gh1nese negotiations regarding Tibet, 
and the Japanese finally made such a statement. 56 0bviously, 
too much blame should not be placed upon Japan for the breakdown 
in the Tibetan negotiations, for a strong China could have re-
sisted all interference. But the eVidence, supplemented by an 
impressive memorandum on Japanese anti-British press cuttings 
c. 
compiled by;trow, formerly employed on United states war 
propaganda in China,57 indicates that the breakd0wo was to 
Japan's liking. Anglo-Chinese negotiations were not resumed, 
and the Tibetan issue remained an obstacle to a better under-
standing between the two countries at least until the Washington 
conference. 
Some conclus1ons concerning the developments of the summer. 
In the months which immediately followed the signing 
of the peace treaty it is obvious that Curzon had dJubts about 
the Shantung articles and the treatment of China, but Balfour 
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maintained his earlier views which might be judged to be based 
upon d~ubtful premises. An example of Balfour's unchanging atti-
tude is ~fferen when he wrote to Curzon regarding the pr,::>m~tion 
prospects of Hacleay whlsalfour described as a person of only 
moderate ability: 'I found him in every respect both loyal and 
zealous. I did not, however, see any special signs of diploma-
58 tic dexterity'. In giving his views on Nacleay, Balfour 
referred to the treaty of Versailles and stated that durirlg the 
peace negotiations a difficult situation had existed owing to 
the war-time pledges which the Japanese had obtained from the 
British government regarding Shantung in exchange for naval 
assistance in the Mediterranean. Balfour believed that the 
Japanese had behaved very badly towards China over the 1915 
treaties, and continued by stating 'Hacleay hates the Japanese, 
while I, on the other hand, am more moved by the contempt for 
the Chinese over the way they left Japan to fight Germany for 
Shantung ••• ,' and Balfour then repeated his phrase about China 
not having spent a sh1ll1ng nor lost a man in securing Shan-
tung's recapture, but had subsequently demanded its retrocession. 
This letter indicates that since his dispatch to 
Curzon in May when he used the same phraseology, Balfour had not 
read any of the details of the military and naval situation in 
19l~-15 when Japan was so powerful in the far east, and Balfour 
i' 
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used the same expressions in a later memorandum concerning/war-
time treaties. 59 It is necessary to challenge Balfour's 
opinion that Hacleay hated the Japanese for although on several 
occasions Macleay had spoken harshly regarding the Japanese 
1,1ili tary party, his actions during the Pari s negotiations, 
especially in April, contradicts Balfour's judgment that Hacleay 
was basically hostile towards Japan. One might conclude t~at 
had Balfour treated China with less contempt and shared Curzon1s 
growing doubts about Japan, especially in relation to Balfour's 
dea1inbs with Koo and the American delegation at 81'is, Anglo-
Chinese relations would have been placed on a much better 
footing. 
Jordan had been a consistent supporter of a liberal 
approach to China, yet despite his sympathetic attitude a 
letter which he wrote to Tilley of the far eastern department 
revealed some aspects of policy which could have appeared ob-
jectionable from the Chinese point of view. He stated: 
'We feel that the worst is now over and that we have 
passed through four weary years of War and kept our 
interests practically intact in spite of all the risks •• 
Not only that, but the British communities in China have 
been taught their lesson and have profited by it. The 
old Treaty Port prejudices have been broken down and at 
all the larger ports the study of Chinese is now regardeg 
as an essential qualification for a mercantile career'.tO 
Jordan continued by referring to China's internal chaos which, he 
argued, could be relieved by lending her first-class administra-
tors from India. 
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No doubt Jordan was still upset by the rupture of the 
Tibetan negotiations, but it must be noted that he was rather 
self-satisfied concerning the preservation of British possessions 
and less concerned that none of the reforms which he had advocated 
at the end of 1918 had been implemented. One must question 
whether the old treaty port attitude towards the Chinese had 
broken down to the extent that Jordan sug[9sted for there was 
marked hostility to suggestions that the Chinese should be 
represented upon the municipal councils, and not a single step 
was taken in China's favour regarding the system of extra-
territoriality. 
In September China ensured her future membership of 
the League of Nations by signing the treaty of Saint Germain with 
Austria, but this event scarcely influenced her relations with 
61 Sritain. While China had advanced her position by ensuring 
such membership she had, however, made no progress eoncerning 
Shantung, improving her financial situation, or reducing her 
internal chaos. Moreover, the Tibetan affair had caused a set-
back to Anglo-Chinese relations and left Curzon, who was abJut 
to become foreign secretary, an 9mbi ttered man on thi s question. 
Although Britain had begun to move away from Japan this was not 
offset by an increase in --friendship with China, and it was to 
the United states that Britain turned in order to attempt to 
avoid isolation in far eastern affairs. 
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A I-'.AAlOD F0Ii COi~SIDERATION, SEIlT~illElt 1919 - D];Oill-illER 1920 
Uo outstanding changes in Al1.g1o-ChillGSe relations 
occur:l.'ed between the autumn of 1919 end 'tue end of 1920, 
but 'lihe 8ctivities of the powers with interests in the 
fDr east subjected B~itish poli~y in Cluua to s thorough 
examination. The problems and policies of the tresty 
, 
settlement cotLtinued to exert their in1'luences, while 
the question of \'1hether Britain should continue to be e 
p8rty to the Anglo-Jspanese alliance raised 8 post-war 
problem of whether the British goverD..Llor .. 't should lose 
Japan 8S 8 committed 81ly in order to i~prove the 
. 
prospe~t~ of oloser friendahip with the United States 
Tbe allionce exerted considerable influence 
upon nDV81 stretegy end numerous aspects of inter-
notional affairs, ba. in this work ettention is concen-
trated upon it. bearing on Anglo-Ch1nese reletions.1 
In common wi ~h other inter-woI'l<l-wr p~iods t British 
policl in t~, fer asst wes affected by China's chaotic 
internal situation. elthough it is questioDDblo whether 
, 
British statesmen were aware of the divisive influenco 
which £oreign intervention hed upon China's internsl 
developments. ~e Shanghai conference which hsd soUSht 
. -, 
egreement among the rivel Chinese factions h&d broken 
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down in the summer,2 and this was followed by attempts 
of liber3l~mind.d Chinese to dissolve the pDrliement 
et PekinB and replace it with another assembly based 
upon popular franchise. !hese moves were opposed by 
Chinese militarists who were anxious to divide the 
spoils of 9 rav8ged China emong themselves. Sir John 
Jordan, the British minister in PekinG, described the 
situation 9S no longer 8 contest between the Chinese 
governments of the north snd south, but between civil 
end militsry cont~ with Jepen backing the militerists.; 
However, rivalry between the two edministrations con-
tinued. If the Peking government were regarded BS 
being more vulner.ble to J~p9nese influences the Kuo-
minteng administration et Canton wes regarded es too 
cl-.A.t 
unstable-, - .nd it wes not until 1928 Det~e BritDin 
recognised the Kuomln1i.ng regime es the offic1el 
~ove1nment 'of Cbine.4 One might argue that despite 
the uncertainties ot the lUominteng government it was 
more representative of Ohinese nstlonelism and freer 
from the influences ot J&P8n than was that of the 
government et Feking, end tbet Britein wes slow to 
recognise these features. But the schisms in the 
soutb were serious end et one time the Kuomintong's 
leoder t S\Dl Yet Sen, we. forced to nee by the Kwengsi 
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invaders. This gave the PekinG govcrmaent on oxcuse 
to ter~inate tte agreement whereby customn' revenues 
\lere divided between the t\tlO administrDtions.5 
During the autumn of 1919 Chin Yun-p' CUb, the nel,'Jly 
appointed Chinese premier at Pekinc, felt obliged to 
tender hiD resignation on a number of occasions 
O\lin~s to the pressures placed upon hiLl by :Llsu ;Jhu-Cheng, 
the leader of the Japanese-supported ''''Jar Participation 
Arr.1Y· and former premier during the presidency of Yun 
r:; 
Shih-kai. " But Hsu over-resched hi:filself Dnd provoked 
counter-measures from provincial leaders Chang Tco-lin 
in LDnchurie, and Wu P'ei-iu in UUC1Wllg, with the 
reDul-t; that civil war in the north begun in July, 1920. 
Uithin some five days another Japanose-becked force, 
,(;h;:; 'National J?acificetion' army, wes crushed, end in 
_AUGust Chin Yun-p' eng was asked to reorGanise his 
Government. In these. circumstances of intrigues Dnd 
countermeasures negotiations with the PekinG covernment 
were almost impossible, but Chine is 8 huge country 
Dnd in the north, as elsewhere t there \'/ere resions which 
hed obtained a marked degree of independence. 
In a report on the situetion in Chino, JordDn, the 
British minister in Peking, stated ths-t there vlDS 
cooperative stebility in Wucheng end H~lnking which had 
boen achieved largely owing to the stronG chvrector of 
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tl~c locul mili tury Governors VIllo COIL~[l~::::~ccl res~)ect 
1'::'0::1 the different warriDS factions to observe neutreli ty 
ill their respective areas. 7 British influence lwd 
declined in llenkow, which Jorden attributed. to e serious 
v;c'-.11mcss in consular representation and the fierce 
politicol end economic rivalry of Japan, Dwl of America 
to 0 lesser degree. In ;';;)hantunc. ;Jord,nl reported thet 
l10 hDd been given a warm welcome Dnd ~~C referred to 
the entipathy of the Chinese population throuchout tbe 
province to the Japanese. Ch'u YinC-kUDllC:, the civil 
c;overnor of Bhantung, had criticised -che terL1S of the 
peace treaty and in a discussion with Jordan hod rQised 
tilC problems relating to extraterri torie li ty \"illich, 
Ch tu claimed, were becoming more Lcute \'li~h the :pene-
tration by foreigners into the countrysido of the 
~)rovince, which were causinc; incidents to L1ultiply Dnd 
roicirg various matters of principle. 8 Jordon continued 
his report by arguing that the JepDl1eSC riGhts in 
Chontung were forcing the extraterritorielity issue end 
cllcrcby reacting unfevourebly upon British interests 
in the interior of Ohina. The question of extra-
territoriality weB to prove of greet importence to 
AnGlo-Chinese relations in the late 1920s. 
At Tsingtao the Japanese were in complete occupation 
and were enforcine martial law. Jordon referred to 
C\ ~~}lfour' s dispatch of the 8th l·~i...!Y-' and cO~ltrosted it 
\1itil tho oanner in \,1hich the Jvp~:'l1eso lwd ex·tended their 
::'~l.flucnce in the province partly ot :0l.'ili<:. in'::> ex)ense. 
lnstcac of the promised 'open-door', Jopvn's Grip bad 
'~i,)ltcncd upon the port's rail,\ .. /uys, viheI'vo~J [,1nd loncl 
~1O IdinG::> • Jordan thouzht that pressurc upon ~ritish 
DI;'cJ. American firms was soon to be expected. L'J.t Jordon 
G1so criticised British mercDutilc interests for not 
;;Ct'1Jij,l:: on with the ta sk of extendin~; t:~eir a cti vi ti cs 
i~l ' ... :::,inc;teo end for depending tOG 1:11.1Ch upon D politicc'l 
sett10ment with Japan. 
A conference of chambers of COHli ... crce hau. ~)ecn held 
at "';~}~.1"1chei at the beginninc; of lTovC12ber c.md Jordan 
LWJ. ottended. Some eighteen iterJG had been discussed 
includinG the development of the Chinese r~ilwDY system, 
tLe suppression of piracy, and tl.le educ2 cion of Ohinese 
on ~ritish lines. A secret resolution \108 passed \'Jhich 
e:·:.:prcssed, 
• •• the unanimous opJ.nJ.on t~1Dt the 
restoration to China of the Dort of 
TsingtDo and of the Tsil1G-t~.:o:'TsinDn 
Heilway ••• wes essential to British 
trede interestE, and Lcouf:eroncij 
pledged itself to urge Ilis !1ojesty' s 
Government to secure equal trode 
opportunities for ell in Shantung.' 
JordDn preised the Shanghai edministrvtion for its 
sense of responsibility, but he raised the question of 
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ShincGc representation. He felt t:l()~v Gonc preliminary 
st;e')s should be taken immediately, Guch D G incll,1.dinr; 
Chinese members upon some of the cub-corr~ittees of the 
rlunicipGl council. Changes werc tckinc place in China, 
011(1 Jordan thought that there "iWC l)romiso for economic 
aG.Vi.J11ce. In conclusion Jordan stoted that tile reso-
lutions of the Shanghai conference hod been widely 
circulated in the Chinese press, Dnd they had coined 
\rldespread Chinese recognition thGt the Dri'Gish [le1."'-
contile community was pledGed to 0 policy '1;0 the mutual 
bcnefit of the welfare of Chine and tLe L1terGsts of 
1'o:::.'oi:.;n trede. 
Undoubtedly many of the BhanguDi chambers of 
co~::1Crce conference decisions were in the interestin 
of the Chinese people es well es those of the British 
ncrcDntile classes, but Chinese notiollDlists no doubt 
objected to many of the subjects 11hich \'lerc discussed 
on the grounds that they infringed upon ChincGc sovereiGnty. 
Objections could 81so have been raised concerning 
Jorden's contentions regarding the need for inter-
dc:,endence, for in contradistinction Chilla .... 185 pressing 
foJ.' independence end the ending of al.1 forciL-;ll treaties 
.\1hic11 controlled her interne1 activities. Experienced 
os Jorden wes concerning Chinese affairs, he was 
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: .. wcT-.:estionably optimistic reGf..l.l'Ji~l':'; t:.10 \;il1incness 
of .,jri tish officials end settlers to 8.::rOC to greot; er 
r'_:)l'osonte tion upon municipel councils. An. example 
of tlle opposition to such e chc;,ll1,·.;c iz offered in tue 
~rGu;~ontG of Ei!' E. Freser, the consul caneral ut 
ShOlfDi. 
1?rvscr thought that to 0110\\1 [) li~li·;;Gd numuer of 
Chi,~e::;e councillors, even if tu.oir ~)oucr3 were res-
trictcd, wes merely postponing a deuond for cbsolute 
equality which such e concession vlOuld lloko it lwrdcr 
"Go resist. 10 He concluded, 
'Chine is wide end those Chinese \lho 
feel it derogetory to live under our 
regulations cen go elsevhlerc. If 
they ere ~ything like 9S numerous 
ea they ere noisy they shoulC. :l8ve 
no difficulty in outdoin~ this settle-
ment in size end wealth. 
In his reply Jordan emphasised th ... t 110 hDd ao wioh to 
disturb the smooth running of .ihDnghoi, but Chine, 
lL;:.e LGypt and India, was demanding D l.n'ger share in 
I " t 11 se ~-Governmen • He could not see how soue 700,000 
Chinese could be ruled permanently by 0 I~lunicipe.1 
council of nine foreigners. all of whora ',/ere busy Den 
uiJ.;h little time to give to Chine~e offDirs. ~'reser' s 
ViC\'lS might be regarded 8 s some\1hot Bliwpish, but they 
Dnd not those of Jordan prcve11ed, fa::::' Chinese repre-
sentBtion upon the Bhanghai municipol council did not 
CO~:Q untiil 1928 after t~le herrowinL; turuoi2. ol' the 
. 't t' 12 :;1:L Cl- \'Jen ~ e s. 
J)ecpite vll the internal riv:..l:i:ies ili"'clli:;~ ti.;.o 
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COUlltl.'Y, Chinese nationalism was a force ntronz.; enoush 
to influence China's foreign relations as illustrated 
by tuc effectiveness of the boycott 01' ';~pU110CC Goods. 13 
T:l0 powers were aware of the potent.i.c:l v[.llue of the 
Cldnese markets, Bnd for economic vs well DC political 
reasons they were willinr: to advDncc ChillO r:::..oncy • 
.As 0 result there were further propos"ls for an inter-
national consortium, 
The International li'iD.~ncial Oonsortium 
Differences of interest rSGordi~::~ 
consortium had already caused del£lY to 
durillg the sumIla~r of 1919,14 
the OCOIX; of the 
forL'lotiion 
L:'cpt;eLlber, Curzon, tlw Bcting forei~;l1 secretDry, informed 
Cllii ... da t the Japanese embassador in London, t:"'Dt he \'18S 
c0i1corned at Japan' s continued ettow~:t[; to scc~_rG the 
exchisions of eastern inner D~ollGolia <:H1U southern Llonchuria 
frOll! 8 financial agreement. 15 Curzon hod already voiced 
simileI' objections to such proposals in AUbuOt, Dud the 
AI.lericen and French governments \'lerc O\,iore of Curzon' s 
opposition to Japan's aims. l6 While the povers were 
debeting their differences, Reinsch, t:.lC AIJerican minister 
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in l)ekin£~, reported that the Chinese 8l'l'Jcd forces \'lere 
three uonths in arrears of pay end the Chinese govern-
Llcr~t had been taking sbort terra loans a:'; exorbi tent 
17 L~terest charges to meet their ira' .ediv te exoonses. 
Ov:il:.f.; to Chine's pressing needs, I':. do Fleuriau, the 
]'roncl: vrnbsssador in London, in an interviml vlhich 
illustrates some 01' the ri vs 1ry associated \d th the 
consortium, sew Mec1eey et the Foreign Office end 
informed the British far eestern expert that in order 
to f'ores-l;all a unilateral Japanese loen to Chine, the 
J.ncricans were proposing en exclusivc .hl:lcricc.·n-Bri'tich-
French advance. l8 The l!~rench government were worried, 
however, et the possible consequences of excluding 
Japan end they thought that the situation would be 
eased if the British government were to use their 
influence derived from the Anglo-Japanese alliance to 
induce Japan to drop her cleims for exemption. The 
.... ccricen government also wanted Bri tein to use the 
influence of the elliance for the SODe purpose. 
Meanwhile Japan faced difficulties regarding the 
proposod exclusions 88 Baron Hoyeshi, wllooe future 
appointment ea embassador to Britain hDd been recontly 
announced, m8de clear in 8 press conference.19 llayashi 
questioned the Wisdom or J8-psn t s seeking oreas of 
c~clUGio~ fron the proposed conscrtium Dsree~cnt if she 
lcc2:cd the cepi tol resources necess8r~7 to develop tbe 
opiJioni.; \'lliich she held. This ?ronptod 11110; of the 
rei." QD stern department to note 'che t if '::-opon vlerc so 
~~ort of capital 'the position ,dll be 0 curiouG one 
D~~ t::e Doney \'li11 have to come fror:: A:,:cr:LcD. The 
JC:;OllCSC can hardly expect the U .S.G. to Dc;rce to thet ••• ' 
-'.IenoinGt the AI~lCricDn secretary of ete..; et considered 
t>.c reol reason why she was un\"il1inc to join tllC con-
zor"cium. 20 
Tbe British government aGreed that every effort 
should be made to induce the Je'ponese to drop their 
dcmondc for exclusions, but they D:;::'~;::ed that if their 
attempts at persuasion were to foil the JDp~ncse should 
be Dllm'led reservations in soutl:crn r~onchl)_riD, but not 
i;:3. ooctern inner Mongolia. Simult:Jneously the British 
:';overnmellt urged the United StotCG tho;; no uniloteral 
IccnD should be made to Chine, for if the Anericc)ns 
codo Duch a loan this would encovrD~c Joprn to do like-
. In:::;o. The British government favoured 0 smell imme-
diota lo[\n of £5 million to China w~:ich should be made, 
cnd t"'ne spending of it controlled, b~' the four twin 
consortium powers.2l British objectio:'lS to D unilateral 
loon hed stemmed from the proposals of D ChicDGO benk 
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to lend $30 million to China, and in spite of various 
.i~:-,lericen Bssurences Curzon opposed tho action because 
of its possible influence upon JapDn. 22 
However, the JDpenese were not \,,1 thout cOIlplnints 
concerning British financiel transoctions onc~ they 
C1'i.~eried whether en advance of £50,000 by the British 
fircr of Vickers, whereby China could pt~chvse aircraft, 
did not constitute a unilateral 10an.23 11axDuller, 
heod of the far eastern department of "GilD j/oreicn Office, 
denied any violation of the consort1ur1 and cloimod thet 
the money would be retained in EnGland ond s:L)cnt under 
the :::mpervision of Vickers. He olso claimed that the 
aeroplanes to be supplied were unsuitable for militBry 
pl~poses8nd therefore they did not constitute n breach 
of the vrms embargo. These arguments were very dubious 
for even if a sum of money were retained in a foreign 
country end debi tted egainst goodz sup!)lied such e 
Droctice is very little different from a direct loen of 
cosh. Also, one must query whether [my aeroplane can 
have no military value, end in foct the Chinese prime 
Ilinister later confirmed that the plancD re~~uired were 
for militery purposes. 24 The JapDnese Dlzo complained 
about the British conditions for the proposed £5 million 
joint loan on the grounds that thc71 constituted Dn 
interference into Chine's internal offoirs.25 There 
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were Japanese objections to the DritisL Dttc~vt to 
ntipulate that the loan should depend u)on the diDbond-
L1Cllt of Chinese troops and the resunption of :)OtlCC t<:)lks 
bctween the north and south f9ctions. However, in view 
Ol Jopan' s actions concerninG .JIHmtuns llcr proi'essed 
CO:lccrn at the interference in Chine' c in-ccrnDl af£virs 
Dust be dismissed as hypocrisy, and in the ForeiGn uffice 
both Clive and I;:laxNuller noted the unsotiof~.ictory 
~ehDviour of the Japanese. 
Uhile Japan was posing some al;lb,;ord questions -co 
"':'ri toin concerning the loan proposulc it \}()[; learnt; 
tIlDe negotiations for the proposed C1:.ico[;0 bonl: loan 
:18<.1. collapsed es the Chinese coulc. not; offer sufficient 
security.26 This news was v/elcoued by CL~rzon who 
irlDt:cucted Lord Grey in ~Jashington to convey his satin-
faction to Lensing rcgardingtihe 1:;)Dondonment of the 
project, although it may be n;)ted t'ilDt l·lDXr·~Uller was 
opposed to e tentetive suggestion that the loan nego-
tia:.;ions should be transferred from Poking to Nm'l York. 27 
Lonsinc; had already informed the Eritish goveJ::naent 
tll~l'1; he did not regard the exchanGe of tLc Lcnniw:;-Ishii 
noton in 1917 as granting Japan the riGht to press for 
-~ilO type of consortium exclusion \'J11ich she was seeking, 
and .. ~Qerican opposition to the exclusion proponuls hod 
been made clear to the J epf;,lnene. Grey reported that 
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the Ancrican government 'cannot even in tLo loot resort 
concede reservation claimed by JGpan in regard to 
.southern fJlDnchuria' 28 which indicc:ted tt.at tl:o Dni t ed 
States was more strongly opposed to [.lny consortium 
concession than Britain. 
At the end of October, Curzon \'IDS appointed forcign 
Dccretory, as distinct from acting foreien secrutary, 
in succession to Balfour. In the Dutumn of 1919 
Cc-,rzon \'las undoubtedly more critical of Japan than 
Bo1four had been, Bnd at least until -Ghe rupture o.f the 
Tibetan negotiations Curzon's attitude towards Chine 
hod ceen more sympathetic. But it hes beon noted 
tl1Dt little, if any, information hed been passed to 
the Chinese concerning Curzon's greeter sympathy, and 
OD Curzon's attitude towards Chino begon to harden 
durinG 1920 and the approach of the \18shington con-
ference, it may be argued that the chanGe of office did 
not Derious1y influence Britain's policy concerning 
Chin8. 
When Curzon met Chinde 8gein in the second half 
of November he continued to be critical of Japan, end 
he informed the ambassador thet rCGordinc the exclusions 
Britain associated herself with Americo.29 Curzon 
stated that the British governQent did not w8nt ony 
consortium agreement to undermine Japan's estob1ished 
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rvil\'JDY rights and other recuGniscu. inteI'CGts. But 
'~llcy \-lere against J'apan gaining farthc:'" spheres of 
influence, or areas of special preference, by i:il0011S of 
exclusions from consortium agreement;::. Curzon once 
al;~liJ.l criticised the sphere of inflL~onco \'lhich J£lpcm \'las 
"building up in Shantung and arguod thot if 0ClP()11 were 
not incl'..ided in the consortium 'her iso18cod position 
would oe singularly unfavourable to 1.:,01.' futu.rc re18tion-
s'ilips both with China and with the Powers in GonorDl'. 
]311is remark had obvious implications for the AnC;lo-
~p~ 
911 .~ alliance. 
'rho consortium discussions hecl been \'lOtched \d th 
anxiety by the Chinese, end Jordan s'toted. tb.Dt he \\18S 
xclieved that Curzon was opposinG JDpants cloius for 
exclusions. 30 Jordan then gave D detailed account of 
Jopen's dependence upon Chine for ne\1 r;;.aliorivls froe 
which he concluded that even if Jupan uerc not () porty 
to tile consortium the remaininG orODS of China's 
OCO;::lomy unin.fluenced by Jc1pan \'lOul6. leave plent;y of scope 
for t~e British, American and :B'rcnch interests to 
develop concessions. 
In mid-December, Viscount UchidD, the Jopenose 
IJinist;or for foreign sffairs, repoot(,;d his country's 
foars tbat the terms of the consvl"tiu;J \'Juli.lcl ollc\"l 
fo~'ci(;n intrusion into economic sphere:::; ond Dreas of 
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China which were regarded as ofJere~.:1ount importDnce 
to Japan's security. Uchide wes surprised '.1hen Alston 
sUGz,ested that Japan could prepare e formula, i1hich 
could be written into the consortium aGreement, sefc-
(j:_~Drding Japan's strategic railways and vital economic 
interests from consortium interference. This idee 
Iled been proposed by Curzon to Chinda in their November 
interview and was in keeping with Curzon's contention 
thot \Jhile it \'1as undesireble to use the consortium to 
s'l;tack Japan' s established intereGt~..:., i0 '.'lao vleo 
unde3ireble for Ja.pan to use exclusions from 8 con-
sortium agreement to secure 8 further economic Dnd 
political expansion in China. Aloton noted Uchide's 
uns\'18reness of the proposed formulD ond commented that 
it was not the first time that the Japanese embassador 
in London had feiled to comraunicete adequatel:,' with 
'1 31 J.:ol:yo. On • lower lev01 in London, Haxlofuller of 
the fer eastern department sew NaeDi, the cJepenesc charg6, 
Dn.d 8rg;ued thet the Japanese proposals for exclunions 
clashed with those of France concerning -I;ho r,min structure 
of the consortium. 
OwinG to the ettempts to relete the proposed £5 
IJillion 10en to Chine with the consortium egreencnt 
neGotiations for the loan's approvel dragged on throughout 
the Hinter. At times it seemed thDt the powers would 
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reach ec:reement, but on each occ80i011. fresh objections 
1:10re rai cede These included A~ericDn opposition to 
the Vickers' loan, end to repeated 2ritish obtem~ts to 
rrcilmlate loen conditions relating to the clisbondl:lent 
of Chinese troops and the convening of B conference 
of rival Chinese factions. 32 Controversy over the 
lo~m come to e climax in February, 1920, 'tIllen J<'lpon 
t:lrceteued to make a unileteral advancc of l&7 [ail11011, 
Dnd in order not to be out-manoeuvreQ Curzon authorised 
D siLliler loan a few days later. 33 
A surprising defence of Jopsu'c actions come from 
Dr Lorrison, adviser to the Chinese Govorn:.1cnt, who 
\'10 G in London. F. Ashton-G\'latlr.,in of the for eastern 
dCiJsrtmcnt noted that r'1orrison had. \l1."i Gtcn to (jllc 
f orciGll editor of tlI'he Times t suggestinc: un intervievl 
ui tLl # Nr r.:. Odat:;iri of tbe YokohoLlc ,,-,pecie :";cm1;:, who 
\'lVG also in London, end the object of -[:;11e Deetine; 
t '.:auld be the enlightenment of -;;he British public on 
tLle Gubject of the Consorti urn ne~-;otietions'. 34 
~:'Ghton-Chvatkin continued: 
'Dr Y.orrison told me that, according 
to ~lr Odagiri, the industrial inter-
ests of Japan were in favour of Japen 
joining the Consorti UI'1 even if shc 
has to pool those of h~r conccGoions 
in South Manchuria end Eoct Inner 
Mongolia t upon which \tlork hOB not 
commenced ••• ' 
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~orrison believed that the Japanese Govornuont would 
not pool railway concessions essential to the defence 
of L.oree, but: 
ond details were given of the linen i:Jhich the west~rn 
countries were seeking to exclud.o from the connori:;ium. 
Morrison, it was stated, hed independent corroboretion 
of these eherges. 
Ashton-Gwetkin continued by notinc thvt Horrison 
'I.'1ao p9rtieulerly critical of the French Dnd British 
banking groups in China who were secking to play indi-
vidual roles which had drewn some porticulDrl;l sharp 
com::onts: 
'nr Morrison spoke to me of the policy 
of the Hong Kong end ShanGhai :Bank as 
being "selfish end grasping". It 
must be remembered in this connection, 
that Dr Morrison's attitude is soid to 
have been in the past, riGhtly or 
wrongly, antagonistic to the HonG 
Kong end bhanghai BBnk ••• ' 
I.orrinon may heve been critical of t~~e Hong l~onG Bank, 
~ 
but he could scarcely have been ..... critical of ..., 
JDpsnese policy, end his comments clearly indicate 
that if the principle of exclusion \'lero "Irons, the 
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weo~crn powers were not above reproach on the issuc. 35 
In April t Lord llardinge t pernwnent under-secretary 
o:f state, reported that Japan was raeking D lent e·~tempt 
to Docure exclusions from the consortium. 36 By IWy e 
compromise hed been reached with the JDpenese whereby 
assurances were given to them for the safeGuarding 
of their railway interests. 37 Curzon tllen instructed 
~I.lston, who hed replaced Jorden aB the British minister 
in Peking in M()rch 1920, to begin nec;otiE}"ciono with 
the Chinese government, but it was not until September 
that the Chinese government received a joint note from 
the consortium powers. As late as November, 1920, 
Curzon had to admit that owing to Chinese opposition it 
wan necessery that no public stotement should be made 
regarding the consortium. 38 
The consortium achieved very little for it CDn 
be seen that 
•••• the political condition o:f Ohine 
was too chaotic, the attitude of the 
Chinese Government or Governments and 
of Chinese public opinion too hootile, 
end the policy of the Consortium 
itself too cautious, for on;:/ D:;~"'i:'ccioble 
progress to be made in the work whicb 
the Consortium ~ed been crested to 
perform.' 39 
The consortium negotiations ere, hO\vever, important 
for revealing the rivelries::f the pOvlers in the :fer 
eest. They also h8d numerous political rDmificDtions, 
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end of relevance to British policy the cO~Dortium 
ne"';otietions reveal the oppoai tior. of the :J:::.~iti:.::h l~overn-
mcnt to the mekinr; of any economc 2,'--lrrond.er~-. One 
cen Drc;ue that the consortium nec;otiD.iollS rnilitoted 
D30innt British poliey in Shantunc for Dlthouc;ll Curzon 
hed enphesised the need to internationalise the Chinese 
roihTDYs t end in 'Particular those of the .,3hontun[j 
nr;)vince which hed considerable poli ticol :::;isnificoncc, 
the consortium agreement of 11ey t 1920, recoCl'"I-iocd the 
existin;::: reilvmy rights of Japan. AlthOUGh in hin 
November interview 'ili th Chinde t Curzon hod sI;okcn obout 
thc powers 'seeking to set Chine upon her le~s oGDin,40 
one must question whether €I successful con30rtiur:l llOUld 
not have seen e reduction in Chinese Govereic.;nty rc' thcr 
thon en increase. 
Zorly Considerations of the AnGlo-Japanese Alliance 
A generel eim of British policy in the post-war 
period wes to improve relations \'rith the United States, 
but the merked antipathy between Americe and Japan wes 
rnaY~n~ it increasingly difficult for Britain to be on 
cood terms with both countries simultcneous1y. Hence, 
en the eutumn of 1919 progressed the question of \'lhether 
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}3:;:'itoin should. give notice of termination of the 
alliance became more pressing. ADart from the relevant 
Anerican end. dominion consid.erations there wos the 
qucntion of whether the terms of the alliance were 
compatible with the proposed LeaGue of No-cions covenant. 
iJinl:cct \"li th the question of the covenant 'tIes the 
undecided issue of American League memberDhip end 
obviously this matter had e direct bearinc upon Britain's 
willingness to rely upon the effectiveness of the 
Lce~e. By the Butumn of 1919 the British government 
hed become critical of Japan concerning Shentune, but 
if Britain were to terminete the alliance she had to 
consider how such e step would influence her mm 
position in Chine. 
When Alston wes still the British charge d'sffaires 
in Tokyo he reviewed the situation end recognised that 
the alliance could be seen es beins eimed et the 
United States end incOlDpetible with the Lee~ue covenant.41 
But iuston continued by arguing that Britain's 08in aims 
in the fer east were peace, China's rehabilitation. 
cooperation with the United Stetes, end 'to preserve, 
if possible, friendly reletions with Japan •••• Alston 
i'avoured some type of a lliance \I'd th Japan even a verba 1 
one and even et the risk of occesionsl I!licunderstDnclings 
\'ri th America, for he felt tb,et such en ellience would 
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help Britain to restrein Japan. It won obvious to 
J.lston thvt a tripartite Anglo-Americon-JapancDc agree-
mcnt '1JOuld be the ideel safeguard for peace in the far 
east, but he felt that the mutual American-Japanese 
antipathy would prevent this. 
Enclosed with Alston'a letter WBS a memortlndum 
froD C. Wingfield, first seeretDry to the British 
embsssj' in 'l!okyo.42 Wingfield wes more in :t:a.vour of 
discontinuing the sllience, but in his final reeom-
mendetions he hedged and argued that if adeQuate sefe-
guards could be found for the consideration of League 
rcquirements, relations with the United Ste~es, ond 
tae rehabilitation of Chine, then thc alliance should 
continue. Such hedging een easily be criticised 8S 
bordering upon indecision, but between the autumn of 
1919 end the Washington conference the comple:x1ty of 
the situation end the wide rouge of variables rendered 
clear-cut opinions upon the future of the ellience 
rare. 
If Britain were undecided over the alliance it 
was clear that the Japanese army wanted it to continue 
for Lieutenant-General Fukuda Masataro, vice-chie! 
of the Japanese general staff, stated in his official 
capacity that he strongly favoured the agreement.43 
'~his prompted Herdinge to express satisfaction over the 
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JDDDnese army's desires. But while t:lC Eritir~t govl"::rn-
ITlcnt \'Vere deliberating upon the elli.: .lce e numoc::::' of 
Cls-turbing r<:;ports reeciled the .t!'oreir;r. Office from the 
Dritish legation et Peking concel'nin.: J-vpC;;''l' f" actions in 
Bhantiung. The reports were very simile::' in tone GGd 
CO:l-G Jnt to John Pratt's dispstcll of JU.clUVI·Y, 1':;11), 
end caused Curzon to state that he wes ver:/ co:_cerned 
at the state of affairs revealed \,/hic',l war; not only 
scondalot1.s., • but in open violation of all tLlO Japanese 
assurances BS one of the i'owers'. 44 Gurzon \'Ient on 
to suggest thst e note summa-rising tl:e ponition should 
be drawn up 'in strong but courteous terms'. end its 
contents discussed with the Japanese ambassador. 
In mid-December e note was honded to Viscount 
ChindB which wes a damning indictment of Japanese policy.45 
It claimed thet tmdue preference tlDS beinG sho\'m to the 
J''''penese regarding shipping, harbour riGhts, wrenouse 
accommodation, end land tenure. Custo~s procedure 
hEld been divorced from the maritime union end there wes 
widespread smuggling of drugs. ~he 'open door' policy 
Dnd the withdrawal of Japanese troops fl"orn i;.)ilentung were, 
it WDS alleged, broken promises. The note continued by 
complaining at the manner in which the Japanese hod 
8:h"'Psnded their hold upon the railways in dhentung. 
It oteted thet, 'A. railway virtually o\'med, policed, end 
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controlled by Japan cannot be regarded. Lierely as Oil 
economic concession, but rather 8S 011 il1strlLC[lt of 
·li0:,:.>~i toriel expansion'. In its conclusion the note 
ex::n ... cssed the hope that the promises ~ .. ll~ich J3pon lH.)d 
ilDdc concerning Shantung would soon be expedited. 
Almost et the same time 8S Curzon "ltlSS presentinG 
:';:10 :J3ri tish government's note in London, Alstol1 in 
~ol~o wes protesting against Japanese discri,wination 
regarding British interests in Bi.1DntUJ."1.g. 46 Carzon 
follo'\'1ed up his note with en intervie'Vl vIi ch Chinda t the 
Japanese embassador, when blunt questions \verc put tiO 
Chinde regarding Japan's actions et Tsingtao and her 
failure to reach agreement with China r"gerding the 
evacuation of Japanese troops.47 Chindo blf,1L1cd the 
United States for withdrawing fro~ the peace conference 
and the Chinese for waging a trade boycott which made 
:lc~;otietions impossible, but Curzon was not impressed 
b;y these Brguments. Curzon maintained that E::itein 
(lOd no desire to break her word regarding the Shantung 
reil\voys Bnd that Japan should enjoy the rights formerly 
possessed by Germany. However, for 8 le-sting equitable 
Golut1on Ourzon thought that emphasis should be placed 
upon the internationalisation of foreign railways in 
China rather then indu1g1ng in national squebbl1ng. 
It is, perheps. ell too easy to agree with Curzon's 
rcblli;:os to Chinds, but there \'/es a ono-sidedness to 
Curzon's criticisms of Jepsn. Curzon r.Jede li~~ht of 
C:-L)n~ln' s difficulties over the tI'c::de boycott end her 
professed inebility to negotiate \,lith Chine, but 
.0ri-G8in's own relations with Chine were extretlely 
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st£oined over Tibet. Obviously thero were differences 
bct\'1een the two issues but there were also simil~ri ties 
in China's attitude to both countries. J).180 the 
clleotiic internal situation 1n Chins mill te1ied 8cainst 
JDpanese ea well 9S British abilities to nCf:;otiate with 
the Chinese government. One must stress that nowhere 
in Chine were the British making any concessions in 
tbeir economic end politiesl riGhts similDl"' to whet 
Curzon was expecting Japan to do. 
Japan's case was ergued by General EukudB ~ho 
stated thBt Japan waB willing to give Uf: her settlements 
in China, but that no country could find Gny neons of 
~rctecting their nationals except by the existence of 
settlements snd extreterr1torial jurisdiction.43 Whilst 
every power in China enjoyed such riGhts, JepDn, it WDS 
C1Di;:;led. h.d every rigbt to 8- settlement at 'J!singt8o. 
When the rigbt time came, Fukuda concluded, JapDn would 
Dssist Chins to end the 8ystem of extrGterritoriality. 
Fukud&'s claims for en exclusive settlcLlcnt at i'singtso 
were disputeble. but the criticisms \llhich he made of 
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ChillO'S inability to preserve la\-, el1,d order \>lere 
strikln(jly similer to those made by Bri t<:1in. 
Jrhe dilemma which faced the Bri tL::h government \'le s 
e:{T)ressed when J .A. C. Tilley, e rm:;orintending undcr-
:3ccrctory at the Foreign Office t complained 'the-I; o\1inG 
-tio the irreconcilable aims of Jopan and America it \;fD S 
difficult to pursue 8 policy conjointly with booth 
countl"'ies. Tilley, who wes elso officially voicing 
the views of Curzon and Herdin3c, s',~ated th{ri; if Bri tClin 
dropped the alli8nce Japan would fell intu the a.rms of 
Russia end Germany.49 At the same time it wos recog-
nised that there were extreme difficulties preventing 
on An6lo-Americen agreement. 
As Britain began to deliberel..e upon the desira-
bility of eontinuing with the AnGlo-Japanese alliance, 
the contentious Tibetan issue exerted a rolevant bearine; 
upon policy considerations. 
]~he Continued Influence of Tibet upon the Shantung 
ne!~otiations 
Despite hopes raised by earlier optimis-tiic reports t 
no progress wes msde concernine 8 resuLlption of tho 
Tibetan negotiations when JordLn met Chen Lu, the Chinese 
8ctine minis0er for foreign effoir~.50 It \-.jDS Jordon' s 
opinion that the Shantung settlement hed uade Chins 
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reluctant to sign en agreement with a further power 
t'l;lich recognised foreign control over Chinese territory. 
Curzon, who hed heen infuriated et the Chinese dis-
ruption of the Tibetan negotiations, noted that at the 
end of August he hSd. seen the Chinese mininter in 
London end 'told him thst.if his Government still 
shollied - still more if they soucht to shelve the 
question - my attitude towards Chine micht undergo e 
~ Dnd unpleasant chenge t • 5l Towards the end of 
november, r.iexMuller wrote e memorandum on the Tibetan 
cituation in which he drew Curz~n's ottenti::::n to the 
failure of the Chinese government to resume nec;vtiGtions 
Q)J 
ond suggested, I*ke Alston hed done, that Curzon should 
sec the Chinese minister, to which Curzon ncribbled, 
'Please send for him immediately'. As e result Ourzon 
SO\'/ Bze, the Chinese minister, and told hin thet the 
British government were deliberately delDying JordDn's 
departure from Feking, as he was the most suitable person 
to handle e resumption of the Tibetan neGotietionn, but 
Chine's answer to this friendly gesture, Curzon com-
pleined t wes to prevericate. Curzon ,'{oroed E:ze that 
o'tlTinc to the 'fibeten issue tbe Chinese Governnent 'miGht 
find et e criticel moment that they hud lost every goed 
:friend •••• 52 
British pressure for the resumption of the Tibetan 
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ne~~;otia cione was maintained when ",-ordcn 0:;[.1in :.:ct Chen 
Lu in PeY~ngt but the Chinese l:linis .cr too:: the lino 
thot the Dri tish government, in coo~)erD-tio:c. \'Ji tll India, 
were preventing Chinese forces from 2utcriilG ~ibct ond 
settling tbeir dispute directly. J orclDli. replied thDt 
Britain had no wish to question Ohina's suzerainty over 
Tibet t but proximity to India made it imponsible for the 
13ri°tiish government to be indifferent to tLlC d:L:::orders 
\'111ic:: \-Jould arise from a Sino-Tibetcio1 clash. 
foro, Jordan argued that there we::: 0 neca for AnClo-
'£ibetan negotiations before either Ohinese or ..:ibetau 
force~ acted unilaterally.53 
A note refusing to negotiate VIDS delivered by 
Ohina to Britain which, in politc lon,:;uDGc, stvted tllet 
tile opening of the Tibeten question , .. lould eXDcerbete onti-
f'oreie;n sentiments in Cbina end:.eed to en ~mti-British 
trode boycott. Unlike earlier verbal stotcoentc, the 
Chinese concluded their note by sayinG ttet the re-opening 
of the 'r1beten negotiations would not hove to 8\tl8it the 
octtlement of the Shantung question, but the B::citish 
reoctions were extremely sharp.54 'iilley r.winteined 
that the note implied 8 mild threat t.'lhich 1:lOuld 
onGer Ourzon, while Herdinge ereued that t: .. c coru::,:,uni-
cotion wes unacceptable end that unless e Dore satis-
factory attitude were adopted Jorden shc:uld be replaced 
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i:1 rekint~: b~/ 8 charg~ d' affaires iD.stead. of [) mLclister. 
C~rzon was furious indeed and claimed that the British 
covcrnr.lent were being trifled with. 
iIaruince's suggestion that Jordan slwuld ;)e; replaced 
.". \vith a charge. 
Chine had given Britain ceUGe for complaint by 
oDl::inC for negotiations concerninG 'i."ibet to bec;'n and 
t~lOn breGking them off as soon £IS they had started, but 
o~c Dust question the justification for 3ritoin's strong 
reocbions, for, althouGh the situation in Tibet wes 
potentially dangerous. it seemed reasonably calm. The 
·.ribet~n e;overnment were mainly satisfied to leave 
matters to the British,55 and in the immediate post-war 
period there was en absence of reportG of Sino-TibetDn 
clDohes. It was not until the sumraer of 1921 that 
13ritt.1in began to urge restraint upon the r.ribet£ln covern-
ment. 56 
The Chinese government were, of course, still 
vitally concerned with the ShGntung settlement, end SZe, 
the Chinese minister, asked Tilley in on intervie ... w' et 
the Foreign Office whether China should commence neCo-
tiations with the Japanese on this ~uestion. But in 
vie\v of the 'ri betan si tuetion CUI'zon doubt;ed \-vhether 
the British should be 'hobnobbinc' \'1ith the Chinese, 
'Gurely it is time for the cold shoulder,.57 Tilley's 
2C8. 
}.'o];l:-/ i'JD S r:J.01.'O fer ... sif;::hted for ~le ,)rr',i."led tlwt 'the ~ , 
to cold shoulder -[;::e Chinese ui t:lOut 
de-::;::.:"i~Jcnt to Oi"r interests. 
- Ghontunc - it is detriment,,1l to O,.~r interests that 
~~o J-oponese should remain in possession ••• He 
c·')~ltinued by stating that the Indi",1 Office i:JuL.l no-~ 
OG~OO to the non-appointment of Cl i,r'i tisll minister to 
.tddnG, and Sir Charles Eliot, I'Iho '.:lDG [lbout to take 
UI) Ilu-cies as British ambassador in 1:01:yo, hed l:u'ged that 
Al:::;tOll should ir;:unediatel;y ropla ce ~ orcLvn \;'hon 1:0 left 
China. Tilley explained that: 
I de have compromised by Ga~~inc~ 1:1" Alston 
will not go till Sir C. Eliot reaches 
Japan end will come houe on leave soon 
9ttePW9rds. In some smoll ms·ttars the 
Chinese both here and at PekinG ilovc oeen 
told that Lord Curzon would not be 
zealous to meet their wislles.' 
.. s -the evidence wes mounting to support Tilley I s con-
tOl1tion about the harmful influence of tile Coponese 
occupDtiol1 of Shantung , it mey be judGccl t"i:ot tile 
:_:uGC0sted compromise wa s extremely petty. 
In the spring of 1920 China achieved !JODC !Jucce!Js 
in exerting authority in Hongolio Oll(l other outilying 
:provinces, end Curzon realised thot the upcurc;o of 
notionalism mede it useless to try to push the Chinese 
c;overnment into nec;otiDtions rccordinG '2i bot. 58 But 
the Tibetan issue continued to exert its influence until 
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l,:iLlO eve of the ~iashington confc:;:'onco,oJJ.d. LN&riably 
tue resu1ts "lere harmful to i~nglo-Cj,:dJ:leso rel~;cions. 
It con be er~ued that Britain':::; into:cGst;s in Indit., 
jusGified her concern for ~ibet, but onc ,Just Question 
'.:uc;,;her such concern was not l.llacnii'iod '0:' 1ndiGl1fFi.iion 
a-t 0:11na' s attempts to edopt indepenuent linos of 
C-r-"on TIoss';bly the estrr'nr'r""'c'~'f- -; ')' ;,·,,,,·,"'.LO (",,';no""e a v.... • .. .... '-' c." LJ. ~J.v ..... L ...... L." -Uli.... iJ 
I'clDtiions c£,used by the Tibetan iscuc ViSS 0 reflcction 
of ~ritl:;:in t s ettitude to Chine, ond if slle hou 'uecll 
marG sympathetic to China on thi..:; illDt;'~cr si:lc \!ould hove 
beo~ more sympathetic over 8 wider r0n~D of issues. 
J..'urther Considerations of l)olicy, IWpriIlt; £,nd Summer. 1920 
L~ ... tl&l<. I" /l ~ D Before he left,......o, for" 'I.j('n,hliot SDW Chinda, 
--~~ the/JvpDnese ambessedor, Bnd told him -I,jllott;uo policy 
of the British government was to amend the Anglo-Japanese 
vlliance to conform with the League covenant, but that 
tue elliance should be continued. 'This was obviously 
pleasing to the Japanese. ,59 AlmoDt at the SOhlO time 
aD Eliot's deperture, C.H. Bentinck of the fDr eastern 
department prepared a draft memorenduu explDinin5 how 
TIri"tDin's fundamental interests in China would be 
influonced by the termination of the [;lliDl1ce, but 
before he would agree to its acceptance os a fforcign 
01'fice memorandum Curzon insisted upon itEi revision as 
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he felt that the originsl draft ",ar: too criticDl of 
Jo 1Jen. I~he accepted memorandum recor::nisod the old 
dilemma that while the alliance ~_ad Vd.vantec;es for 
.0ritoin they were et the expense of e better undor-
standing with America and Chins, but its conclusions 
were that, on balance. Britain should remain e party 
to the agreement.60 
The harmful influence of the s11ionce upon An;-:lo-
"~L1ericen relations was made clear \vhen Sir iJ,.ucklend 
Geddes, the Br! tish embassador in via shington, reported 
that news of its renewal would be 0 contentious issue 
in the pending American presidential elections. Geddes 
felt that both the British and Japanese governinents 
should issue a joint declaration tiwt renewol of the 
alliance was deferred in order to allovl the creation 
of fJ. League of Nations machinery \'I11ic"l1 \'1ould render 
such agreement superfluous. But ·this recoLlmendation 
avoided the question of whether Japan would 00 satis-
fied with 9 general 8greement in exchange :for looing 
Britain 8S e firm ally. Althour;h this wos en important 
issue, Curzon stated that he wes 8geinst referring it 
to the oabinet, snd it may be noted that Curzon's atti-
tude of fevQuring the continu8tion of the allionce 
llsrdened e.geinst various Foreign Office officiels who 
were sympathetic to its termination. 61 IIO\'levor, 8 
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~)ost~;onement of the renewal question vie,': achieved when 
boti.l the :i3ritish aDd Jepanese Govcrn~:ic:-:·to eC:rcc<l that 
os t:"e alliance wa s Dot strictly ill contOl"ni ty v/i"[jh the 
proposed League covenant they were E;iving tile .Geague 
notice that their agreement would te continued after 
July, 1921, 'in a form not 1nconniste~lt wl th that 
C • 62 ovcnOfJ.t • 
It hed been the intention of tbe British r;ovcrn-
QC~t to refer the question of the alliance to the 
IopeI.'ial conference proposed for t:,e autumn of 1920, 
r-", 
but this event was postponed until July, 1<)21.°' In 
the breeth1ng space thus afforded, Victor \iellesley, an 
Dssistant secretary t prepared a memor.3ndUl::l in which he 
vcrced with Jor4Bn l s well-known dictum that clle fer 
eastern problem was Japan's position in Cihine. G4-
Vollesley was critical of Japan's policies end he 
questioned what would happen if the Chinese rose in 
revolt ageinst the Japanese end appealed to Britain for 
help. \VhH would then become of Brit;:'1in' s p~~ofessed 
respect for China's integrity? wellesley sew the 
o_ifficul ties for Bri tein which ".Terc re.sul tins from the 
mutual Americen-Jepenese antipathy end he eIDuh2sised 
., . 
vlere llevlllt; 
the marked influence which Americens i:1 CLino / UDon 
... 
Chinooc effairs. In such a situvtion ',jelleDley fovoured 
a rether vague tripertite Americen-Britisa-Jepenese 
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I u:1.~Lcrstending I, and it wa s significo::1t t;"~10"'; "de1loDley 
placed 3 great deal of importance UpOl1 [J hi:1t from 
l'1orri:::;, the Americen ambe sse dor in Tol:yo, that such en 
undcrstonding might be possible. But in anSllor to e 
Duc;cestion that he should have ::;rcliLlinory discllscions 
\'1i;;11 Butler Wright t counsellor of the Ane:;.-,icDn embassy, 
Hordinge, who we s conscious of Curzon IS c,ltti tude, rE:plied 
that 1Vel1esley I Better wei t for the presGnG'. 65 
Early in June the Chinese Foreicn Office issued a 
press communique which contained e historiccl review of 
the AnGlo-Japanese alliance and its cO:1:::;e\~ucnccs for 
China. Il'he communique voiced. the claim that os China 
, .. /DS e member of the Lesgue, for she '']IJS D sicnlJtory to 
the Austrian treaty, article 10 of the :ropoGcd LeBeue 
covcnont would preclude a reneuol of tho t.~ lliencc on 
t:le grounds that Chins's territorial integrity hod to 
66 bo rcnpected. Alaton believed thDt much of Ohins's 
acitation against the alliance embodied 0 Genuine feeling 
th~t it~ renewal would condone Japan's poet policy to 
China. Hc maintained thst AmericDn res:Ldents in 'China 
i'lcre inciting anti-Japanese sentimentD Dnd their noti ves 
\"lerc partly explained by Americen cOr:li"7lerciel i:.lterests 
being in opposition to the alliance. 
In Tokyo Eliot's enthusiasm for the continuation 
of t>.e sllience hed not diminished, Dnd he referred to 
po,(~i cion in the east if in a future co:nflict J:;.'pen \'lere 
o~~ the opposite side. He concluclcd by 81't;u.i~J.b ti~:at 
cvel'~ if Japan were discriminating aGainst Bri tisl1 trading 
i):t;o}:'ests there was something to be sei(l £1.'0:'1 tile 
Jop2nece point of view. Sir Eyre Crovle, perITmDent 
OGsistont under-secretary of statG, ... ·,8C of the opinion 
t:~ot; Eliot's dispatch cerried convic'i;ion, but Curzon 
cc.:JS little or nothing about ChinD or ind.ie·. This 
tolO!3 undoubtedly an accurate reflection, for Lliot 
seoL1ed oblivious of China's existence. 
As the summer progressed Alston, the ~w\:ly appointed 
DI'itioh minister at Peking, emere;ed as 011C of tii.e Eiost 
active opponents of the Anglo-Jepanc!3u ulliDl1CC, Dnd 
creater concern for China becemo one of his prir ..cipa1 
Guide lines • It is interesting to note ci.1C.rb ifhen 
. \.lcton was serving in the Foreign Office in 1915, and 
tIle first four groups of Japan' s fDmous t\;onty-one 
deLlonds became known, his reactions \'Jere t:-:.ot the 
JOT.lDneSe 'were moving to 8ssert excll.. .. si-vc control over 
Chine but the opportunity wes nrovided for discussing 
L1Dttcrs in a friendly fashion and l)erhops reaching 
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SC:.:C i....'/)SlS for fut'.:re co-or:c;::::'a cicn': I. y Drtl:.' oftcrvwrds 
.:.l::;-(;on prcp£lred a memorandum i.'hich l'cco.·:niced: 
I thclt Japan was bound to receivQ L:Olae 
compensation [for her \'Jor efiertiJ? but 
Britoin mu~t act couti?m:.:1Jr!. ... "~,.1~ that 
we can do lS to hedGo LC:;r~;l.1 Lieu 
channels where British interests ore 
least affected, end endeavour to ~rcvon~ 
her closing those chorL."lols 0 1 toc;ctL:er". 
Alston warned that A~ericoll opinion 
could ~o alienated by J2Don's action 
and this might recoil on I.J:c:i.t;.,ill. I 68 
i~lston's attitude towards Japan beCdn to ~~rd~n shortly 
oi'~;cr\';ards, but he hod remained in f,JV0U:':" of ~\j~,:,o COll-
tinuotion of the alliance. 
\lithin 8 few months of his orriv::.·l ill J.. ekinc, 
however, ~lston's attacks upon Jcp~n bcceue ~ursher, 
0;'1(1 he argued tbet 'The only way to r...;~~c'in tLo confidence 
of the Chinese end the rest of tuC) ~lOl"'l~ is to lsy the 
D:~e at the root of the present policJ of Jap;:m in Ohine 
\'lliicl.l is deep rooted in the great injustice of the 21 
Alston gave considerable details 
of Joptm I B advances. into Chin.a 1::n0 t~lG Ullfair ~:;ractices 
in uhich Japan h6d indulged, end si:;elieu tlw't; ... 'basic 
question was whether ilritain was to rcco3nioc these 
OdV::"'llces or insist upon a return to sOLietlliiJ.S like the 
prc-1914 situation. 
foiled to protect Chine from the ossreooion of one of 
i;~le parties to it, and one-sided com~ercio.l agreeI:.lents 
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fc:vour of Japan hed been concl~)"G.ec1 vt C~:.LlO I:J expense. 
It; HOS true that; it was difficult to 3CGOrC- concessions 
Lo'.: .LDl"' China I s disorders could 0:': attributed ';;0 the 
.J~J.ring the Gummer of lS20 Alctol1 vi;.:;itcd the 
Uni<:;cd ,,-,'te tea, end while in ",·la shinGton he dij.1ed with 
~~~./..). 1101"'1.'is, the Americen ~rilbesscd.or to Jopon, <:md B. 
Colby, who bed reploced LensinG er.:; t:;.e A~cric:,,'n secretary 
of state, ana Alston emphooised the need for G close 
All~lo-Gexon policy for the far eost. 70 Eorris agreed 
::')110 .. stv.·ed that he would do all ~.ri thin his power to work 
fOl' such e policy. Alston also sew J. LocI'lurrey, head 
ol' the .i-.merican far eas:;ern burc~.1t.l , and. both won Bt-:;reed 
"\;:10 ~ Lhe policies of their renpectivc C01..mt:cic::.; hed 
bccoue discredited in recent years. Americon discredit 
"b.:)U :C'c:sulted from the unfulfilled hopes f,;J'uich her states-
r-"on lwd oroused regGrding aid for China, uhilc 13ri tain' s 
i:"::;c:.:'eclit hed arisen from her war tL.,e cOllr:il;r.wnts 
\lhich bad bound her to support Japun. Alston con-
eluded his report by stating that th.e Dni teu Gtutes 
WOD incensed et Q Japaneoe proposal to occupy the 
northern pert of .Jakhal1n, e Russian-acId islond of! 
"l;1::.e cast coast of Asis, 8S Japan evontuolly did in the 
autumn of 1920 after 8 massacre of Japane::;€: soldier::; and 
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c:~"viliens at Ntkolaievsk. 71 
While Alston wa8 in AuoricD D ~Drlie~entory 
(lucn::ion asked whether Jepon \'le8 not tol:il1[:; Ddvanlioc:c 
of ~Gl:e mili tC;i ry si tua tion in Chi nu to diLC:.:-io:i..llDte 
o[~[1in;::;t foreign commercial interer:;ts ::md tLercby under-
[,li11(; the 'open door' policy. In conside:r:inc vlhet reply 
of the far eastern de~2rtuent 
~::;houlu. be delivered Bentinck/agrecd tLDt J"spsn hod 
vio18ted the principle of' equal opportunities for trade 
in China which was specified ill thE; _Jrcemble of the 
!'~nLlo-JDp9nese alli8nce. In such circUL,stDnces, 
Dcntinck argued t 8 non-commi tto 1 reply '\>lQuld be 0 good 
thine.: t, .:md ~Iellesley agreed. 72 The I'opl:l uhj.cb. we s 
delivered stated that if end uhen nCf.':otif.ltio~J.s for th,::: 
l'enewol of the 
,uestioner had 
011i8nce becan the pointr:; 
raised would be ~n 
which the 
mind. This 
reDl'! must have been considered 913 at least D Lunor 
., " 
affront to the Japanese government, ~)ut it is question-
cble whether it wes sufficiently st~onc to be Dn cncourage-
ucrr~ to the Chinese. 
'~hen Alston returned to China from America he 
denied that he wes enti-Japenese, but he con.tinued his 
coml~ents by making some sharp remarks about JJPon IS 
nolicie5 in Ch1na. 73 He criticised the united States 
for hsvin5 been flabby snd uncertain, but alston placed 
ell hopes for the future peace of the fer east upon 
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1...~-::::lo-AL~(;l""i cc'n cooperation. Office , 
C'}L~, •. =. 8' ere s;.lston' s 'robust fei th 
o:",::::;:'c<:i:'n in Chine or e18e\;he:;:'e I • 
;, ~i. ',;c~~ tLnt S&pen would never C()~l::.::cnt; 'co ~) .. vc LL) her 
~)(;cn stated publicly, but Lentir:c:: felt 't;l;::;t to eDse 
'c",::, ~itu[1tion the restor£1tion of ;,ei-hei .:01- to Chine 
should be considered. 
C;o':ccrn~nc: Chine v/ere thOll:~ht pos~;:l.1Jlc, =.·m~·:;L1d: beli eved 
'b:lC'~ Clline should. be consulted bl':~ c;"-;.c ';~>: Oi..l1,'\. n:~t be 
~jCCOUC one'. 75 
Jilston I~; vi si t to the Uni tcd Ztctoe oronscu. s~)ecu-
~~c::t;-.:; Hore planning in reference ':'0 ~c·l;eL. An article 
<:,;p: ·cG:;:'cd in 'The Times', end e q1.:cction \.l<" s ;yut dO\m in 
'1~I;c 110use of cot:lm0l1 rl .?6 Bent·; nc~·· .... 1";· .. 10.·' ·r-1~"J· ·'lo·1-',,~ ""('1' v _ _J.. J,..~ L. ..... \ ... >..... ,-i v"-~v v J,. VU..&. .. J.t.,..) 
be sL·id to erouse Jepan' '" " '1""-)'~ C·;O"'C- {.>.".1.. rP1Y 
';"" ~_.l ..... L .. ~) 1-.J.. ..L.. .I...:..:...) V I.J .. ~. V ..... J. 
cllOn~:e of policy was contempletcc'l, onc;' t;:lC porli2IJcntory 
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rc:;l~l merely confirmed that Als-con heCi. r..,et t:1(;mbers of 
·l;l1e iir.lerican government. Japanese suspicions were, 
however, aroused, Bnd ~eg~it tbe JopDnese clLorg', 
questioned .0entinck in en interview at ·(;11e ]'oreiGn 
Ciffice. In reply,to enquiries concerning policy, 
Dontiinck replied that the British government 'hau not 
lost Bight of the f~ct that we were sllies of Japan'. 
Dnd t~lat both countries were vi tally interes'bcd in all 
matt~rs affecting the fer east.?? lIe continued by 
p~aising the Anglo-Japanese consultations ~lich bed teken 
place regarding Japan's actions in Siberia vnd 'I told 
hiLl the Americen press had issued groetl;)' exaggerated 
reports about Sir Beilby Alston's visit to Washington 
••• 
Hr Nagai appeered to be satisfied ••• ' 
Almost 8 week earlier Iiardinge, the permanent under-
secretary of state, had informed Chindo, the JODonebe 
Dl.1DDssDdor in London, that the United Gtotos hod invited 
D~itein to make joint representeLions in protest against 
JQpan's actions in Sakhelin, but that Britain had dec-
lined to do so. Not unnaturally, Chindo thanked Hordinge 
wDrmly.78 But Alston had already inforiliod tae foreign 
secret Dry of the American dislike of tl.J.c JDp1)UCSe 
proposals concerning Sekh9lin,79 and therofore IIerdinge's 
reL10rks to Chinda were scarcely helpful to .fuJ.blo-A.r.;;.cricen 
rolDtions. With Japan's actions in ChinD becoming more 
279. 
Llorlacing to Britain's interests oew dC:? argue that 
_.ls-con's efforts to improve cooperation vii th the United 
GtOGes should have received better support. If i1.1ston' s 
actions were contrary to the aims of the Bri'cish govcrn-
l~lOnt it is difficult to see why l10 i'm,s not rebuked, 
cnd one must conclude that the situation whereby Alston 
could pursue one line of policy while nDr<linc~e pursued 
L'l1other reflects some of the uncertainties 1:;1 British 
thinking concerning how Japan could -DO retained as &In 
olly, but her actions be restricted. This dilemma is 
opparent in the reasoning of Bentinck, who wae s 
supporter of the Anglo-Japanese alliance but believed 
thot; '\~e must be careful that the "'lording of t~"e new 
[K:1.Clo-Jepanesi! Treaty does not in any wey appear to 
SDllction Japan's temporary position in Tsingtuo end 
Dhontung,.80 
In mid-August the Japanese govcrnne::lt finally 
replied to Curzon' s note of December t 1919, \'lh10h hod 
comploined of discrimination against British cOIDmereiBl 
interests, but the Japanese reply won considered unsetis-
fectory. H. Fox of the Department of Oversees Trod. 
orsued that because the Japanese hed no answer to 
Curzon's cherges they were compelled to resort to 
Generalities about their policies which were divorced 
from practice.81 In e fur'tiher report J. Pratt, the 
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cO~':3ul general at Talnen, referred to hi:.; d.iopetch of 
JL·mU)l'Y, 1919, and then described ti'.o cmltil1,-led expansion 
of ,jc;panese interests in ShantunG, 1-" • d "v lV \,11. .e decree of 
drUG peddling, and the increase of economic discrim-
inD-cioll eseinst :3ritain. Pratt cmclosed a report from 
Il.A. Archer, vice-consul at TsinctDo, \"'hic~:. [jDve [1 most 
de c[}iled account of Japan' s discrirrJiJ:lctoJ:';j ectiolls. 82 
AB the summer drew to its cloDe Jordan, t:le former 
oinister at Peking, and Wellesley of tLe for oastern 
Lw,llficvtion of the Anglo-Japanese D llionce. 
ercued that: 
'The independence and i~tccrity of 
Chine end the principle of equel 
opportunity ••• ere L~ C) far more 
unsteble end uns8tisfoctory sto·te 
today then they vier. so:-.::.o tucmty 
years ego ••• end it \,'Quld not be 
difficult to show that tte alliance 
has been lariely responsible for 
this result. 83 
Jordan 
While Jordan agreed with the need for creater cooperation 
;;i t!l the United States he doubted. '.:hether the Amoric~1ns 
would aGree. In the circumstC)ncos Jordon felt that 
the British 30vernment should send identical notes to 
the Lnited Gtstes and Japan stat;in(; the problems arising 
from American-Japanese mutual antipc.1th~T Dnel ur:"~inG the 
need for an Anglo-Americen-Jepsnooc 8 r.;ro CulCnt • 
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',;e11es1ey advocated thot 1:)ri toin';:; main line of 
action should be direct negotia'i:iioruj ";li t·~.i JD:L)c"l1 \'Jllen 
'che Dritish government should seol: the QrDs"Gic revision 
u::.' article 156 of the peClce treat:;' whici1 tr ... IlGfcrrcd 
84 
:l.'07-',J01.' GermDIl rir:;hts in Jhentunc; to JDpDn. b'ven if 
GUC~ 0 policy were unsuccessful, Wellesley arcued, it 
\1C"L.lld be evidence of Bri tein' s do Gire to rcdres~:; the 
wrOi~G resulting from the actions in ~lich ilrituin had 
1.>eon b:mnd end would help to restore 13ri'G2in.' r~ reputetion 
1'01' justice. 
In such e complex situation it ,ws hardly sur-
thot Curzon, the foreign socrotary, should 
OilnOW1CO the setting-up of a speciol conDittee to con-
cider the Anglo-Japanese 0 lliance, ond it; VID S sOLJ.O'i;Jhat 
:::;i~;nificent that he should follow such un announcement 
b~; sGl'"..ing for examples of Japanese porfidity.85 
n 't . 
.L.lI'J..;:)J.n, China ond the League of Hol.Jions 
'llhe continued unsatisfactory otti tude of Jopon 
tovnn.'ds British commercial interestG end China neces-
sitated the making of statements \'ihich reflected publicly 
upon British policy in the far eost. ii'or ex r-""le a _ ~; •. i 1:' , 
petition addressed to Lord Curzon from the Association 
of British Chambers of Commerce in Chino ond Hong l:~ong 
~rotesting et Japanese discriminetion,recoived Q reply 
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:';:.,:·l; t::e ID2tters raised 'would receive 'due conoi-
Hence, it L:; fe irl~' c1:::o r t~:o L; t;£le 
J.~~~is eddi tiouel :::rote st WS2 made ,:.y .!..J ....... Little t 
,,;uid cent;;.· ined herrowin;::; c.etE'ils of J'8)8nCf;c' Dctions 
~~_:c'~ os the unnecessa :;"y occupation ')f Ohinese territory, 
::"ll-tl·(.:.9tc.en t of Chinese pea sent::.~, ':::~1e ::88 of Jhinese 
~~ld. ,;,,;>une,se criminals to intimidD (; IQi'] [ll:,idinC citi-
:JeLl;'; t ~orced loans, heavy taxation, en(l r;.lenJl other 
. .,.,. 87 
.\ , .•.. ,.,." ". ~'J..,..J.es 
._ .. _. '-"., u...l.c:.... v • }Idles Lempson of the for eastern 
(icpvr'Gnlont considered that althour;b the DCmOrDl1dum con-
'cL'i..ed exaggerations it h£' d confi:::ned ul:ot L.(.: cl <;,1lready 
been l~no\m about J opan' S Bctions. lIe reco£~:lended that 
<..;1;'0 l?orcign Office should publish tl,e ocoor:::ndwn as a 
~ ol:..i'idontiDl print end this \Vet done. \'ielJ.esley, en 
G GSi['-G<.mt~secretBry t believed th&'li [;110 ~eport was 
",,)o~ically eccurete end he cornpereC:. ·!.~L(' ~:c'peneoe behaviour 
EovJever, a 
;:~oro cautious cJPproech wez urged by Eyre CrmJe t who 
Lrcued thf.'t i>ri tBin should not ~)e iLeld rc::;r~)nsible for 
Dny Jepanese abuses because of the ell:i.ence. He 
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• 1-' dJ' t tl ' 1" ~~ 
,:lClXvDlne GDD 1e pre-wor agreeLlcln;:.:; TjlllCn ~rencc end 
GCr":,:<.m;y had VIi th Russia in no wo7/' illvolvcJc:_cse 
co;.mtries in E.lny responsi bi li i.;.-Les fOl' C' •• c i3i oCl'i""n 
co~~vict system. Curzon, the for8i:n cecrctQ~y, asked 
to bo supplied wi th copies of all t:w rclev<..:nt 'iJ')lH;:rs, 
,nl( ;::;oIJevJhc.1 t si=;nificantly he LlOUC tue point thot 
Dulfour, 'V/ho is very much concerned <:,;'L; O'lD.~ Dp~0rent 
pDrtioli ty to the Chinese cc:,;se in ,jl:.ontun:.;', illi~;l:l.t 
lil:e to see the memorandum sent b:y' .Little. 
Bolfour was in Geneva leadins the Britich dele-
CDtion to the first Bssembly of t:w LCD(;Ue of LJotiOllS 
',.'hich convoned in December, 1')20. As the 8BseGbly 
approached, it was necessary to Give consideration to 
\';l::.~,lt support should be accorded to Ohi11D should sbe 
rDise her complaints against Jopon conccrninc ;..-.i.18ntunc;. 
!.i:~lC Ohinese minister for foreiGn affuirs 'dOS reported 
Dr; saying that as England, Fronce Dnd l".;oly \lcre 
Dlreody pledged to support Japan at GonevD, Chine's 
CD se \'18 s hopeless, but most of the officials at the 
J?oroign Office denied the existence of ony sucll f·1edge. 
nevertheless the situation wes deliccte for, as C.J.B. 
Burs'c, a legal adviser, argued, jjritoin coulLL lwrdly 
support Japan on the issue of Jhentur.(: et the peace 
conference ond then oppose her on the SODO ~Dttcr so 
shortly eft er\"la rds .88 Hurst thou::;ht tllDt it \]ould be 
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~li0el' to oppose Japan on the grounds tllDt Jopon had 
cOi:.tinued to make d1fficul ties for the 3rit;iGh dominion[) 
to obtain possession of' forrJer Gerr.Kn:. island:::: Dnd thus 
hod foiled to honour her obligations to the :oDce 
treaty. Bentinck, a member of the fer oast depart-
~en~, wos of the opinion that no pledce had been ~ivon 
-tio ::JU:,!~)ort Japan before the Leaeue, ond \1hile he thouc:h t 
C:1CC it \"as not conclusive that Bri toin coulc'~ only 
O~"pO';3C Jepcm because she had not l:ept hcr port of the 
~coce treaty bargain, he felt that the points raised by 
TIur8t should be kept in mind. F. Aohton-Gustkin, a 
f:irst secretary, ~rgued tl-Jet Article 20 of the Loacue 
covenant precluded the possibility of such D pledse to 
JUVcn ond he thought that the Chinese oinister was 
fi::;llin:; for en indication of Britain' C otti tudc. As a 
result a reply was sent to Olive statinc that althOUGh 
tIle }:;1'1 tinh government werc; pled.c;ecl to SUP3>ort Jcpan' s 
claims regarding Shantung at the Peace conference they 
\'Icre under no such obligations bofoJ:.'o t:.o :.ueo;:;uc. 
China continued to press for on incicotion of the 
I3ritiDh at't'ltude Bnd intervie\Js took place in both 
Peking and London. When Clive, the cOUllnellor of 
the embassy et l' c~ing, reported thot he 1'.0 C. been 
questioned further, Miles Lempson arGued that the matter 
\/DC complicDted end owing to her pD5t :r)olicies Britain 
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I"";vcn o(~mittinG ti:w t our action 0.1 1917 \:/u::' c.i.ictoteG. by 
In1i ;;<..·1';; necessity t •• • it hes ccrtc1inly ::':'Cd~urlClcd. to 
0,.:"" llt1cionel discredit •• 89 Vclloclcy cede u c~ronG 
CL' GO DL:I)inst JopDn end in unequi voc;:) 1 tOl'!1:J Lo co:,ldc~~med 
the ;~;:wntuns settlement es '£I grave inj'll:Jticc to Chino'. 
llc <}:L': :UCcl I;het the restitution of Dovorci;.-:n riCi.lts 
Ili'tillOUt economic rir;hts ~.,es D (,le:i:'O cup:1CmisIJ, Dnd 
J 
cO;-lcluded by saying that while B:.. . lt::..,in hvcl cl'lCloDvourcd 
to eradicDte irredentism from Europc she hod so\·m 1 ts 
socd~ in Asie on en elmoct unprecedented scalo. A 
j;'<.. tlw.i..' cryptic comment from Curzon steted thDt he ~~Dd 
I.1ot the ;:~ro blams befor(!, end 'I wo G the only per;:;on in 
eebinct whc~ olJPoced the decision of :leb. 191/ which was 
£;-(;ro;1-.;ly urged by tlr BDlfour'. 
"";20, the Chinese minister in liondon, coIled upon 
'~Jrc Crowe end ste:;ed thvt the Chil1CDC f;ovcrn_~ont 
recoGnised thet .ilrit~;.>in hed been compelled to support 
tTOPDH'L; CID 1ms et the peace conference:. llo\Jovcr. Chine 
choice of action et Geneva, but Crowe Ecve an evasive 
90 reply. As a result of the rcpresentetioDn end 
deliberations instructions were sent to the British 
dclegotion in Genevs that are such a reflec~ion upon 
British policy that they deserve 8 full quotetion, 
'After reviewing 811 the circum-
stonces and baving regoru to scunt 
consideration given to Chine's case 
et Versailles in 1919i it will be justifiable to claim ibert~ of 
action should the ques~ion couc up 
for discussion bef0re the ~eegue. 
You should be careful thorefore to 
avoid any action which mieht be 
construed as committinG us to 
support of any arguments Jep9n mDy 
now adduce. 
'Our pledt:~e to JDpon in 1917 
end 8ction at Versailles in l~l9 as 
they were dictated by necessity 
have undoubtedly effected British 
prestige in China very odverocly. 
We must avoid any action calculated 
to prevent China from at leant ob-
taining the fair hearing before 
the League to which she is in equity 
entitled. • 
The instructions were initialled by both Curzon Bud 
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Crm'le and were t'herefore made with high Br! tis:-' euthori ty. 
However, if British actions in 191'': ond 1919 were 
dictated by the necessity of honourinc treety obli-
gations to Japan it is difficult to unders'Gsnd \1hy 
Britain hsd tre8ted Chins so coldly during the peace 
settlement neGotietions. On 8 number of occasions 
BritGin had refused China's requests for interviews, 
c021::u1 tDtions wi tb Chinese re'jre~~~;n_t:~' [;i VCGiuJc1 -;,een 
co::; ore ti vely rvrc t sna 3ri tein ',eel fDiloc.~ to ncl:e ony 
C()·.'.ccc:~aO[lS to Chine reg8rdinr, her coc..orciol, tierri-
tori~lt ond extraterritorial ri~ht~. Ouch actions were 
not c1icteted by Japan but had rcsul~:cd f'ro::1 os. escments 
-~:,_(::t in the existing situation in Chino it \'Joc in 
=_>_'it<:.'in t:; main interests to actont such tactics. Onc 
:.:: ~ ~:lclce that C;:.rzon was tryinc to blome Japan too 
i·.1uch for the shortcomings of Br:i..tinh policy, and it 
LlU:.:;t ho [,tressed that althouch C'..."'.rzon \"lor; £levoee tine; e 
fair heuring for China, he wes not arsuing for [) 
rov~rsol of the Shantung settlesent which hod been 
dCDunded bv Chine. IJ 
II~}rdly surprisinGly Curzon' c instructions broucht e 
~][E'l:cd reoction from Henkey and Dolfour ullo \"!Crc both 
ill Geneva. TIenkey, who hed nlDyed [) leeclinc; rele in 
t::e !-;hontung settlement of April, 1<;19, stronsly denied 
th::)t SCDnt consideretion was given to the Chinese ccse 
at Versailles. On the contrary, he stressed the point 
tl;ot there were sevoral meetinf':;s at Ullich Chineso <:;nd 
Jt_>Kno~~e delegates were heard at ~·;r'.:;ot; ler,;::;th.9l 
~[;·lfour \tIOS very indir';nent, end he Dr:--;1.~ecl thot Ct:rzon' s 
i:lst.2uctions sUcgested thet any TIloclificatio::'1 in the 
;':;hontuns settlement must teke t~1C fO::-E1 of thrOt;in~~ over 
t:10 Jo,onese and ,\'1i thdrsw1ng froD the position Bri tc.'in 
l:1 ... 'd odopted in 1917 when Jc:pen' s essiGtancQ \/VS con-
sidered vital. 92 Belfour stated. that 1.10 woe at a 
10G~ as to how such G reversal of ~olicy could be 
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jUfJ~ified for even if Britain's prestic:e hod. declined 
in Chinv since 1917, such e reversal of policy could 
only be followed by a decline in prestice in J"epen. 
Ee did not agree that only scant consiclerotiol!. \iC3S 
~ivcn to the Chinese case at Versailles Bnd he then 
v/ent on to ask for • any arren:";'emen"ts wad.e in 1-<. .. :1'15 in u 
1919 which 8re not contained in the printed treaty ••• 
lie also 8sked for any informetion \ . .;1 tL. regGrd to tile 
tlisuso which Jap8n had made of her til."cety riGhts. 
The fect that these questions were put must be 
judGed extraordinary for on the first ~uery Delfou1' 
hod been 8 leading party to the supplementClry April 
aGreement concerning Shantung which wvs often referred 
to os the 'Belfour settlement' that \-;86 pUl.--posely not 
written into the treaty of Versailles. In e conver-
sation with the Chinese delegate Wellington Koo, Baliour 
hiwcel! had specifically referred to the exclusion of 
the supplementary settlement from oche )rinte<l trcety. 93 
'.J.:hroubhout the peece treaty negoti(;) liions :0alfour hed 
been in Paris es e leading British deleC(J~e while he 
retained the office of foreign secretax~. i.l:heref ore, 
if there hed been any arrangement es suggested by Belfour 
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D Llorrli peculier consti tutionel developnollt v.'ould have 
becn revealed. It is true that .Dolfour hvd ceor:;eJ. to 
be foreign secretary in October, 1919, but he became 
lord president of the council shortly aftcrvmrdG, end 
for him to go to Geneva to lead the Dritish dclogution 
unaware of the growing evidence of Jopan'c activitiGs 
i~l Chine must e lso be considered strDnBo. 
Lampson made 8 detailed case 9':ainst Eolfour's 
DrD'uments. 94 u He stated that it was essential that 
:Britain's actions at Geneva should not be prejudiced 
by any pest agreement with Jep<-,n, and if the Shontung 
issue were raised the British deleGation should be 
sympathetic to Bny proposals which the Chinese delegLtes 
mi6ht meke which could lead to a settlcmen'G rather thon 
tvke sides in an argument. It was possible that Japan 
\'JOuld strive to prevent China from gDining D hearing, 
but there should be no action on the ~art of th: British 
delegation to support such en exclusion. Upon the 
point concerning Japan's past record in Chin., L6mpson 
WDG somewhat seething and he ettcched 8 number of 
iilemorcmda end reports with the cOmillent that, • If Nr 
Bulfour could afford the time to reed these documentG. 
they may perhaps afford him the mr1teriGl he desires.' 
It was admitted by Lempson tllst Bal.fo1.1J:' v/os in 8 
very strong ;)081 tion to judge wbether China' re: eDse had 
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,'cc:';:LVCQ scent consideration in PDris. I:ovol"thele.ss, 
\loll-informed circles that China' re c<:l:\7Umer..ts did not 
LLomp.Jon t semphasi.§.7 receive the coac,idorc'tiion they 
deserved et the hends of the Council of .0'()ur; OIl the 
focts, China's arguments certainly seem stro~c.' 
\!ellesley argued thClt whatever tIle lec:;<:'l strencth' 
of Chine's CDse was it could not bo coins8id that 
->_"itoin liquidDted her debt to J,ypon in Chinese currency. 
lie continued by stating that Bri toin 1,10 s fDced ui th the 
evils of' either breakin~ fClith vJ'ith JopDn, or 0hino, 
~:mu thv"t each alternative was undecirable. i:icvcr-
tllcless, as the bargain with Japon should never hDve 
boon wade, INellesley favoured reachil1C ocreer;1cnt \'1i th 
Gldna. 95 Eyre Crowe Clgreed in substance \1i tll rJ~1mpGOn 
t:l~)t fresh attempts should be L.mde to Gtart Sino-
J~' ponese nef,otie tions, and Cro\,/(O) moclc the point that 
JOpDl"l should be encouraged to see ttwt she ,had oore to 
coin from reaching an agreement Hi th Chins .. M then (('0 ...... 
il'1.sisting upon her treety riGhts. IIouevcr, if there 
\lere: a clash between the two countries Croue thOUGht 
Bri tein had to redeem her olcd"c to ~<.: ':')un, but 
.1.' l.) .r. 
Bri toin might use the rene\<lDl of t~:c ,a.nC,~lo-
ollicmce as a weapon to induce Japvn to modify her 
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'J.1o these lengthy deliberations (;urzon made one of 
-- (' uell known blue pencilled COrnl.lcntr;, 'I Bill still 
:':1:)~; cui te clear what papers it is ;.,.'roposcd -to send to 
I em afraid that :Lt if, useless lio unload 
96 
'-' ll(;"vy batch upon him.' 
Hhen the League Assembly fir:2 11y l~ct, Hellincton 
~oo, on behelf of the Chinese dele~ution, stated that 
~'ltl:oU3h he was not going to raise issueD concorninG 
C1line immediately he would do so et e mor~, appropriate 
-ci:.,c. 97 Hence, it may be judGed tLot 011 the orfju-
:-:,::"It;0 concerning the assembly \IJere but [) storm in 0 
But the exchanGes must be jud~:;ed 
il.lpcrtent for revealing the division of opinions 
oconG both Foreign Office officials and between Ourzon 
Obviously. by the 9utamn of 1920 mo~t 
bod ~'od cecond thoughts upon the justice of the 
SllOn·cung settlement of 1919 end thut Chin~) Lv<l been 
t:r.·~u':;ed rather shabbily. However, with the close of 
lC)20 there wes no clear way fOI'\'wrd ollvisogcd ',;'hereby 
Br l-~i.' in could. modify her policy to Chine ""hile remaining 
frionds with Japan and the United States. 
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The Shentung question had lain dormant for nearly 
the whole ot 1920, but in 1921 it agein became an 
important iasue, especielly when proposals were accepted 
by nine powers for en internationol conference on far 
eastern effairs and naval disarmament to be held et 
Washington et the end of the year. Undoubtedly 
Britain's far eastern policies were concerned mainly 
with the Anglo-Jepenese alliance end naval strategy, 
but as the Washington conference drew near the question 
of Shantung hed a marked influence upon Britain's fer 
easLern relations and largely determined her policy to 
China. 
It has been noted that et the first session of 
the League of Nations in December, 1920. Dr Wellington 
100, the Chinese delegate, stated thet he would not 
press his country's claims regarding Shantung on that 
occ8sion but added, 'We do not waive eny right to which 
we may be entitled.,1 Possibly Koo's statement et 
Genevs hed en influence upon the Japanese government, 
for early in 1921 Baron Hey.ahi, the Japanese Dmbessador 
to Britain, gave an interview to the London '~~ening 
Lt,)n<ierd' in which he denied tnDt Jopan wos seo ... ~~ll:::; to 
retDin the province. He ststed. that: 
'The Chinese GovGrnr:len~G \;les requosted 
nec~rly e year ago to m~)kc Orr[~l:;e­
menta to conwwnce the necessary for-
malities for receiving back the 
>.Jhentung territory, but lU1L)rtuni.Jtel~l 
nothin('~ has been done; so thut, 
although the Japanese Govornwen:t 
maintains its firm intention to 
restore this territory, it iD not its 
fault that no progress 110s been r:,ade. t 
lIL:lyashi continued by stating thet it \iO:::' Jopan 1 s 
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policy to support the 'open-door' in Chine Dnd the 
intornLd;ionel financial consortium, 2 enel naturally such 
"m interview was noted by the Jj"oroipl Office. 
Throughout 1921, Ji:;.lpan wes dete:.Tuinec1 to nocotiete 
directly with Chine regarding Shantung free £1.'00 inter-
ference from third parties, ond this influenced tL:C 
orc;:.;nisation of the We shington confeI'encc. 
be:;iiming of the year there were still e:q;;ec 0 • ..itions tlwt 
the LCDcue would provide the settinG; for rosolving 
C11i11.e'o claims, and this was cleorly in the mind of 
Alzton, the British minister in Poking, vl'11on he reported 
UpOll the current ettitudes in Chil1D.3 Alston stDted 
that it was clear'that China wes not pr pored to ebolish 
her established policy of p18yin~~ one foreic;n pO'vler off 
aGainst another, end that this was :orticulDrl~ resented 
b;y the British government , ••• in view of the 10llg 
record of practical work don. by British subjects end 
capitel in Chin. to the mutual benefit of both 
countries'. ~h. minister then referred to Y8rious 
maniteatetlons of Chinese aiatruat of Brit&in, and to 
Chine' a breaking otf negotietions reg8rd1ng ~ibet. 
But Whiteball replied that Britein 'hed no intention 
or restricting the liberty of action of tbe British 
delesatea to tRe League of tietions in the event of . 
the Shantung is.ue being reised by the Chinese Govern-
ment, in order to ensure China's obtaining et least 8 
feir hearing ••• t Ohine. however, was determined to 
obtain far aore then e teir hearing to her claims for 
the restoret1on ot 8hentung. 
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Jepan's ocoupation ot Shantung reised two issues 
for Brit.in. u •• 17. ishe influence which 8uch occu-
pation hed upon British intere8ts t especially in 
Tsingt8o. end ot much greetar importance, its influence 
upon intern8tion.l relations. Comp18ints against 
Japanese discrimination regarding British shipping 
prompted Ashton-Gwetkin, e second secretary at the 
Foreign Office. toergue thet the Japanese were 'organi-
cally unti'ved '0 .da 1ai.ver 8U7 country under en "Open 
Door" 818t .. , owing to ,_ "very d1!!erent conoeptions 
of the function. ot GoYerwaen'" en1;ert;sined by them'.4-
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In the summer ot 1921, Lempaon, a member o£ ~he fer 
eastern department, criticised the Japanese, saying, 
'they have shown both inefficiency and discrimination 
in their administration of Tsingteo, but thet wes only 
whet we knew from ~xperience would happen I .5 
Consideretion of Japan's administration of Shantung 
led to consideretions of her intentions concerning the 
future ownership of the province. In February, 
George S. Moss, a vice-consul in Tsingtao home on leave, 
submitted 8 memorandum whioh Lempaon summarised as 
follows I 
"The Jepaneaa do not mean to clear 
out ot Sh.n~g where they have 80 
consolidBted their position that 
they are to all intents end purposes 
planted therefbr good. He is clear, 
however, tha. the only true solation Qt the proalem is tne evecustiou of 
the Japne .. garriaon, end the ebo-
U ~.n of' both tbeir mill tarJ end 
oJ.vil a4111n1.tn.10118. In their 
,leee. be "TOest.. the eata bl18h-
•• nt of one single international 
conoeaa1on under proper internetional 
aUDic1pal GoYernment.-
Lampson 414 not agree with Mo •• th.~ Britein would do well 
to negot1ate tor • settle.ent between China end Jepen, 
snd thought. 
'We should ge_ 911 the kick. end none 
of the helt-pence from both sides. 
The right poliey tor us to follow 1& 
to weit upon events, which is possibly 
unoriginel, b\lt i. certe1nly sound in 
• metter where nationel sentiment on 
both sides is involved end where our 
previous record is egainst us.' 6 
Lompson continued by referring to Moss's idea that 
wci-hiS.Wei should be surrendered by Britein as en 
inducement to Japan to do likewise to Tsingtao. 
But •••• it is not evident why Greet Britain should 
buy Chine a satisfactory settlement of the Shantung 
question et the price ot the return of ~J ei-hei We!. , 
Jordan. the British ex-minister to Feking, also 
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opposed the ideas of Moss end thought that any attempt 
on the pert of Britain to re-open the Shantung question 
would only erouse Chinese resentment. Jordan noted 
that Japan wes enjoying ex-German rights in Shantung, 
much to China·s annoyance: 
'We shared the respons~b lity for 
Ithe Shentung aettl •• e with the 
Wnited States end other owers end 
I s.. no re •• on whJ we abould go out 
of our w81 to court further odium by 
eDt.~ns upon independent negotiations. 
It the Paris decision needs revision, as 
it certainly .e ••• to dot the revi~on 
should be undertaken either by all the 
Powers who were p.r~1 •• to i~t or by 
Japan and Chine negotiating directly.' 
Jordan concluded by saying that it wes possible thet 
.:ellingt:on Koo' s transfer 8S Chinese minister to 
; 
Britain wes to fecilitate arrangements for direct 
negotiations with Beron Heyesbi, but it was doubtful 
if Ohinese public opinion would allow such developments 
Wellesley, an •• sistent secretary at the Foreign 
Office, agreed with Jorden's conclusions. 
A further report upon Japanese administration, 
written by A. Archer, the vioe-consul in Taingtao, 
U8S not recei'Yed in the Foreign Office until M87,7 
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endANewton, 9 me.ber ot the tar eastern dep&rtment 
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ceme to tbe conclusion: that Archer's report indicated 
that sn early s.ttle •• nt of the Tsingteo question 
was not enticipated by tbe Japanese. Wellesley 
expressed the hope 'that the Americans will take up 
the Shantung question sbortly·. \"lishes that America 
would exert diplo •• t1c presauze concerning bbentung 
wereto be repeated by Wellealey end other offici8ls 
.everel t18e8 during 1921, end it steamed from 8 
belief t~t because Britain had becked Japsn at Parie 
this limited her own renge of action, for British 
policy could not be reversed 80 quiCkly.8 
Thus, in the :first part o£ 1921 both Britain and 
Japen were oonsidering the ohentung question again, end 
there can be no aoubt that it Ohins hed been united 
she could have exerted e msrked influence upon the 
situation. But exireme disorders in Chin.'s internel 
afJ:a1rs continued, end .a 9 result the con'temptuou8 
attitude of the powera towards her persisted. Yet 
behind 9 moat complex situ8tion created by the 
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innumerable wera of the provincial leaders there 
were political movements, such es federa~ism, whioh 
indicated the potential strength of Chinese uationalism 
and possible independenoe from foreign loans.9 
All efforts to establish unity within China broke 
down, snd in July wertere reoomoenced between the 
Aliliwei and Chibli fa.tions over the right to control 
the province of Hupeh. 10 There were also marked 
divisions in soutb Ohins. and early in the year 8 
Cantonese request for e share of the revenues of the 
M9ritime Oustoms Union was Qurtly refused. ll Britain 
wes hostile to ~8nton, end Alaton orgued that there 
was no justifioation for I) separate government in tbe 
south. H~ reported that be wes using his influenoe 
with the representatives of the powers to induce them 
to work for the re-unification of China by supporting 
the parliawen"t;a17 reforms proposed by the Peking govern-
ment. l2 Later in the year southern throats to obtain 
a sbare of the customs revenues by force were m~t with 
British proposals tor the international use of gun-boet 
t8ctiQs.l3 
In the winter ot 1920-Ie21 Chine t S internal dis-
orders led to • cleah with Japan when Chinese bandits 
on the borders of Korea launched 8 series of ettecka 
upon Japenese prOpert" ~nd burnt down the Jepenese 
consulate et Hunchun. 14 This brought sharp retali-
ation from Jepenese troops, end the subsequent 5ino-
Japanese negotiations to settle the dispute lasted 
for six months. E. Te1ebmen, second secretary et 
the British le!&tion in Peking, recognised that the 
• 
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Japanese troops hed beheved very badly, but maintained 
that the Jepenese hed to protect their nationals, end 
be pleced most ot the bl&me tor the dispute upoa the 
~ainese, 'Were e Bri'ish Consulate to be burned by 
bandits, with Ohine.e troops stending idly by, we should 
lend bluejeckets, etc.,lS 
Teichmen's ergu.ents were no doubt justified from 
the viewpoint ot !ritisb interests but, es with Alston's 
failure to .ee the need tor e southern Chinese govern-
ment, they did not t.ke .ceount of the growing strength 
of Ohinese netion.li •• ,end no doubt Britain entegonised 
Chinese netionel1sa wben .he sought to influence Chine's 
internel ett.ire by in.i_ting upon certain conditions 
before egreelO! to tin.neiel loans. At the beginning 
ot 1921, con8ider.tion we. given to W;; v loan egreement 
88 8 meens '0 •• cure the diabendment of 8 number of 
Chinese troops, but the prep088ls were opposed by 
Lempaon on the grounds ~h.t they were imprecticeble 
end the 8uggestioD we. drOpped. l6 
'.cibetBn consid.rstions 
In the post-war period. Anglo-Chineae relations 
hoa suffere~ particularly from the differences arising 
frou the Ticeten question. For most of the period 
i;he Tib.tan authorities were prepared to allow Britain 
to take the initietiv. in relations with Chins, but 
in the lste spring ot 1921 there were signs that the 
'£1betans were ebout to Bet independently end attack 
the Chin.s. troop. on fibetan 80il. ~he position 
was delioate for although Britain recognised China's 
suzerainty ove~ ~1D.t. Britain did not want to see 8 
large scele move •• nt of Ohineae troops into that 
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oountry. Hence •. when the i'ibetens threatened unilateral 
military action, Well.alay asked the India atfice to 
counsel moderation upon the Tibetan govcrnuent, urging 
them to,re •• 1n on the def.nsive.17 tibetsn mi11tery 
action could ea~1ly b.ve inflamed the situation end 
thereby worsened;"'nglo-Ohi~.8e relet1ona. 
Owing to the failure to obtein en Anglo-obin.a. 
8~ement conoeraing Tibet, tor which Britain blame4 
Chine. Teich88n .rgued to~ e more ective British policy, 
especially sinc. ~ib.ten i.petience wes growing. 
Teicb.msn declared th.t I ••• we should make friends 
openly end de.f1n1'tely with the Tibetans ••• i1' necesserily 
indep.~tly of tbe Cbine ••••• ·18 Shortly afterwards 
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~eichuan also ergued that the exportinG of a~~s to 
~lbet should be sllowed end he claimed the·1; Tibet wes 
do facto en independent countr.y a:ld thorefore ot<tside 
the scope of tb.e arms embargo sGoinst ChillS, He wes 
awaro of the dangers of Cb1ne~e reactions, but he 
thouGht that 9 boycott of British goods could be 
avoided if BritaLn prooeeded tactfully. Of course, 
Tcich~an's influence 9S e second secretary was limited, 
but his views assumed much greater importance \'ihen 
Curzon, the foreign secretary, stvted, '1 have all 
vlong held this view end heve neVGr sympathised with 
F.O, objections which I em glad to see are et lest 
beGinning to thaw.,19 However, Ourzonts ottitude 
towards Chine in reletion to Tibet wes almost certainly 
too touchy. 
During the summer the Tibetan question played 
little pert 1n Anglo-C~nese reletions, but et the 
end of August the British government decided to ask 
Chine to resume nego~i.tions for 8 Tibetan settlement.20 
lhe British government's epproech wes net conciliatory 
for they threetened that if negotistions were not 
resumed they would negotiate directly with the Tibetan 
Government. Aa the W.sbington conference was so near 
one must question whether the time wos opportune to 
raise such B difficult issue in such 8 manner. 
Chine easily evoided the nressure uhich Bri tDin ' .... as 
seeldnr; to exert by steting that t::e extr~' \'lOr~: \"hich 
the \'leshington conference entailed nrovcntod her from 
considerlnf, the Tibetan question, encl she esked that 
the matter be deferred until after t·e confer 11co. 21 
_~ut it weE not until the letter half of October, and 
tlvd: 
wi tll ill-grace t •• the British Government ec;reed 
to 0 90stPonement~2 
Cabinet Deliberetions upon the Far EaEt 
The events relating to the report of tho Lritish 
covernrlent 's Bd-hec comm1 ttee to recorll,:ond upon the 
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Anclo-Japanese ellience, end the attompts of the 
Canadian government to secure the alliance's terminetion 
lw-vc been descrt bed in deteil else,-;here. 23 It is, 
perheps, sufficient to recell that Curzon "res not in 
fevour of the ad-boc committee's proposels to make the 
An{'jlo-Jepenese alliance El triparti to aGreement \'lLich 
LlCluded the United Stetes, end tlwt Lloyd George, the 
'irirJe minister, persueded the Cenodien government to 
defer any Bction until efter the imperial conference 
:le d Llet in tbe summer of 1921. 
'2b.e imp~riel conference was duo to neet in June 
and et a cabinet meeting et the end of i:Oy the AnClo-
Jep£lnese alliance 5nd the fer east ~lere examined in 
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~reet detail .ndmeny points were msde which were of 
fundament.l irnport8Bce to British policy in Chins. 24 
Curzon begsn • review of the situation by preising the 
pest influence of the Anglo-J9penese-allience, stating 
thDt it: 
'provide' tor the preservetlon of 
the common interests of ell Powers 
in Cbine ~y ensuring the independence 
end integrity of the Chinese hmpire 
9nd the principle ot equal oppor-
tunities for the commerce and industry 
ot .11 netions in China,' 
But in view ot tbe inroads which hed been mede upon 
Chine's sOTerelgnY,1 tellov1ng the form9tion of the 
alliance, sUch' •• ~he fightinG of two foreign wars 
upon Chinese territory, Japan's twenty-one de~8nds, 
and the growth ot spheres ot interest this claim wes 
specious. One m.y elso judge that the critical com-
ments which Curzon mede the followine October concerning 
the 'open-door' must C8st serious doubts upon the 
sincerity of his cabinet 8tetement. 25 
Curzon continued his review by outlininc the 
orcuments 8g~inst renewel of the alliance, and he wes 
aware that the alli.nee wes alienating Britain from 
the sympathies of China end rendering ~riti6h tasks in 
that country more difficult. He repeated thet British 
policy in Chine bed always been that of the 'open-door' 
end drew ettent~on to ~h. developments whereby China hed 
become en unwieldy end helpless country. Curzon 
stressed thet it wel the desire of the BI'itish govern-
ment to see Chine built up egain, 'end some sort of 
cohesion arrived et in thet country'. 
At the door of Chine, Curzon argued. there was 
Jepen wbo hed imbibed the German spirit of disciplined 
8{)cression. As Jepen could not support her growing 
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population it wes n.turel that she should look to China 
for expenmion, .nd Cttrzon steted thetz 
•••• he would like to remind his 
collesgues of the degree to which, 
by her 8ction in Korea, Formosa, 
the Pescedores, Manchuria end 
Shentung, Jepsn we8 elreedy forming 
a ring round Chine.' 
DU'/j Curzon then ergued for • renewsl of the alliance 
on the grounds thet it hed been successful, it hed 
assisted Britain during the wer, there were dangers of 
JDpen becoming involved in 8 new Russian-JDpenese-German 
sGreement if she were abandoned by Britain, Japen would 
feel slighted. end both Australia end New Zealand 
favoured renewal. 
Obviously Curzon bed examined the situation very 
csre!ully, but 8D1 sympethy for China wee outweighed by 
greeter consideretions for Britein'~ strategic position 
end intere.ts. It must be noted that Curzon hed 
recommended nothing to •• sist his professed desires to 
see greeter cohesion 1n Chine. 
Win.ton Churchill, the colonial $ecretary 8nd 
member of the cabinet, ergued the~ the differences of 
opinion between Americ. end J.pen hed arisen from the 
situation in Chins and the different ambitions of the 
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two powers in that cOUBtrJ. He stBted that 'It would, 
indeed, be en enormous advantege if enything could be 
done to get the United Stete8 end Japan to come to some 
egreement.' Churohill then .dvocsted thet en inter-
nationsl conference be held which, it must be noted, 
did not contrsdict CurSOD'S erguments ~or the renewal 
of the slli8Dce. 
The wisdom of Churchill's argument for Britain to 
support en international conterence was questionable, 
for if 8 main •• uae of the fer eastern problems were 
American-Jepan ... riY81ry in Chine, Britein would be 
forced to take aid.. when the issues were debeted, and 
this wes exactly whet Britein did not went to do. 
Britain wented to re •• in friends with JepsD, while et 
the some t1ae it we. hoped that the United at.tes would 
. 
help to curb some of the Japanese excesses iL Ohins, 
especially in regerds to Shantung. Obviously the 
considerations which hed prompted Curson to favour the 
Anglo-Japanese 811i.nee did,not apply to the United Stetes, 
end if a clash were to heve occurred between the United 
States and Jepen it wes doubtful if Anglo-American 
'. 
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relations could hsve borne a repetition of the situation 
which existed et Paris without serious ropercussions 
ci tber to Anglo-Japanese or Anglo-American affa·irs 
No voices. however. were raised in the cabinet in 
opposition to the suggestion for a conferenc~ of the 
interested powers. Austen Chamberlain, lord privy 
seol, supported the idee that the conforence should be 
cO:1vened by the president of the Un! ted Btatez t while 
Dolfour, lord president of the counCil, wanted to see 
8 combination of the Curzon-Churchill proposals: 
tHe L!elfou!7 W88 in favour of the 
renewel of the Alliance, but it should 
only be tor 8 short term~ and at the 
eame time Hie Majesty's ~vernment 
should 8.1 that they wished to have a 
Conference sbout the Pacific. At 
<Utterent times he hed talked e great 
desl to Lord Grey about the question, 
end the letter bed always taken the 
vi6W that His Mejesty's GovernMent oust 
be very careful 8S to how far they tried 
to keep Japan out ot Ohina. It had to 
be re~embered that the Japanese were not 
a llowe·d to go to ••• any Jllece where 
there we. s white population. It was, 
theretore, somewhst unreesoneble to say 
she was not to expend in 0 country where 
there weB e yellow reee.' 
Despite Curzea's cleims regerding hie respect tor the 
integrity or Chine there is no indication in the account 
ot the eebinet meeting to suggest thet Belt"our·s comments 
were unsccepteble. Indeed. such ideas were lster 
expressed by Cur.on to the Chinese mini ster. 26 
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In summinr; up the discussion of the c6-oin.et, Lloyd 
Gco~~o did so without waking eny reference to Chins, 
end 11i6 mein concern w~s that by u.roppi:ag J~1i8n she 
Lli: .. ;ht turn to 8 resusci teted GerL1Quy. Tile Jllsin con-
clusions of the cabinet were that et the forthcoming 
imperial conference, the British governme~t should 
oupport a proposal for the president of the United States 
to convene e Pacific conference, but only after it bed 
been wede clear to Japan thet i~ was not proposed to 
drop the Anglo-Jepenese alliance. 
Groliing HOst;lity to the ADBilo-Jfggnese Alliupce 
Opposition to the Anglo-Japanese ellianco both 
videned end deepened in the summer of 1921. Alston 
reported from Peking that the Chinese government and 
the British legation hed received protests from 
provinoiel org8nis~tions egainst excluding China from 
ccnsultations should • renewal of the 81liance be decided 
upon, snd there wea talk ot 8 boycott of Eritish goods 
if Ohins's claims to be heard were ignorod. Alston 
slso reported that it weB clear that the United Stat.s 
legation wes helping to arouse hostility to the alliance, 
and that e leeding British newspsper in Chins was 
sdvocet1ng e conference of 8 numbe~ of powers to realise 
the integrity of Chine and the 'open-door' policy.2? 
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Vii thin Bri tein e parliementary question asked whet 
C lna' s objections were to the rencn-wlof the Anglo-
Japanese a1li8nce in its ex:i..stinz: form, Bnd e draft 
reply stated thet Chine' objected to any reference to 
hersolf in ., tr08ty unless she were first cOrlsulted. 28 
But this draft which at least indicated that China 
uisht have a valid point for consideration \·ras diseorded 
in favour of a formal reply which stated thot £IS the 
alliance Was under review no comment could be mede. 
A more sympathetic attitude was adopted by the 
British government in reply to a letter it hed received 
from the China Aa.oeiation in Greet Britain, 8 body 
representing trede and commercial interests. In e 
letter to Cursen, the Association protested thst the 
Anglo-Japanese 8lli8nce hed. not witnessed the honouring 
of the integrity ot China, and that Japan's actions had 
been contrary to the principles of the 'open-door'. 
It cuncluded by saying that ·a development of the Japanese 
Alliance into en egreement between the four Greet Powers 
vlould do mucb to consolidate· and maintain the generel 
peace or the Fer East "for many years to come.· 29 The 
Associetion'. letter wes published in ~he Times' and 
on the following 481 the 88ma newspaper published 9 
letter from Welle.le1 in which the Foreign Office quite 
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exceptionally rose to its O\,ffi defence. After referring 
to the importance ot the issues which had bec:!} raised, 
\"Jcllesley steted that the British gov~rnwent hed publicly 
announced that the representations of the Chinese govern-
ment concerning the renewal questio~ would receive -due 
cOllsideretion et the hends ot the Imperial Cabinet. 8S 
viII those of the verioue Gove~ents end parties con-
CGxvaed' • ~ ~ellesley then praised the financial 
consortium as being 6 good example of international 
cooperation, snd h. concluded by stating thet the Chins 
Association could r$st assured that its desire for 
greeter international cooperation in China was 8 IDetter 
to which the British government were tully alive. 
~ellesley W8S generally sympathetic towards Chine, 
and his letter to'The Times' might be seen 9S 8 soquel 
to 8 memorandum which he hed written 8 few weeks earlier 
in which he hed reviewed the tar esstern situation.3l 
Ho stated thst Britain's relations with Chine were not 
satisia cto17 , for Britain, like other Luropeen powers 
~lth interests in the tar east, hed lost prestige 88 e 
result of the war, end 
• ••• the ett1tude of Ilia l:ajesty' s 
Government over the Shantung question 
end the impending renewal of the 
Anglo-Jepene •• Allience are the two 
factors moat responsible for the 
alien.tiOD ot Chine's traditionsl 
sympathies for this country which is 
finding prectical expression in her 
truculence and intractebility over 
the Il'ibetsn frontier necot1etiorls. 
In addition she is resentful of iihe 
Oonsortium policy which in effect 
amounts to a finencial blockade, bu~ 
this is quite unjustifiable.' 
Wellesley's memorsndum concluded by referring to the 
very reel dangers which existed regarding D boycott 
ef ~ritish trade. 
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One may judge thet Welleslay' 8 lett~r to 'The r.rimes' 
had two mt>in objectives. ~he fir£t was to defend the 
consortium in which Wellesley believe~,but which he 
rcco~7Used was not popular in Chins, while the second 
wes to teke some of the sting out of Chin~'s criticisms 
of Brit~in by promising to consider carefully Chine's 
objections regarding the alliance and Shantung. In 
the seme dispetch in reference to Japan, Wellesley mede 
the surprising stetement that apert from the renewal 
issue there wes no question which colled for special 
COOL'lent, 'Anglo-Japanese relations for the pest two 
years maybe said to heve been normal Bnd to have under-
cone no material chenge'. But in view of the Curzon-
ChindB exchengea ot 1919, end the growing suspicions ot 
Jopen's motives in Chins, such e remark must be 
questioned. 
Towards the end of June, Sir Auckland Geddcs, the 
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]3:;':"i ~ish smbessador in \leshington, reported tlH}t s-t;ories 
concorning the alleged attitude of the i.r.r;)eriel con-
fcrcnce to the Anglo-J:apanese allivnce \'IGJ:'e cc::using 
considerable American antipathy "liow£lrds Dritain. 32 
Gcddos also reported that it was common to he.3r such a 
:::"c;-.1Drk Bn t 'England hes to mako her ctloice 8S to 
",'[lcther america is to be her friend or eneny clapenc1ing 
on \;hether she makes Japan her enc;JY or friend. t 33 
-,.lmost et the same time LDmpson :~'cported that the Foreign 
Office was receiving showers of telesr:Jphic communi-
cations from organisations and individuels in China 
protesting et the prospects of e renewal of the alliance, 
and that some of the protests wero perticulerly bitter 
agDinst Japan."'" 
Hence, it was against quite formidable foreign 
opinion that the imperiel conference hC:1I3_ to cleciu.e its 
policies. 
l~e ~§1n Conclusions of the. Imperial Conference 
The imperial conference began on 20th June, end ten 
deys later the British cabinet aGain discussed its far 
eastern polioy. After reoognising tuet Japan would 
resent being rejected as an ally the prime minister 
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SULll~led up the situation TUbintainin13 lthere were certsin 
iu.ndDmental points which hed to be adhered to, viz.: 
'(1) Greet Britain could not quc..rrel 
with the United Btates or Alr!e:.:ic8. 
(ii) It wes essential not to insult 
Japan by doing enythin[~; v.,~hict \'loulcl 
be tantemount 1x> casting her aside 
after the loyal way in which sh<:; hvd 
observed the TreBty in ~lihc pest. 
(iii) Chine must be cerriea \,lith us 35 
and be a party to any conversation.' 
:1he first two points of the cabinet ID desiderete were 
PO:ci.lO)S obtainable, but, especially in vie\':/ of the Shantung 
issue, it is difficult to see how the third point could 
be a.chieved without excluding the second. Lloyd George, 
holtlever, emphasised the importance of the second point 
by referring to the remarks mBde et the imperial con-
ference of 1911 when Sir ~dward Grey, tae foreign 
secretary at that time, hed pointed vut the llarmful 
effect which the terminetion of the alliance would have 
upon Anglo-Japaneae reletions. Lloyd George then 
)rGiscd Japan's war time efforts and was generally compli-
;Jentory to Jepsn. But it wes clec'r th8~ the third 
point of the desiderete W88 not 8 ~ere platitude for 
l..loyd George referred to the enormous pot<:ul"liiel of 
China's economic growth and argued, 'It was essentiel. 
therefore, that we should not leave ChillS to be walked 
over by America end for the letter country to get the 
wholo benefit of Chins's trade'. Thus, the British 
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cr'binet had adopted a policy which aimed at accommodating 
the United States, J"apen, end Chins thet v/flS almost 
inpossib1e to achieve. 
Despite Ceneds's desires for immediate action 
the i~perial conference accepted the general line of 
the British eabinet to seek a compromise solution of 
the contentious issues, end Dr Lowe has described 
the main developments within the conference.36 Dr 
Loue concluded thet 8S 8 result of the conference, 
'the future of the Anglo-Jepenese allience was left to 
the Weshington Conferenee to determine'. Consideration 
for Ohine's desiderete, however, 8S distinct from the 
China si. tuetion does not appear to have cOlIliJvnded much 
attention, but while the conference wes still in III 
session the Shantung question we s rz;'i sed in a number of 
ways. 
In mid-Ju1" 8 par11ementory question asked the 
prime minister if he could stete 'whether the Weshington 
Conference will be able to discuss ell tbe ~uestion8 
""hich have If vi tal beering on the peaoe end tr&nqui11ty 
or the 'er Eest,- such 8. the question of Shentung , •3? 
nut the reply wes evesive t merely steting that it would 
be inopportune to uke en), comment. Eliot, the British 
embessedor in Jepen, reported that there were good 
reesons to belie.. tbet the J8pene.e government were 
oll:dous to settle the Shantung <}uestion before the 
\J3!..,hington conference t end the Chinese minister in 
~o~~o welcomed this procedure bccsuce he falt that 
J8pan would ofter very favourable terms to secure a 
speedy settlement.~8 Vice-Consul Archer reported 
frOG Tsingtao that ell sections of Jeponese opinion 
Ll the port expected Br! tein to surrender .!ei-hei Wei 
as £Ill inducement tor them to leeve Shentung, '1£ they 
Cive U~l Tf:lingteo they expect us to give up Wei-hei Wei. 
Dnd they seem to expect us to meke the fj.rst move!' 39 
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As the summer ripened it became clear that if the Anglo-
J'DpDnese alliance were to prove D major iter;; for Br1 tish 
policy G t We shington, the Bhentune; question \'TeS also 
GoinG to play en important role. 
Guny4er D1plom.ey 
Early in July t Curzon infol'[,}cd. Colonel Hervey, the 
United St84~es ambasssdor in Britain, tr.at the S.dee of 8 
for eastern conference hed found f9vour with the imperial 
Conferllef8, eud that he (Ourzon) had been charged with 
the tesk of inviting the Americen government to convene 
such a gathering, end the obvious states to be invited 
were Americ8, Britain end the Dominions, JD,a~ end China. 
Curzon then exple1ne4 his views upon the 8f)9nde which 
were thet first. the pe.ce of the fer east should be 
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:-~0:~tledt end second en aGreement on tl-.e future develop-
'~-'nt of China should be revched. ConsIderDtion :for 
01;i~1O, Curzon meintoined, hed 0 fo::'cnos"c :01oco in the 
J~nclo-Jepenese alliance, end 1 t '.!ould be in the interests 
:~'f 32:'i tein end the United States if the integrity, 
inder'endence, end t open-door' policy reGarding Chins 
',Iere respected.40 
In the summer of 1921, hO'vlover, differences 
~eveloped between Eritein and America conceI~inG whether 
there should 'be one conference to ctiscuos navel matters 
onc1 onother to discuss Chine" or whether one conference 
should consider the full range of tar eastern effeiI'a. 
Aocrico favoured one conference. while Britcin felt 
that two conferences should be held. Dr Nish hee 
descl. ... ibed Cur_nts displeasure over the matter end the 
minor diplomatic row which ensued, end it is only necessery 
Juo ooph08ise those espects of the ef'f'eir \vhich are 
relevent to British policy in Cbina.41 
When Curzon received the Amerlcen proposols for 
the tivshington conference' s egende he 'N'ZH, horrified to 
note that it W8S envis8ged to devote tour out of five 
major items to China, end he made some scathing remarks 
about the ·open-door-: 
'Tbe Open Door in China by which is 
meant the creet10n of Equal Oppor-
tunity will et once re1se the question 
of all t~e e~croach.c~ts UJon or 
abetements or that principle whieh 
have taken place durin: ~t8 la~t S0 
years. The "integrity of Chins" 
involves en eXfllinvtio::l '::Ji' : . .::.r 
territoriel frontiers, ead raises 
the questioL ••• of locoed terri-
tories end harbours. 'l!be question 
of the ••• independence 01: OlU1W 
csnnot be pursued for en hour 
without entailing an e::c:;·mno-z;ion of 
the prea.nt internel po~ition of 
Clliua ~ which is onc i)f eJi.lLus-
tretive ehsoa end governing inepti-
tude ••• \~hen we co:;~e to Shantuns, 
we eao.rk upon 8 whole field of 
embittered controverZi,iuvolvinr; 
queationa of ports. re~lw8ys, customs. 
gendBrmerie, econo.aic ri:~~:.ts auel 
privilegaa end 80 on ••• 1 42 
Curzon continued by 8ttecldng the idee ot ;:.wking surrenders 
of leased terr1tori •• or of meking any concessions to 
Ohins whetsoever. end this stvtement of tte foreign 
secretery muat oast grev. doubts upon "';>:,-i -:';i}il-..' s declered 
policy of re.pect for the • open-door' Bud 0hina's 
integri ty • 
Curzon 8sked Wellington Koo. the Chinese Illin1eter 
in ~ndon, to Bound his country' a re~ctiollS to the 
invi tstions which were pending to 6ttcud "tihe ·,'iesh1~on 
conference. As W8it expeoted. t~oo replied thf):'; he 
thought his government would he delighted to be repre-
sented, end he took edventsge of the occasion to stete 
tbBt 8 reel 1aprov •• ent in aino-Jepenese relations 
would be poas1ble only it Britain ended her all1anoe 
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and used ber new found freedom to :t'estrein Jep&n.43 
C1wzon dissgreed with Koo's assossment of the situation 
f.md. countered by making some sharp rembrks concerning 
ChillS'S internel situetion. 
~hortly afterwards Curzon also saw Bvron Hayasbi, 
the Japanese embassador, and explained that although 
Lritoin was well disposed to Japan there was e need, 
o\'/ing to Chinese end American oppoai tion, to review tbe 
£8r eastern situation. Curzon the:t'afore asked Hayashi 
if Japan would agree to be represented Dt waShington.44 
In dia~ussion Hey.ahi steted quite frsnkly thvt he thought 
that his government hed been fundamentolly wrong con-
cerning Shentung, end that 8 fairly drastic modifi-
cation of Japanese policy would be roade shortly, but his 
comments were not offieie1. 
In mid-July widespread ~ublicity wes given to the 
invitations which ~resident Herding had issued for the 
~i9slU.ngton conference, which helped to focus attention 
upon the main objectives of British policy. For exemple, 
'The Times' conteined en entbusiestic report of events 
in perliement when Lloyd George, • as the spoltesmen ot 
the .writish ~mpire ••• welcomed the wise end courteous 
initiative of the United Stetes' for conven:i.ng the con-
terence.45 Lloyd George empbesised thet the imperial 
conference bed been guided by three main cone1deretlona 
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\'lhich were loyalty to Je'08n, 'en old end proved ally', 
agreement \lith whom hed been of grcDt benefit 'not only 
to ol~selves, but the peace of the Fer BDst', consi-
del"'etion of Ohina t and friendship for the United States 
ivi th whom there wes '8 deeply I.'ooted instinct to COD.-
sult snd oooperete'. Thus, the british government hed 
mode clear their desire to advance on a uroud front. 
Shortly after Lloyd George's parliguentory state-
men.t the dispute between Ourzon enci tbe Americ(;;D. 
government sharpened, end Curzon having feiled to get 
his own way over the oonferenoe organization, decided 
to 'leave the excluaive responsibility for the Oonference 
to the Government who initiated it t • 46 Eut it was 
just not true tbet the United St9tes had initiated the 
co::lf orence, even if 1 t hed issued the invi tationa end 
the venue were Weshington, end one must cOL.l.clude thet 
Curs.) n we s trying to cover the fact th8t; the rlritish 
Government were committed to attend Dn international 
CO:i:~erence which was taking a shape tihut CurZOll disapproved. 
A public hint of this lost control was :It.lde in answer 
to " perlismentery question which asked \'Jl1e~l.iher there 
vlOuld be any ber to the Washington conference considering 
'tii.w revision of the Shantung cl:::\uLCS of t~leljcrseilles 
treety.47 The reply ateted that, 'The initiative 9S 
regards the subject. to be discussed et the Washington 
Conference must be with the AnaricDn Governl':cnt, by 
\'/hOIll the conference has been sUlllnoned.' 
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Hopes for the success of the 'lIashinGvon conference 
~ust have been depressed when Alston reporteu from Peking 
upon the bitterness ot Americans in Chino, as \<1011 as 
lihe Chinese. to the possibilities of the remc\t{sl of 
the Anglo-Japanese _111&nce.48 American newspapors in 
China were alleging thet Britain \,lould welcome en 
Amoric[·n-Japenese conflict. end enti-British remarks 
were not confined to unofficial sources for e prominent 
member of the American legetion had written: 
'It is therefore decidedly to England's 
advantage to renew the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance iX'oVided that it can be nrec-
tised as n t~e peet, ~&DeIYt ~n=iend 
will condone snd wink at any Japanese 
sggression 1n Chine end Siberio provided 
o£ oourse that Jepen \~ll keep her tends 
off Indi. 8114 Austre lis. ' 
'.2:le seme Amerioen elso alleged that ~s Er,Glcnd realised 
A,:j(~ric8n trade in Chine. we~ inoreol:ing ,my shculd not 
J~he hnglish sit beck end wei t for tbe inevi tcble iunerioen-
J ;}l:>~:me6e cIa sh, which would hE'vc ol::vious oc:'vanta ges for 
~:cland. These allegations may hovo been c:~ressed 
<lcciring an Americvn-Jepenese conflict, but in vie\'/ of 
Britain's wertime agreements with Japan, and Dritein's 
support ot Japan et Paris, some of the other allegations 
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'i"l(~l"6 nO"4 without foundetion. Irrcsuectivo of the 
./ 
: ..mbntE'nce of t~'Je cherges, however, \iDS the f~\ct thet 
their bein(5 mede et ell wes e blm'! to British hopes for 
D broed agreement. 
Curzon thought that the American govC:~'lLlent hed two 
:'le.in objectives in reletion to the Weslrl.n€;to:n con-
forcnce. The first was the securinG of an inter118tionel 
stater.1en't; of .general principles whtch would enable 
.:J::.:it<"in to terminate her Dllience \,,1 th JOPQl1, end the 
second 'WBS that Chine hed to be sClved f~om \+lhet America 
r0G81"ded £IS the dsngerous clutches of Jepen not only 
for Chins' s sake but elso in the intereS"l:iS of American 
'trede. He continued: 
'Both these subjects of discussion 
involved greet difficulty,bec~~sc 
the first brought up indirecvly 
the Anglo-Japanese Agreerecnt. 
The second, on the other hend, opened 
the door .to slmost intcr!Uinoble 
oontrovere;y, complicated et the 
start by Jepan's decision not to 
allow Shantung to be discussed. t 49 
Dospi'tie J9p8n' s desires tor direct negotiations with 
Chine regarding Shantung, the issue involved the 
ilritish government in some import3nt diplomatic acti-
vities in the late summer and autumn of 1921. 
'.rho IToap.cts for P!:s:ect §ipo-J'apanese Net;2Yi8tions 
In aid~ugust tn.~ were reasons to believe that 
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J~;OD!l wes not going to press Ghine to begin s('perete 
nC2otiQtioas on the Shantung issue. The J(.lpi.:nese 
uil'listcr in Peking infor'med AlstoiJ. t:,::..··~lle tiDe: no 
E:pecivl i!lstructions regerdinG 'rsingtso, except that he 
\-103 prepBred to discuss tLe matter v!heneve}"' t:,e Chinese 
c£·red to do so.5O lie bad been eudlOriscd to offer 
t: .. c uithdrewel of mill tor,. guards 011 the roilwuy ss 
t::oon 8S Chinese guards could be f:;ubstitutcd, but the 
Duthority of the Chinese government wall so ::;heky that 
it we s scarcely wo~tb negotieting './i th thom. But 
\vlthin 8 month or this interview with Alston, the 
JDp.:yneSe government advanced detailed ~ropoGels for a 
settlement of the Shentung question. 
The Jepeneae proposals offered concessions to 
China on 8 nWlber of issues, but t:ley involved the 
cOlltinuBtion of 8 considerable emount of Janc·nesa 
influence in the province. 51 They stetec'l. thvt the 
lot'sehold or K18oehow end ell the rights reeve.din3 the 
50 Idlometre zone sbould be restored to Ohine. The 
Japanese govern •• nt would abandon any ele1m for en 
exclusive settle.ent et ~S1ngt80 if the Chinese would 
o~en tbe 1e •• e4 territory ot Kieochow ss 9 port, end 
permit nationsla of 811 toreign countries freely to 
reside end to carry 011 commerce, induatry, agriculture 
or any otber l •• ful pure.its ~ •• Ohiue shell likewise 
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CC~' out; ••• the openinf? o'! suj.tGblo cities f.4 nd tOl'ms 
·,.r:lth:Ln the province of Sher..tlln~; foT' residence enc. trade 
of tb~ netiol1Clls of ell countries. t JcpeH ';:; proposals 
continued. by stetinlj that the Kia ochow-Tsj.nsAfu railway 
0;10. the appurtenant mines should be ~lOrkod £1 f3 e joint 
Sino-Jnpenese enterprise, end t:H:3t J[4p8n Hould renounce 
~ll ryrcferentiel rights concerninG cconoDic developments 
os stipul~ted in the Sino-Germen treat:.' of 1898, while 
extensions of the Eiaochow-TsinoJ!\.fu reil\V'sy should be 
cffered to the financiel consortium. Separate nogo-
tietions should begin 'to promote the efficienc~: of 
t!1C Chinese police .force guarding the reilwey'. Jepan 
e1so ,?roposed that the customs house £It l.2ninctiDo should 
bocome pert of the customs system of Chine, Dnd that 
public property formerly possessed by Gernony should be 
t~an$ferred to Chine. Both Japan and Chine should 
ep~oint the1r respective commissioners es soon ea possible 
to errenge the neeesssry detailed planning. 
A number ot Fore1gn Offiee e:<perts on the fer eeet 
ntudied the J8'p8nese proposals end their implicetione. 
C. >;. O£Hnpbel1 begon his consideration of th(: Japanese 
case by referring to the rights accorded to Japan by 
the Feria p8ece settlemen~ end to the 'Belfour Settle-
went of 1919' whieh he quoted in full. 52 He argued 
thst the Japanese proposels seemed to offer more than 8 
iu.Jf:i..lment of the Belfour settlement;, especially con-
ccrnlnr; the dropping of the claim to €I settlement et 
;:.:i_Docil0W. But C~mp'bell warned thct it h;.1d GO be 
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renerobered thet the Jepsnese hed been 8c(~uirin~; property 
in ~hentunr, for the previous seven yea ros anci. the 
inclusion of agriculture in t;he -f)roposed ectivi tiea 
-Jhich were to be open to foreigners would l;O~10:ri t the 
,}o::.)[:nese almost exclusively. Cempbell claimed thet 
-che proposals would give Jspen 9- position in S~18ntung 
~n1810eous to her !)Osition in South l-1enchuri& end the 
Chinese would not welcome this. He concluded, 'On the 
,\lhole the eide-memoire strikes jJJe 8S a studiously 
ooderote document'. 
Wellesley agreed wi tb Ceropbell that the ~·9paneBe 
terms were moderate, but he emphasised that the crux 
of the Shantung problem wes control of the retilw8y end 
upon this point there hed been no ebetement of Jepan's 
demands. Wellesley argued thet ti.w rDilwey 'le the 
onl;; thing that metters beceuse it is the main instrument 
of peecetul penetration'. end he pondered upon whet could 
bo done to induce Jepen to relax her grip. ne thoug;ht 
that Britein should not try to intervene but 'e little 
pressure trom AmeriGe would, I think, do the trick'. 
'.L:yrrell thought that China WQul,,:: te unwilling to 
Gc-l;tilc the Shantung issue by direct ller;otietiol1s with 
;; open for she wes expecting to d_o bettier by r<.:ising the 
~etter at washington where she would g- t; l:"I.Jericen 
lie concluded, 'vIe should. I thinl: vfa tch for 
:' .L<Jvo~I·eble opportunity to advice tile JDpauese to do 
t~eir utmost to prevent this'. 
Just before the J epvnese Pl.·csoutcd their- proposals, 
.Ali~ri;oa wes questioned by the Chi..leEe ministeJ.~ for 
forcic;n affairs on the attitude of the Bl.'i-tiish govern-
iuent towards Sino-Japanese ne~~oti.;; ~ions regQI.-ding 
Alaton had repliedti.18 L -~vhile -\J~.o ;:letter 
hDC:_ not been discussed specificall" iii v.;as felt thet 
it '11[;;:;' unwise for Chine not to have lis;;enod to the 
J::':'pDnese overtures and 8scertf;i .. led w:lstijjoi.c otfers 
,.;0::':'C. 53 A few days after this iutervie';;, Eliot in 
":O:;:"YO reported thet the Japanese govc.l'nwent 1.-ould be 
v:.- :.::y ,:>lcased if the Br! tish would "'J.se their iEi'luence 
-lio il1.d.uce the Chinese govern:nent to concidcr\;:1e 
J~I'::J.1ese proposals ~or ShantunG in 0 reasonable spirit. 54 
:3ri tein·a advice to China must, hot-lever, be con-
.::.idc::.'cd e s being very unfortunate t for w~en etu, the 
C:11n6se charge d l effaires, ca lIed ()t t~lC :D'o::"'ei~;n Office, 
Wellesley replied to Cbu's request for GUidance ~~th 
the reply that •••• we Pegerded the Shantung question 
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<?(; [) ;oowttcr \/lhich concerned the Govc::.:-nl.1ont:J of Chine 
and ,Jepen ana them ~lone.,55 
~L:L:ect conflict with numerous memoroncl.D which ;~ellesley 
~~od \,lritten in 1920. end they prompted Ctj.rzoDo to note. 
'r vlould not have seid thet' anG., 'I cLl. ... ce til[O"; 1 .. :e 
[F.1.V:"'CE.; \;·hich '.,'c110s1ey 
llsd off ored ChuJ But when I recall my hOL'-Guu c.i.scuss1ons 
o\:io~;:l V:Locount Chinde ebout Bri tisll interestB it. Shontung 
I C~n;l()t subscribe to the proposition the"1.; it is e 
l'mttc!' \'lhich concerns China and Jepnn D lone. • But 
.':: ere is no evidence that the Chinese \'Iel"'C ever informed 
By the end or September, Wellesley did not think 
th£1t the Chinese would begin nesotiat;io118 ,dell Jepen 
~~c.fol'e the Washington conference oncl. he erc;ued t:U3t t 
•••• there is one edvent9ge in it 
coming up for discussion Dt Wash-
ington end thet is it offers cn 
~tunity for thE. r.;.ilt.::ey ':';';.estion 
to be settled on 9 more sctis-
feetory besis than i~ proposed in 
the letest Jepeneeeoffer. It is 
the crux of the whole mett8r and. 
we cennot speek of e settlement of 
the Shentung problem 80 lon~ es thc~r 
control remains in Japanese hends.·~ 
At the same time fyrrell ststed thbt he hed never hed 
Greot; hopes tor Chine consenting to dil'ect hee;otic:tions 
with Japan with the Washington conference so ne;; .. r. 
This impression hed been confirmed when he noted the 
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a.~ Q~e"t to tlt C~ .. \lH k{t~""-
appointment~ of Lensinr:;, the American e:;':-800J:' ,;;ery of 
S-COl;C, "b.'lM7cl7ntv~<OIf\~~, t\'I~l~)SO views 
on the Shantung question are ver':J nro-ChL"! C!3c' • Curzon 
werel:;,' noted that the Ohinese exv:ected to 0~et better 
terms at the conference. 
Lome Lest Considerations before \~3E;hint:5'tQll 
Although the British cabinet were moctinc; frequently, 
the far ea st we s rvrely discussc(1 for SUCll :L teLlS es 
uhen it: 
Early in October, hO\-rever, the ci:..bine"t met 
•• t discussed the question at some 
length in all ita aspects: a.e. 
the success of the Confel.--ence i tsolf; 
the financial 1)08i tiOl ~:·ct".}e(;;n Gre~")t 
Britain end the United StDtes ("111ioh, 
though not :>ert of the A'7C!.1d2 on. 'the 
Conference,'" has an importvnt boarinc); 
the dema.nds on ~iinistcre, a~lt} ;Jorc 
especially the Prime r''Iinister at home. t 
'The general trend of the Cvbi:cetts 
opinion wes very stronGly t') '(j~l':; effoct 
that, in vie\-l of the pervmount impor-
tance of the Con.f'erenc.: (')nd tile vitb'l 
issues et st&ke - issues of · ... )eece cmd 
war - it wes indisnens~blc t1]ot tih:; 
Prime 11inis~er should if possible be 
present at the outset, eVGIl thouGh he 
could not be absent from hOI.1e for more 
than 8 few weeks.' 
·~h. question WIs edjourned for further 
consideration.' 57 
At 8 further meeting of the C(}blnet held some ten 
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l~~y~3 J.tn;Cr it wes agreed that the r)rirlO mini~ltor should 
~"o to :;!sshing=ton, 'es soon es tile 1.JEJ:,liE1nr:;rd;p:t:'J' end 
1 it t ' d th' "'1 ' 58 CO:1nrtl s us ~on ren ere ~s nOSSl. u 0 • Il"be cebinet 
tl1011 n~.n1ed its full delegetion of ':lhicb rJvJ.i'our weB to 
)rove the most important for he in fact led I;hc Empire' 8 
1=:9 
-'-C<'ID "/ v·" • Apsrt from a discussion on for c8otOJ.:'Il neval 
~)trstegy held at the beginning of NovuJber :j~ t uould seem 
-:;l1Dt no further consideration of the \IBshln.g-GOll con-
fcrcncc was r.H~de by the cabinet beio2c :~Dlfc;\J_::::- left for 
Outside the cabinet, hO\,lever, discussion concerning 
;~l'..Dntung intensified when the Ch:l_nese govorn;aellt replied 
co the J!.!penes~propoBalS. 60 '2he Chinese \'/l'i-tten reply 
denounced Japen's offer of the 7th September a3 oom-
pletely unscceptBble ss it did not restore Chine's 
Govorei.gnty and "the reply listed J-epan' E envisaged 
ocouomic and politicsl controls in detB11. In psrti-
culor the Chinese reply denounced ~[op[lIl'n continued 
:-,,"'iC;L1tG over the 6hentung reilwsy. 
\vellesley's reactions were sharp Bud he -bold Cbu, 
. 
the Chinese cba~g6,thst •••• it wos 8 deplorable etti-
tude for the OhUese Govt. to take up and tlw~ if they 
thoue;llt they were going to get better terma 3t Washington 
they would prob8bly be aorely disappointed. ']bis memo 
••• has no doubt been wri"en with an eye to Ohinese 
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:-:rO>£l -,:L_de in the U. s. • iJ.'yrrell ec:reed tnet there 
, .... .or; i) proper;ende motive end. he tlsd.e the l'vttwr sif,;ni-
:;.'iCCl1.t remark th£lt, I ~he Ohinese seem to be en-cirel,. 
-,blivious of the terms which they gr<:'ntcd to the Germans 
in ... :"'i.oochow Bnd do not eppevr to think thDt \'filot is 
,sOUCG for the Germsn mey be seuce for tile Jap. I 
~-:;'_(rzan 's reactions were different ElJ'ld he merely noted 
tha.t 'i!'rorn 8 Govt. on the verge of cOLllpletiG collapse 
~:.o I'e?ly is e lmost ~-'WDorous.' 60 
i:he J apsnese did not 8"oprecit te any humo:.:.'ous 
as"90cts to tbe situ8tion end l:,;liot reported tnat the 
JDj?D:C4CtW c8binec were upset by the Obinese re)ly Dud 
I.;hcy ~10uld be glad if ..Britain or tile Unii;ed S-iiates 
~'lould '11 proprio motu" advise Ohinese to negotiate'. 61 
~jellesley t however, opposed intervention anQ. he argued 
ti1Dt ifBri t8 in did J.ntertere she woul<l real) ti .le odium 
of one, if not two, sides to the <i:i.s-pute. iie stBted 
\'Iith considerable optimism that: 
'Now ttat Jepen is showing <;;, reecJ.neos 
to make concessions tl:e Dbvntune; question 
becomes e less dangerous subject for dis-
cussion et Washington end 1 DG, i-;'lclLled to 
think that, i-! handled with 'tact (ulcl 
judgment, the problem is c~p8ble of 
settlement there not only ~Elic,-'bly; 
but, with the epplicetion of 9 little 
gentle pressure'from Americ8 coupled 
with friendly advioe from ourselves on 
• IIOre •• t1stectory baais then is lIkely 
to be achieved by direct negotia-l;ions 
especially in the matter of the ~sinenru­
T81ngteo re11w8Y. 
• In any Cl.' se our qttitit.icle Qv::,rtais 
question et Versailles unfits us 
for the role of mediator.' 
T~"l~~~ll a.greed wi tb v.'ellesley, but '.",1 th . ,recrll <Jccnrecy 
-.li.U'ZO:l for t7cDst that there ' ••• will be a so:,;tlament 
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of ~~a question outalde the ConfQreaca wi~~ t~e ~ler1cens 
Dild curselves acting as friends of tihc t\~O [,-,o.r-tiles'. 
CUJ.·,~on agreed that thero should be no intGrf'el.'onca 
4)::J.tl instructions to this effect wel."e seat to .lston.~2 
Cm the seme day that the Ohinese ro{,li0cl "1.;0 the 
upon t;he Dhentung question. Lc'opzon \'!O S <J t.lc;nbor of 
the British delegation to WBshir.l.cton wl.4e.cG ],10 sat as 
Dn observer upon the separate Sino-J"vpDues0 nOGo-
tityl;ions, end therefore his views upon ~L8ntuni; were 
iLlport~'nt. 63 _ Much of .Lempson' S i.:101.110l'.''-JnduiJ Wi:S historic 
Dnd he be(;sn by claiming thet if Chine ev,~;r Decooe • 8 
united self-conscious nCltion, the beGinninG of such 8 
devolopment will dElte back to the r..Jhontur...g c.:.uestion·. 
In l. ... cviewing the peace conference developlllel1.tc, Lempson 
e:-"l)ressed decidedly pro-Chinese sentiments Dnd he argued 
that events had vindicated Chine's refuse 1 to sign the 
pOflce treaty. Lampson ettc.lcked ;";lE:my of t:w Liethods 
vdopted by the Japanese t'o increase ;::cr inrluc~1ce in 
Jhentung which were d~triment8l to British as well 86 
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Chinese interests. Nevertheless, Lampson regretted 
that China should have refused to negotiate with Japan 
on the beais ot her September otfer, 'The incident 
bodes ill tor the tr8nquility of the conference.' 
Lempson then outlined whet he thought might happen 
et WaShington. He thought that Chins would certainly 
seek a reversal of the peece tr0ety clauses referring 
to Shantung, end that Britain, 'Hsving been e party to 
that deCision, our attitude must et least be neutral'. 
He recogni8ed thet by the Shantung settlement et ~8ris, 
Japan 'agreed to restore the shadow and retain the 
substance', and that. reversel of the settlement was 
desired. Of greet importance were his points: 
'It would be politically unwise for 
U. M'3 .. ty' s Government to attempt 
to eot es medietor between China and 
J.,.a on 'hi. 8ubjeot, but should the 
discussions et the Conference wax hot, 
en opportunity mey present itselt for 
pre.81nS for 8 settlement on the basis 
ofa (1) Surrender b.1 Jepan of control 
over the ~s1n8~fu-ms1ngtao RailwaYI 
(2) eft intern.tion.l eettlement et 
Taingteo itself. These two points 
Oon.tl~ut.the orux of the problem.' 
The lbes of eo",lon suggested by L8l1pSon are 8 good 
indicetion ot Bri tieh pOlicy et W8ab.1ngton. 
While Leap.on .. a .~ng tor e le8s sympetbetic 
policy to Jepen, OUrsOll 'W.a diacoureging to Wellington 
~o, tile Chine.e 1I1n1ater in London who wes to belp 
represent his,country et w8shington. Curzon asked Koo 
'~iould it not be sound statesmanship to steer Ja.pan 
away from the greet industrial erees of Chine proper, 
and push her - 80 to speek - to the north? ~wnchuria 
wee not e part of China proper •••• 64 Earlier in the 
interview Curson hed refused to give Koo any kind of 
encouragement or hope concerning Britain's ottitude to 
Shantung et the Washington conference. Somewhat 
surprisingly Curzon told Koo thet much would depend on 
'how fer Mr Belfour, who would be representing Greet 
Britein might be bound by decisions arrived at at the 
~Dris Conterence ••• but that he would enter into the 
negotiations in the moat friendly spirit, I felt sure.' 
Koo undoubtedl7 did not ahere Curson's assessment of 
Delfour'a attitude. 
~e question of Britain's obligations under the 
terms or the p •• ce-tr •• t7 we8 e contentious issue end 
notioe of 8 parliamentary question asked 'whether the 
British GoYeroment is still bound by the secret agree-
ment entered into with Japen which declered its policy 
et Paris in "apect to ShentungJ end whether the 
changedciroumsUeDCea heve modified the British attitude 
on the _ tter?' In considering the reply Asbton-
Gwetkin pointed out th.t by the Versailles tre8ty Japan 
proaised to restore ell politicsl rights to Chine but 
to retain the economie privileges oriGinally accorded 
to Germany_ A difficulty wes the Shantung railway 
''lhich WSB 8 poll tics1 tector. Ashton-Gwatkin was con-
vinced thet Britein W8s no longer bound by the secret 
8ssurances ot 1917 but wss bound by the Paris treaty, 
•••• end that amounts to the' same thing, viz. that in 
getting eny further concessions for China with regard 
to Shantung, we cen only eppeal to Jepan's sense of 
equity end good policy'. 
Gwstkin arguing that 
Lempson agreed with Ashton-
' ... w. clearly cs~ot go beck on 
those obligations Lversailles treatJ7 
by word or deed. save with the consent 
of JepBn'. 
3-0 :) ,'. 
The repl1 which w •• given AY. Auaten Chamberlain on behelf 
of the government ateted, 'So fer BS Ht. Majesty's 
Government ere concerned, the Shantung quest10n wes 
settled by the de~i8ion embodied in the ~reety ol Ver-
sailles. ,65 
Alston reported that this reply hed caused 00081-
d.ereble bi tt'erneas in Foking. He steted thet the 
Ohinese.governmenthed hoped the British government would 
no lonser heve felt bound to their commitments to Jepen 
which hed r •• tricte4 Brltiah .~tion et Paris. end tit 
wes e greet d18eppolntaent to them to reed so bruaqu. 
en ennounce.ent' whicb the Ohinese government felt wes 
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rather hard upon tbe •• 66 Al.ton added 8S e. post-script 
V.P. 
to his despatch 8 atatement trom/Turner, Vice-consul 
at 1\singteo , which 8.id that the Japanese were firmly 
consolidating their position end insuring the conti-
nuation of their intereata in Shantung. In these 
circumstaDce. the Ohin... description ot the September 
offer of the Japan •• e a. being sim1lar to the return of 
8 ciger box atter all the Ci!8rs had been taken out 
'may not be 80 wide of the "rkt. 
If the Chin ••• vere being discouraged bY Britsin, 
Eliot reported that the Japanese government were 'pleased 
with the language of A.ericln officials both here snd 
at Weshington on the aubject ot Shl11tung. ~.,. have 
resson to hope that the United States will be.ndl. thia 
question at Oonference in 8 way agreeeble to lapea, •6? 
Newton of the ter e •• tern department observed that 
obviously the metter could not be settled beto~e 
W8shington and th.t it weB satisfactory to note that 
the Japane.e were ple •• ed with the ott1c1s1 ettltude of 
the Americana on the .ubject. 
Aa Our.on h.d indicated to Koo itwe& Belfour who 
wes to 18.4 the British delegation to WaShington, but 
hopes persi.ted that Llo1d George would make en .ppearence. 
While on the ship to Americe I Belrour seri bbled 80m. 
idess for consideration at the conterence. He stetedc 
'I em disposed to think that our 
Fer Eastern arrangements should be 
embodied in two treaties rather 
then one. The first of these 
would de.l with the preservation 
of peace and the meintenance of the 
territorial stetus quo ••• The 
•• 00n4 would <ltel with Chins.' 68 
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The drett whicb Balfour proposed concerning China, 
hO\\Tever, may be judged es a collection of platitudes 
which, while atetlng that the powers agreed to 'the 
preservetion of the independence and integrity of the 
Chinese iepubllc', •• 1d nothing about the return of 
Shantung or the restoration of Ohinese soVcreignty.69 
COQclusion regarding Pre-Conference deliberotions 
It 0 •• be s •• n _bat in 1921, Britain was faced with 
problems concerning Japan, Americs, end China, many of 
which were similer to those which had existed in 1919. 
As fer 8S the first two countries were concerned 
Britein's eims were fairly Simple, namely, she wanted 
to pleese both of them, but 8S fer es Ohins was con-
cerned the British government wes often torn between 
whet weB equitebl. end whet suited Britain's interests 
best. UndoubtedlJ Brit.1n t • teak wss complicated by 
Ob1ns'. lnc.sasnt 1nternel strife, but it cen be ergued 
tbst ~'a te.ka of goYern1ng were made infinitely 
more diffioult by the presence of foreigners on her soil 
claiming ell kinds of extraterritorial rights and exemptiODS 
from Chinese 8o.erelgnty. 
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0HAP!AiR IX 
:mE INFl}JDCE QI §. SIWi;UBG QYie'lION yPON TU WASHINGTON 
!he W •.• ~on conte"nee listed from the 12th 
November .• 1921, un1;11 the, 6tb J'abrusry, 1922, end it; 
achieved 111111:ed n,av.,1 di8.rument. 8 re-elignment ot 
tar aBstem allianoes, 8nd • restricted revision ot 
Chine '8 .foreign Weat7 r1.gbta. Of the thre,e JIl8.jor 
treaties whioh were .igned. the Four end Five power 
eBreement. covered .be •• in navel deCisions end brought 
the Anglo..Japaae •• alliance to en end. wbile. the Nine 
pove trut3 heel the cleel_reel obj.ct. even if its meens 
of implem .... 1l1on weNuD..p.citi~. ot securing wider 
intern.-cioul zeap •• t tor' oliin. 1 S 8overe.ignV. In 
a4ditioa totb. tree.ie., twelve ~esolutiona were pessed 
whioh bed • b .. rtDl upon the ,...ra of the toreigner in 
Ohine en4 ordered tile establishment ot two commissions, 
one to 8Seal •• Ohin. i • 'erit! question. end the other to 
repo~ apoD the proDl ••• relating to ~r8t8rr1torielity.1 
Independently of _he main conference. the J8p8n8ae end 
Ohine.. delegations agreed to negotiate upon the Shantung 
queation, end 8a • result 8 Sino-Japanese agreement 
upon tU' 1~ wa, 2' .. 011e4.2 
~h.po •• r. w~l.b •• re represented et Wean1ngton 
were the British Empire, the United Stetes, Frence, 
Japan, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Portugel, 8nd Ohine. 
The south Cbine government wes not represented 8B it 
h8d been et the Peris conference, but this omission 
wes not en indication of Chine's unity es her internal 
situation remained cbeotic.3 Cansde, Austrolie, New 
Zealend and Indie s.nt representatives who were ineluded 
in the British Empire del.g8tion, but it wes the British 
government, ~nd Belfour in perticuler, who decided 
British policy regerding Shentung.4 
Witbin its first •• ek the Weshington conference 
divided into two .. in committees, one to consider the 
limitetion of era ••• nts, end the other to deel with 
Chine end Pacific .fteirs.5 The first independent 
Sino-Japan.se ••• ting •• s held on the 1st December, 
1921, when it W88 accepted thet Britein end Americ8 
should .ttend as ob.ervers. frence elso wented to 
ettend, but en objection from J8p8D proved strong enougb 
to prevent tbis.6 Until tbe conclusion ot the con-
ference Sino-Japenese ••• tings were 8lmost e d8ily 
occurrence .s att •• pts continued to solve the Shentung 
problem. 
E.rlt Contertnc. Oon.ider.tionl 
Before the Weshington conference began, Beltour, 
lord president ot tbe council end leader of the 
British deleg.tion, outlined whet be considered were 
Britain's •• in ..... He stated that he would_ry .to 
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retein aome form of the Anglo-Jepenese alliance 
without of tending either Americe or Jep~. With 
reference to Chine be claimed tbet be would seek the 
·preaerY8tion of tbe independence &nd integrity ot the 
Ohine.e Republio', and the principle of equal oppor-
tunities tor tbe fo~lgn trader.? Shortly efterwards 
Belfour wea more apecitic 8nd be esked 1n perticuler 
to be allowed vo adopt 8 generous attitude towards 
retroce41ngWel-~lWe1 end surrendering Britein-s 
share of the ,Boxer lD4e .. 1t7.' 
Lord Cur.OIl, tbe tonip aeoretat'7., did not agre. 
w1th Beltour, ,and he .~ou,bt _hat We1-be! Wei miSht 
prove yslueble in the tu~ur.. He arguedl 
"eitheS' i8 it • oOllc •• sion on the 
part of Japan to offer to evecuate 
Klaochow which ahe promised to return 
to Chine when she took it from the 
tenen8. ' l'urtb.er we IlU8t· be cereful 
not 'to meke any ot}er except for en 
adequate return. It autuel surrend.ra 
are to be .ade let them be aggregeted 
tog.' •• ~ •• per$ of • def~t. con-
oe •• 1on '0 8 Chine thetdeserves the 
t.your .n4 1. • bl. ",0 take l4T811tese ot 
1t. To bend beck any territory to • 
c •• enaen. 'bat 1. cle'YOi,4 of authomtJ' 
end 18 ell but b8nkrupt would eppeer to 
-- an a.t ot polntle.. generos1 t;r. t 9 
349. 
Curzon applied the same arguments to the Boxer indemnity. 
The oomments of Curzon were scarcely helpful to 
BDlfour, tor Curzon W88 arguing that whereas Japan 
should surrender Ki8oohow, which was ot major impor-
tance to her. Britain should not surrender Vel-hi! Wei 
which was ot inaignificent interest. Throughout the 
Washington deliberations the question of Wei-hli Wei 
recurred. but it'we. not until the very end ot the 
{:~d 
conference ',8s be Britain ennounced that sbe would 
t~ 
retrooede it, end it we8 not until April, 1930, 1 ..... 
the surrender .es '.tfected.lO 
Japan .180 placea much blame upon Obina's chaotic 
internel 8ituetion end .t the second meeting of the 
Pacific committee Beron Keto, one ot the Japanese dele-
. 
getes, .rgued th.t 'exiating difficulties in Chine lie 
no lea. in her do •• stic situetion th~n in her .xternal 
reletions,.11 Keto continued by peying tribute to 
the prino1pl •• ot 'he 'open-door' end asserting his 
countr7'. reap~t tor Chins's integrity. The British 
and BellieD Aeleset •• expr.s.ed similar sentiments. but 
this platitudinous discu •• lon W8S brought to an end 
when El1hu :aoo~. 'on. or tbe American delegetes t stated 
thet internationel ••• urenc.. conoerning respect tor 
Chine ha4 been frequent since 1902 end he asked why 
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such repetitions were therefore necesser,r. 
It bee been argued that at both Feris end Washington, 
the UId te4 Stetes weB seek1ng to end 'partioulerist1c 
arrangements' end to place tar e8stern diplotn8cy • on 
the beats ot en over.ll internetional egreement parti-
cipated ln by all the major countries, including 
Ohine t .12 P08sibly 8S 8 step in this direction Boot 
maintained that, 8lthough e new agreement on China 
should witness no immediate interference with the 
existing treaty ~1gh1ss ot the foreign ooun'tiries. it 
left to the poa.e.sors ot these rights 'the power of 
making chanse. 1n thea tor the bena.ti t of Cbine; but 
these limitetioD. OD China should be known".l; Boot 
continued by .~et1ns that it w.s desirable ~o distinguish 
between Ohina proper 8nd: "'hose countries over which 
ChinIJ exercised su.e.in't7. These remarks bro\lgh1i a 
swift r •••• ion fro. Wellington Koo f one of the lee4ing 
Ohine .. delegates, whon.reel,. conteated the riSh1;. ot 
tbe pow.re 1;0 aka auoh e diatinction end cleua.d thet 
Cbine'. territorie. were specified in her constitution. 
But Root stated 'het Koo hed misunderstood him en~ loo 
ecoepte4 the ezp18B •• lon which the American otfered. 
Bello"", laowne», W.8 ver,- displeased with 1(00 
and be repor'e' to Curson whet a bed iapression the 
Chi •••• dlplo .. ' w.ahaying upon the conterence. 'Rh.re 
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were suspicions, Belfour ergued, thet Koo might be 
contemplating the rei sing of the Tibetan issue, and 
Belfour thought that it would be desirable that hints 
should be dropped et Feking to restrain Koo. l4 ~hi8 
suggestion waB met with e rebuff from Alston, the 
British minister in Peking, who reported that although 
the Chinese government were pleased with the promises 
which were being mede to them, there was talk of the 
Chinese delegation leaving Weshington if Britain 
persisted with wh8t wes elleged to be en enti-Cbinese 
&tt1tude. An1 ettempt, therefore, to put pressure 
upon Koo would be bitterly resented.15 
While th, Chineae government were speaking firmly, 
Koo edopted 8 bold appro8ch in an interview with Belfour 
in mid-Nove.ber. Koo sought to escertein whether 
Britain hed eny intention ot adVocating a plen for the 
financiel ~ontrol ot Cbins's internel affairs end con-
, 
firmetion thet it we8 not the intention of the British 
government to support sny ettempt by th, Jepenese to 
incre8se their influence in Manchuria. l6 Balfour 
readily gave 8 negative reply on the first pOint, but 
on the second he ate tea that 'no suggestion hed re.ohed 
me that Jepen •• e intended to bring forward any specific 
proposals of this neture'. But in view of Curzon's 
edvice to Koo upon the eve of the conference, Belfour'. 
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reply must b'e considered evasive. l7 Balfour stated 
that KOOIS attitude throughout the interview hed been 
reasonable. end at times conciliatory, but Koo had 
werned him that 8n unsstisfactory British approach to 
the MenchurieD question 'might be prejudicial to our 
CO~Jercial interests in Chine and to torthcoming Tibetan 
neGotiations', 
Charles EvaDs Hughes, the American secretary of 
state, mede sfurther etteck upon particularist arrenge-
ments when he ergued et a meeting ot the Pacific com-
mit;tee thatl 
'Chine wes 8 sovereign and indepen-
dent Stete. end hed her adminis-
trative autonomy except as limited 
b1 restrictions which may heve been 
placed upon it through valid engege-
ment., that it might be possible 
tor the coDlDli ttee to remove or modify 
aome of theae reltrict1ons, but that 18 
these would be p.rticular questions,' 
These remarks must heve been encouraging to Chinese 
hopes for treaty revision end 8 week later Alfred S~e. 
a leading Chinese delegate. mede 8 lengthy attack upon 
the' infringements upon Chine' 8 sovereignty.19 Sze 
complained bitterly against various actions of J,p.n. 
the presenee o~ to~e~gn leg8tio~ gu&rds. foreign postw 
offices. ,nd extret • .ritorielity, As D result the 
~cifie committee .greed to set up e commission to 
examine the letter i8sue. 
In London, however, Curzon objected to the us. ' 
of the word 'sovereignty' in reletion to Chine end be 
argueds 
'In the t.ee of this expression we 
might find it difficult in the future 
to maintain egeinst Chine's will the 
arms embergo or even legetion guerds 
or troops OD the P.kin~-Tientsin line. 
Incidents may moreover occur in which 
it would be neceasery to resort to 
force in order to protect British 
liYes end property involving a teoh- 20 
nicel viol.tion or Chinese sovereignty.' 
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The matter weB discussed in the Foreign Office, end 
Nowton, 8 member of the far eestern department, ergued 
thot althougb he was 'not convinced that the promise to 
respect Chin.'s "sovereignty" will not prove emberress1ng, 
its omission or formel qualifieetion now would probsbly 
be even more emberre •• 1ng.' Wellesley, eaaistent 
secretary, concluded that there was much 8llibie~ty con-
cerning such words ~~ ~U8~~tee't 'respect', Bnd 'observe' 
in relet10n to Ohine's sOv~reignty.21 But despite any 
misgivings on the pert of the British government, the 
first article of the Nine-power treaty when it was 
concluded in February began by stating that the contracting 
powers, other then Chin8" egreed 'To respect the sover-
ei~t the ind.penden~e. and the territoriel and 
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odDinistrst1ve integrity of Chins,.22 
One m8Y cl.lm thet the 8rgument concerning 
sovereignty W8S more then e question of phraseology. 
and reflected the opposing aims of British snd American 
policies over.p.rt1culeristic arrengements. It may 
also be 8~id that it the British government bad readily 
respected the • open-door' her relations with the 
United States en4 Chins would have improved, although 
possibly 8t the coat ot Anglo-Japanese relations. 
But it there Were Anglo-American differences ewer respect 
for Chine's sovereignty it cen be seen that there wes 
a marked degree of cooperation in the way the two 
delegetiena worked tor 8 settlement to the Shantung 
iueation. 
Tll9 Beg1nn~»g ,t th, 81po-Japlus9 Sh9P~W?i Nego-t1,tions 
Towards tht end ot November. Hughes end Belfour 
together saw the leeding Japenese end Chinese delegates 
and told them th~t it would be ~reterable if nego-
tiations tor • Shantung settlement were to tvke pIece 
outside the conference. Tbey agreed that the con-
ference could endorse sny .gree~ent which was reached. 
and ~81toU1" esked,_ t;het Alston in. Pekine; be instruoted 
to tr.f to persu8de the Chinese government to consent 
to suoh. e procedure. 2' Similer 1nstruGt1ons w.~e sent 
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by IIuches to J.G. Schurman, the United States minister 
in Poking. 24 Al.ton replied that the Chinese govern-
ment were of the opinion that es they hed hed the last 
vord in the recent correspondence with the Japanese 
government regarding Shantung it was 'for the letter to 
approach Chinese Government with offer of some con-
cessions'. The British minister elso reported that 
his American colleague hed encounter0d a very stiff 
attitude from the Chinese sovernment. 25 
At 8 meeting of the Pacific committee et the end 
of November~ the Jep.nese delegete Keto thanked HUGhes 
and Balfour for~ng the two parties together for 
negotiations. 
different: 
But the attitude of the Chinese was ver,y 
'Chinese delegation made e reply to 
the effect that they hed not soli-
cited or .aked fQr such 8 meeting, 
SB the Government and people of Chine 
hed elweys hoped to bring the matter 
before the conference with 0 vie\~' to 
obte1ning 8 fair snd equitable 
settlement. Whilst ecceptillb \lith 
gretitude our good offices, they 
did so without prejudice to their 
ultimete 8ction in the unfortun&te 
event of no such settlement being 
ette1ned.' 26 
Bvl!our then commented upon the msrked differences between 
the attitude. of the two countries snd the difficulties 
which lS1 ahe.d. 
De.pite her misgivings, Chins agreed to sttend the 
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neGotiations which began on the 1st December. Belfour 
reported thet he 8nd Hughes were to attend the first 
~'Jeeti:ng and leave Jordan end Lempson as British observers, 
Dnd r-1acMurrey end Bell ea American observers. 27 
Newton of the tar eeetern d.epertment stated that 
this development was promising, end thet the AmericDns 
seel:led reed,. to 1;eke e firm line vi th the Chinese in 
order to obtain $ settlement, end Wellesley argued that; 
tAfter the eonsidereble concessions which 
Japan 18 now prepared to make it ought 
not to be beyond the powers of the Con-
ference to re.cb e satisfactory settle-
ment. The reilwey remains the crux of 
the problem but MrBelfour bes told us 
that there is some prospect of a solution. 
A li~le tactful pressure on Japan end 
fece seving services for Chine OUGht to 
40 the 1rick. t 
To this Tyrrell, under secretsrY of Btete, sdvooat1ng 
pressure by Amerioa on Chine. added whimsically that 
'Senator Lodge is now called upon to undo the miachief 
done in Chine by bis violent end ~~e8son8ble oppoa1~1on 
to the Sh8ntung settlement mede by Hr W11son.' ~rrell's 
reference to the treaty of Verse11le. was 8ppropriate 
tor it wes eleer that the We8b1ng~n deliber&'c1ons were 
to be .nother round in the struggle to settle the 
Shantung is sue. 
Almo8t imme4:1etely' ItOMe of the arguments heard et 
Pen8 were rep .. ted tor 8t 1sbe &econd S1no-Jepen8ae 
... tiB«1 
'Chins adopted the attitude that 
ell existing treaties end arrange-
ments made ebroad must be completely 
disregarded in approaching the 
8ubjectowing to the highly cha.rged 
stete of public feeling in Cbin.B._7 Hr Han1hars ~8 Japanese delegatlV 
,greed to confine the question to its 
practie81 •• pects, but in fairness to 
his own country he must point outthet 
ObiDe had, in taet, actually received 
pecuniery advantage froo her aGreement 
with.Japan o~ 1918, not to mention the 
fact that sbe bed sole~ly pliGhted 
her word to Jep8n in 1915 to recognise 
any transfer to Japan of ex-Germon 
rigbts.· 28 
A further similarity to the Paris situstion wes that 
Ohinese students were ag8in putting pressure upon the 
Ohinese da18gB1d..on. 
One week lster Leapaon sent the Foreign Office 
copies of the oonfidential correspondence with which he 
had just been supplied, which had originslly been 
excbBnged beneen the SteteDepartment and the Japanes. 
embssS1 in the auaaer of 1919 concerning the understanding 
resched et Peria in rela1iion to ShBntung.29 In 8 
letter to the Japanese charge d'affaires, Lensing, then 
secretary of stete, argued that his government had agreed 
to srticles 156, 157 end 158 of the peace treaty ~n17 
on ~b8 bsaia ~b8t tthe Japanese Governmen~ should agree 
that the Slno-Jep8ne •• Agreements of 1915 end 1918 should 
not be ral1ed upon or r.tar~ed to in the negotiet1ons 
~OJ: "he _turn to CbiIll' or K18o-chou and the Germsn 
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riGhts'. But the Jep9nese reply denied that they hed 
ever surrendered their rights under these treaties, end 
this denial is supported by Dr ~ifieldts conclusiona. 30 
Lampson's 8cquisition ot the correspondence was an indi-
cetion thet such considerations would again be exer.ing 
en influence upon the deliberations of the powers. 
There were. however. features of the ohantung 
controversy et Washington whioh were different from 
those et Paris. These 4itfe~euoes inoluded an ettitud. 
of greeter willingae8s on the pert of Jepan to make Oon-
cessions, even if the concessions were judged by some 
to be insufficient end aore apparent than real, ende 
less sympethetic .pproach to Ohine by the United States. 
Although the Weshington conference witnessed es its 
starting point 8 repeet ot some of the Main arguments 
heard et Peris· these were pusbed into the background by 
the -cum of 4evelopllents. 
Early in Dec._ber reports from Washington indioated 
that progress wse being mede ~n some or the smaller 
issues. lewton noted that 8 oompromise over foreign 
property ••• mea p&8sibls, namely, th&t &11 former German 
property 1ft Shantung should revert to China without 
compens8t1oa, but _hst ·Obin. should pay Japan for 8ny 
property acquired or oon8~ructed b.1 J8p9n during her 
occup8tion. ,1 Tb. s1 tuet1oD. was reviewed by We Uesley 
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who somewhat optimistically stated that onc of the 
difficulties which the Japanese government 'vlere facing 
\'lOS hO,\<1 to give wey gracefully over the Shantunc rai llf81t 
end he thought that Jordan's original proponels to 
internationalise Ohins's railweys wes the only satis-
f~ctory one.~2 
Despite its importance, the Washington conference 
\'lOS not discussed by the British cabinet et any great 
lenGth, end eTen~s in Egypt end Irel3nd, and the incidence 
of unemployment continued to dominate cabinet agendas. 
\i~en the fer east wes discussed in the second half ot 
November attention,wes concentrated upon naval disarm.a-
ment I and ea • rawl t ot the cabinet mo'e-cine;, instructions 
were telegraphed to Belfour not ,to allow France to 
become too strong.33 The question of far eastern 
security was deeply influenced by the couclusion of the 
Four power agreement in December, and undoubtedly this 
was a major teet of the conterence.~ But the powers 
had to ratify the egreement endwh1le the oonference wes 
still proceeding i~ wes realised that its deliberstions 
would be in Tsin unless e astisfsctory solution were 
found to the Shantung ~blem for failure on this iesue 
oould impede r8t1ticetion of the Four power trcoty. 
By mid-December, S1no-Jepenese negotiations were 
concentrated upon the Shentung railway, and Belfour 
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reported that the Japanese hed put forward an alter-
native scheme to the earlier proposalu for e joint 
Sino-Jepanese enterpr1se. 35 This apparent conciliatory 
mOV0 on the pert ot the Japanese was probably the result 
of American pressure, for Tyrrell hed sent s confi-
dential telegram to L81lpson stetingl 
'We learn trom e secret source that 
although TokioGovernment have in-
structed their Delegates to ~eke 
every endeavour to 'sec'J.re recog-
nition ot their claim to work jointly 
Shantung Railway ••• they realise 
that Hr Hughes 1s opposed to joint 
working, and that proposal may be 
also exercising public opinion outside 
the U.S.A. If therefore e settle-
ment of the Shantung Question es e 
whole would be hindered by insistence 
on c~i.t they would be prepared to 
consider compromise.' 36 
But the information which the British 00vernment had was 
incomplete for in a secret telegram to Tokyo 'lJhe Japanese 
delegation statedl 
'We therefore think it is edvisDble 
DOt to persist in nominBl questions, 
but rether to adopt the policy of 
thJ.'ow1.1'lg ew.y the neme end keeping 
the tact, end to tacilitate the 
solution of the whole question by 
not refusing, es circumstances ~8y 
demandl to withdrew with 8 good ~ce the jo nt edministration proposel. t 37 
Bolfour continued his report by giving further details 
of the Japsnese propossls end even without the knowledge 
of the Jepanese delegetion'. reel purpose it was cl.er 
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thet Japan wished to retain strung measures of control 
over the reilwey, tor 8 Chinese offer to obtain a loan 
to settle ownership by one immediate cash payment was 
refused. In addition to misgivinGs over the financial 
aspects oftb. question. Newton was 'rather afraid that 
vppointment of a Jepsnese Chief Engineer, i'~noger and 
Chief Accountant would leeve the Railway in the effective 
coutrol of Japsn' t and he presumed that 1\10 should leave 
it to the Americana to take the lead in objecting to 
any features ot the settlement which ere unsatisfactory 
to ClUne·. Leter in December Beltour sent Curzon the 
full deteils of the Chinese. and. Japanese proposals to 
settle the railway issue and while they were compli-
cated they cle.rlY.revealed the clasb between Chins's 
desire tor a quick settlement end Japan's wish to retain 
control. 38 
Ilugbes. the Americ&n ... ;reter.r of state. 'v'les aware 
of the Sino-Japaneseerguments Bnd he advised C.B. warren, 
the iweric.n emb88sedor in' ':Colqo. 8ccordingly. But 
Warren reported that ChinB had no securities to offer 
, 
for Bny 10,11- to purebase the Shantung rail1;JDY, and thet 
Chi~ ... .... ady overdue with war-loan repvyments.39 
Oh1n&'a 1ntern.l we.knessea. were undoubtedly reflected 
in the 4eaperete conditione of her finences, end at the 
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beginning of the w.ahington conference Alston reported 
from Poking that e run had started upon the Ohinese 
banks snd the Ohinese government were et the end of 
their resourees.40 Almost simultaneously, rivelrJ 
erupted within ChinCl smong the Ghihli, A~wei, J!'engtien 
~Dd ~ommunic8t1on cliques, wnd largely owing to tbe 
L:..£lucnce of Oh8ng T8o-1in, the t-UJnchurien leader t the 
premiership of the country pessed to Lienb Uhib_1. 41 
In the hope of gsirrl.ng some Japanese money, Lieng 
cubled the Chinese delegetes in Weshington instructing 
'liheu to yield sroun~ in the Shantung negotiations. 
But Wu ~·.1-fu, • provincial leader who W&s meinly inde-
pendent of the rival cliques, learnt of Lieng's actions 
end cabled the Ohinese delegates criticising the prea1er 
in the sharpest terms.42 Wu elso published his ell.-
getions th&t LiengbBd be~r8y.d Chine's rights in Shantung 
by seeking Japaneaeloana whlch entailed the perpetuation 
of Japan'. grip upon the reilwsy, and ~8ng Sh1h-1 wes 
cOI!lpelled 1;0 qui1; offioe t despite the efforts of Cb&ns 
'J2oo-l1n to ,88ve him. Cl vil war recommenced in noriih 
~ 
China in January, 1922t ~h lasted for. some five months. 
Possibly a8 8 consequence of her internal divisiona, 
ChinD \fee not hesitant to discriminste 8geins'I; foreigners, 
and et the end ol 1921 Alston wes complaining bitterly 
~nat the boycott of British goods ot Amol.43 In 
-"A )lJ/ • 
ed~ition to the trade boycott, ~ bridGe connectinG the 
foreshore with the concession lot of ~essrs Dutterfield 
o:1.d S'.;ire hed been d:;:magec., and Alston spoke to the 
~liner;c p:I'emier in very strong 'Gcrli1S end. l"efuced to 
attend the President*s new year's bell. 
Uhile Alaton wes endeevouring to sefcg'uDrd British 
L-:.terests in Chine , opposition 'liDS voiced in tl:e Foreign 
OffiCG to the linking of '\~ei-h.i Wei with the Shantung 
problem. With obvious reluctence C~mpbell of the far 
oootcIn department srgued that if 8 settlement of the 
DilOl1tung problem were resched Britain could hardly retain 
the territory, but Newton cleimed tL.at 'it seems 
unreeson~ble that we should be called upon to surrender 
',iei-h8i Wei to Cbina 8s the price of e set "\i lement t the 
win edvantwges will eccrue to China end the main credit 
for which will 8ccrue to the United ';;tstes of Americs t • 44 
Wins~on Cburcbill, colon1al secrcto~, argued for reten-
tion of the territory, end drew the Forei£n Office's 
ettention to 8 letter he bed received rl~m e for eastern 
businessmen which strepsed the importoucc .a! \iei-h.i W'ei 
es • port tree from Chinese customs duties ~nd the means 
WhOl~by considerable goods were smuggled in and out of 
Clline.45 
~owerda the end of December the British delegation 
we beooll1ng acree singly concerned with the pos£i ble 
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iluluence of the Sbsntung problem upon American r8ti-
ficotion of the Four power egreement which had already 
bem: reached l end the ultimate success 
ana. 
ference, / Renkey wrote in these terms 
46 Also 
t1:1e prime minister. / Lempson warned 
of t~le con-
to .uloyd George, 
Tsunee i:'~D tsudeire, 
the secretery-generel of the Japanese delegation, ot 
the conaequencea of American feilUl.·e to ratify t and 
reported that he hed been informed thata 
'Beron Sbideb.re was well aware of this 
snd that Delegation were doin5 their 
b.at to find aome way out. ~ then 
hinted that if unfortun~' tel,y t:1cre we s 
a permanent hitch over Shantung resul-
ting in complications OVQr ratification 
of the ~4ruple Treaty I wes personally 
very !Duch atreid that there \I]ould be e 
~epercua.10n upon public opinion which 
would find utterence in Parliament. 
I ~8ncy this m.4e aome impression upon 
him for he said he perfectly under-
atood. Ithe po:l;.1; end ,realised that this 
was 80.' 47 
But one day later Belfour encountered 0 difficult 
Shidebsr&, 'the Japanese embassador to idashinction and a 
lee-dine; J~panese delegate. ' 
Shidehere informed Balfour that J'opDn hed rejected 
the Chinese proposals tor the Shentung railw<'y and weB 
insis'i:iing upon e Jepenese treffic Ilan8cer ond consulting 
~ .. 
engineer. Japan opposed immediate payment for the 
, . 
reilway by Chins because Japan felt 'that any attempt on 
the pert ot the Chinese to raise money would necessarily 
be accompanied by en .ppeel to enti-Japanese feeling 
thrOughout ClliIl8'. But Baltour denied that this we8 
likely and sought to lower the tempereture. He told 
Dhidebara that i 1; would be better if en errengement 
,.,ere reached vi thout the intervention of Huchas ~nd 
himself, and be depreoeted eny step likely to lead to 
the breek1ng ot the negot18tions. 
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Benee the situ81;ion S8 the year ended was slmost 8 
stalemate over the question of the railway which bed 
been described repeetedly 8S constituting the crux ot 
the Shantung problem, although progress had been m&de 
concerning other matters involved in the province. 
The JeSU!l7 ~e,oi1't~Pu 
At the b.g1nn~ng ot the new year, ~yrrell edvanced 
snother posaible motiYe tor Jep.n's hostility to Chine's 
proposals tor en immedlete p.yment for the railway. 
He argued ~h.t in the existing stet. of Chin&'s indebted-
ness the whol., or .pert, ot the cost o£ the reilwey 
would -a.ve to be found:by foreign oountries \'1ho would 
thereby acquire influence in Sb&ntung inatead ot Japan.49 
Je.p&n we. 81:111 1na1aillng upon _king e losn to China 
Dnd there were aigna 1Jb.t Chins would eccept. Meanwhile, 
it had been '18p .. ase4 upon J~p8neae end Chinese dele-
gations uhet1' will De m08~ unfortunate if they £a11 to 
rG80h • set1l1elD8llt priolt to Mr Bellour's departure on 
14th JenU817'. To these developments Newton made the 
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point, "there ls .tll1 hope'.5O 
In tbe sacond week of January, BBlfour roported 
thDt the Shantung qu •• tiou weB st!ll in the melting 
pot, but it an agreement were reached it wes almost 
esnent1sl that Br1 tain should shm'l her GOoli. foi th by 
Botb Newton Dnd Tyrrcl1 
agreed that 1t we. entirely up to ~lfour to decide 
upon retroce.aion or not. 51 While B01tour was srguing 
for El liberal .t1;1tude to Ohine, Al.ston in l>eking con-
tinued to be on bed terms w1 th the Chinese government. 
lie reported that the Chinese fleet was in arrears with 
pay 9nd threat. were being mad. to the 8e1t adm1nis-
tretion Xi.er Cb.1nldn.g. Alston argued, 
'My Japanese end .rench colleagues and 
I consider it desira.bleto ask for 
e.rl1 .uthor1~ from our governments 
to send 9 gunboat each -to protect 
inter.... of ~ndho14.r8 of reorgeni-
sa tion loen by upholding -~ae 8ulihori ty 
of wbe can'rel 8elt edmini.tretion.' 52 
OurzaD -creed to the u •• of gun-boat t80t1C8,5, but 
before en7'b1ng w.. 40ne -the S1no-Jepeneae negotiations 
over Shen~ tntluenoed ~be posit1on.54 
Beltou~ repo~ed that en impasse had been reached 
in tbe Sino-lap.n .. e nego-.1et1ons t end ~ll argued 
that 1t .. 8 on17 ~o.n pressure which was likely to 
bring the Chin •• 8 into line. But after a few days 
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T~c lfour ste ted that the negotiatio!ls had recommenced 
with all oonsiderations ot the railway being excluded 
Dnd Japan bed repeeted her promise -co withdrew her troops 
froo ShBntun~ 8$ soon Is Cbine wes capable of providing 
sUbotitutes. 55 
While the situ.tion wes beginning to look a little 
more bopeful et Wesbington, Warren, the United States 
BobDssa.dor, wes exerting consideroble pressure upon the 
J&pDneSe government to reach en 9~reement concerning 
Shantung. Be pointed out tbet the attitude of the 
J2penese et the conrerence bed produced e most favourable 
iQpression in Amertc8, but this would be destroyed if 
no decision were relched. In such en event , ••• the 
OilGstion ot Shentung would not be allowed to rest quiet 
but would be teken up .gein t • 56 Eliot, the British 
ombBasedor in TokJo, saw tbe Japanese vice-minister tor 
foreign affairs end wes told that Japan was reedy to go 
on trying to reecb en agreement with the Chinese in 
order to !sc1litete retificet10n in the AmericDn senate, 
but 'whBtever agreement may be made in Weshington some 
powerful tection in Chine will refuse to eccept it,.5? 
The British .mbe8.edor concluded by reporting how &ot1ve 
Warren wee in hi. efforts to find 8 basis for e settle-
mont. 
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In the third week of January. Balfour reported 
that practically ell the points enumerated in the 
Japanese note of Beptember 7th, 1921, had. been disposed 
of except the r6ilwey end salt iSGues, and some minor 
Almost at the seme time RuChes argued thet 
Chine stood to geln from BD agreement for Japan hed 
[;loved ewey from her idees of joint ownership of the ra1l-
~la.y; 
'~h. study which Hr Bolfour aud I heve 
given to this question Gives us r8ason 
to believe that there is within the 
reach of China the possibili"ty of e 
settlement fer more favourable then I 
had judged feasible when firGL studying 
this problem last summer.' 59 
negotietions on the re1lwey issue hed, however, reached 
o ver.y difficult atege. 
When Balfour end Hugbe8 met on the 18th January 
they were concerned et the leek of Sino-Jepenese pro-
gress towards a tinsl settlement. GO Hughes stated that 
Jopen we8 reluctant to make 8 finel offer, end there wes 
8 possibility of Jepen wanting to benefit from Chin.'s 
chaotic atete, but Hughes thought that the Chinese would 
not take the decision to bridge the gap between the two 
parties without some help from himself and Bel£our. 
l.l'here we., however, • denger that 8 ny sction underte ken 
might 1 •• 4 to Cbine.e 8ccusations of Anglo~oerican 
interference, but Hugh •• thought that this wes 8 risk. 
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\'/llich should be feced. The American secrotory commented 
upon the o£fers which Japan b.B(1_ made Dnd recop;nised 
tl:.c)t the whole problem centred around a i'insl1.cial 
settlement for the rsilwey, end he real.L::ed, £IS Beli'our 
did, thet there weB J8penese suspicion of America end 
Chinene dislike of Britain. After further discussion 
it tros agreed thet Belfour should invito the Jopenese 
delegates for en informal exchanGe of vie""s on Shentung 
and that he should let them know thet Hughes would be 
present. It wes 8lso agreed thet Hughes should invite 
the Chinose delegates to s similar discussion end they 
be informed that Balfour would be present. 'At the 
interview with the Jepenese, Mr. Belfour sbould take the 
l.eod end in _he interview with the Chinese, this role 
should tsll upon Hr Hughea. t Within two days the first 
meeting w.a held with ~hldehere ot the Japanese dele-
gstion. 
Both Baltour end. Hughes mede numerous suggeotiona 
to Shidehere 1n en • .tio" to re8ch 8 compromise solut1on.6l 
Among the probleas involved wes the question ot the 
nationelity of the tr.ft10 menager, end it wes proposed 
thDt ~oint m8n8gers be appointed. It was also suggested 
that the relevent appointments could be timed to satisfy 
both abin. .n4 Japan. 
When Hash.. .ad Beltour met the Chinese delegates 
nhortly efterwerds they exerted considerE<ble pressure 
to induce the Chine!3e to modify their objections to 
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cLe s p~~ointment of leading reilway e:~e<.~u"i:jives. Hughes 
arGued thet the Japeuese were to [} certv::..n extent 
catrenchcd in 3hentung by force end. tbe Cl"'...inese were 
not strong enough to drive them out. Ilughes e1so 
:"eint~d.ned thet the Japenest,..' weJ:c [;,150 to some extent 
entrenched leGally', end if the present; e'Gteml,t failed 
to lll"oduce ell agreement 'there could be no more Con-
ferences on that question', and 'the chance ~fi1ich wes 
offered 'was e greet one for Chine ,to obtain results' .62 
Hughes' comments must be considered someuhst remsrkeble 
for en American secreter,. of stete to heve r:H~·det but 
~l£our's ea80eieting himself with the views expressed 
weB in keepins with British policy. Bslfour 'begged 
the Ohinese not to risk 80 .uch over the eppointment of 
& subordieete officiel, end Wellington Koo egreed on 
behelf of Chine tbet J epene se 8p:.'rehensions t>[orc under-
stsnd.8ble. But Koo asked whether such fears could not 
be reduoed. bY' the .ppointment ot en &s;:;ociate treftic 
lD9nsger. 'After ell, the Chinese had ,7,000,000 people 
in ~h8ntung 8,einst Jepen's 20,000, and were entitled to 
the menage.ent ot the railway'. 
After the Chine •• 4elegetes hed left the meeting, 
IIUChes continued to discuss the situation with Belfour 
u~i mrn1tioned that ev~n prominent Democrats ,rllO hed 
V ,~<;::'~' ;:0'cet eympethy for the Chinese people were con-
v'::'nc.:cl t!~et they oUG~t to accept tllc propoccd ecr.cee-
On the seme d.ey, HuS;hcs sent D telegrcT:'! to 
3ch:trmsn, the American minister in Peking, instructing 
hir.: to put pressure upon the Chines('\ Govcrnr::cnt to 
inQucc them to accept the ropcced 8cttleoe~t for 
" 64 .~, .crrcung. 
In l.ondon t We llesley reco0l1i sed that the Chinese 
;:~ov\:r:1ment 't.,ere under considerable prossu:::'c, rmd he 
c.,z;'..:>otOI..'t '.Ihather e navel demonstration would persuade 
t;~c Cl:i:,lcse to act more reasonably or if tot tl1is criticsl 
junct'J.."':'c {.the demonstretiolV miGht possibly leed to a 
r:?C)ctlticn of the truculent ettl tud.e which Ohina ec.opted 
over the Tibetan negotiations when the Vcrsoilles 
dec.LsioH about Shantung beceme known. ,65 III the circum-
s':';Qnces advioe was Bent to Alston in Pekinc thot novel 
ection wes undesirable. 
At his own request. Sze, the ChineRe delegate, had. 
un interview with President Hording on the 25th January. 
It Nould seem thet the interview was friendly but 
IbrUin~ reiterated the warning "alhicl1 Hughes had given 
the Ohinese deleget10n 8 few deys oarlier, sayinc thet: 
'it would be 8 colossal blunder in 
.t8tecre.ft it Cbj.na were not to teke 
sdv£lnt&ge of the opportu.vity no\! 
offered ber for the settlement of 
the Shentune; question as the alter-
native might involve e risl: of 
losing the Province.' 66 
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2~):...lfour was informed of the meetinG Dnd hi.s report upon 
developments .r.uiJde it clear that he \'lDS well GWiJro of 
:";10 sharp tones which the United States c.:;ovcrnl:lcnt were 
, ,,,.~ -1'." 67 
'-'."" .... ,1. ue 
\'Ji thin a. few days of ·this il1tervieilJ, Belfour 
• I'~ported thet, with the exception of th~ railwDY, 8 
Jino-Jeponese agreement upon Shantung had ::eo11 reached. 
~kC forwarded 9 text of the agreement which \.'D 8 qui to 
dC-GDiled and covered such matters as property trcnsfers, 
mining rights, and wireless and telegr1)phic cOIWJuni-
col;ions.68 But when Belfour began to address the ?3rd 
conference of the British Empire delecates on the lest 
dDy of January, already more then a fortnight after 
':'lalfour's intention to leave for home, his tone wes 
very pessimistic. He stated. that both he and IIughes 
had sent very strong telegrams to their respective 
representatives in Chine and J8pon,but that the Chinese 
Government were still not s.greeing to terms rr..:gerding 
the roilwe.,..69 However, while the British conferance 
was still iD aesaion, Belfoux- announced that; [:\11 agree-
ment on the ~"llw8y problem hOd been reechcd which 
completed the terms tor a Sino-Jepanese treaty con-
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=lu.;hes announced the termn of the l3ino-~,:,~::,)Gncse 
:';:;:o'..:oty to e plenary session of the \'!Dshin[;tol1 con.ference 
Ol, [;110 1st February and from its oc.::ii.'1 point:;; it uay be 
J'Uu.:;ed that although Japan ret~lil'led r.1cesures of control, 
the sGreement marked a considerable edvcnce for China. 
':I::~c r,laiu points were: 
'Japan will, within six months f=ow 
the date of the rr0aty, restore to 
China the leased territo:t:f of Kioocho\l, 
end ell public properties therein, 
wi thout charge except fo::' such 
additions end improve~e~ts as may 
have been mede by Japan dUL~nc the 
period of her occupation; 
• All Japanese troo,;,:s ere to be 
~1thdrewn es soon es posBible -
from the line of the Raihmy wi tl1in 
six montbs et the latest. end from 
the leased territory not later thon 
30 days from the date of its trvnst~r 
to Chine, 
'Tbe custombouse st T£inctro is 
at once to be made an intc~rol port 
ot the Chinese Maritime CustOD:S; 
'~e Shantung Railway (ll'sinCtco-
Tsineutu) and eppurtcnsnt }lrOpel'tteoS 
ere to be transferred to Chine, the 
trensfer to be completed within. 9 
months, et the latest. froD the dote 
ot the coming into force of thc 
Treaty; the value fixed beinG poid 
by Cb~n8 to Japan by Chincf:;C Covcrn-
ment treasury notes, secured on the 
properties and revenues of tOne 
Reilw81, end running for s period of 
15 yeers, but redeemable citho:r in 
whole or in pert et any tice efter 
, 7 •• ra trom the dste of payment ••• , 
the Chinese Government to employ e 
J8~n... sub~.ct 8S traffic manager, 
8n4 • Jepanese subject es ono of two 
chief 8ccountonts t undo:!:' the auJuhoI'i ty 
end control of the Chine:::o r:r:ne:_:ii.jG 
director of the railway;' 70 
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_Lore wo.;.'c other articles to -::bo t~'G8:;J DODe of \'lhich 
c~;Llcortium, e measure which \<{as probvbl;,' 12_ot vcry 
uelcol1.o in Chine. When the terL:Z of the Llwutung treaty 
U0:':-0 i:lll1ounced to the conference, :':'t;llfow: ctDvod that 
Dl.~i~;)ill \vould re-t;rocede Wei-hai ~:ei OIlC. l~e L18do it 
clODI' thet this step 'ill: s closely lin::~ed to JDpL'U' S 
decisions concerning Shentung. 71 
Nt:tur~ll1y ~lfour reported ~.;lle -berI.:":: of tilO Sino-
eJ ,1r'Dnese treety to the Foreic;n Office il:.J~ediotely. 72 
.Bo-t;h Wellesley and Tyrrell were VO~T plo~.,:;ed Dud argued 
-[j:..wt the sgreement wes ·che best i.:;uarontee for AClerican 
rD-(;ii'ict1tion, but it is ~rcnge that Ct:.rzon' s reoctions 
ere difficult to find. IiVhen the Britich cobillCt met 
corly in ]'ebrusry they we:re informed by CtlI'zon thvt 
-:;110 IJeshington conference 11e3_ :?!'ccticoll~' cOrYlplcted its 
-task and they agreed that Curzon 'n:::..ould t elegr~ph to 
Nr :u.)lfour the congratuletions of the Cebinct to him 
upon the successful conclusion of tbe Washington Con-
.terence'. This Curzon did in quite hendsome tormo 
although one must question whether such e ncsser;e was 
a mere .formslity.73 Curzon seems to have been upset 
by the propoael to retrocede Wei-hai Hei for immediately 
3f~~c:!:' the terr:lS of the Sino-Jepaneo,", tree; 'U:" were 
D~~~o'Lmced he coof:1ented tl1et 'Hr Bc:, lfour :18C r-;'0.1 gi von 
u,,:,.ci-hei ,vei (os he evidently SlvlDYS weant to do) 
·,;i :::lOllt even stipulating that the French shoul.i, Give 
Noreover, in reply to the sugg0stion 
of hie officials that it would Le t& Gruceful reference 
':.; .. cXi:.recs H.ll. GovernLlent t s full cOlli'i<iencoliL10t Ftt' 
~;:.:J.i:our' l~os used his discretiolw:,,:'Y povler to J:'estore 
·~:ci-l.l.i .~ei to Cbina in tbe l:est opiri t of tr'l..1e stetes-
;;;oi"..dlip t, Curzon Said that he could. not scnd CJnother 
'..;cJ.cG:i..'.::m t congratulating him upon the one "leek spot t .74 
It nlight be judged thBt et the Weshington conference, 
]}L,lfour 9nd Curzon bad reversed i,;hcir stenupoints in 
rc)'vtion to Chine which they had tD}.::en up in 1919. 
In 1919 Belfour had been very critical of Chins, wheree8 
Curzon had been more sympathetic, but at \~'ashington the 
reverse wes true. 
The &'id of the Cgnrerence and §QlilC of ;'92 Consec;uences 
On the day that the Sino-Japanese trce"y was signed 
B31four sent a very long dispatch to London reviewing 
t~c 3hentung negotiations and t~e final settlement.75 
In D01four's opinion there would be an end to a contro-
vorsy which hod embittered far-eo stern relations end 
been 9 source or irritation between America Dnd Britain , 
3'76. 
provided that the terms of the agreement \le:cc feithfully 
cL'rriod out. He argued that: 
'Although Shantung hSD 'been, dis-
oussed outside the conference, it 
ia to the influence of the con-
ference that the settlement is aue, 
and the disposel of this:..:I'GG1yG end 
dengerous problem mey be credited to 
the eonference as onc of i tn :~)ri1.lcipel 
achievements.' 
I$~lfour then began £. historic[·l r:~vie~:; i:it.:LC~1 i:1 the 
li~~:l:t of his otHn role in the event::; whic;. ~le d.escribes 
~~ Dorticularly interestin~. 
At the peace conference, Belfour ~t~teC, the 
Chinese discovered that all the poitJcrs cxco::/t ~he United 
StQtcs 'were bound by undcrsLcnci:1C;s siv;::n i:1 1917 to 
Dur.:port the Jepenese clc:.'ims to every thins in C~18ntung 
~.'Jhic~ Japan hed conquered fro",] tl'c Gcr:lD;~L::-;'. It is 
sO:J.C\ihvt significant to note tt.1Jt ~c Ifol.lI' c.id ~lot refer 
to the Sino-Jepenese treeties of 1915 ond IS 1:,;: by which 
C~linD \\T9S slleged tc heve 'volU:,it.:n"ily' D~-'.rrondered 
SLvntung to Japan. Indeed, Balfour ·,,·C:1t c.:: to describe 
Chill~' z tlerked reactions esainst Jor,sn iD t::.O aerly 
pcccc period and how apart fro:,; enti-~":"'1pD,10r;G boycotts, 
C::in1:;; lirushed eside offers in J.:;'nucry, 1']20 and iJeptember, 
l')~l to negoti~te over 5hantuns, "l:b; i'.i.r!.)c o':fer we s 
berely ecknowledged; the second offer was refused in 
terms wbich emounted to discourtesy'. 
Belfour continued by steting: 
'Fortun.tely. during the three 
yeers which beve followed the Paris 
Conferanee, the JepeneSlGovern-
ment end people beve learned that 9 
policy of militery aggre.siveness 
is of dQubtful sdventage, and that 
. l' is a aistake to entagonise their 
nearest neighbour and one of their 
be •• oustomers,' 
Bslfour's desoription of the war-time end peace con-
IS ference develop.eats ... in glaring contrast to his 
.8rlie~ oft repeeted oritic1sms of Ohins not hsving 
spent a ehilling nor lost 8 lite in her efforts to 
regain Sh.nwUBI_ 
Beltour ~hen ' •• oribed how the Sino-Japenese 
negotiations beg.n in December and his eccount makes 
it cleer t~t very good Anglo-Americen cooperation 
preveile4. Be stated that between the 11th snd 26th 
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Jenuar.y tDit1at1ve W8. left to ,MsoMurray of the 
Ameri •• n delegation, who did much to secure 8 settle-
ment of .11 the i.sues except the reilw81. and on this 
levter issue both Belfour end Hughes hed exe»ted 
pre.sure when 'be situ.tion wes 1n the balence~ 
When the te~m. ot the S1no-Japanes. treaty were 
acreed, Beltour oontlnue4, he and Hughee assured the 
Oh1n ••• delegetes 'the_ the agreement rl:8ched would be 
spread on the reco»4a of the Conference. ~he;y were 
thus ••• ureA of • powerful morel guerentee, on whioh 
whey set p .. ; s'Sore.· But Jep8n objected, end it was 
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left to the J.~ne8e .nd Chinese delegates to report 
sepsr.tely to the American end British representatives 
who were entitled to use the information 6S they thought 
fit. As .lreedy st.ted, when Hughes received his 
report he ennounoed its terms to 8 plenPry session of 
the conterence. 
It 1s cleer tb.t 88 ell the mejor tresties Bnd 
resolutions b.d been co.plated, or their main terms 
agreed to. the termln.tion of the Wsshington oonference 
wes aweiting the conolusion ot the Sino~J8p8ne.e egree-
ment reg8rd1ng Shentung, .nd two days sfter the agree-
ment was signed on the 4th February, 1922, the conference 
closecl. Belfour' ••• count ot the l.st full session 
indi~te. how much W'8 .chieved end whet promise there 
vss for better 1ntern.tion.l rel.tlons in the futUDe. 76 
It tbe work ot tbe W'shington conference were con-
814er.ble it auat be Doted thet very little we. 
surrendere' by the powers '8 fer 88 Chine we. concerned, 
with the exception ot Sh.ntung, although they meae 
numerous promiaes to .041ty their position. It hes been 
ergue4 or Dr Irly. thet ••• relult ot post-conterence 
psss1v1tl by the powers in implementing their promises, 
Sun Yat-aen, the le8~r of the Kuomintang transferred 
bis hop.s for hel, 1n Chins's r.un1f1cetion from the 
western power., whioh r •• ulted in cons1dereble trouble 
for British interests in Chine in the mid-l920s 
including rioting end e trade bOYCott.77 Though such 
oonsideretions ere beyond the soope of this work, one 
oen observe that except in the immediate post-washington 
period the Shentung question ceased to exeroise public 
opinion, end the British became en increasingly 
import8nt target tor enti-toreign activities, eepecielly 
at the time ot the Shenghei end Shemeen incidents ot 
1925.< The question therefore arises whether Britain 
by helping to solve the S1no-Jepanes8 dispute regarding 
Shantung 414 not sucoeed in aeking e rod tor her own 
beck. 
There were, however, immediate Chinese doubts 
whether the Jepeneae hed really surrendered their control 
over Shantung tor the agreement still granted them et 
1eest importeut rights ooncerning the r81lwey tor 8 
mini_us period ot five years. An article written by 
en Amer1cen 30urn8liat, J.B. Beker. which sought to 
81lay Ohinese teers and had some obvious American high 
powered ba.kinS, we. rele •• ed to the Chinese press. 
The reectiona ot Aahton-Gwetkin# snd other members of 
the British delesetion we~e that the erticle wes 'An 
able exposition ot whet J&p8n hes given up in Shantung 
to regsin tbe good-will of Chins snd the world. Mr 
Baker showe thet in regerd to Shantung, Chine hss reelly 
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gained ever1thini sbe oould want. ,78 But at the end 
of the Y88r S1no-Jepenese negotiations were still in 
progress for tbe transfer of the reilway under the 
terms of the Feb~ry egreament when the handover date 
was fin81ly erreng_' for March, 192;.79 
It d08s not appeer thet the British cabinet dis-
cussed Cbine .when Baltour returned to Britoin after 
the conference, although the fer east was considered 
in relation to d18,rmsment. end Bslfour made the point 
thet Brit.in h.d to ohoo.. 'between e Deval peril end 
a financial perll t •80 While it wes nsturel that the 
disarmament •• pects Of the conterence should be upper-
most in the conaideretion. of the cabinet, the ~I~n 
A;o ~ 
Ob.1n8 must be judged atrenge. 
Early in H8rc~t 1922, .A.lston reported from Peking 
that there were te.~8 th.t the Sino-Jepanese agreement 
would prove detrimental to British interests in Ts1ngtao 
end that diacrim1netion '.geinst British shipping would 
continue. Ashton~.tkin. who hed returned to the 
fer-esstern aep.rt.eat, argued' 
''!wo deagera .eem to threeten e 
•• t1'!8ct0t7 outoome of the Shlntung 
Settlement.· (1) !h8t the Jepanese 
.. , .q~ere the Chinese snd remain in 
vlrtu81 control. 
(2) ~h8t the Chinese, efter 
essum1ng control, may prove themselves 
inc.p.ble ot .8inte1n1ng e decent 
.dministretion. • 
To this exposition Wellesley steted that he thought 
the first possibility to be more likely than the 
second.a1 
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A di8P8tch which ... revealing regarding Britain's 
attitude towards Chine wes prepared by C.W, Campbell 
of the far esstern department when he considered the 
implementetion ot the Sino-Japanese agreement. He 
stated: 
'The tailure ot the Japanese to insist 
on foreign representation in the 
future municlp8l1ty at Tsingtao is 
inexplicable. Until Chine is fit for 
the ebolltlon of extraterritorielity 
the mun1cip8l •• rvices of foreign 
.ettlements should be controlled by 
toreignersa It ls absurd to ettach 
importance to eny statement such 8S 
.e. m,de:b7 the Cbinese Delegation 
et Washington that Chins intends to 
introduce a uniform system of regu-
lations tor foreign settlements. 
Let the Chinese reform the adminis-
tration of tbei~ own numberless 
oit1 •• end towns, and show that they 
can manege public services of this 
kind efficiently by their own efforts 
.••• before they ere ellowed to play 
ebout with the tew square miles of 
foreign settlements in their large 
count~. The mere fact that 
fore1gn settlements ere still con-
sidered necessery has to be over-
come before they cen rationally 
propose to underteke the municipal 
8ff_irs of our people, I agree 
entirely •• , on the point of co-
operst1on with the Americans on this 
que.tion.· 82 
To these oomments Archer, previously a vice-consul in 
Tsingt8o, mede.the point that et the esrlier S1no-
Japanese disoussions held on January 12th and 13th, 
I1ach~ey end Jorden, wh;o were present es observers, 
insisted that in the event ot Ohine geiDing control 
of Tsi~eot Amerieen end British subjeots would not be 
liable to Chinese texes. 
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Undoubtedly a..pb.ll's description of Chine's 
1nte~1 conditions wea correot, but the oonclusions 
which he drew were contr8r7 to the spirit of the Nine 
power tre.ty. to which Britein hed only reoently beoome 
e signatory, which promised respect for Chins's 
sovereignty .. 8, In ,d4it1on, Archer's comments make 
it clear that while the British and American delegates 
were putting pr ••• ure upon the Japanese representatives 
to yield ~UDdt the western delegates were et the seme 
time aeelt1ng ~o in.reese their own count17's rights in 
the Sb8ntung province. 
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At the conclusion of the conference, Newton of 
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CONCLUSION 
The 1-'aris and Washington conference£ 'dtich 
followed the first world wor offered the Britit;h 
c;c,vcrmJent two opportun1 ties of estvbli£hinp; Et more 
o (1y:i table ba sis for Anglo-Chinese relations thon that 
',11'~eroby China was treated 9S 9 colonial country. 
-,.3ut et these conferences no attempt ,,{es uade to con-
'.:idor Chine' s political aspirations syrnrot.ihoticolly; 
Dnd undoubtedly the policies which BritDin nurnued 
ilOI-:-'1od to generate Chinese hostility \ihich lion cDjJecielly 
~lirccted against Br! tish settler.lcntz in t~1e uid-1920s. 
In 1919 it was natural that the British covernment 
\1ere Dore concerned with the far-esotcrn action~ of 
.. ·,17lOric8 and Japan, who were powerful cQuntric.':.'" th£ln 
of Chine, who was lamentably wei:.1k. Wor-timo develop-
lJcnts hed given Britain abundant CDU;"C to foal.' the 
noliticel advances of Japan, but it \l1OG equally recog-
nised that the economic strength of ALlerice could 
endanger 13ritein's 'Position in Ohina. Therefore, 
:j:;"'itoin a'Pnerently did not ,,,ant to incrcorJe t'10 nunber 
of '\roriables in the fer eastern si tUDtiol1 b;{ scoJ.rJ.ng e 
nC\: understanding with Chine whose intcrllol disorders 
,,[ould {lava rendered sny agreement of de.:·ub"cful vDlue. 
But from British representatives in Chir:u like Alston, 
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;'-01'0.<;':"1 and Pratt came numerous reports ti.l<:.t v:;ino ,..,8S 
r,.,nenting her position of interna'i-io.rlvl iuferiority, 
\'J11i1e tLe Chinese boycott of JeponeGc soous enel the 
h .. ,y 'the li'ourth movement supported tl1cir conteutions that 
Chine sLtoulci not be ignored. 
en e£fective central government, however, oLscured the 
S GJ::GilGth which Chine was derivinc; fror:l crowL:"b netion-
e1iom, with tbe r~sult that she wa::; nol; accorded the 
respect that her position end potentiul power warranted. 
Between 1919 and 1922 there ,,",ore wernillSs fro;" 
.L!or(;;it;:i~ Office ate.!'f like Ashton-GvlE1 L;kin, LiDclot1Y and 
lfe11esley concerning Japanese perfic1ity unC. fjpecu-
18';;io11£ of Japan proving the 'J.russit~ 01' the for east'. 
'';:11e Curzon-ChindiJ exchenges in the second he1f of 1919 
Llay be seen to reflect aprrehenoion et the ex'lJent to 
wllich Japan' ji acti vi ties could endancer British irrcerests 
in Chine. But i1" Japan were recoGnised os being 
potentially de.ngerous one IT!ight tL.il"~L '~b('t an obvious 
counter-meesure would be for Bri teilL to adopt ... 1 more 
friendly ettitude towerds China. llopos for such an 
outcome were, however, frustrated by BritDin'r, essess-
~jC:1t of Chine t s internvl position. 
The Foreign Office hed realised tron the beginning 
of the l)lIris conference that the POl (:e Gettlcnent would 
restore some of Chins's sovereib~Ly by ~otifyinG the 
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:J"~Trcl1dcr of the extraterritorial rir:l1t:..~ vnd Boxer 
l;Jl0\Jn t(H~t Soviet .dussia hed a1f]0 forfoi ted tl.:sc 
,....... .!, egs<' l' ..... L V~_L t.J • Even if the negati ve :2'cD;~UreG of the 
mumtung settlement are considered., thero is no doubt 
tlwt Chine gained e stronger intcrnationol :'lor:::il:iiol1 as 
a rosult of the treaty of Versailles. 
her inter!'al situation remEined chaotic, on(~ it wos 
\Jidely thought in London that Chine shov:i.<.l 8110\1 cleor 
evidence of stability before further retrocesf;ions 'were 
made. But whether it wes possible for C'..;.ine to achieve 
stobility while the powers enjoyec.l their c1cc;r('c of 
control over Chins's political and comuercivl centres 
must be questioned. It can be seen tlwt the victorious 
pOV>lers surrendered very little. After coreiul deli-
berotions the more generous policies auvocoted by Jordan 
ir .. December, 1918 were rejected, end i'lith only minor 
esceptions Britain decided to r:toin her ri:hts ond 
possessions in Chine. The records also shoVJ th£lt in 
~lJhG Pt,lris negotiations there was e contemptuous Lri tish 
attitude towards China. 
rrhese developments appear to justif:/ the l~}tcr 
i!'o;;:'eign Office memorandum in 1930 thot -tho foilurc to 
ado,t more liberal policies resulted in a Golden OPDor-
tunity to place Ang1o-Chinese relations upon s sounder 
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i8otin~ beinG lost.1 But such D CO:.1i:1C·at, in oddi tion 
00 ioplyinG charges of incompetence o:-:d. in.difference, 
tonds to obscure the reasons "'Thy D rCDP:Jrois()l of 
policy did not take place. As the British :.")rincipals 
~iC'!e :cot given their reasons, tho on:::·\lCr 7Jr.'y:)orl:lops 
1)0 found in the dispatches which sho',,- t~;::,t, first, there 
\'JD!3 rcluctance, despite growinr.;; nis;;ivinr:;s, to break 
vith Jopen who bad proved a 'loyal and trastcd ally'; 
second, there '.'la s an aWGreness, es1)ocielly by Gurzon, 
that l~mericc would not enter into Dn:? form of firT!1 
D lli;)nce wi th Britain; third, there \;'orc hopc:3 that 
_.:,.:.'i toin \'lOuld extend her economic intc:c'ents :~rl Cllino 
\'111:"ch militeted against voluntary rctroce::mions; and 
finally there was Curzon' s extreme om:oyonce \,-i th the 
C:.:::"nese government, at a fairly important stace of policy 
.cortlulotion, for their darinG to cover ne~30ti::.\tions with 
:Jrite·in for 8 settlement of the Tibeton C]u .. cstion. 
It \'Iea outside the scope of this \'lorlc to rcvie\v the 
. ..:n:-;lo-Japanese alliance, but" it ',lVS observed thot 
nu~erous British diplomats were eit~or imprcs~ed with 
Japon 1 s record El a an ally t or epprcho:1ci vc at the pros-
peet of her becoming en enemy. BritGin Has interested 
in Japan mainly owing to navel COl1:3il:erctions, but for 
vDrious reasons it was felt th3t Japan chould be allowed 
to mointain spheres of interest in Chin;,.', end it was 
,::rr~uecl th~t if Japan were epnroechinE too cloae to 
:i3l"i tiDh posGessions she could be de:flectc(l foirly 
cD.~;ily to l'!~anchurie end other parte oi" -tiLe u8inlDnd 
VILlerC Britain had no interests. In 191') it uould seem 
tllot nobody enviseged a Japanese occupc.'tiol1 of the whole 
oJ: the Chinese coast which made en. Anclo-Japcmese con-
flict inevitable only some twent:/ yeers later. A 
more important question at the time vieS vJh:-l Brit;l;lin 
should risk upsetting Japan over ChinD, especially 8S 
there v/ere naval matters to be discussed which heC!. en 
obvious influence upon 9 wide rance; of Anr;lo-il..mericen-
Japanese reletions. 
iunericen policies towards China, pvrticulerly those 
of ~lilson, were generally liberal er:d sought the right 
of free movement of ca pi tal Bnd :~.::;oods into China, end 
opposed the concept of individuel countries possessing 
oxclusive spheres of interest. ouch policies brought 
about friction with expensionis'l; Jr.:;pDn, but America was 
vlGO cool, end et times unfrieEdly, to\'i'srds Brit~in for 
pursuing perticulerist aims. When Alston visited 
America in 1920 there wes close informal telL: of the 
need for an A.nglo-Sexon understandinG in the fer east, 
but ea the British oabinet deliberDt~ons of 1921 may 
reveal there wes nothing like e de.fini i:e offer from 
Al..leric[< "'hich could have led to an .i>.11: ;lo-l-l.{;JlYi'ic,:m 
.i..inc power treaty which wes conclu6.eCi 3t ~i<:n;1.1itlbton wos 
~:,c::.;;:.'~:'<led ss 9 gurantee by the wesliorn ~)owcr~ f)~;Dinst 
ft:rtL.cr encroachments upon Chinese sovOrOi(.,;.l1ty, but its 
~c::"L1Dproved ineffeotual t 9S WGS proved. in 19:5'/ • 
• 
There 
ca~ be little doubt th8t if Anglo-~~cric~ll relations 
hod been closer Chine would have benofited, for Britain 
WOL prepared to upset America over China even less then 
01'0 \'1es Japan, and American policy -\jot'lOrds C',i1l8 wes 
cloarly more sympathetic then J~pen's. 
'lbe mein purpose of Britoin f n acquisi tior .. s in 
CllinD before 1914 wes to further Ler economic interests 
in tlwt country. Therefore, in the post-war period 
~;l~lon Chinese netionelism was increasing t~-:.(; lesser con-
cesoions should have been surrendcreu to b.alp l1'0VoUt 
cnti-British f'eeline;s gDtberinc. But at ~ tiwe when 
cuch conciliatory action might have provGu effective, 
Curzon considered thet to Bl8ke surrenders to s Chinese 
GovC'rnment which was bankrupt enCi lDcki:c~_; iE control was 
L;he height of lunecy. Conse(;ucntly tLc rov soninG \vhich 
doticrmined British policy was that Chine lwd to ~ekc 
reciprocal offers which would prove of economic 
edvontege to ~rit8in before concessions were wede, or 
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territory retroceded. Such 8 policy overlooked the 
point that it is almost impossible to improve economic 
reIo'cions between two cOl.IDtries if poli ticel relvtiono 
are bed. end it ignored Jordan's repeated cleims that D 
bold unselfish approach to Cbina \loulel nrove more 
advonter:eous to Britain than a riGid adherence to treaty 
riGhts. If Bri tein were obliged to con~1ider Chine only 
Di'tcr studying the interplay of AmcricDn <:md Jopunese 
actions, it was surely necessary to be able tOdtmOeuvre 
GOllcerning treaty rights end concesnions, end the value 
of nome of the marginsl privileGes indiceter..; that D 
Generous attitude in an attempt to improve ~nclo-Chinese 
relations would not have been too vcntureSQi.1C. Undoubtedly 
Curzon's policy concerning treaty rishtG wes e mist,,'ken 
one, es the famous December r::'cmorondum of 1926 ,·,hich 
~)our:;ht to reverse it shows; its edoption in 1919 limited 
:Jritoin's 8ctions in the one main field uherc she wes 
free to be flexible to Chine. 'rhi s un co l:ll)romi nine; 
at ,;i'tude may be judged to have stemmed from "the British 
C~overnLlent end officials regardins China still as e type 
of colonial country whose political espiretions were of 
sIDa.ll concern. 
Obviously t some consideration of the stt.'te[;men is 
relevant to en assessment of policy, especially 
lk~lfour end Curzon who were the main J3ri tit:il T,Irincip~ Is 
396. 
involved. \'lhile foreign secretory Bolfour woo 
undoubtedly inadequately briefed concerninG for eestern 
affoiro, but later when Balfour led the British dele-
gation to the Washington conference be exercised on 
adoquote commend over the situation. Curzon displvycd 
o good knowledge of far-eastern affairs from the moment 
thot he took over Balfour's desk et the Foroign O!f1ce 
in Junuery, 1919, but in the second half' of ti.le yeer his 
c:rm,Ting sympathy tor Chine weB turned into cmtipothy by 
t;~e Dction of the Chinese governnent in severiLC .':10[:;0-
ti[}t;iollS with Bri t&i.n over ]~i bet. Chino 'r:. octions ivere 
reprehensible, but Curzon with his service in India wes 
obviously too sensitive, and he tended to rccard Chins's 
brcDking....aff ~ negotia tions a 0 l:;mch os on Dct of 
L:.T~crtinence a s bad faith. The Tibetan iscue wos 
lmfor"i:iunote and untimely for AnGlo-Chinese relations, 
for it made Curzon less prepared 'co try to underst.ond 
the Chinese point of view. 
Thus, while there were weeknesDes in Dritl'\in' s 
policy to Chine end her ha:ndling of the Slwntung problou, 
thero can be no doubt that the policies ~vhich "1ero 
decided upon were the result of careful delibcre ,;ions, 
Dl~d if a golden opportunity had -~ieGn runGed to eS'~Dblish 
better rele:.,ions it was not apparent to the l!'orciCl1 
Office at the time. The Shantunc -pl.' oblcLl 'fIG::; of 
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co oiderable importence for i t~)rc::::cntcd D fm:dcH;1(;ntt 1 
diIer.t""l9 in 8 limited form: whether Brit~in "1ouId line 
~.;.) liith ~ Ameriee end Chine onLone hanc., or renwLl close 
ally Japan on the other. Fro~ tie evidence 
::1J mm conclusion is that Britsin :wd cleDr vlDrning 
that C~'lina, despite her chaos, shoulcl 'be treated \'lith 
Dor0 respect. end by disregerdin~; the gro\,lth of Chinese 
~otionalism Britain took the first major step towards 
t~le destruction of ber interests in Chi 118 • 
]'ootnote 
1. (orei~n Office memorundum, 8-1-1930, D.L •. F.P. II 
VIII, p. 5. 
AFPENDIX I 
THE MAIN BRITISH STATESMEN, DIPLOMATS AND OFFICIALS 
CONCERNED WITH THE PROBLEM OF SllANTUNG 
398. 
The biographical details which ere given below are 
generolly restricted to those that ere relevent to an 
assessment ot the Shentung issue; only limited reference 
is mede to deteila which heve a besring upon other fer 
eestern end foreign effairs, 
Individuels who .ttended the Paris peace conference 
or the Wesh!ngton conference, or both, either BS dele-
gates or officiels ere marked with an 9sterisk.* 
Alston. Sir Be11b7 'renc!a. B. 1868. 
Act1n~ counaellor et P8k1n~. Jenuary-July, 1912. 
APPENDIX I 
TIIE MAIN BRITISH STATESI1EN. DIPLOMATS AND OFFICIALS 
CONCERNED WITH THE PROBLEt-l OF SIIANTUNG 
398. 
The biographicsl details which are given below sre 
generDlly restricted to those thet ere relevant to en 
assessment of the Shantung issue; only limited reference 
is mode to dateils which heve a bearing upon other far 
eastern end foreign atfairs. 
Individuals who attended the Paris peace conference 
or the Washington conterence, or both, either es dele-
gates or officisls are marked with an asterisk.· 
Alston t Sir Be11by lreneia. B. 1868. 
Acting counsellor et Peking, Jenuary-July t 1912. 
Employe' in Fore1sn Oftice, September 1912-Aprll, 
1913. 
Acting counsellor and charge d' affairs et Peking t 
June-Bove.ber. 1913. 
SerTioe in Chin., 1916-17. 
M1n1ater pl8D1potentlary et Tokyo, April, 1919-
Msrch, 1920. 
Minister plenipotent18rr et Peking. Msrcb. 1920-
Ausuat • 1922. 
Archer, Henry, All.n, leirfex, Best B. 1887 
In cberge et Tsingteo, vice-consulate from 
August, 1919. 
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Empl07ed in roreign Office es 2nd class essistsnt, 
Msrcb-August, 1922. 
·Ashton-Gw.tkin, I'renk, Tre1ewny, Arthur. B. 1889 
Emp101ed on speciel service at Singapore, 1918 
lat A •• lstent, January, 1920. 
2nd Secretary, Jenuery, 1921. 
Attended the W'.bington conference, 1921-22. 
·B&lfour, .A.rtbur, Jeme.. B. 1848. 
Prime minister, 1902-5. 
~ir.t lord ot the Admirelty, 1915-16. 
Secretery of stete for foreign affairs, December, 
1916-ootober, 1919. 
A le.ding m •• ber of the British delegation to Paris 
pe8ce conterenoe, 1919. 
President ot the council, 1919-22. 
Led British delegation to Washington conference, 
Oreated en .ar1, 1922. 
BarclsYt Co1vi11., Adrien, de Rune. B. 1869. 
Periodicel1y cb erg. d'8ffaires at Wesb1ngton, 
1914-19. 
Csmpbell, Cberl •• , Willism. B. 1861. 
Extensive •• rY1ce in Chine 8t conaul-genera1 and 
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first secretary level until he retired in 1911. 
Re-spp~inted e tempor8ry olerk in the Foreign 
Oftice, March 1918. 
·Oeoil. Lord Edger, Algernon, Bobert, B. 1864. 
P9~li8menta~ under-secretary ot state for foreign 
8fteirs. 19l5~ 
Assi8teut aecretary of state for ~ore1gn attairs 
to rank directly ~fter the secretary of state, 
July. 1918. 
Attached to the Paris pesce delegation but resigned 
14 Jenuery. 1919. 
Attended.first.A8s~~bl1 ot the League, 1920, 88 
o~e ot the delegates from South Atric •• 
Olive, Rober~. H.~l. B. 187? 
Employe~ in F~re1gn Of~lc., ~»1 1919 eiter bSving 
been 8 charge d'affeires. 
CQun •• llo~ ot emb'.~7 et Peking, January. 1920. 
·Crowe, Sir E7re. 
AS8i.tant un'.r-~.oret'r1 of state, 1912. 
Miniater plenipotenti8rf at P~ri8 .peace conference. 
Permenent un4e~-secret8ry of state, 1920. 
Curzon ot Kedl.a~ont (Georse Nathan1el Ourzon) B, 1859. 
Parl18m.nte~ under-secretsry, 1895-98. 
Governor-generel,ol Ind18, 1898-1904. 
Lord preaideat of the council, December, 1916-
October, 1919. 
Acting foreign secretery in Balfour's absence et 
tbe Per!s conference. 
Foreign aecreter" October. 1919-Jenuery, 1924. 
Davidson, JOAn, Well.c., ~rd.. B. 1888. 
Acting vice-oonau1, Centon, 1915. 
iot1ve in 'renoe with the Chinese Labour Oorps, 
1917-18. 
Resumed work in the consular service, November, 
1918. 
Actinl oonsul et ijengchow, February, 1920. 
*Drummond, Sir Je.e., Eri~. B. 1876. 
Privet •••• ret8rJ to Belto~. »ecember, 1916. 
ProIlO1;ed senior clerk, Febru&ry, 1918. 
~.t8ched to Brlt~.h delegation to Paris peace 
conference dalegetion. 
Appointed first 8ecret~r.1-go~er8l of the Le.gue 
of Betlou.. Ma,. 1919. 
·Gedde8, Slr Auckland, O.mp"~. B. 18']9. 
British smb •••• dor .t W8sh1ngton, March, 1920-
Jebruery t 1924. 
Attended the W •• hington conterence. 
Grehe •• S1r Rould. \\,1111811. B. 1870. 
Aaai.tea' unde»-aecretsry of stete for foreign 
aftab •• 1916_ 
401 
Acting perme.oent under-secretary of state during 
the ebaence of Lord Hs'rdinge at the Paris peace 
conference. 
Greene, Sir Wi111em, Co~gh.m. B. 1854. 
Amb.8s8dor et Tokyo, 1912-19. 
Gregory, John, Dune.n. B. 1878. 
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Acting first .ecretary in diplomatic service, 1914. 
Assistent secretery in Foreign Office, 1920. 
Grey, Viscount of Pe'11odon (Edwrd Grey). B. 1862. 
Secretary of stete for foreign affairs, December, 
1905-December, 1916. 
Amb8s •• dor 'extraordinery on special mission to 
United Stetea, August, 1919-MDrch, 1920. 
Hendle7-Derry, Henry t' Forster. B. 1879. 
Acting vioe-consu1 at Tientsin at vvrious times, 
1916-18. 
Fromoted 8 vice-oonsul in China, April, 1919. 
·Hankey, Lord (Meurice Peacel Alera Hanke,.). B. 1877. 
Secret 817 * Committee 'Imperial Defence, 1912-38. 
V.r'o.binet 1916 
Imperie1 war cabinet 1917-18. 
O.binet 1919-;8 
Secretery ot the British Empire delegation to Paris 
peace conterenoe. 
Attended the W •• hington conference. 
*llerdinge of Penhurat (Charle. Hsrd1nge). ~. 1858. 
Permanent UDder-.ecretary for foreign affairs, 
June, 1916. 
Super1ntending embassedor, Paris peace conference 
delegation. 
Ilarmsworth, aeoil, Biasbop. B. 1869. 
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Per118mentar,r under-secretary ot st~te tor foreign 
affairs, Jsnuary, 1919. 
*Uurst, S1r Oe011, J •• e., Berrington. B. 1870. 
Le,sl adv1 •• r t,o ioreign Office, Auguot, 1918. 
Attaohed to Paris peace delegation. 
• Jordan, Sir John, Newe,ll. B. 1852. 
Min1,t,r plenipotentiary 1n Peking, May, 1906-
Maroh, 1920, 
Attended the Weah1nBton conference as 9 member 
ot the Brit1sh de1eg8t10n, 
B. 1886. 
Ao'1ns a~con4 .eo~etary 8t Tokyo, 1908. 
'ot1nl t1~at .eoretary at Peking, 1916-1919. 
Alten4ed tbe W •• h1~lton conference. 
, . 
Oouaae11or iD Jore1in Office, 1922. 
Minister plen1potentiarJ -t Faking, 1926-19". 
Created Baron Ulle8rn, 1943. 
, ,. 
B. 1855. 
Aaa1atent under-aecretery of stete, 1907-1918. 
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if L10yd George, Devid. B. 1863. 
Prime minister, December, 1916-1922. 
Led British delegation to Paris peace conference. 
Wes appointed s delegete to the Weshington con-
ference but did not .ttend. 
Oreated en .er1 in 1945. 
·Lothien, Lord (Phili}) Henry Kerr). B. 1882. 
Secre~.ry to the prime minister, 1916-21. 
Attended the P&ri. peece conference. 
~wcDon81d, Sir 01.ude, Mexwe11. B. 18;2. 
Amb •••• dor in ~ok7o, 1906-1912 • 
• ~Wcle8Y, Sir Jemea, Villi,., Roneld. B. 1870. 
• 
Promoted 1st lecretsr1, 1908. 
CaUDaellar ot embessy, Peking, 1914. 
Trensferre4 to :foreign Office, 1916. 
Attached to '-ris pe.ee delegation. 
Appointed minister plenipotentiary to Argentine 
!eJn·blll8 t .January, 1920. 
Trsnsferred to Peking, September, 1922. 
Appointed chiet de1egete to speciel Ohine tariff 
conterence et Peking, September, 1925 • 
Mvlk1n, Herbe", Willis.. B. 1883 • 
.. ai.t.nt 1egel .4v1 •• r in Foreign Otfice, 1914. 
GiTen renk of lit •• cret8ry in diplomatic service 
while in ettendenee et Peris pesce conference. 
Attended the W".bins'on conference, 
11axHuUer, Wil1l8., Grentell. B. 1867. 
Counsellor ot legation et Peking, 1909. 
Returned to Jrore1gn Ottice, 1910. 
Une ti.e oonau1-generel et Budapest. 
aeturned to 'ore1an Ottioe, 1914. 
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Appointed minister plenipotentiary in diplomatic 
aernee. 1918. 
Prstt, Sir John, ~o.e.. B. 1876., 
Student interpreter in Chins, 1898. 
Proaote4 out ot H.H. vice-oonsuls in Chine, 1910. 
Consul et ~8iD8ut 1913. 
Consul-generel et ~.1neu end other posts in Ohins, 
1919-26. 
Acting oounaellor in loreign Ottice, 1929. 
ReedJ.ng, &1:111 (Rutua Deniel I ... os). B. 1860. 
Ambe ••• dor extraordinary on specie1 mission to 
the Oute .. aute., JeJlU8ry, 19l8-1'l&y, 1919. 
*Sperlins, iowlelld" .Anbur, Cherles. B. 1874. 
Sen1o~ ole»k i8 Pore1gn Ottice. 1913. 
A~~.ohe4 to Pari. pe.ce delegation. 
£tten4ed the w.shington conterence. 
Spring-i.ioe. SiI' 0.011, Arthur.B. 1859. 
Aab .... 40r to W •• M.ng1;on, ,1913-18. 
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Teiebmen, Sir Eric. B., 1884. 
Attached to legation et Peking es senior chancery 
essistent, 191~17. 
On speciel service on ~beten frontier, September. 
1917-Ms". 1919. 
Appointed eeoon4s.cretery in the diplomatic 
sernee, Ms", 1920. 
Employed 1n ~reign O~~1oe, 1921. 
Ae'in! .88i8t8a~ Obin ••• secretary, 1922. 
Attached to Chine tariff conference, Peking, 1925. 
Oounsellor ot embessy, 1927. 
Tilley, Sir John. AnthonYt 08cil. B. 1869. 
Acting .s.iatent under secretary of stete for 
foreign 8ffairs, Jenuary, 1919. 
Assistant secretery in Foreign Orfice, April, 1919. 
Ambe8sedor to Tokyo, February, 1926. 
~ Tuft on , Cher1es, Henry. B. 1879. 
Perlismentsry under-secretary of stete for foreign 
sfteirs, July, 1910. 
Assistant clerk, 1911. 
Senior olerk, 1918. 
Counsellor of emb.ssy while in attendance at 
Paris pe.ce conterence. 
A •• istent secretary 1n Foreign Office, January, 1920. 
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·Tyrrell, Sir Williem Georse. B. 1866. 
Pr! 'Yet. • .. ret.~ to Sir Edwsrd Grey, 1907-15. 
Asaia •• nt und.r-aeoret8ry of state, October, 1918. 
M1n1ster p1eBipotenv18ry et Peria pe9ce conference. 
v/e11es1ey, Sir V1oi;or,t j.1.uD4ert Augustus. Ilenry. B. 1876. 
Senior clerk, 1913. 
. . 
Aasistent secret817, April, 1919. 
Aaaiatent UDder-.ecretary of stete, Februery, 1924. 
Deput~ un4er-aecret8X'f ot state t r'181, 1925. 
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APPENDIX II 
TiLE POLITICAL REPRESElr.PATIVE3 AND OFFICIAlB OF THE UNItED 
STATLS. CHINA AID JAPAN OONCEBNED \-I1TH THE SHANTUNG PROBLEM 
\~HO ATTENDED !BE PARIS PBACE OONFERENCE, 1919 AND/OR !BE 
WASBING!ON CONJ'ERENCE, 1921-22 
The politicsl representatives and officials from 
the Um ,.4 Kingdom who e"ended the conferences ere 
ShO\ffi in A.ppendix I. While delegates from the British 
Empire, n8mel~, Osn.a,. Aus're11e, New Zealand end Indie, 
ettende4 tbe two conference8, the records show that they 
played no pw.rt in deciding tbe Shantung settlements end 
their nemes are therefore omitted. 
PI;;' Fe.ee Conference 
United Sift •• 
w. WilaQD, President 
R. Lenslng, S.oret.~ of Stete 
E. Bouae, President's S.cret8~ 
H. White, former U,S, Ambasssdor at 
Peria .nd Bo •• 
J.R. Bli.s l . ailitarl expert. 
0:U91,.. ''U\ A41i •• rs 
.. " -. . \ 
Pleni-
potentiar.y 
Delegates 
(5 plsces) 
E.~. Will~~ •• t former Cbief of Fer Eestern 
Division, Stet. Dep.rtment. 
Chins 
D.H. Hi!ler, legel edviser. 
J.W. Lemort, financial expert. 
S.K. Hornbeek, 'tt!ir eesternetteirs adviser. 
R.S. Baker, press officer. 
Dr J.T. Shotwell. historicsl questions. 
Lt:M 'lseng-tsi&nSt Minister ot Foreign ) Pleni-
Afteira potentisry 
Ob~t~ng ~. Wens, former Minister ot Delegetes 
Agriculture end Oommeroe. 
V.K. Vell1ft!ton loo, Chinese Minister (2 Places) 
et W.shington. 
Seo..x. Alfred SZ.t Ob1nese Minister et 
London 
Buntchou Wd. Chinese Minister at 
Bruss.1a. 
0#10,,1. 
Lin Cbuns-Cheh, Oounsellor of the cabinet. 
Weng-Ob1n-ohun, Dlzteo\or of the Peld.n.g-lIankow 
rei;l.v8 1. 
C.C. Wens, Oounsellor of the Hinistry of Agriculture 
end Commeree. 
S1r John ~oLe.VJ Brown, Counsellor of the Leget10n 
of Cbiu ,1; Lenull. 
q Dr,'" Morrison, Political Counsellor of the 
heJddeney of 'he Republic of Chine. 
Wunst: KiD.fh A •• 1.tant Seoretery. 
Japan 
1\ 
Merquia 8a1.~i. lower hta1dent of the 
Council of 1U.n18tU •• 
Baron Mekino, former Minister of Foreign 
Arreirs. 
Visoount Cb.1D.~. J8p8n ••• Ambe •• 8dor et 
Loncloa. 
1.1. Met*U1 •• speue.e A.b.8S8do~ et Paris. 
jI.H. 1~u1n. Japanese Ambassador at Rome. 
011111.1• 
Colonel Nagsi, Military Attache. 
X. Niab1bere, genersl steff. 
St.deo Set.ur1. SecreteI"1. 
M. Ar1te.,' Seoret8r:f .. 
Xa.h'P'inn Conference 
United Stet., 
O.E. Hughes. Secretary ot Stete. 
, 
H. CB bot Lodge, Senetor. 
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Pleni-
potent1817 
Delegates 
(5 plsc •• ) 
E. Boot. tormer Seoretery of Stete. 
0.1. Underwood. Senator. 
Delegate. 
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0"lq1.1. 
E. Bell, Coun •• llor of Embessy. 
Chin! 
J.' .A. MacMurr.,., Chief of Far Eastern Division. 
Stete Dep.rtment. 
S.K. Bomb.ok. Depertment of State. 
£.~. Villi.as, formerly Obief of Fer Eastern 
Division. St.te »ep.rtment. 
Seo-Xe Altre4 5z •• Cbinese minister et 
Wa8hington. 
V.K. Well1ngton Koo. Chinese minister 
et London. 
Dr Cbung-Hul W.ns, Obief Justice of 
Ohin •• 
Ch80-Chu Vu. 
Offici.1. 
Vice-A4m1rel Ting-KeA Teel. 
WunsJ:. King, lecret.r,-. 
Dr Hewkl1ng Yen, .aviser. 
Deleg8tea 
Jep'p 
Admir.l B8ron T. Keto, Minis"ter of the ~ 
Nev,-. ~ 
) 
Baron K. Sb1deher8, Jepenese Ambessedor) 
Delegate. 
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et Wa.hington. 
Prince I. Tokugew., President of the 
House of Peu •• 
Delegates 
t·1. llenih.re t Vice-Minister for Foreign 
Uteirs. 
2,Ac1.lt ' 
K. Debuchi. Counsellor ot Embossy. 
S.d8o Sabur1 t Counsellor 'of Emb&$sy. 
Yemeto Ich1~8h1t Ji'irat Secretery of Embassy. 
lih.ahi Ken.i. Secretary of the Department of 
Imperi.l b11w'78. 
MPEBRIX III 
iEit1JH!I AND CHINA 
414. 
2mOC~'rIQN RE§W;ING ~HE LEASE OF KIAOCHOW - MARCH 6. 1898. 
The inci~.n's conneoted with the Mission in the 
Prefecture of ~ .. o-ohau-too. in Shantung, being now 
closed, the Imperi.l Cbinese Government consider it 
advisable to give 8 speciel proof of their grateful 
appreciation ot tbe trien4ship shown to them by Germany. 
The Imperiel Gerl1l8ri. ,nd the Imperi8l Chinese govern-
ments, therefore, inapired by the equal end mutu8l wish 
to strengthen the bonds of friendship which unite the 
two counvr1e., end to develop ~he economic end commercial 
relations between the 8ubjects of the two States, heve 
concluded the following separete Convention:-
SEOfION I 
ARtIOLE I. - Rights 0&4,4 to German troops. - Hi. 
MSjeatythe Imperor ot Ohine,guided by the intention to 
strengthen· the triend1yreletions between Ohine end 
GermsDY. end et the •• me time to incre8se the military 
reedin... .t th,Chin •• e Empire t engeges. while reaerving 
to him •• lf ell rights of sovereignty in 8 zone of 50 
ki10.etre. (100 Gbin •• , 11) . 8t11~ound.1ng the Bey of 
l~eo-cbsu et high-v.ter. to permit the tree pss .. ge of 
Germsn troops within this zone et eny time. as 81so to 
abstain from teking any messures, or issuing any 
Ordinsnces therein. without the previous consent of 
the German Government, and especielly to place no 
obstacle in the way of .ny regulation of the water-
courses which mey proY. to be necessary. 
Rights reserved. - His Mejesty the Emperor of 
Chins. at the ssme tim., reserves to himself the right 
to stetion troops within that zone, in agreement with 
the Germen GoYemm.ut, end to take other mllitsry 
measures. 
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Al1TIOLE II. - T.rritory lessed. - With the intention 
of meeting the l.gitiaete desire of His Majesty the 
German Emperor, tbat GermeD7. like other Powers. should 
hold a plece on the Chine •• coest for the repeir snd 
equipment of her ships, tor the storage of materisls 
snd provisions tor the .eme, snd tor other srrangements 
connected therewith, nia Majesty the Emperor of Chine 
cedes to Germany on les8e, provisionslly for ninety-nine 
years, both side. of tbe entrance to the Bay of Kiso-cheu. 
Germany engeg •• to construct, et 8 suiteble moment, on 
tbe territory tbus ce4ed, fortifications for the 
protection ot the building8 to be constructed there end 
of the en~r.De. to the herbour. 
416. 
l~RTICLE Ill. - L1m1 ts of tern tory leased. - In 
order to avoid the possibility of conflicts, the Imperisl 
Chinese GOTemment will abstain trom exercising rights 
of 8overeignt7 in the ceded te~itory during the term 
of the less., end le.ves the exercise ot the seme to 
Germany within the following l1mits:-
(1) On the northern side of the entrance to the bay: 
The peninsula bounded to the north-eest by e ll1ne 
drawn trom the north-eastern corner of Poteto Island 
to Loshen Harbour. 
(2) On the southern side of the entrance to the bey: 
The pen1nsule bounded to the south-west by • line 
drew trom the 8outh-westeramost point of the bey lying 
to the south-louth-west of Chiposan Islend in the 
direction of foloa.n Island. 
(~) The Is laud of OhipoBsn and ~oteto Islsnd. 
(4) The whole weter area ot the bay up to the 
highest weter-lUrk at present known, 
(5) All ialends 17ing seaward from K1&o-cha.u Be,. 
which •• ~ be ot t.po~8nce tor its defence. such 88 
Tolos~nt Ohe11enchow t &0. 
Delim1t8tion. - Ibe High Contraoting Parties reserve 
to themaely •• to deUait Bore 80curetely t in 8ccord&nce 
with 1o~81 tJ:'8d1t1ol1a, the bound8ries of the territory 
1 ..... to German,- end of the 5O-ld.lometer zone eroWld 
417. 
the bey, by means of Commissioners to be 8ppointed on 
both sides. 
Rights of Chinese ships in ~i80-chsu Bey. - Chinese 
ships of v.r end mercbant-ves8els shell enjoy the same 
privileges in the Bal ot Kieo-cbeu 38 tho ships of 
other net10Ds on friendl, terms with Germ&~J and the 
entrance. departure. end so~ourn of Chinese ships in 
the bey shall not be subject tOlany restrictions other 
then those which the Iaperial Germ&n Government, in 
virtue of the rights of sovereignty over the whole of 
the water erelot ~_. ba, transferred to Germany, may 
et any time fia4 it neeeaasry to impose with regerd to 
the ships ot other nations. 
AR~ICLE IV. - Nevigation signals. - Germany engese. 
to oonstruct the neces •• r.y nevigetion signels on the 
islands .nd a~lloy. et the entrance of the bey. 
Port duea. - No due. shall be demended from Chin ••• 
ships of W8r In4 mercb.nt-v •• sels in the Bty of K1.o-cheu, 
except tboa. whioh .8Y be levied upon other veasele tor 
the purpose of mainteining the necessary harbour e~nse­
menta end quays. 
AR~lOI& V. - aeturn ot l"sed te;rri tory. - Should 
Germany et some future time express the wish to return 
Kieo-cheu Bey to Chine before the expiration of the 
lease, Chine enges_. to refund to Germany the expenditure 
she has incurred at Kieo-chau, end to cede to Germany 
8 more suitable place. 
Germeny engages et no time to sl.lblet the terri-
tory leased from China to snother Power. 
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Chinese in leased territory. - The Chinese popu-
lation dwelling in the ceded territory shall et ell 
times enjoy the proteotion of the Gercen Governoent, 
provided that they bebave in conformity with law end 
order, unless their lend is required. fOl' othor purposes 
they may remain there. 
If lend belonging to Chinese owners is required for 
any other purpose, the owner will receive compensation 
therefore 
Customs stations. - As regards the re-estDblishment 
of Chinese customs stations which formerly existed 
outside the ceded territory, but within the 5O-kilometer 
zone, the Imperial German Government intends to come to 
an agreement with the Chinese Government for the defini-
tive regulation or the customs frontier, and the mode or 
collecting custom·. duties, in 8 manner \<Jhichwill ssfe-
guard. ell the interests of Chins, and proposes to enter 
into further negotiations on the subject, 
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SECTIOI~ II - RAILWAY AND MINING AFFAIRS 
ARTICLE I. - The Chinese Governr:10nt sanctions the 
constr~ction by Germany of two lines of railwey 1n 
Shontung. The first will run f.rom Kieo-cheu via 
Weibsien, Ts1ngchofut Poahen, Tzechwen ond Tsowping to 
Tsinen and the boundary of Shantung. The second line 
will run from Kieo-cheu to Ichowfu, end from there to 
Tsinan via Liewuhsien. But the construction of the 
extension from Tsinen to the boundB17 of ~aantung 
shall not be begun until the railway is completed 8S 
for as Tsinen in order that further consideration may 
be e;iven by the Chinese ea to how they will connect this 
with their own trunk l1ne. The route to be taken by 
this lest branch will be definitely determined in the 
regulations which will be drawn up hereafter. 
ARTICLE 11. - In order to carry out the sbove-
mentioned railway work. 8 Cbino-German Company shBll be 
formed. This Compeny mey have offices in one pleoe or 
1n s8ve~el plecea, 5nd both Germen end Chin... me~oh8n'8 
shall be et liberty to inve.t money therein. end shere 
in the appointment of diree.ora for the management of 
the undertaking. 
~ICLE Ill. - Germen1 end Chine shall in the near 
future drew up • further agreement relative to the 
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nonoc;ernent of the railway by the Company, ond all 
matters pertaining therto shB11 be discussed and decided 
upon by these two countries alone. But the Chinese 
Government shall afford every facility to the Chino-
German Company 10 the construction of the road, end it 
shell enjoy all the advantages end benefits ex"t;ended 
to other Chinese-foreign companies o~ereting in Chine. 
It is understood thst the object of this agreement is 
solely the development of commerce, end in constructing 
this rei1roed there is no intention to 'lmlawfully seize 
eny laud in the ProYince of Shantung. 
ARTIOLE IV. - The Chinese Government will ellow 
German subjects to hold end develop mining property 
for 8 distance of thirty 11 from each side ot those 
rsilwsys snd elong the whole extent of the lines.· 
The following plecee where mining operations may be 
cerried on ere perticularly specified; Weihsien end 
Poahen elong tbe l1ne ot the northern reilwey from 
Ki"o~h~u to ~8in'l1t end Ichow t Laiwuhsien. e·~o. t elong 
l 
• By • 8ub •• quen. .gr •• ment d.te4 July 24j 1911 (s'teched 
to the Mining Reguletions of 1900, No. 1900/4 post), 
Artiole IV we. IIOditie4 by the subst1 tu"on of specific 
mining er.es in lieu of the general gJ."8nt of mining 
righ'ts within ,0 11 (.p~ro:rl_tely 10 miles) on either 
side of the line ot the 8~ntung Railway. 
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tbe southern or K1so-ch&u-Ichow-!l!slnsn line. Both 
Germsn $nd Chineae C8pitel mey be invested in th ••• 
mining end other operations, but 8S to the rules end 
reguletions relating tbereto, thiaohsll be left fo~ 
future consideration. The Ohioese Government shell 
afford every faCility and protection to Ger~en subjects 
enGeged in these works, ~u8t 8S provided for above in 
the article relsting to r811~y construction, snd all 
the sdvsntage.end b ... tit. shsll be extended to them 
that ere enjoyed by the members ot other Chinese-toreign 
oompanies. !be objec~ in thi8 c... is elso the 
development ot~.o .. e~e solely. 
SECTION III - COl!MlllOUL OPERA!SJ;OBS IN SHANTUNG 
The Chinese Government binds itself in 811 osses 
where foreign •• sist.nee, in persons, cepital or meteri.l, 
mey be needed for Iny purpose whatever within the Province 
o! Shentung, to otter the 88id work or supplying of 
msterisls in the first instance to Ger~n manufacturers 
and oerchents engaged in undertakings of the kind in 
question. In csse Germen msnufaeturers or merchants 
.re not inclined to undertake the performance of such 
works t or the furnishing ot materisls, Chins shall then 
be at liberty to aot 8. she pleeses. 
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The above Agreement. shell oe retif~.ed by the 
SovoreibD.D of both the ContrectinG State!:, Dnd the ret1-
ficotions exchanged in such menner that, after the 
receipt in Berlin of the ~re8ty ratified oy Chine, the 
copy ratified by Germany shell be handed to the Chinese 
Hinister in Germany. 
The foregoing free~y hss been dre~m up in four 
copies, t,..,o in Germe n end t\lO in Chin eee, end we s si g,ned 
by the Representetives of the two Contracting States on 
the 6th March, 169S, 'eorresponding to the 14th dey ot 
the second moltth i1n the twenty-fourth year Kueng-hsu. 
(Grellt Seel" of the!sung-li Yemen.) 
(Signed) BARON TON HEYKING, 
!Ph. Imperi81 GerIllBn Hinister. 
LI HtnfG .. CHJU'fG (in Ohinese), 
Imperisl Chinese Grand Seeretsr,J, 
Minister ot the ~sung-li Yemen, &0. &0. 
WENG TUB8-BO (in G'h1nese). 
Imperial Chinese Grand Secretary, 
Meaber Gt the Counoil of Stet_, 
H1n1.t.~ ef the ~.ung-11 Yemen, &0 •• &0. 
(MacNurra.y I, pp. 112-6) 
423 
APP.BBDIX IJ 
DOCUMENTS REGARDING JAPAlI' a TWENTY-oNE DEMANDS OF 1915* 
A. JAPAB' S ORIGINAL DEMANDS AS HANDED TO THE PRESIDENT, 
YUAB SBIB-X'AI, BY HR HIOKI, THE JAPANESE MINISTER, 
JANUARY 18, 1915. 
(Japan ••• !renslet1on) 
Group I 
~he Japan ••• Qe.eraaen1l end the Obine.e GOTernment, 
being ' •• 1re,,* 110 _1I1taln tbe generei peace in the hr 
Seat end '0 ..... gth.n 'he rele1Jlou ot sm11Jy end good 
neighbo%'hoo4 .xi.tillS betweel1 'he two countries, agree 
to tbe tollowing article., 
~IOLE I. !h. Chinese Government eng&ge to give 
fUll •••• nt to ell mettera that the Jepaneae Government 
mS1 hereafter .~e.~tb the Germ8n Government respecting 
the 41lp •• ition et ell the r1ghbs. interest. and Con-
c •• siou, wlll.h, 1 ... ir1n1e ot treati •• or otherwise, 
Gel'Ull1 po ....... na-e-n.. etd.ne in relation to the 
• The SiDo-J8P.~ •••• egotiations ot 1915, Jepenese end 
Chin." Document.~' Cbta ••• ott1e!.l S' •• ement. 
Oernegie Endowment tor Internetionel Pasce, DiviSion 
of Intemats,o .. 1 Le", Pamplll.t No. 45. 
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Province ot Shentung. 
ARrICLE II. The Cbinese Government engage that, 
within the Province of Shentung or along its coast, no 
territory or islend will be ceded or leased to any other 
Power, under eny pretext whet ever. 
ARTICLE Ill. Tbe Ohinese Government ogree to 
Japan's building e reilwey connecting Chefoo or Lungkow 
with the K1eocbou-~a1nenfu R8ilwey. 
ARTICLE IV. ~h. Chinese Government engege to 
open of their own eccord, e. soon es possible, certain 
important cities end towns in the Province of Shantung 
for the re.idence and commerce of foreigners. The pleces 
to be so opened abell be decided upon in 8 seperete 
egreement. 
Group 11 
Tbe Jepen ••• Government end the Cbineae Government, 
in view of the tect thet the Ohinese Government hes always 
recognized the predoainent position of J8pan in South 
Mancburia end Eastern Inner Mongoli •• agree to the 
following article., 
AR!ICLE I. Tb. two Oontrscting Pert!es mutu8lly 
egree that the term ot the leese of Port Arthur and 
Dsiren end the term respecting the South Manchuria 
R81lwey end the Antung-Mukden Bailway shell be extended 
to a further period of 99 ye.re respectively. 
ARTICLE 11. The Japanese subjects shell be per-
mitted in South Menchuri. end Eastern Inner Mongolia 
to le9se or own lend required either for erecting 
buildings for veriou8 commercial and industrial uses or 
for f'erming. 
ARTICLE Ill. !he Jepeueee subjects shall heve 
liberty to enter, reside end travel in South I~nchurie 
aa4 Esstern Inner Mongolie, end to carry on business 
of various kinds - commercial, industrial and otherwise. 
ARTICLE IV. The Chinese Government grant to the 
Japanese sub~eot8 the right ot mining in South r~nchuria 
and Eastern Inner Mongoli.. As regards the mines to 
be worked. they shell be decided upon in 8 seperate 
agreement. 
AR'lICLE 'f. !he Chin... Government egree thet the 
oonsent of the Jep.neae Government shall be obtained 
in advance, (1) whenever it is proposed to grant to 
other netion.ls the right of' constructing a railway or 
to obtain. trom other netions the supply of' funds for 
construoting • reilV87 in South Manchuris end Eestern 
, 
Inner Mongo11., .nd.(2) whenever a loan is to be mede 
with any other Power, under security of the texes of 
South Meuohur1. eud Eastern Inner Mongolia • 
.... ' 
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ARfICLX VI. ~he Chin •• e Government eDgege that 
whenever the Chin... Government need the service of 
politic81. finanoial or military advisers or instructors 
in South MellChu;ri8 or 1n Eaatern Inner Mongolia t J apen 
shBll first be aoneulted. 
AR!CIOLE vn. ne Chinese Government sgree thet 
the cont:l'Ol and mBJUJgeaen' of the Kirin-Cb.Bngchun Railway 
shall be handed over to Japan for a term of 99 years 
dBting from the signing of this iJ!reety. 
Group Ill. 
The Japan.ae Government snd the Chinese Government, 
hsving regard to the close relstions existing between 
Japanese capitalist. and the Hsn-Yeh-Ping Company snd 
desiring to promote 'the common interests of the two 
nations, agree to the following articles, 
The two Contraoting Parties mutuslly 
agree t~t when the opportune moment arrives the Hcm-
Yeh-P1ng Company shell be mede & joint concern of the 
two nations, end that, without the consent of the 
Japenes8 Government. the Cbinese Government shell not 
dispose or perait the Compeny to dispose of any right 
o~ property ot the Oompanr_ 
, 
AR!ICLE 11. Tbe Chine •• Government engege that, 
8S 8 neces.ery meaaure for protection of the invested 
interests et J.pea ••• cepit.lists, no mines in the 
neighbourhood ot .bese owned by the Hsn-Yeh-Ping 
Oompsny ah.ll be permitted. without the consent of 
the 89id Co~.ay. to \e worked by snyone other then 
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the 8sid Ooap-D7' ed further th9t whenever 1 t 1s 
~ropo8ed to 'eke 9ft7 other me98ure which msy likely 
streot the iB •• re... ot the 8.14 Company directly or 
indirectly. the Goa.eat ot ~he 8si4 Oompeny shell first 
be obt.in.a. 
Group IV. 
!hI J.pe •••• Go?ernmln •• nd the Obinese Government, 
with the object ol ettectively preserving the territorial 
integrityot Ohb.. t .sr •• to the following articl •• 
!he Obla... Go •• rnaea. eag.g. not to .ede or le.se 
sny other Powlr .al h.rbour or bty on or any ialw.nd 
along the ce •• ~ ot Ohla •• 
Group ,. ' 
1. !he Ohine •• Oentral Go?ernment to eng.s. 
influenuiel i.pene •••• poli'icsl. fin.aolsl en4 militery 
edviser.; 
2~ the Oblat •• Gev.ras.D' to grent the J.pe •••• 
hospit.l •• ' •• pl •• ·.nd 8chools in thl interior ot Cbine 
the right to own lend; 
3. In the tece ot meny police disputes which 
h8ve hitherto ar~.en between Japan and Ohina., oBusing 
no little annoyanoG, the police in localities (in 
China), where s~ch errangementsere necessary, to be 
placed ~der ~o1nt J8penes8 end Chinese 8dminiatret10n, 
or Japenes. to be •• ploy.din police offices in such 
localitie., ao .. to help at the same time the improve-
oent of the Chine •• Polic. Service, 
4. Chin. to obt.ln fro. Japan supply of 8 
certain quantity ot aras, or to eatablish an arsenal 
in China under ~oint Japane.8 end Chinese management 
and to be suppli.d with experts and materials trom 
Japenl 
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5. In o"er to help the development of the Nencbeng-
K1uk1ens Re1lwa7. with which, Jap8nese cepitaUets ere 
so clo.ely~d.n'it1ed. end with due 'r~gerd to the 
negoti8tions wh10h Q8V. tor y.a~s been pend1ng between 
Jepen end ow.ne,J.n relation to the reilwBY question in 
South Ob1n' t O~a to .sr •• to give to Japen the right 
4p ."'",. 
of constructing • reliw8Y to oonnect Wucheng with the 
Kiuld&D.I-Ianchang 11~ ••. and e1ao the reilw,ys between 
Noncheng a~4 He~ohou ,nd betwten Nsnoheng and OhaoohouI 
o. In v1.v ot .he relet10ns between ~he Province 
Qt iUk1en and .O~.. and of the agreement respecting 
the non-el1eD8tion of that province, Japan to be 
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consulted first wbenever foreign capitol is needed in 
connection with the reilweys. mines end harbour works 
(including dockyerda) in tbe Province of FukienJ 
7. China to grent to Jepenese subjects the 
riGht of preaching in Chine. 
B. COOftEl-PliOJBCf 01 THE CHINESE GOVE1~Ti-1ENTt HANDED 
TO MR BIOKI ON JEBRUARY 12, 1915. 
(J)pen ••• Trenslation) 
Group I 
Tb. GoT.ma.nta of China .nd Jepen, being sincerely 
desirous to m.tnt.in th.'ganere1 pesce of the Fer Eest 
and further -'rengthen the friendly relations end good 
" .' 
neighborboo4 .ub.i.ting between the two countries, 
have conclude' the'following erticlesl 
ARTICLE II the Ohine.e Government declare thet 
they viII gi.e tull •••• nt to the dispositions that mey 
hereafter be .pe.a upon between the Japanese and Germen 
Government. in reg8rd to ell interests which GermeQY 
possesses in the Province of Shantung by virtue ot 
trestie8 or reoorle4 ce... (excepting the provisions 
of Section 1 ot' the 'e;aonvention for the Leese ot Kieochou 
to Germ~). 
The Japane •• Government declare that, when the 
assent of the Chinese Government in regard to the 
interests above ret.rred to hes been given, Japan will 
restore K1eochou to Cb1n., end they recognize the right 
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of the Chine.e Government to pert1cipste 1n the negotiations 
mentioned in the preceding clause between the Jspenese 
and German Government •• 
ARTICLE 11. !he Jepenese Government sgree that 
they will be entirely responsible in regard to indemni-
fication for 108.e. Of all kinds 9c~8sioned by Japan's 
milit8r.J operations 1n K180chou; end although the 
Customs, telepepha 8na. poata witb1n the lee-Dad terri-
tory of K1.ochou will, peo41Dg the restoration of 
K!sochou, beedm1n1at,r.ed tor the present 8a heretofore, 
the mil1t8rJ r81lW818 end t.l'sreJbs which were con-
structed for the u.e of the Japanese troops will be 
imtledietely re.oved, .ad the Jepeneae forces remaining 
outside tb. 1 •••• ' terr1torl of K1eochou will first be 
withdrawn .~ the t1meof the restoration of Kieochou to 
Chine. 
~IOlii Ill. ID oe •• the Chinese Government 
propose the ••• lv.. to oonstruot 9 railway from Chefoo 
end ~lni'Ou to 0000.0' w1th the K1eochou-~sin8n i8ilw87 
end reia •• to~11D loaD t9r the p~oae. they agree, 
provide' G.erraeny 1a wil11nc to abandon the right to 
furnish cepitel fo~ the Ohefoo-Woihsien line, to 
nCGot1ete first witbJspenes8 capitalists. 
A.R!ICLE IV. !he Ohine.. GoverruDent 96ree, tor 
purposes of toreigntre4e. to select suitable plece. 
in the Province ot Sh8atung .• nd. open tbem es marts, 
3nd the regul.t10ni rel,ting to such merts will be 
determined by Ohina h.rself. 
Group II. 
!he Jepeae.e Goyeraaent aeclare that they will 
elweys re.pentbe 00.,1.,. .."ereign~ of Chine in 
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the Three Ba.'.n Prodacest end eocordingly the Ohinese 
end Jepene.. Gc;"eftlmenta h ...... vi th e View to the 
developmento~ 'heir ooamerc1el re18t1ons in the southern 
portion of the· Three· •• 'era Provinces t agreed upon the 
following .rtic1e'l 
A:B.!IOL'l I. ~. ·Chin •• e Government egxaee thst the 
term of 1 •••• of PO" ~hU1' end D81ren sbell be exten-
ded to Diaet1-Dlae 7 •• r8. expiring in tbe eigbty-sixth 
ye.r of the Republic or in the year 1997 of the Cbristi&n 
era, en4 that the tt.e for the reatoretion of the entire 
South la~chur1. Reil~ to Ohiae shsll be extended to 
ninet7~.7*.r.t talling due in the ninetieth ~.r of 
the lepubl10 or iD the 1 •• r 200% of the Christian ere, 
end further th.t in ell other metters the provisions ot 
=---
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the respective originsl treaties shall be adhered to. 
~ICLE 11. Tbe Chinese Government consent, upon 
the expiration ot the term of the Japanese management 
o! the Antung-Hukden Bel1w'7, to negotiate with Japan 
respeeting the •• naer ot ext~d1ng the said term eud 
to continue to carry into effect ell other provision. 
according to ~. VI of the ADn.x to the Agreement 
relating to HBaohur1e conclu4e4 between Jspen and Chine. 
~ICLE Ill. ~e Chinese Government shell select 
places, in ad41tion to the m •• t_ alreedy opened. in 
the ~bree E •• t.~ Provinces end of their own accord open 
them to tr.4e. and at_er tixing tbe b0unQ81" linea, 
permit merchents or Japan and other countr1es free17 to 
reside t tr.'., end o.~ on oommercial end industri&l 
business ot,811 kinds, .nd elso to rent lend. sfter fair 
negotiet1on w1~h the r .. ap.ot1ve owners of such lend with 
regard to rental. tor the ereotion of buildings required 
for commercial end induatriel purposes. Such merchants, 
bowever, BAell equ8111 P&l texea ond contributions 
imposed upon ~hem. 
A~ICL& IV. It, not l&ter than one full yea~ trom 
the 481 on which the pre.ent Agreement is Signed, euy 
Jopenese a7Qdioete de.ires to engage in mining in the 
sOU.tA~ portlon of the ~hre. Eflstern Provinces, the 
Chinese Government shall consent to grant to such 
syndicvte for the term otone year only the privilege 
of prospecting mines in thet region with the exception 
of those on which prospecting or mining hes already 
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been commenced. Ot the mines which have been examined, 
perwission ahell be granted to work one-helf the number 
8ccording to the provisions of the Chinese t·a.ning Law; 
gnd the remaining mines shell be disposed of by China 
herself. 
~ICLE V. The Chinese Government ogree that if 
it is found nece.eery hereefter to construct railways 
in the southern portion ol the Three Eastern Provinces, 
they will construct them with c&pital provided by Chine 
herseU, end. it foreign cepital is required, they will 
first negotiate for 8 l08n with Japanese capitalists. 
ARTIOLE VI •. the Ohine.e Government declare that 
if it is propo.ea hereefter to employ toreign advisers 
in regard to politicsl, tinencial, end militory 8ffelrs 
of the southern portion of the Three Eastern ~rovinces, 
preferenoe will be given to Jepenese. 
ARTICLE VII. The existing trestiies between Chine 
and Jspau in reserd to the ~hree Eestern Provinces 
shall remein in tore •• a heretofore except as otherwise 
provided tor in the pre.ent Agreement. 
Group III 
Notes to be 4xchenged Respecting the HDn-Yeh-P1ng 
COlllpeny. 
As the H.en-Yeh-Ping OOlDpeny, being B Chinese com-
raercis1 concern. hee undoubtedly, aocording to the 
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laws of China, the right to preserve its property eod 
conduct end supervise its business, the Chinese Govern-
ment do not find it proper to take measure immediately 
in its behelf without first consulting the Oomp8~. 
If, however, the Co.p.~ desires on e future oc08sion 
to come to esree.ant with Jepanese cspitelists for the 
joint men.ge.ant ot ita present business, the Cbinese 
Government will give permi8sion in so far ss such step 
does not confliot with the lew. of the country. 
c. EXCHANGE ca 10'lli2 BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAlI RESP .c;cTING 
Tm.; RESTORATION OF THE LKASED TERRIroRY OF UAOCHOW 
BAY, OF MAY 25, 1915. 
(Japane.e text) 
Peking, Hey 25. 1915. 
~~ns1eur Le M1n1.~r •• 
In the DBme ot the Iaperiel Government, I heve 
the honour to lIleke the following declaretion to your 
Excellency'. Goyernmentt 
It, upon the conclusion ot the present war, the 
J~panese Government ahould be given 8n absolutely 
tree dispo89l of the le8s.d territory of Kiaochou Bey, 
they will return the said leased territory to Chins 
subject to the following conditionsl 
1. Opening ot the whole of Kieo-obou 88 commercial 
port, 
2. Establishment of • Jepenese settlement in the 
loc.lity to be des1sn-te4 by the Jepeneae Govern-
ment, 
;. Esteblishment, it desired by the Powers, of en 
intern.t1on.l .ettle.ent, 
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4. Arrengements to be made. before the return of the 
se14 territory 1s eftected, between the Japenese 
end Ohineae Goyern •• nts. with respect to the 
disp08e,l td aerun public establishments end 
properties end with ressrd 1;,0 the other conditions 
snd proce,dures. 
I evail. eto. 
(Signed) Eld. Hiold 
Ilia Excellencl 
I'Jr Lu Cheng-Ha1eng. 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
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(Chinece text) 
Pek1ng. Iley 25. 1915 
Excellency. 
In the .eme ot Ja'1 Government r b»ve the honour to 
ru£)l~e the following 4ecler,t,ion to the Chinese Govern-
Llcnt: 
When, after the terminetiQn of the present war, 
tho leased territo,ry ~ K1eochQw Ec.<y 1s completely left 
to the free disposel ot Japan, the,Japanese Government 
will restore the •• id l .... d territory to Chine under 
, , 
the following co~d1tioD8' 
" . 
1., The whole ot K1eochow ~y to be opened ~s 9 
Commerciel Port. 
2. A conce.sion under the exclusive jurisdiction of 
Japan to b. ..tablish.d et 8 piece designated by 
the Jepan •• e Gov.rnment. 
,. If the foreign Powers desire it, en international 
conce~.1on .. y be e.teb11sh&d. 
4. As regard.t~. dispose; to be mDde of the buildings 
end properties of Germeny end the conditions Bnd 
procldure reiating thereto, tbeJapenese Go~rnment 
&n4 the Cbi.~a.: Govaruellt, shaU arrengi the matter 
by autu •• 8peUl-.t ''before the r~storet1o~ 
I evsil, etc. 
(Signed) Hiok! Ek1 
His Excellencl 
Lou ~.eDs-~.i.ngt MiDister of Hore1gn Aftsira. 
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APPENDIX V 
SII;O-JlI.PANESE AGREEY~lT OF SEPrEI-IDER 24. 1918, WITH 
REGARD fO SHANTUNG· 
Tile Jopanese l'dnister of Foreign Affairs (Goto) to the 
Chinese ~1inister in Jepen (Cheng fsung-hsie.ng) 
Tokyo, September 24, 1918 
Sirs In view of the neighbourly feelings of 
friendship between our two countries, the Government of 
Japan, being desirous of errenging matters in a spirit 
of llS1'ltlOIlY, be8 dreWD up en egreement which it regards 
es e setis!ectory settlement ot all outstanding questions 
relating to the Province of Shentung, aud I now heve the 
honour to bring thi s propossl to the notice of your 
~ ~ 
GOVC:r"Illaent. The terms of the proposed agreement ere 
es follows. 
1. All Jepenese troops stationed slonG the 
,." 
Baentung a.i1wey - with the exception of one Company 
which will be left et 'rainen - will be withdrew to 
~13ingteo. 
• Foreign Relations ot the United St8tes, 1919, Vol. It 
pp. 571-72. (Included in the dispatch from the 
Minister in Chin. ( Rein.ch) to the Acting Secretery 
of Stete, No. 2534.-Peking, Februery 20, 1919.) 
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2. The Chinese Gov.ernment may est8blish 9 Police 
1'orce \ihich shell take over the du.ty of guercli!lG the 
rcllwoy. 
3. ~he Administration of the She~tul1G Railwey 
~hell set eside • sufficient sum to meet the expenses 
of the l'o110e P'oJ."Oe. 
4. J8paneae subjects ere to be employed et the 
Headquarters of this Police Force and at ell important 
stGtions end in the Police ~re1ning SChool. 
5. Among the emplo1.es of the Shantung RBilwey 
posts shall be g~ven to Chinese subjects also. 
6. l~ter it hes been ~ef1n1tely decided to whom 
the Shantung Rsilwey ia to belong the rr:ilwvy is to be 
placed under the joint m8nagement of China end Jvpen. 
? The Civil A4mini.tret1on Offices now in 
existence ere to be ebolished. 
I heve the honour to request thet you will com-
uunicete to me the views of your Government ~dth regard 
to the above proposel. 
I hev. (etc.) BARON GO~O 
~he Chinese Minister in Jepen (Cheng Tsunc-hsieng) to 
the J-DpEJneSe M1u8ter ~or Yoreign AffQirs (Goto) 
Tokyo, undated 
Sir': I hIve the honour to acknowledge receipt ot 
your letter couched in the following terms: 
(Quotes in tull letter trom Minister for Foreign 
Affairs ot September 24. 1918.) 
I b.e.ve the honour to inform you that the Govern-
Dent ot Chine accepts with pleasure the proposal con-
tained in th'e letter quoted .bove. 
I have (etc.) 
Seel of Cbsng Tsung Raiang 
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AP~ V~ 
WIi APBII. W~LE~1Jf.!W 
~he formula decided upon by the represeutotives 
o£ ~eri~5. Britain, Jsp&n. and F~~nce on April 30th. 
1919. regfJ.-d1lli 1ille Shentuna province ws., 
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'~he pelic1 of Jap8~ ia to bend b~ck the Shantung 
~~ninsul. 1n full sover~1satl of China, reta1uing only 
tue economio pr1v1le,e$ grented to Ger~ny and the 
ribht to establ1sh • aettlement under the usual con-
Jitions et ~81D&t.o.· 
'The owners of the railway will use special 
police only to ensure .eQur1ty for tr~!fic. They will 
be use' tor no other purpose.' 
.~. police ~o~e will be composed of Chinese. 
snd such Japaneae, 1natr~ctor8 S8 the airectors of the 
reilwB¥ m51 select will be 8ppo~ted 01 the Chinese 
Gove~8Ilt. ' 
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APPENDIX VII 
T~:"'~l.iI'Y OF aAQE B;&IWED !HE ALLIED ABD A8S00IAfl POWERS 
AND,· .gwn. Jt!NI 28. 1219 
Article 156. 
Germany r~ounc.. in I.vour of Jepin, ell her 
rights. vitle'nd privileges - pert1cularly those COD-
cerning tbe territo17 ot ,iA..eochow, nUwe;ys. mines end 
subm&rine Ofbles - which she ecquired 1n virtue of the 
Treety ooncluded by h.. vi ta Ohine OD &rch 6, 1898, 
and of ell other • .raag.aents J:G18tlvG to the liTov1nce 
of ~bentung. 
All GerJUll rigata ~n tile Wa1ngbeo-!.fainen:f:u Ba11w81, 
1ncluc1ing 1t. breacA Unee.: iJogetb.er nth 1ts eubaidi817' 
propert7 of .811 k1ada, et.'iqne. shope. fixed end 
rollina .tock, mines, plants end meter1s1 for the 
exploitation of t5he miu •• e" and rell8in acquired b, 
Jepen .. toge*b.eJ: wtth .11< alhws endprinleges ettaching 
thereto. 
The. GeJ:1l9D. a •••• aub .. rlne oobles from Tningteo 
to 0henghei and from !s1ngtso to Chefoo, with 011 the 
l·il.;hts, privileges end properties attachinG thereto, 
e~c sim11arlJ acquired by Japan, free end cleer of ell 
cbarges and enouabr •• c •••. 
442 
Article 157. 
~he movable and lmmov8ble property owned by the 
Ger~n Stet. ia .he terr~.o~7 of Kiaochow, 8s well 8S 
sll ·che rights wbioh QermaB7 might claim in consequence 
of tae works or improvements made or of the expense. 
incurred b7 h.~t 41zee.17 or indirectly, in connection 
'With this terr1to~ •• :pe ~nd re_in ecquired by Jepen. 
froe and cl.er or ell cherge. end encumbrences. 
Article 158. 
Geruny sbell han4 over .0 Jep8n vi thin three 
~onths from the coming in.. to~ of the present 
Treaty the .roM", ••• "patent pleDs, title deede, end 
documents of every ld.ad, .a'«er they may be, relating 
to the 8dm1n1.~tlont whe1ihel' civil, military, 
financial, judioial or other, or ~he territory of 
Kisochow. 
lii thin the .8me period Germen;y shell give pert1-
culars 1;. J.pe.n.o1 all '~t1.s, errengements or agree-
ments relating to 'he ~ight.t title or privileges referred 
to in the no preoe41D6 Aniele •• 
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